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Although it is a fundamental principle of insolvency law that all creditors are treated 
equally (the par! passu principle), in practice this principle is subject to a number of 
important exceptions. The principal exceptions are the respective rights of secured 
creditors, preferential creditors, landlords and execution creditors. The body of work 
contains a number of peer refereed articles in all these areas, in relation to both corporate 
and individual insolvency. In additional to an historical approach and a doctrinal 
approach, certain parts of the body of work also contain theoretical discussions and some 
empirical research. A number of the articles being submitted have been the subject of 
many citations by learned authors in the area. In addition one article has been cited by 
the New Zealand High Court and the New Zealand Law Commission has quoted from 
another article. The body of work is original in that it contains new ideas or views 
matters with a new approach. 
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Commentary 
The overriding purpose of the collected publications was to consider the rights held by 
different types of creditors upon the insolvency of a debtor. It has long been an interest 
of the candidate that rights of different types of creditor in formal insolvency procedures 
vary so much. Whenever specific rights of certain types of creditors are analysed by 
government or other committees, it is rare that those creditors' rights are considered in 
the context of insolvency law. Similarly, when insolvency law is considered by official 
bodies, the individual rights of different types of creditors are not usually looked at in any 
detail. When one considers that the main thing a creditor is interested in is getting paid, 
no matter what the circumstances of the debtor may become, this is an area requiring 
greater consideration. 
The research methodology of the published material was in general limited to historical 
and doctrinal analysis but also included an element of empirical work and theoretical 
discussion (in the works on preferential creditors). 
In this commentary it is proposed to deal with the published works on a subject by 
subject basis. Where a particular article has been cited elsewhere (to the knowledge of 
the candidate), such citations are noted. 
The starting point will be an explanation of the work done in the area of secured 
creditors' interests. This will concentrate on the research covering unincorporated 
lending and, in the modem context, more importantly, the most common corporate 
lending mechanisms of fixed and floating charges. 
The next type of creditor to be considered will be the preferential creditor. Although the 
passing of the Enterprise Act 2002 has greatly reduced the current importance of this 
research, the published works in this area appear to have been well received and have 
added to the debate. 
A landlord has a number of rights peculiar to his or her status. Arguably the most 
controversial of these rights is the power to distrain for unpaid rent. The published works 
consider the nature of this right and how it operates in the formal insolvency of a debtor. 
The final type of creditor considered is the execution creditor. As will be seen, the 
doctrinal investigation of the rights of an execution creditor in the insolvency of a debtor 
shows up a wide discrepancy as to the creditor's rights, depending upon what type of 
execution is employed, and what type of formal insolvency procedure the debtor has 
entered. 
Note regarding co-authored works. The list of published works contains materials co- 
written with Roger Gregory and Andrew Keay. Some explanation of the respective input 
of the candidate and co-authors is required by the University's Regulations. I have 
enjoyed the rare privilege of co-writing with two such able and well known academics. 
The input of the co-authors, although not capable of exact quantification, was, in the 
opinion of all the parties involved, equal. 
The way in which Roger and myself approached o' ur research was a little different to the 
modus adopted by Andrew and myself. In terms of working with Roger, we adopted a 
not altogether efficient approach of both reading everything either of us could find, 
meeting to plan the various articles, and generally sitting together to draft the pieces. 
Working with Andrew was a little more efficient in that we met to devise how we would 
approach the research and then effectively split the main tasks between us so that we each 
took primary responsibility for particular matters prior to meeting up to complete jointly, 
a final edit. The empirical research we undertook involved us jointly brainstorming the 
issues we wanted to look at, and then jointly drafting the questionnaire. Wemetto 
analyse the results jointly. 
Secured Creditors' Interests 
Articles 
"Fixed Charges over Changing Assets - the Possession and Control Heresy" (1998) 2 
CfiLR 68-87 Co-author Roger Gregory (hereafter referred to as "Heresy") 
"Book debt charges - the saga goes on" (1999) 115 LQR 14-17 Co-author Roger Gregory 
(hereafter referred to as "Saga")2 
"Book Debt Charges: Following Yorkshire Woolcombers - Are We Sheep Gone Astray? " 
[2000] Insolvency Lawyer 157- 168 Co-author Roger Gregory (hereafter referred to as 
"Sheep")3 
"Partnership Floating Charges - Opening a Can of Wonns? " (2000) 4 RALQ 241-262 
(hereafter referred to as "Worms") 
"Fixed and Floating Charges -A Revelation" [200 1] LMCLQ 123 -149 Co-author Roger 
Gregory (hereafter referred to as "Revelation")4 
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Commentary 
My former mentor and colleague Roger Gregory and I have long considered the accepted 
wisdom on fixed and floating charges to be fundamentally flawed. We were both weened 
on Professor Pennington's seminal article "The Genesis of the Floating Charge" and 
whilst accepting most of the points made therein, felt that there was more to be found. It 
has always seemed to both of us that the idea that "fixed" security should by definition 
cause paralysis of a business was somewhat illogical. It is generally accepted that a 
company whose assets are subject to fixed security can deal with those assets, only if it 
obtains the consent of the security holder for each individual dealing. A general licence 
given to the company to deal with the fixed charge property is not possible. This 
restrictive approach to freedom of contract seemed to us unjustified and so, armed with a 
copy of Holroyd v Marshall we decided to look more deeply into the question. 
Our initial researches were essentially historical in that we wanted to look at what the 
position was regarding consensual security mechanisms prior to the invention of the 
floating charge. We concentrated on the requirement in the modem book debt cases that 
the debenture holder must control the bank account into which the book debt proceeds are 
paid, in order for the security to be fixed in nature. In the Heresy, we traced a good deal 
of case law involving unincorporated secured borrowing and found an enormous amount 
of authority which states that for mortgage security over changing personalty, there has 
never been a requirement in equity for the mortgagee to have possession or control over 
the mortgaged assets. In equity, a mortgage of future personalty attaches to mortgaged 
assets the moment those assets come into existence. No further conveyance or act, such 
as taking possession, is needed to obtain a good equitable title. 
The purported need to show possession of charged assets has been discounted in some of 
the leading modem cases but the same judges do require control of the bank account 
when it comes to fixed charges over book debts. In the Heresy, we considered how 
mortgages of, for example, book debts and stock in trade, in the unincorporated sector 
never required any element of control or possession and that this requirement was only 
introduced in the cases dealing with corporate lending. To some extent, the problems 
thrown up by the Bills of Sale Acts, which were, it appears, at least partly responsible for 
the introduction of the equitable charge, caused some confusion at the same time that the 
floating charge was being adopted. The courts never expressly addressed whether a 
security document drafted on the one hand, as a mortgage, or on the other, as a charge, 
would have made any difference. The modem tendency to view charges and mortgages 
as the same thing, is legally unsound and leads to potentially vague and generalised 
interpretations of carefully drafted documents. We wonder whether, if the modem courts 
had to construe a nineteenth century precedent mortgage bill of sale, they would follow 
the old authorities or reassess it in light of the modem authorities. 
P Watts "The Rending of Charges" (2002) 118 LQR 1,3; D Capper "Fixed Charges Over Book Debts - Back to Basics but How Far Back? " [20021 LMCLQ 246,247. 
An important and related point is that the modem courts have insisted, that if the chargor 
company has a power to deal with charged assets without the necessity of acquiring 
individual chargee consent, the charge cannot be fixed and must float. In the Heresy, we 
give a number of clear examples of mortgage bills of sale where a power to deal is 
perfectly acceptable. Although we identify considerable conflicts between the 
unincorporated and corporate case law on securities, we were at this time unable to find 
exactly how and when these inconsistencies came about. Crucially, our understanding of 
Florence Land at this time was incomplete and it was not until we wrote Revelation that 
all the parts fell into place. 
The main theme that possession or control should not be a requirement for a fixed charge 
was taken up in Sheep. Although we were firmly of the view that possession or control 
should not be necessary and that a power to deal with secured assets could be express or 
implied, the one main authority against us, in a corporate context, is Re Yorkshire 
Woolcombers. In order to convince the reader that we had a valid point, we decided to 
dissect this case and highlight how each individual basic tenet of it was, in law, 
misconceived. An appendix of cases attached to the end of the article was intended to 
persuade the reader that there is far more authority against Woolcombers than there is in 
support of it. Perhaps the most important point made here is that Farwell J, at first 
instance, insists upon chargee possession for the existence of a fixed charge. His 
Lordship cites no authority for this proposition but it appears to have been accepted 
without demur by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. It is particularly difficult 
to reconcile the majority decision in Tailby with the decision in Yorkshire. 
The Saga looks at three cases circa 1998 and highlights the problems faced by the courts 
at this time, in establishing the boundaries between fixed and floating charges. The 
amount of control or the nature of the restrictions necessary to establish a security as a 
fixed charge remained at this time uncertain, largely due to the obvious contradictions 
between some of the modem cases and some older and more considered decisions such as 
Holroyd. 
The matter which had always caused us the most concern, and to which no adequate 
explanation had been offered by anyone, was how could the modem cases be so 
obviously at odds with the older authorities. Something happened in the mid to late 
nineteenth century which caused the courts suddenly to refuse to recognise fixed security 
with chargor possession and a power to deal. In order to track down this "holy grail" we 
decided to re-read all the cases we had looked at. The origins of the floating charge were 
reasonably explicable and comprehensible, but the sudden adoption of the view that fixed 
security caused paralysis of the business appears first in Sir George Jessel's judgment in 
Re Florence Land. It would seem highly unlikely that such a brilliant Chancery judge 
would have got it wrong, but it is not readily apparent what authority his Lordship was 
relying on for his decision. The answer to this conundrum came by re-reading some of 
the common law decisions on future property mortgages. 
We had not paid much attention to these before because we were aware that the common 
law cases were against the future property mortgage with power to deal and we were 
primarily interested in equity's approach. On looking again at Graham v Chapman, it 
immediately bore comparison with the language used by Jessel. On further examination, 
it became tolerably clear that the reasoning in Graham, a bankruptcy case, had been 
imported into company liquidation law, by s 10 of the Judicature Act. Although Graham 
itself was not a popular decision, it was law at the time of Florence Land and this is 
where the idea that fixed security caused paralysis came from. Graham was shortly 
thereafter overruled, but in the corporate sector, the idea of fixed charges with a power to 
deal being a conceptual impossibility had taken off. The reasoning in Graham is 
inconsistent with a vast number of cases decided in equity and this is why the modem 
case law, whose lineage is traceable from Florence Land through Yorkshire to the 
modem decision of Brumark, is doctrinally inaccurate. 
One interesting theme which runs through the whole of the area of creditor interests in 
insolvency is the effect of slO of the Judicature Act. Its impact on fixed and floating 
charges appears never to have been recognised and, as will be demonstrated later, its 
impact upon the rights of preferential creditors, landlords and execution creditors was 
also significant. 
The other article in this area, Worms, considers what the effect is likely to be of the Law 
Commission's proposal to create a new type of registered partnership and to exempt this 
new business medium from the provisions of the Bills of Sale Acts. The Law 
Commission is of the view that such a new type of partnership would choose to create 
floating charges, which undoubtedly it could. The suggestion in the article is that a 
partnership, freed from the restrictions of the Bill of Sale Acts, would provide a more 
effective security for a debenture holder by executing an old style mortgage bill of sale 
rather than a floating charge. The mortgage has any number of precedents dating from 
the nineteenth century and arguably should not be subject to the vagaries of the modem 
corporate case law on fixed and floating security. If this did occur, it would potentially 
re-ignite the debate which took place around a century ago, as to whether = all 
encompassing type of security over future property should be permitted. It is certainly 
not easy to put forward arguments based upon fairness to creditors to justify the existence 
of such security devices. 
Preferential Creditors 
Articles 
"The Preferential Debts Regime in Liquidation Law: In the Public Interest? " (1999) 3 
CfiLR 84-105 Co-author Andrew Keay (hereafter referred to as "Public Interesl', )5 
5 Cited in the New Zealand Law Commission Paper "Priority Debts in the Distribution of Insolvent Estates 
(An Advisory Report to the Ministry of Commerce) October 1999 NZLC SP2 at 27,28; G McCormack 
"The Priority of Secured Credit: an Anglo-American Perspective" [2003] 1131,389,393; J Lee Suet Lin 
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(2002) 23 Company La"er 84; ;R Mokal "Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth" (2001) 60 CLJ 
581 at 581,582,585,586,590,591,596,606,609,612,614,615,618; A Walters "Round Up: Corporate 
"Preferential Debts: An Empirical Study" (1999) Insolvency Lawyer 112-118 Co-author 
Andrew Keay (hereafter referred to as "Empirical Stud)ý 9)6 
Commentary 
The purpose of this research was to consider generally the preferential debts regime. 
Although there was a certain amount of pre-existing comment on the system, it mostly 
considered only certain aspects of the preferential debts system. Our intention with this 
study was to look at preferential debts from an historical, doctrinal, policy and empirical 
perspective. Although some other commentators had looked at policy arguments for and 
against the system, there was surprisingly not much said about the history of the regime. 
Similarly, no-one had attempted to assess the impact of the regime on practical day to day 
insolvencies. 
The results of our research were not quite as self evident as may have been thought. 
The history of the preferential debts regime begins with the Crown prerogative. In the 
bankruptcy of an individual, the Crown's rights would generally prevail over those of the 
bankrupt's other unsecured creditors. As long as the Crown claimed its rights prior to the 
formal assignment of the bankrupt's assets to the assignee in bankruptcy, the Crown, not 
being subject to the Bankruptcy Act's doctrine of relation back, would take priority. 
There is some evidence from the early nineteenth century that the courts would go out of 
their way to prevent the Crown succeeding in such claims by ordering the assignment at 
very short notice. Until 1883, the Crown was not stated to be bound by the terms of the 
Bankruptcy Act and therefore could in theory ignore its provisions. The Crown's rights 
had been cut down by the Bankruptcy Acts of 1849 and 1869, and these restrictions 
appear to have been accepted by the Crown even though no express mention was made 
therein as to the binding effect on the Crown. 
Under the Companies Act 1862, again no mention was made as to any of the restrictions 
on actions against the company in liquidation being binding upon the Crown. Section 10 
of the Judicature Act 1875 provided that "the same rules shall prevail and be observed as 
to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors" in the liquidation of 
companies as existed in the bankruptcy of individuals. The courts seem to have ignored 
this provision in liquidation. Even the very clear wording of later statutory amendments 
was overlooked. It was not until 1922 that the courts finally accepted that the Crown's 
rights in liquidation were to some extent abrogated. 
Insolvency" (2000) 21 Company Lawyer 262; A Walters "Round Up: Corporate Finance and Receivership" 
(1999) 20 Company Lawyer 324; V Finch Corporate Insolvency Law Perspectives and Principles 2002 
Cambridge at 430,436; 1 Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, Yd ed, 2002, Sweet and Maxwell at 660; V Finch and S Worthington "The Pari Passu Principle and Ranking Restitutionary Rights, " Chapter I in 
Francis Rose (editor), Restitution and Insolvency, Mansfield Press, 2000 at 4 and 6. 6 Cited in V Finch Corporate Insolvency Law Perspectives and Principles 2002 Cambridge at 428,430, 432. 
From the Companies Act 1929 up to the Cork recommendations being put into effect, the 
Crown (and other public bodies) slowly had their preferential rights extended. These 
were reduced markedly following Cork. At the time of the drafting of the two articles 
included in this publication, the Crown's preferential rights had begun to expand again. 
Now, of course, the Crown has lost its preferential status entirely under the Enterprise 
Act 2002. 
The preferential status of employees was introduced into England and Wales in 1825 and 
remained a valuable claim up until recent times. The current financial limit of L800, in 
modem times, is frequently only a small fraction of what an employee is actually owed 
by an insolvent employer. This shortfall is to some extent made up from claiming against 
the National Insurance Fund. The arguments for protecting employees from the 
insolvency of employers are just as strong today as they were in 1825. With the 
protection afforded by the Employment Rights Act, the status of employees as 
preferential creditors would seem to be a needless additional protection. This is 
especially so, when one considers that the government has a right of subrogation from the 
employees' preferential claim for any National Insurance Fund payments made. 
The fundamental policy underpinning insolvency law ofparipassu treatment for 
unsecured creditors is ignored by the preferential debts regime. 
In considering the Crown's preferential status, in the Public Interest, we considered 
arguments in favour of the Crown's rights being retained. These arguments are based 
upon the related ideas that the Crown is an involuntary creditor and that debts owed to it 
are debts owed to the community at large. 
Against retention of such rights it is argued that debts owed to the public exchequer are 
insignificant compared to the total government income. The Crown, with its potentially 
detailed knowledge of a particular debtor, is arguably in a better position to protect itself 
than ordinary trade creditors. Contrary to accepted wisdom on the subject, 82% of the 
insolvency practitioners surveyed, did not believe that the Crown's preferential status 
made it less likely to initiate winding up proceedings. If the preferential creditors sit back 
and take no action against insolvent companies, unsecured trade creditors are unlikely to 
do so themselves, as such action may be viewed as throwing good money after bad, 
especially if the preferential creditors are likely to reap the rewards. The economic 
arguments against the Crown's preferential status are also arguably strong. Insolvency 
procedures may be completed more quickly and cheaply in the absence of a requirement 
to set aside funds for preferential creditors. Rescue may be more likely. The government 
itself accepted that its status did not encourage rescue of ailing businesses, as it set up a 
joint body of various government agencies to co-ordinate how best to recover Crown 
preferential debt. More funds would be available to unsecured creditors, and banks 
would spend less time and energy trying to draft or operate security devices taking 
priority over preferential creditors. On a more basic level there is a strong instinctive 
argument that the Crown's preferential rights are just unfair. 
The Empirical Study led to a number of fairly clear conclusions. Over three quarters of 
the respondents believed that the Crown's priority diminished the possibility of rescue. 
Well over half of the respondents believed the Crown had a policy of voting against 
rescue packages. Due to the frequently poor financial results for unsecured creditors of 
an insolvent liquidation, a majority of respondents felt that creditor discontent was high. 
It is interesting to note that Parliament has now decided to abolish the Crown's 
preferential status. The suggestion made in the Empirical Study that Cork's 10% fund 
should be resurrected, has also been taken up by Parliament. 
Landlords' Distress 
Articles 
"The Landlord, his Distress, the Insolvent Tenant and the Strangee, (2000) 16 Insolvency 
Law and Practice 47-53 (hereafter referred to as "the Stranger"f 
"Landlord's Distress - Past Its Sell By Date? " [2000] Conv 508-527 (hereafter referred to 
as "Sell By Date") 
Commentary 
The purpose of the research on landlord's distress was to attempt to provide a reasonably 
comprehensive historical and doctrinal explanation of the remedy generally and how it 
operates in an insolvency context and, in addition, to consider its future in light of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
Sell By Date is designed to give an exposition of how the remedy of distress originated 
and developed over the centuries. It tells the story of how in pre-Norman times the 
remedies available to a landlord were fairly limited and so, distress became a necessity in 
order to balance fairly the respective rights of the landlord and tenant. This remedy was 
initially subject to the jurisdiction of the courts but it soon became possible for a landlord 
to distrain without the formality of obtaining the consent of his own court. As time 
progressed, the potentially draconian power became subject to a number of statutory 
restrictions. Eventually the balance was perceived to have shifted too far in favour of the 
tenant and the landlord was then accorded further rights, most importantly the right to sell 
the goods distrained. This right to sell the distrained goods had an impact on third parties 
in that, because in theory all goods on the tenanted premises could be distrained, innocent 
third parties could have their goods seized and sold without even being aware of the 
distress. The end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries aw some useful, but 
potentially flawed, protection for third party goods being introduced. 
On top of all the piecemeal statutory amendments made over the years, a welter of case 
law grew up under which complex procedural rules and rules as to what goods were 
7V Finch Corporate Insolvency Law Perspectives and Principles 2002 Cambridge at 29 1; M Wilkins "The 
paripassu principle and human rights legislation" (2000) 16 Insolvency Law and Practice 93. 
privileged and which were not, acted to add to the general confusion. Sell By Date also 
considered how other jurisdictions have approached the remedy of distress. Most 
common law jurisdictions which have inherited the remedy have abolished it either 
completely or at least in relation to residential leases. 
At the time of drafting Sell By Date, no-one had hitherto considered how the Human 
Rights Act 1998 might affect the exercise of the remedy. This was examined and the 
views expressed appear to be bome out by Lightman J in Fuller v Happy Shopper Ltd 
[2001] 1 WLR 1681 at 1692 and Professor Beatson's Independent Review of Bailiff Law. 
It is certainly an anachronistic remedy and in the candidate's view would seem to have no 
place in a modem enforcement system. 
The Stranger built upon the general treatment of distress and considered how the remedy 
operated in formal insolvency procedures. As with most rights of enforcement, it is in 
how it stands up when the debtor is insolvent, that one sees its true strength. Parliament 
has tended to perpetuate the rather illogical rules which apply to landlords' distress in the 
Insolvency Act. Even if one accepts that there is a case for distress as a remedy, its 
capacity for sidestepping the paripassu rule is clear. Depending upon which insolvency 
procedure the tenant enters, the landlord's rights may either be quite impressive or 
illusory. As originally drafted the provisions of the Insolvency Act contained many 
illogical contradictions. Despite some amendments since the publication of the Stranger, 
there remain a number of questionable distinctions. We await further developments in 
this area but the Stranger suggests that following Parliament's decision to abolish the 
Crown's preferential status, there is no room left for a landlord to continue to be accorded 
a self help remedy which often operates to defeat the par! passu rule. 
The two articles on distress have hopefully added to the debate and highlighted a number 
of issues previously not fully considered elsewhere. The historical justifications for the 
remedy have been investigated, the discouraging complexities considered, the variable 
consequences in formal insolvency and the potential for attack under the Human Rights 
Act have been explained. 
Execution Creditors 
Article 
"Execution Creditors - (almost) the Last Rights in Insolvency" [2003] Common Law 
World Review 179-2 10 (hereafter referred to as "the Last Rights") 
Few people would argue that creditors should not be able to take security for their debts 
over the property of their debtors. There is clearly a lively debate as to what forms of 
security should be permitted and how they should operate, but in general, business 
activity would be made extremely difficult if lending could only be made on an 
unsecured basis. This is due, if nothing else, to the higher interest rates which would be 
payable on unsecured loans. 
Arguments in favour of the Crown maintaining its preferential status are harder to come 
by, and have now been found by Parliament to be less than convincing. A similar point 
could be made of a landlord's remedy of distress. It is difficult to justify the existence of 
such a remedy in modem times. It is an anachronism which arguably gives landlords an 
unfair advantage over a debtor tenant's other unsecured creditors. Both the Crown's 
preferential claim and a landlord's power to distrain are the necessary incidents of the 
respective creditors' status. The Crown was automatically a preferential creditor (at least 
regarding some types of debt). Once rent is late (at least under a commercial lease) the 
landlord's power to distrain arises automatically. No particular step or act is required to 
furnish the Crown or the landlord with these special claims. A similar point could be 
made of a creditor with the benefit of a retention of title clause. Once the contract is 
entered into, the creditor will always have the power to retrieve his or her goods if the 
contract price is not paid. 
Execution creditors are different. If an ordinary trade or other creditor is not paid, that 
creditor may decide to sue the debtor and obtain judgment. If the judgment is not 
satisfied, the creditor may then proceed to enforce the judgment by any of several modes 
of execution. The creditor is expending time and money in obtaining judgment and then 
executing it. It is arguable that this perseverance should be recognised by the courts and 
that such creditors deserve to be accorded some priority over other less active unsecured 
creditors. 
There are, somewhat surprisingly, few recent commentaries on the rights of execution 
creditors in the UK. Apart from the significant work by Hare and Milman there has been 
little in depth analysis of execution creditors' claims in the event of the insolvency of the 
judgment debtor. The purpose of the Last Rights was to consider again the rights created 
in favour of creditors with the benefit of an execution. Of particular interest was how 
such rights operated in formal insolvency procedures. Since the work of Hare and 
Milman the new procedures of administration and voluntary arrangements have been 
introduced. No-one appears to have analysed how the rights of execution creditors 
operate in these relatively modem procedures. 
The most interesting aspect of the Last Rights is the discussion as to what rights a creditor 
under a writ offlifa obtains and the suggestion that under the new third party debt order a 
creditor obtains no rights as a secured creditor. 
The effect of a writ offifa has long caused some confusion. The debate in the New 
Zealand Universities Law Review between Calnan and Blanchard highlights the problem. 
There is arguably authority for both the proposition that afifa creditor becomes a secured 
creditor and authority against such a proposition. The Last Rights attempts to reconcile 
these authorities by considering the era in which such cases were decided. The main 
House of Lords' authority against thefifa creditor becoming a secured creditor was 
decided at a time when the courts only recognised mortgages as consensual security 
devices. Mortgages by definition require a transfer of title to the mortgagee. Clearly, no 
title vests in afifa creditor upon the execution. Aftfa creditor does have the right to 
ensure that the sheriff seizes and sells the debtor's goods and pays the proceeds over to 
the creditor. This right is defeasible upon the payment of the debt by the judgment 
debtor. This bears some semblance to the classic definition of a charge. This is how the 
later cases in the nineteenth century characterise the rights of afifa creditor. The creditor 
has the benefit of a charge over the seized assets but not a mortgage. The difficult case 
law at the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries which attempt to 
explain what a floating charge is, have muddied the waters in this area. 
The consequences of being a secured creditor in liquidation and bankruptcy are hardly 
affected by such secured status due to overriding statutory provisions. Where such status 
is of more significance is in the operation of voluntary arrangements and to some extent 
administration. Very little consideration elsewhere has been given to this matter. 
The replacement of garnishee orders with third party debt orders has, it is argued in the 
Last Rights, led to a probably unintentional alteration to the execution creditor's rights. 
Under the garnishee scheme, despite some loose judicial phrasing, it was assumed that 
the execution creditor became a secured creditor. This was borne out in the wording of 
the relevant statutory instrument. The new statutory instrument dealing with third party 
debt orders has been drafted differently and it seems no longer converts the execution 
creditor into a secured creditor. 
The main conclusion drawn in the Last Rights was that the current review of enforcement 
procedures being undertaken by the Lord Chancellor is necessary but will not solve all 
the problems if enforcement is looked at in a vacuum. Some sensible liaison with the 
Department of Trade and Industry might prove productive in introducing some level of 
consistency, as to what rights execution creditors have, and how these are to be viewed in 
an insolvency context. 
Conclusion 
The various investigations into the varying rights of differing types of creditors in formal 
insolvency procedures show the law to be a maze if not a minerield. When one considers 
how long insolvency laws have existed and how long different types of creditor have 
claimed different priority rights, it is somewhat amazing that the law should be so 
complex and in places left substantially unchanged for long periods of time despite 
obvious general dissatisfaction. Since beginning this line of research, things have begun 
to move in the direction of the law being clarified. Although the candidate would argue 
that the Brumark decision is per incuriam it does at least give some clear guidance to 
legal advisers as to the nature of fixed and floating charges. The Crown's preferential 
status is going. Landlords are likely to have their right to distrain restricted in some way. 
The Lord Chancellor may tidy up the rights of execution creditors. The eventual 
emergence of administration almost as a kind of single gateway to corporate insolvency 
may bring more uniformity to creditors' rights. 
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FIXED CHARGES OVER CHANGING 
ASSETS-THE POSSESSION AND CONTROL 
HERESY 
Roger Gregory* and Peter Waltont 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly twenty years of banking practice and thematic judicial exposition following upon Siebe Gorman and Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd' have failed to harmonise modern discord 
over the fixed charge on debts or other personal property-if anything the sturm und drang is intensifying. For example, the Auditor and Comptroller General feels that 
receivers have wrongly treated floating charges as fixed and wants something done about it; 2 Dr Gough considers that a fixed charge over personalty with an implied power in the 
chargor to deal with the security is a conceptual impossibility; 3 the Court of Appeal's judgments in Royal Trust Bank v National Westminster Bank PrC4 present a picture of the 
Utmost confusion; and in Whitton vA CN5 in New South Wales Bryson J expressly refused 
to follow the approach in Re Brightlifie Ltd6 as being incompatible with Romer LFs third 
characteristic of a floating charge in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd 7 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, many company lawyers would settle for the follow- 
ing passage from McCarthy Js judgment (quoting the court below) in Re Keenan Bros 
Ltd8 
"I think that one has to bear in mind at the outset that this form of charge [the floating charge] 
made its first appearance in England as a by-product of the joint stock companies which began 
to flourish after the enactment of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844. In order to borrow 
money, such companies offered as security not merely their fixed assets, but also assets which 
are regularly turned over in the course of business such as the companies' stock-in-trade. It was 
obviously cumbersome and impractical to charge such assets pecifically with the repayment 
of advances, since it would mean the constant execution and release of securities as the assets 
were disposed of and replaced. Hence the concept developed of a charge which did not attach 
to any specific assets of the company, remained dormant until the mortgagee intervened and 
in the interim did not prevent the mortgagor from using the assets in question in the ordinary 
course of his business. " 
* Professor of Insolvency Law, University of Wolverhampton; Principal Legal Adviser, Deloitte & Touche Corporate Recovery. 
Research Tutor, University of Wolverhampton. 
[1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 142. 
2 HC 695 Session 1995-96. 
, Gough, Company Charges, 2nd ed (Butterworths, London, 1996), (hereafter "Gough"), 368. 
4 [199612 BCLC 682. 
3 (1996) 14 ACLC 1799,1810-1814. 
6 1987] Ch 200. 
1903] 2 Ch 284,295. 
(1986) 2 BCC 98,970,98,974-98,975, quoting Keane I 
Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review 2,1998, pp 68-87 68 
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The judicial approach is strongly underpinned by Professor Pennington's influential arti- 
cle, "The Genesis of the Floating Charge, " in which he traces the refusal of the Common 
Law to accept anything like the Roman hypotheca and analyses Holroyd v Marshall'O in 
1862 as "the first leading case in which equity intervened to remedy the defects of the 
common law ... 
in which the mortgage created what was later identified as a floating 
charge, although it was too early at that date for the court to recognise it as such". II In a 
later section of his article12 Professor Pennington argues that after 1862, when Holroyd 
made the floating charge a possibility, decisions on statutory company mortgages and on 
shareholders' liability on insurance claims pointed a way forward which draftsmen 
promptly appreciated because in the 1860s security documents granting such charges 
began to appear. The break, in Professor Pennington's view, came with Re Panama, New 
Zealand, and Australia Royal Mail Co 13 in 1870. 
In his leading work Company Charges14 Gough says: 
"Conceptually speaking a specific charge with an implied licence is an impossibility. It is con- 
ceptually impossible to postulate the existence of a specific charge and at the same time permit 
the chargor, without need for express consent from the chargee with regard to specific prop- 
erty, to dispose of that specific property in the ordinary course of business". 
Most, if not all, law graduates who read the company law syllabus learned the elements 
of a floating charge as part of it. One can understand the theorising potential of the seem- 
ing coincidence that, in substance at least, the floating charge started life in 1862, the year 
of the first real Companies Act. Hence there is a belief, hallowed by repetition, that 
hypotheca (with "Holroyd v Marshall" woven into her damask) stepped, Venus-like, fully- 
formed from the sea, tripped on a submerged boulder or two" and finally landed on the 
beach to distribute copies of Panama to a shocked, surprised and delighted legal profession. 
The allusion to mythology (albeit classical) is not accidental. The idea that Holroyd was 
some bright new thing consciously reared by company lawyers to become the intellectual 
beauty known as the floating charge is, in the authors'view, every bit as mythical as Venus 
but not nearly as alluring. 
Holroyd marked the end of an ancient dispute (or, even, feud) between common law 
courts and equity courts over bills of sale. Each side held fixed views, more or less res- 
olutely stuck to them16 and carried on so doing for centuries. It is not proposed to trace 
the history of t. his altercation here-it has already been fully documented by HW May 17, 
9 (1960) 23 MLR 630. 
10 (1862) lOHLC 191; 11 ER999. 
11 Pennington (1960) 23 MLR 630,634. 
12 Ibid, 642-644 (section entitled "The Consummation"). 
13 (1870) 5 Ch App 318. 
14 Gough, 368. 
15 King v Marshall (1864) 33 Beav 565; 55 ER 488; Be Marine Mansions (1867) LR 4 Eq 601; Stanley's case 
(1864) 4 de GJ and S 407; 46 ER 976. 
16 In Twyne's Case (1601) 3 Co Rep 80(a); 76 ER 809 (Star Chamber), the fifth resolution of the court was: 
"here was a trust between the parties for the donor possessed all, and used them as his proper goods, and fraud 
is always apparelled and clad with a trust, and a trust is the cover of fraud. " By 1788 Buller J relented sufficiently 
from his forefathers' approach to accept that the trust or charge appearing on the face of the instrument in 
Bucknal v Roiston (1709) Prec in Ch 285; 24 ER 136 did not constitute a fraud: Edwards v Harben (1788) 2 TR 
587; 100 ER 3 IS. 
17 The Law of Fraudulent and Voluntary Conveyances, 3rd ed (Steven and Haynesý London, 1908) (hereinafter 
"H W May"). 
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Kerr' 8 and Powell. 19 Those who take a too strong view of Professor Pennington's descrip. 
tion of Ho1rojd as the "first leading case" should read his very good article in 198520 
where he recalls the ways in which equity distanced itself from the common law from the 
end of the seventeenth century. 
It is necessary, however, to refer to some of the salient features of the two courts' dis. 
pute. 
Common law 
The indivisibility of ownership and benefits such as possession is one of the great 
bedrocks of common law thinking2l and originates with its view of seisin as an essential 
component of ownership. Seisin was not just a land law notion; it applied to personal 
property as well. Thus in 1275 a manorial court22 considered the liability in trespass of 
Richard le Bocher, who was "in seysina" of a woollen fleece and a pig's ham as a result of 
a bit of (rough) market trading not far from Cambridge. A number of consequences 
flowed from this approach: 
(a) Remedies for trespass, detinue, ejectment, conversion etc were available only to 
plaintiffs who could demonstrate possession, actual or legal, or at least an immediate 
entitlement thereto. 
(b) Generally there could be no title without possession or control. A mortgage of 
future property, therefore, did not vest any title in such property until by some novus actus 
the mortgagee had reduced the property into his possession or control. 23 
(c) Some wickedness had stemmed from the splitting of ownership and possession; and 
the common lawyers had had their dislike enshrined in statute in a number of circum- 
stances. For example, the Statute against Fraudulent Deeds by Debtors 1379 prevented 
persons from transferring their property by deed to a third party, going into sanctuary 
and living on credit thereafter, knowing that their persons were immune from process and 
that the transferred property was safe because the transferee was not indebted. Another 
example was the Statute of Frauds 1571, which sought to outlaw transactions under 
which title passed but not possession and the "use" was singled out for dishonourable 
mention. The "order and disposition" provisions in the Bankruptcy Acts only disap- 
peared with the Insolvency Acts 1985-1986, following recommendation by the Cork 
Committee. 24 
What the common lawyers disliked about the splitting of ownership and possession was 
the creation of a delusive credit by traders who transferred their property to a third party 
18 SE Williams (ed), Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 5th ed (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1920) (hereinafter 
"Kerr"). 
19 T Coventry (ed), JJ Powell, A Treatise on the Law of Mortgages, 6th ed (1826) vol 2, ch 2 (hereafter 
"Powell"). 
20 R Pennington, "Fixed Charges over Future Assets of a Company" (1985) 6 Co Law 9. 
21 See H Bracton, "de Acquirendo Rerurn Dominio", Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, 300. - 22 Select Pleas in Manorial Courts 2 Selden Society (18 82), 142-143. 
23 Founding authority for this proposition is generally taken to be Bacon's Maxims Reg 14, cited in Holroyd 
v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191,195. Cases exemplifying the maxim are cited ibid, 197-200. 
24 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmd 8558. In ch 23 of its Report 
the Committee noted that in commercial practice visible assets were no longer an indicator of creditworthiness. 
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by bill of sale but carried on in business as though owners, trading with the property. Bills 
of sale, being secret, then 
destroyed what would otherwise have been a prospect of distri- 
bution in bankruptcy. 
Equity 
The stance of equity was almost entirely opposed to that outlined above. Equitable reme- 
dies were superior in the sense that they could be invoked without proof of possession. 
Mortgages of future property were effective as soon as property fitting the description 
came into the hands of the mortgagor-no novus actus was needed. Equity also moulded 
its rules to promote trade. In particular it recognised that raising money on security was 
vital to trade and that the only way to pay off borrowed money was to continue trading. 
it was quite unfussed, therefore, about the idea that mortgaged property could be left in 
the possession of the mortgagor to be used by him in the operation of trade to repay the 
loan. 
Both sides had a point--delusive credit was a fraud; on the other hand, trade finance 
needed present and future property as security and the trader to continue in order to 
repay. 
This was the dispute which Holroyd finally ended. In this case a chargee whose security 
extended to "machinery implements and things" fixed in or placed about a mill and future 
items of that description prevailed over an execution creditor in respect of after-acquired 
machinery following seizure and sale by the sheriff. It is worth reading the report of the 
argument in the law report. 24A The execution creditor relied on the common law prin- 
ciples of possession and novus actus and the chargee urged the equity principles, which 
did not require possession and novus actus but were, rather, that the equitable interest was 
complete, and its priority established, as soon as property covered by the terms of the bill 
of sale came into the chargor's hands. 
Whilst the judgments applied equity doctrines, Lord Westbury tied the mortgagee's 
equitable interest to the right to obtain specific performance (as opposed to the maxim 
equity looks upon that as done which ought to be done). In Tailby v Official Receiver25 
the House of Lords was not sure whether Lord Westbury was seeking "to guide or per- 
plex"25A later courts and settled that the equitable interest arises from the maxim. 
EQUITABLE SECURITY AND TRADE FINANCING 
Whereas many discussions of fixed and floating charges concentrate heavily on the post- 
Ho Iroyd era, there is a question of how trade was financed before 1862 and what sort of 
security arrangements were put in place. What follows is taken from judgments on bills of 
sale in three cases of 1758,1804 and 1857, which, treating three years early in 1804 as the 
merest scintilla, mark the beginning, middle and end of a one hundred year period. 
24A (1862) 10 HLC 191,195-209. 
25 (1888) 13 App Cas 523. 
25A lbid, 547, per Lord Macnaghten. 
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The first case is Worsley v Deniattos. 26 A bill of sale by way of mortgage was given by a 
corn miller and factor to his banker. By the bill the miller "grants, etc all his stock, uten- 
sils, and other things used in his trades of brewing and malting, and of a cornfactor and 
miller; consisting of coppers, tuns, backs, coolers, pumps, cisterns, screens and other 
implements; and also all his changeable stock, consisting of debts, horses, carts, casks, 
hops, beer, ale, wheat, barley, malt, coals, wood and all other goods and commodities 




As Lord Mansfield said of the document: 2613 "By the express tenor of the deed, Slader [the 
miller] was to have the absolute order and disposition as before. In fact he was permitted 
to continue in possession, and act as owner. They who dealt with him trusted to his 
visible trade and stock". 
The second case is Nutbrown v Thornton. 27 The bill of sale is not set out in any detail. 
Lord Eldon refers to it as an "assignment of all the cattle, stock and personal estate; and 
the landlord was at liberty to enter and sell all this in the event provided". The transac- 
tion here involved a lease of a farm for seven years and another transaction, a bill of sale, 
under which the tenant was advanced E500 by the landlord to enable him to cultivate the 
farm. It was envisaged that the loan might go on for seven years and allowed for other 
credit to be taken up with the landlord. If the debt exceeded; E500 at any time, the land- 
lord could enforce his security. 
The third case is Weaver v Joule, 28 in which Blainey, a brewer, executed a bill of sale as 
a mortgage of all his "household furniture, stock in trade, brewing implements, linen, 
glass, earthenware, metalware, cart, harness, pig and all other goods, chattels and effects 
whatsoever belonging to him ... except and reserved, nevertheless unto [Blainey] so long 
as he shall continue to pay off the said sum ... the free use possession and enjoyment of the said personal estate and effects hereby assigned.. ." According to the report, "Blainey 
remained in possession of the goods assigned, and to all appearance carried on the busi- 
ness of a retail brewer as though no such assignment had ever been made". 28A 
The main interest of Worsley and Weaver is that, notwithstanding their dates, they 
adopt a structure which appears to be common form having regard to the law reports of 
cases cited by HW May, Kerr, Powell and Christian. 29 
The main difference between Worsley and Weaver is that the former does not, in the 
report at least, expressly leave the property in the "use, possession and enjoyment" of the 
borrower, unlike Weaver. In this context Lord Eldon's judgment in Nuthrown is quite illu- 
minating on the effect of absence of any express power to deal where goods were assigned. 
He noted that "first it made it impossible that the tenant should remove any cattle from 
the premises; though the terms require that he should be a cattle dealer". 30 The Lord 
Chancellor held that the whole point of the agreement was that the tenant should have the 
enjoyment of the farm for the purposes of agriculture and expressly refused, therefore, to 
allow the landlord assignee to take property forming his security until the seven year lease 
26 (1758) 1 Burr 467; 97 ER 407. 
26A Emphasis added. 
26B (1758) 1 Burr467,475. 
27 (1804) 10 Ves Jun 159; 32 ER 805. 
28 (1857) 3 CB (NS) 309; 140 ER 759. The reference to "effects" in the bill in this case was usual. "Effects" 
was taken to include stock in trade in Re American Leather Cloth Co (1879) 42 LT 504,43 LT 43. 
28A (1857) 3 CB(NS) 309,316-317. 
29 Christian, Present Practise in the Law of Bankrupts, 2nd ed (1818). 
30 (1804) 10 Ves Jun 159,161. 
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ended (or the debt exceeded E500), leaving the tenant assignor free to carry on business 
with the stock, crops and cattle, saying: 31 "The circumstance of a trust by way of deposit, 
as in Fells v Read, [321 is not required in this instance, to furnish the principle upon which 
the Court might be required to interpose". Effectively the lease and the bill of sale were 
read together to ascertain the nature and purpose of the agreement. 
In giving effect to assignments or mortgages of the whole of a trader's assets, equity 
gave effect to the busigess nature of the contract. As Erle J said in Bittlesione v Cooke: 13 
"There often may be a very good reason for taking a security over the whole of a trader's 
stock present and future, as then the stock may be used in the meantime and made a 
source of profit, whilst, if a portion of the existing stock is separated and set aside as a 
security, it is tied up from use". In Hutton v Cruttwe1134 in 1852, where a hotel keeper 
assigned all present and future chattels, Lord Campbell CJ described the circumstance as 
"the common case of a bill of sale bona fide given to secure an advance on the faith of the 
security to enable a trader to carry on his business". 
In a shipping case of 170935 security over the cargo of a vessel about to embark upon a 
trading voyage extended to the "produce and advantage" that might be made thereof and 
no doubt the scale of such trading would be quite extensive. Similarly the mortgagor of a 
ship's future freight had the exclusive management of the vessel and its voyages. 36 
Any trawl through the law reports from the early eighteenth century onwards into the 
late nineteenth century shows that, in the financing of trade, bills of sale giving specific 
security over all the present and future chattels of a trader became a standard mechanism 
employed by those who supplied the capital. 37 
The cases were numerous largely because mortgagees or assignees under bills of sale 
sought to defend them against a wide range of attacks. The most frequent examples are: 
31 ibid, 161. 
32 (1796) 3 Ves 70; 30 ER 899. 
33 (1856) 6 El and BI 296 (119 ER 875), 3 10. See also ibidper Lord Campbell. 
34 (1852) 22 LJQB 78,80. 
33 Bucknal v Roiston (1709) Prec in Ch 285; 24 ER 136; Curtis v Aubur (1820) 1 Jac &W 526; 37 ER 468; 
Langton v Horton (1842) 1 Hare 549; 66 ER 1149. 
36 Davenport v Whitmore (1836) 2 My & Cr521; Douglas vRussell(1831)4 Sim and Stu 524; The Ship Warre 
(1817) 8 Price 271 (see the contrasting approach of the common law court in the same case reported Robinson 
v MacDonnell(1816) 5M&S 228); Leslie v Guthrie (1835) 1 Bing NC 697. 
37 A representative sample of cases is as follows: Ryall v Rolle (1749) 1 Atk 165; Worsley v Demattos (1758) 1 
Burr467; Lunn v Thornton (1845)1 CB 379; 135 ER 587; Re Langmeads Trusts (1855) 20 Beav 20 (52 ER 509); 
Reeve v Whitmore (1863) 33 LJ Ch 63; Belding v Read(1865) 13 LT (NS) 66; Holroydv Marshall(1862) 10 HLC 
19 1; Mercer v Peterson (1867) LR 2 Ex 304 and (1868) LR 3 Ex 104; Lomax v Buxton (187 1) LR 6 CP 107; 
Thompson v Cohen (1872) LR 7 QB 527; Greenhirt Y Smee (1876) 35 LT (NS) 168 (badly drafted, ended as all 
present property, but trade continued); National Mercantile Bank Ltd v Hampson (1880) 5 QBD 177; Walker v 
Clay (1880) 49 LJQB 560; Taylor Y McKeand (1880) 49 LJQB 563; Payne v Fern (1881) 6 QBD 620, Clements v 
Matthews (1883) 11 QBD 808; Joseph v Lyons (1884) 15 QBD 280. Sometimes the bill expressly left the goods 
in the possession or possession and use or possession use and enjoyment: eg Hutton v Crultwell (1852) 22 LJQB 
78; Harris v Rickett (1859) 28 LJ Ex 197; Weaver v Joule (1857) 3 CB (NS) 309; 140 ER 759. Some bills cover- 
ing all machinery plant and stock were expressed to cover substitutions, renewals and additions: Congreve v 
Evetts (1854) 23 LJ Ex 273; Leathem v Amor (1878) 47 LJ QB 581; Lazarus v Andrade (1880) 5 CPD 318. See 
also the precedents in DB Wilson, Law and Practice under the Bills of Sale Act 1878,2nd ed (Horace Cox, 
London, 1881), 98-100, and in FCJ Millar, Bills of Sale, 4th ed (Stevens and Sons, London 1877), 348. There is a short interesting discussion on compliance by companies with the Bills of Sale Act 1854 (to which compa- 
nies were subject) in FB Palmer, Company Precedents, Ist ed (London, 1877), 404-410; see also the precedents 
ibid, 435,43 8. 
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(a) The order and disposition clauses in bankruptcy 
In Longman v Tripp38 the editor of the Bristol Mercury assigned his interest in the news- 
paper to the plaintiffs as security for advances. He continued to manage the newspaper's 
business and on his subsequent bankruptcy his estate successfully claimed the business 
under the order and disposition clause. Charges over debts and other choses in action 
were also within the clause. Lord Eldon held in Jones v Gibhon39 that escape from the 
clause required that notice be given to the principal debtors by the mortgagee. 
(b) Fraudulent conveyances as acts of bankruptcy 
In Worsley v DemaltoS, 39A referred to earlier, the assignment of all the miller's stock 
and assets present and future under the bill was expressed to be in consideration of 
5 shillings. The banker assignee's argument that he was to support the miller in future 
dealings did not save the bill from being an act of bankruptcy. 
(c) The Statute of Frauds 
Whilst Twyne's Case3911 of 1601 reigned, a transfer of property by bill of sale which left 
possession in the transferor was struck down as a fraud at Law. It was this point upon 
which equity opposed the common law courts on the ground that if the possession was 
consistent with the terms of the bill of sale itself there was no fraud (Bucknal v 
Roiston). 39C 
(d) Subsequent purchasers 
The bill of sale holder could challenge a sale by the mortgagor if not effected in the 
ordinary course of business (see Payne v Fern40 where the jury found that the mortgagor's 
sale was not in the ordinary course of business). 
(e) Judgment creditors 
Holroyd v Marshall was a case of competition between a bill of sale holder and a judg- 
ment creditor following seizure by the sheriff. 
Whether or not Jessel MR's remarkS41 in the late 1870s that a charge over the under- 
taking would "paralyse" the business upset bills of sale financiers is not clear, but it is 
interesting that in a small group of cases the courts felt constrained (here in Lindley Js 
words) to say of bills over all present and future chatteIS: 42 "The object of the bill of sale 
is obviously not to paralyse the trade of the grantor, but to enable him to carry on his 
trade, and the bill would be worthless if we were to construe it otherwise ... I think, there- fore, that the covenant not to remove is a covenant that the grantor will not remove or dis- 
pose of the goods otherwise then in the ordinary course of his trade". Moreover, the 
consequence of the mortgage relationship was not to make the mortgagor agent of the 
mortgagee to realise the security. 43 
38 (1805) 2 Bos & Pul (NR) 67; 126 ER 547. 
39 (1800) 1 Ves 46 1. 
39A (1758) 1 Burr 467. 
39B (1601) 3 Co Rep 80(a). 
39C (1709) Prec Ch 285. 
40 (1881) 6 QBD 620. 
41 Re Florence Land (1878) 10 Ch D 530,541. He was not alone in saying this of a charge on the "undertak- 
ing". 
42 Walker v Clay (1880) 49 LJQB 560,561. The other cases were Taylor v McKeand (1880) 49 LJQB 563; 
National Mercantile Bank v Hampson (1880) 5 QBD 177 and Payne v Fern (1881) 6 QBD 620. 
43 Joseph v Lyons (1884) 15 QBD 280. 
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As far as equity was concerned, if an express power to deal with the subject matter of 
security over all present and future chattels was given to the borrower, it was effective; 
and, if it was not expressly given, it was implied. This was the position between 1709 and 
1881. 
WHY DID THE FLOATING CHARGE TAKE OFF? 
The obvious inference from the fact that specific security with a power to deal was an 
everyday financing mechanism is that the floating charge would be otiose. The banks had 
all the security and powers they needed to finance and facilitate trade. So what happened? 
Bills of sale developments 
The answer lies in the general wisdom of Parliament and in particular the Bills of Sale Act 
(1878) Amendment Act of 1882. The Bills of Sale Act 1878 removed bills of sale from the 
operation of the reputed ownership provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 and, follow- 
ing opposition, Parliament intervened again to restore the position in the 1882 Act. 
Parliamentary activity this time, however, was not limited to restoring the Bankruptcy 
Act position. By a sweeping reform, security bills of sale had to be as nearly as possible 
in line with the statutory model form" and this model did not allow for security over 
future chattels. Overnight it became extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the banks to 
take security over present and future trade personalty which would be effective against 
third parties. Priority over third parties was essential. 
Whilst companies, as such, were not taken out of the operation of the Bills of Sale etc 
Act 1882 there was an important exception made in s 17 for "any debentures" "issued" 
by any "mortgage, loan, or other incorporated company" and "secured upon the capital 
stock or goods, chattels, and effects of such company". 
Initially the interpretation put upon s 17 was catastrophic for the bank& In 1884 in 
Brocklehurst v Railway Printing and Publishing C045 the security was taken out with 
trustees for the debenture holders, whom the company did not covenant to repay; and in 
the separate debenture holders' agreement (where repayment was offered) there was ref- 
erence to security but the security given to the trustees was not specifically identified in 
the contract. In that state of affairs the court held that (i) the document was not a deben- 
ture; (ii) the security amounted to bill of sale and was, therefore, void for non-registration; 
and (iii) (most crucially) the words "other incorporated company" in s 17 had to be con- 
strued eiusdern generis with "mortgage" and "loan" and did not, therefore, cover the gen- 
erality of companies formed under the Companies Acts. 
This decision caused immediate consternation. Within two years the court in Ross v 
Army and Navy HoteJ46 was considering the state of a company's debenture instruments 
which had been reworked specifically to avoid the decision in Brocklehurst. In the event 
the Court of Appeal there held that the original documents (and not the additional ones) 
44 Bills of Sale Act (1878) amendment Act 1882, s 9. Future property was excluded by s 5. 
45 [1884] WN 70. 
46 (1886) 34 Ch D 43 (CA). 
76 Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review [1998] 
were effective, distinguished Brocklehurst, and said soothing things about the word 
"debenture". 
It was, however, not sufficient and in Jenýinson v Brandley Mining C047 the Common 
Lawyers went back to Brocklehurst for inspiration. Grove J distinguished Ross, saying 
that "the question in that case was merely one between the debenture holders and the 
company itself " and that it was "no authority whatever against a bona fide creditor for 
value who has issued execution against the company; if it were, a company would be 
enabled to entirely evade all the wholesome requirements of the Bills of Sale Acts. . . ". 47A The judge thought that a company which wanted to avoid paying debts would only have 
to issue debentures and get the holders to set up their claims, which would be a "manifest 
injustice". The old feud thus carried on; Holroyd v Marshall might have stopped the war 
but not all the common lawyers had rushed out to kiss and make it up with hypotheca. 
In 1887, in the preface to the fifth edition of his book, H Burton Buckley reported48 
that, as far as companies legislation was concerned, since his fourth edition statutory 
alterations were few and unimportant. In his second paragraph he says: 
"A statutory alteration of some moment is, however, contained in the Bills of Sale Act 1882: an 
Act which renders the policy of the Bills of Sale Acts applicable to securities given by Joint 
Stock Companies, subject to exception provided by s 17 of that Act. The difficult wording of 
that section cannot but occasion litigation. Two or three cases have already been decided upon 
it". 
In his text49 he notes that "many difficult questions arise upon this difficult section in 
a difficult Act and not rnany have yet been decided" and asks whether "any debenture" 
can be given to one person or must be "issued" to several, whether the euisdern generis 
rule should apply to "other incorporated company" and whether security over part only 
of the chattels would satisfy the wording of s 17 (this last point was left open in Ross v 
Army and Navy HoteJ49A). 
Lindley on Companies in 188910 simply notes that a company can give a bill of sale 
which will be within the Bills of Sale Acts unless s 17 applies-citing Shears v Jacob, -51 
Deffell v White, 52 Attenborough's Case, 53 the awkward decision of Jenkinson v Brandley 
Mining53A as well as Ross vArmy and Navy. 
As far as the banking world was concerned, taking security over present and future 
property had been the cornerstone of the trade financing system. Security was a sine qua 
non of lending and the power to deal was a sine qua non of that security because only by 
continuing to trade could the borrower get into a position to pay off the debt. The whole 
point of the system was to facilitate trade-not stop it. Suddenly the Bills of Sale legisla- 
tion of 1882 had jeopardised the whole thing. 
47 (1887) 19 QBD 568. 
47A Ibid, 571 (emphasis added). 
48 Buckley on the Companies Acts, 5th ed, (London, 1887). 
49 Ibid, 158-160. 
49A (1886) 34 Ch D 43. 
50 5th ed (London, 1889), 202-203. 
51 (1866) LR I CP 513. 
52 (1866) LR 2 CP 144. 
53 (1885) 28 Ch D 682. 
53A (1887) 19 QBD 568. 
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Charges over the undertaking 
A few years before 1882 and, therefore, for reasons wholly unconnected with the Bills of 
Sale Acts, the Chancery courts had been entertaining actions in respect of a species of 
charge whose wording had started to be used by companies formed under the Companies 
Act, though borrowed from another source. 
It is widely accepted that Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail C054 is 
the first instance where the courts recognised the type of security which later became 
known as the floating charge. This invention of equity was the culmination of a small line 
of cases5s where the courts experienced difficulty in interpreting the meaning of a charge 
given over the "undertaking" of a company registered under the Companies Acts. 
Mortgages over a company's "undertaking" first appeared at the end of the eighteenth 
century during the Industrial Revolution. 56Companies were incorporated under private 
Acts of Parliament and were given statutory authority to engage in large-scale public util- 
ity projects requiring powers of compulsory acquisition such as the construction and run- 
ning of canals, railways, water and gas works. 
Commonly a railway company set up in this way had the power to raise large sums by 
inviting the public to subscribe for shares and to borrow large amounts by issuing mort- 
gage debentures secured on the company's undertaking, tolls -and profits. As the incorpo- 
ration of such companies became more common, the Companies Clauses Consolidation 
Act 1845 was passed, which contained provisions of general application to such compa- 
nies and which could be incorporated by reference into the Act creating any new utility 
company. 57 Section 41 of the Act stated that any mortgage created by the company must 
be in the form given in Schedule C to the Act. Schedule C provided for the company to 
assign "the said Undertaking [and (in case such Loan shall be in anticipation of the Capital 
authorized to be raised) all future Calls on Shareholders], and all the Tolls and Sums of 
Money arising by virtue of the said Act, and all the Estate, Right, Title and Interest of the 
Company in the same. . ." The meaning of undertaking is rather unhelpfully defined in 
s. 2 as "the undertaking or works, of whatever nature, which shall by the special Act be 
authorised to be executed". 
As there was no legislative history to guide the c6urts as to the meaning of "under- 
taking" in this context, when the matter came up for consideration, as it did several times 
in the mid-nineteenth century, it initially led to some decisions which were not all readily 
reconcilable. 58When considering the meaning of the term "undertaking" the courts were 
swayed by the public policy reasons behind the companies' existence. Sir John Romilly 
MR in a railway case stated: 59 
54 (1870) 5 Ch App 318. 
55 See King v Marshall (1864) 33 Beav 565; 55 ER 488, Re Marine Mansions Co (1867) LR 4 Eq 601 and Re 
New Clydach Sheet and Bar Iron Co (1868) LR 6 Eq 514. 
56 See eg Hopkins v Worcester and Birmingham Canal Proprietors (1868) LR 6 Eq 437, where a canal com- 
pany was set up in 1791 by a statute giving the company power to raise money by way of mortgaging its under- 
taking. 
57 The 1845 Act was supplemented by a similar Act of the same year for Scottish statutory companies and 
by other Acts of the same and subsequent years dealing with specific types of utility. 
5' See generally Chantal Stebbings, "Statutory Railway Mortgage Debentures and the Courts in the 
Nineteenth Century" (1987) 8J Legal Hist 36. 
59 Furness v Caterham Railway Co (1859) 27 Beav 358 at 361; 54 ER 140. 
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"All I understand by the decisions of the Court on the word 'undertaking' is, that it is the right 
to use land for the purposes of conveying passengers and making profits by the tolls, that the 
debenture-holders cannot take possession of the land and use it so as to put a stop to the 
undertaking, and that mortgages of the undertaking do not enable the mortgagees to put an 
end to it". 
The suggestion that a mortgagee might take possession of the land upon which the rail- 
way operated and thereby put an end to the undertaking was described by Coleridge J as 
"a very monstrous and improbable supposition" . 60 The mortgage of the undertaking contemplated a repayment of money consistently 
with and by means of a carrying on of the undertaking. In the leading case of Gardner v 
London, Chatham and Dover Railway CO, 61 Cairns LJ explained the meaning of under. 
taking as: 
"the proper style, not for the ingredients, but for the completed work, and it is from the com- 
pleted work that any return of monies or earnings can arise... Mhe undertaking ... is ... 
made over... as a going concern, with internal and Parliamentary powers of management ot 
to be interfered with; as a fruit-bearing tree, the produce of which is the fund dedicated by the 
contract to secure and to pay the debt. The living and going concern thus created by the 
Legislature must not, under a contract pledging it as security, be destroyed, broken up, or anni- 
hilated. " 
Although the wording of the Schedule C security suggests that the mortgagee would on 
default by the company be entitled to force a sale of the company's assets, the courts 
regarded the public nature of the undertaking to be of paramount importance and so they 
limited the mortgagee's rights to enforce his security. Whilst the company was a going 
concern, the mortgagee was not entitled to an order for sale of any or all of the company's 
assets. "Undertaking" was taken to mean that the company would continue to provide its 
services to the public. The courts did not allow the destruction of the public utility which 
Parliament had intended to continue in perpetuity. Whilst the company was a going con- 
cern the mortgagee's only remedy was to ask the court for the appointment of a receiver 
of the net earnings of the undertaking. 62 The security did give the mortgage holder a pri- 
ority over judgment creditors. The courts would usually grant injunctions against judg- 
ment creditors who attempted to levy execution against the company's assets. 63 
Although the mortgage holder had no right of foreclosure or sale whilst the company 
was a going concern, once the company had sold the undertaking64 or been wound Up6l 
the mortgagee's rights could be enforced against the proceeds. The mortgage of the under- 
taking was, therefore, a security over all the assets of the company used in its business but 
the mortgagee could only enforce the security against such assets once the company had 
60 Doe d Myatt v St Helen's and Runcorn Gap Railway Co (1841) 2 QB 364. 
61 (1867) 2 Ch App 201,217. 
62 Great Eastern Railway Co v East London Railway (1881) 44 LT903. The mortgagee also had the right com- 
mon to all creditors of the company to levy execution against the company's assets: see the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845, s 36 and Russell v East Anglian Railway Co (1850) 3 Mac &G 104,143-147 (42 ER 
201). 
63 Legg v Mathieson (1860) 2 Giff 71; Wildy v Mid-Hants Railway Co (1868) 18 LT 73. Cf Russell v East 
Anglian Railway Co (1850) 3 Mac &G 104; 42 ER 20 1. 
64 Furness v Caterham Railway Co (1859) 27 Beav 358; 54 ER 140; Re Woking Urban Council (Basingstoke 
Canal) Act 1911 [191411 Ch 300,314. 
65 Re Glyn Valley Tramway Co [1937] 1 Ch 465, 
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ceased to be a going concern. The restrictions on remedies available to the mortgagee 
lasted only as long as public policy demanded that the company's undertaking be pro- 
tected. 
The crucial point made consistently by the courts is that the mortgage of the under- 
taking of a statutory company is quite different from a normal mortgage. Lord Truro 
LC66 emphasises that the statutory form does not give rise to a "specific equitable lien" 
upon the estate and effects generally of the company or on "every spade or barrow which 
the company may possess". To permit this type of interpretation would permit the mort- 
gagees at any time to assert their "lien" on the company's assets at the expense of the com- 
pany's general creditors who had provided credit to the company on the strength of its 
apparently unfettered ownership of such assets. In the view of Lord Truro this would 
amount to a fraud. 
A similar sentiment was expressed by Cairns LJ: 67 
"The assignment made by the mortgage debentures is immediate, and is to continue for three 
years at the least. If the debenture holders are right in their argument, hey became immediate 
assignees in specie of all the ingredients which I have enumerated as going to make up the 
undertaking, and they might, from the first, have asserted their rights as mortgagees by taking 
and impounding not merely the proceeds of surplus lands, but the capital, the cash balances, 
the rolling stock, and even their own money advanced. " 
Both their lordships dismissed such suggestions as being contrary to the intention of 
Parliament. If the debenture holders' arguments were to succeed, the maintenance and 
operation of these companies for the public good could be frustrated at the whim of the 
mortgagee. 
Whilst the courts developed the meaning of "undertaking" as it related to the statutory 
company mortgages, Parliament introduced in 1844 the possibility of trading as a com- 
pany registered under the Companies Act, 68 although only limited use was made of this 
business medium until after the reforms put in place by the Limited Liability Act 1855 
and Joint Stock Companies Act 1856.69 
It seems that from these early days draftsmen of secured loans to registered companies 
looked to the statutory precedent for guidance. 70 Indeed it would have been surprising if 
this had not been the case. Early modern company law, therefore, saw the adoption of a 
mortgage (or "charges" to avoid the provisions of Bills of Sale Act 1854) of a company's 
undertaking. The first reported instance is King v Marshall, 71 where the charge was cxe- 
cuted in 1859. The company was in insolvent liquidation and the issue before the court 
was whether uncalled capital came within the meaning of "undertaking". Sir John 
Romilly MR adopted the statutory definition of "undertaking" and held that the uncalled 
capital fell outside the term. Uncalled capital was just one species of debt owed to the 
company. If a company charged its debts, it could not carry on its business nor could it 
" Russell v East Anglian Railway Co (1850) 3 Mac &G 104,143,146. 
67 Gardner v London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co (1867) 2 Ch App 201,217. 
611 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844. 
69 See Farrar's Company Law, 3rd ed (Butterworths, London, 1991), 20. 
70 See Edward Manson "The Growth of the Debenture" (1897) 13 LQR 418,420, where the writer suggests 
that the form of a series of debentures issued by a registered company secured on its undertaking was based 
upon the series of concurrent mortgages of the company's undertaking issued by statutory companies. 
71 (1864) 33 Beav 565; 55 ER 488. 
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sell anything without the chargee being entitled to receive the proceeds. To hold otherwise 
would paralyse the company and prevent it from carrying on its business. This reasoning 
echoes the words of Lord Truro LC and Sir HM Cairns from the statutory mortgage 
cases. It is based upon the concept that a charge in specie of debts owing to the company 
would allow the chargee at his whim to demand the company's book debts be paid directly 
to him. This would in turn make it impossible for the company to carry on its business. 
Re Marine Mansions C072 involved a building and development company which went 
into liquidation having previously issued debentures over its assets. The debentures con- 
tained a "pledge" of the property for the time being belonging to the company with all 
buildings, stock, receipts and revenues arising therefrom and a "first charge" on the 
undertaking, property, receipts and revenues as aforesaid. Page-Wood V-C construed the 
debenture to be a "specific charge and mortgage" of the land and buildings of the com- 
pany, which would not in itself prevent the company carrying on its business, although he 
suggests the consent of the debenture holder would be needed to effectuate a sale of the 
property charged. The debenture also created a first charge on the other property men- 
tioned, although there is no guidance in thejudgment as to the meaning of "undertaking" 
in this context beyond the statement that the wording used did not include the capital of 
the company. 
The decision is therefore inconclusive as to the meaning of "undertaking" but it does 
point out that, even though a large proportion of a company's property is subject to a spe- 
cific charge, this will not paralyse the company. It may carry on in business. If it wishes to 
sell charged property it would get the debenture holder's consent. If it wished to use its 
C4 receipts and revenues" (which clearly includes its book debts) to acquire further prop- 
erty, it could get the charge transferred to the new property (probably feasible on the facts 
as the company's stock in trade was real property and the turnover would be unlikely to 
be rapid) or "deal with the debentures in some other way". This last point is not explained 
but it seems that, where the charge is over the company's income, if the company was 
unable to use the income without the express consent of the debenture holder each time 
it wished to use that income, then the company would indeed be paralysed. The only way 
to interpret the decision is that there must be some implied authority in the company to 
use the income in the ordinary course of business as in the bills of sale cases listed 
aboVe. 72A 
In Re New Clydach Sheet and Bar Iron C073 the company issued debentures secured by 
a mortgage of "the undertaking, and all the real and personal estate" of the company. 
Lord Romilly MR decided that the mortgage extended only as far as property which 
existed at the date of the mortgage and not to future or substituted goods. Re Marine 
Mansions was distinguished as the debenture there expressly referred to future property. 
There was no discussion of the meaning of "undertaking". 
The courts addressed the meaning of "undertaking" in the context of registered com- 
panies fully for the first time in Panama, 73A where the Court of Appeal gave the term a 
wide interpretation which the courts subsequently developed into the floating charge. The 
'form of the debenture in question was virtually identical to that of the old Schedule C 
72 (1867) LR 4 Eq 60 1. 
72A Supra, n. 42. 
73 (1868) LR 6 Eq 514. 
73A (1870) 5 Ch App 318. 
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mortgage under the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (the only difference of 
substance being that the word "mortgage" was replaced by the word "charge"). The deci- 
sion appears to draw on elements from the previous three cases discussed and from the 
statutory company cases. The liquidator's arguments founded upon the reasoning in the 
statutory mortgage cases but Giffard LJ refused to limit the meaning of "undertaking" to 
the income arising out of the company's businesS. 74 On the facts of the case his Lordship 
decided that the debenture covered all the property of company both present and future. 
This part of the decision has its roots in the reasoning in Re Marine Mansions in that it 
recognises that the charge over the undertaking allows the company to continue to trade 
and to acquire future property. 
Giffard LJ went on to explain that in the context of the case the term "undertaking" 
necessarily implies that the company will carry on trading. His Lordship points out 
expressly that the statutory mortgage cases have no application to Panama, 73A because in 
cases such as Gardner74A the property charged was peculiar subject matter, ie a permanent 
railway, which could not be broken up whilst the company was a going concern for pub- 
lic policy reasons. The principal difference between Panama and the statutory company 
cases is that in Panama there are no public policy grounds to warrant protection of the 
company ,s assets from the debenture holder. There is no overriding public utility in pre- 
venting the chargee from enforcing his charge even whilst the company is a going concern. 
Once there is a default by the company there is -no reason -why 
the debenture holder 
should not be able to enforce his charge. To borrow the imagery of Cairns LJ in Gardner, 
the debenture holder is entitled to chop down the "fruit bearing tree". 
The decision in Panama is, therefore, that the charge over the undertaking allows the 
chargee to have priority over ordinary trade creditors if the company is wound up and its 
assets are being realised (mirroring the position under the statutory mortgage caseS75) but 
also that the debenture holder is not prevented from enforcing his security whilst the com- 
pany is a going concern as long as the company has defaulted under the terms of the 
debenture. Use of the term "undertaking" implies that the company will carry on in busi- 
ness; and the debenture holder cannot interfere so long as the company carries on its busi- 
ness in the ordinary way and complies with the debenture agreement. 
It can be seen from this that the decision in Panama originated from the courts' diffi- 
culties in interpreting the term "undertaking" out of its original context in the statutory 
form of mortgage. The courts at no time applied the bills of sale case law. Although 
Holroyd v Marshall is referred to in argument in Panama the court does not discuss it. It 
is relevant to Panama, only in that it is a decision of high authority which confirms the 
principle that equity recognises a charge over future and changing property. Holroyd is 
not a case on the meaning of undertaking nor is the security in question a floating charge. 
The practice of companies charging their undertaking or all their property both pre- 
sent and future continued throughout the 1870S. 76 The next case of importance was the 
74 Giffard LJ had been counsel for the successful debenture holders in Re Marine Mansions, where he argued 
that the effect of a charge over the undertaking of a company was a charge on all the company's real and per- 
sonal property and that the company could only sell the charged assets with the consent of the debenture hold- 
ers. 
74A (1867) 2 Ch App 201. 
75 Re Glyn Valley Tramway Co [1937] 1 Ch 465. 
76 See eg Re General South American Co (1876) 2 Ch D 337 and Re Native Iron Ore Co (1876) 2 Ch D 345. 
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Court of Appeal's decision in Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex p Moor . 77 It involved a debenture expressed to "bind" the company's "estate, property and effects". 
The court construed the debenture to be a charge over all the company's property both 
present and future subject to the company's power to carry on its business in the ordinary 
way, which included the power to dispose of charged assets. If the company were to 
default under the agreement, the debenture holder could ask the court for a receiver in 
order to realise his security or rely on his priority in a winding-up. 
James LJ initially refers to the document as creating a "specific charge"77A and later as 
a "special charge"77B and decided that the words "estate, property, and effects" were 
exactly equivalent to "undertakingl"77C which we find in the other cases. This point is of 
importance as it widens the principle of Panama beyond the term "undertaking" and 
allowed for a type of charge where the company charged all its assets for the time being 
but by implication was allowed to continue to trade with them. Thesiger LJ also called the 
charge a "specific charge". 77D Neitherjudge considered that the specific charge in any way 
prevented the company from carrying on its business using the assets charged. 
Jessel MR reached the same result but by a different route partly based on the com- 
pany's articles. He decided that the document created "a security on the property of the 
company as a going concern, subject to the powers of the directors to dispose of the prop- 
crty of the company while carrying on its business in the ordinary course . 9177E This in itself 
appears to be consistent with the majority but his Lordship went on to reject the view that 
the security could be a specific charge, reasoning that a specific charge on the property of 
the company would effectively paralyse the company as the company would be unable to 
use even the money borrowed because a third party with notice of the charge would be 
liable to repay it to the debenture holder. The company would be unable to lease or mort- 
gage property without the consent of the debenture holder. 78 The charge as explained by 
Jessel MR is not a specific charge. The charge recognised by the majority of the court is a 
specific charge seemingly with a licence to deal with the assets charged. It is not possible 
to dismiss the majority's decision as merely mislabelling that which later became known 
as a floating charge. If they did not mean specific charge in the sense explained by Jessel 
MR they would surely not have used that phrase. 
The following year in Re Colonial Trusts Corporation, ex p BradshaW79 Jessel MR sit- 
ting as a judge of first instance considered the effect of a debenture where the company's 
" real and personal estate" was charged. His Lordship followed his own judgment in Re 
Florence Land and referred to James LJ 's judgment in that case as being entirely consis- 
tent with his own views. The case is famous for the judicial use for the first time of the 
phrase "floating charge"79A to describe a charge on the company's assets for the time 
being where the company is left "to deal with them as they think fit till they are stopped 
77 (1878) 10 Ch D 530. 
77A Jbid, 544. 
778 Ibid, 546. 
77C Ibid, 546. 
77D Ibid, 550. 
77E Ibid, 540,54 1. 
78 Jessel MR's explanation of the effect of a specific charge echoes his argument as counsel for the successful 
plaintiff in King v Marshall (1864) 33 Beav 565. 
79 (1879) 15 Ch D 465. 
79A Ibid, 472 ("floating mortgage or charge"). See also ibid, 468,469,472 ("floating security") 
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either by a receiver or a winding-up" . 79B Jessel MR again points out his view that if the 
charge were not of this nature it would paralyse the company and prevent it from con- 
ducting its business. 
In Re Hamilton's Windsor Ironivorks80 Malins V-C followed Re Florence Land. He con- 
strued a general mortgage of the company's property so as to permit the company to 
remain in possession of the mortgaged assets and use them for the purpose of carrying on 
its business in the usual way. This interpretation of the deed allowed the company to 
assign the fruits of a contract by way of charge to another creditor and for that creditor 
to gain priority over the general mortgagee. The case turned upon the construction of the 
general mortgage deed. In the course of explaining the effect of deed Malins V-C made 
these important observations: 8 I 
"But in what sense was it an assignment of all the property of the company? Did it mean that 
the company was thereby disabled from carrying on its business? Certainly not. It might be that 
the assignees under such a deed had a right, whenever they thought fit, to enter into possession 
of the property and stop the operations, but the meaning of the deed was that the Iron 
Company was to be left perfectly at liberty to carry on its business". 
He points out that, although the deed in question was what shortly thereafter became 
known as a floating charge, a differently worded deed may have had a different effect. The 
judge recognises the possibility that a security interest could fix immediately on the 
secured assets and allow the company to use those assets whilst giving the mortgagee 
express power at any time to enter into possession. This is a description of a specific 
charge with a licence to deal. On the facts of the case this is not what the parties had 
intended but it is clearly a possibility. A specific charge with a licence to deal was not any- 
thing unusual at this time. In the next two years, for example, the courts continued their 
long settled approach to cases on bills of sale. 82 
THE DRAFTSMAN's REFUGE 
The problems created by the Bills of Sale etc Act 1882 were life-threatening both to bills 
of sale in their traditional form as a specific security and to the new-fangled floating 
charge expressed to cover the "undertaking" and/or the "whole of the property present 
and future". 
Release from the dilemma came with the Court of Appeal's decision in Re Standard 
Manufacturing83 in February 1891. The charge here was expressed as one over the com- 
pany's "undertaking and all its property both present and future". In three and a half 
pages of judgment delivered by Bowen LJ, following eleven pages of reported argument, 
BrocklehurstUand Jenkinson 85 were rejected and four judgments critical of those two 
7911 Ibid, 469. 
90 (1879) 12 Ch D 707. 
aI Ibid, 7 10. 
82 See cases cited supra, 42. 
83 [189 1] 1 Ch 627. 
84 [1884] WN 70. 
85 (1887) 19 QBD 568. 
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cases in the lower courts around 189086 were approved. Section 17 of the 1882 Act now 
applied to Companies Act companies. 
After nine or ten years of serious uncertainty, commercial lenders and their draftsmen 
finally had a precedent which they could rely on and which would get them out ahead of 
unsecured creditors in the event of insolvency. Having thus found a security which 
worked, the draftsmen stuck to it like glue and the floating charge took off. Preferential 
claims did not trouble the banks' recovery until the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Act 1897 came into effect. When they did come into play, it seems that the 
amount of the claims was not too troublesome. The more traditional bill of sale type of 
drafting simply became commercially unfashionable. 
Specific security with licence to deal 
Although the bill of sale structure for commercial security instruments did not regain its 
former pre-eminence amongst banking Law draftsmen, the legal principles governing its 
nature, did not cease to exist. Buckley LJ in Evans v Rival Granite Quarries17 pointed out 
that a floating charge "is not a specific mortgage of the assets, plus a licence to the mort- 
gagor to dispose of them in the`ýourse of his business" and he expressly rejected a sub- 
mission by the debenture holder "that it was competent to the mortgagee to intervene at 
any moment apd to say that he withdrew the licence as regards any item". 
In Re Cimex Tissues" Stanley Burnton QC upheld a fixed security upon scheduled 
machinery where the debenture gave a power to deal in the ordinary course of business. 
He did, however, hedge his bets a little by saying, first, that if the power to deal was 
44 extensive"19 he would have decided that the charge floated and, second, in applying 
Holroyd v Marshall to reach his conclusion, that it was "assumed"90 in Holroyd that the 
charge was specific. In our submission neither of these two cautionary notes is justified. 
An "extensive" power to deal had been a commonplace of security financing arrange- 
ments for over 150 years before Holroyd and in 1862 specific security was the only form 
known to the law. In Re Atlantic Computers9l and Re Atlantic Medical Ltd92 charges over 
income from leases where the chargor did not control the bank account were held to be 
fixed and a similar result achieved by Jonathan Parker J in Royal Trust Bank v National 
Westminster Bank93 was rejected by Nourse LJ on the ground that on the facts there was 
no licence granted. 94 
The Companies Act 1985 itself recognises that security documents in the nature of bills 
of sale may still be executed by companies because in the list of charges registrable at 
Companies House is one which, if executed by an individual, would require registration 
86 Read v Joannon (1890) 25 QBD 300; John Welsted & Co v Swansea Bank (1889) 5 TLR 332; Echnonds v 
Blaina Furnaces Co(1887) 36Ch D215; Levy vAbercorris Slate and Slab Co(1887)37Ch D260. 
87 [ 1910] 2 KB 979,999. 
88 [ 19941 BCC 626. 
89 Ibid, 635, citing RM Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security. 2nded (1988), 56. 
lbid, 636. 
91 [19921 Ch 505. 
92 [1993] BCLC 386. 
93 (199612 BCLC 682. 
94 lbid, 702h. 
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as a bill of sale (s 396 (1) (c)). Companies do have the advantage that charges registered 
under s 396 (1) (c) do not have to be in the form prescribed by the Bills of Sale etc Act of 
1882 and are valid even if they would otherwise be struck down by the 1882 Act itself 
(Dublin City Distillery v Doherty" and Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co 
Ltd)96. For most practical purposes the definition of debenture in Levy v Abercorris Slate 
and Slab C097 iSsufficiently wide to prevent a charge over personal property from having 
to be in the statutory form of the Bills of Sale legislation. 
There are important differences between the two types of charge-floating and specific 
with licence-in their operation. 
(i) Only a floating charge is liable to be avoided under the Insolvency Act 1986, s. 245. 
(ii) The general priority position varies considerably. 
(iii) Priorities over judgment creditors are different. For example, if a charging order is 
made before a floating charge crystallises, the charging order prevails. This would not 
apply to a specific mortgagee. 
(iv) Whilst a floating charge continues to float, a set-off is effective, 98 whereas a mortgage 
of a debt destroys the possibility of mutuality. 99 
(v) Assets subject to a charge which as created was a floating charge are amenable to 
preferential claims in winding-up and receivership. Assets subject to a fixed charge 
are not so amenable. 
(vi) Realisatioh of a floating security requires, in Romer Us third characteristic, that 
some "step" be taken by the debenture holder. 100 In Fidelis Oditah's helpful phrase, 
that step means a step to bring "management autonomy" 10 1 of the directors over the 
assets to an end. In a fixed charge security the charge holder can intervene at any time 
under the agreement without having to take steps to crystallise anything. 
MODERN ISSUES 
It will be obvious by now that in the authors' view the current debate over the fixed charge 
on book debts or other changing assets does not raise a real issue at all. As a matter of 
principle the objection to the insistence upon possession or control as a pre-requisite of 
certain specific equitable charges is that it inserts into modern equity a medieval common 
law rule which was developed to suppress a fraud which is no longer practised, a rule, 
moreover, which equity did everything in its power to evade. Specific security over chang- 
ing assets with an express or implied power in the chargor to deal with them has a much 
95 [19141 AC 823. 
[1990] BCC 393,410-41 I, per Browne-Wilkinson V-C. 
97 (1887) 37 Ch D 260. 
99 Biggerstaff v Rowatt's Wharf [189512 Ch 93 
99 See Rory Derham, Law of Set-Off, 2nd ed (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996). 
100 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers [1903] 2 Ch 284,295. 
10, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 199 1), 111. Thus, whilst the charge 
floats the chargee cannot single out any item of property and take it to realise his debt: Evans v Rival Granite 
Quarries [1910] 2 KB 979,998 (Fletcher Moulton LJ), 999 (Buckley LJ). To similar effect is Robson v Smith 
[1895] 2 Ch 118,126. In the absence of some restraint a mortgagee whose interest is specific can take any item 
of property (see eg Greenbirt v Smee (1876) 35 LT (NS) 168) subject, however, to an obligation not to choose 
and sell items so as deliberately to destroy the value of the whole of what he sells a part (Champagne Ferrier- 
Jouet SA v HH Finch Lid [1982] 1 WLR 1359). 
86 Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review [1998] 
more venerable pedigree than the floating charge. The difficulty with the cases since Siebe 
Gorman102 is that they proceed on the false assumption that, because the power to deal 
exists as a component of the floating charge, such a power cannot exist in relation to cer- 
tain fixed charges. Debating from false premises is likely to lead to confusion. 
A few examples are noted here. 
(a) It is an "extreme commercial improbability" that a chargor who does not operate 
the bank account would wish to control it; therefore, a charge must float notwithstanding 
that the charge is stated to be fixed (Re Brightlifie Ltd). 103 William Gaskell Group v 
Highley'04 takes the opposite view. In Whitton v ACN105 Bryson J specifically dissented 
from the approach of Re Brightlifie as being irreconcilable with the third of Romer Us 
characteristics in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Ltd. The Irish Supreme Court in Re Wogan's 
(Drogheda) Ltd 105A has recently sided with the opposition to Re Brightlife. 
(b) In Re Portbase Clothing Ltd [06 counsel conceded on behalf of a private debenture 
holder that, without control of the bank account, the charge must float even though 
stated to be fixed. In contrast in Royal Trust Bank v National Westminster Bank PJC107 
counsel for the bank account operator (Natwest) conceded that his opponent's charge 
over debts was fixed despite the absence of control. 
(c) In Re G E. Tunhridge Ltd 108 the court held a charge to float where (i) it was stated 
to be fixed and (ii) in cl 6 of the debenture there was an express prohibition on selling the 
relevant assets "without the prior written consent of the lender". In Re Cimex Tissues 
Ltd109 the court held that a charge was fixed where there was a schedule of machinery 
attached to the debenture and an express power to dispose of the assets charged. The 
judge followed Professor Goode's view that, if the power to deal was not "extensive", then 
that might not be inconsistent with fixed charge. We note here that Holroyd v Marshall 
was cited in support of the judge's conclusion. 
(d) In Royal Trust BankI09A by RTBs debenture "Brookes" (the borrower) "hereby 
assigns" all the interests benefit etc in the leases and RTB agrees to "reassign" them back 
to Brookes on redemption. Brookes was to collect the income from the leases as "agent" 
for RTB (cl 31 (i)) of the debenture). By cl 15 RTB had an option to invoke stronger pow- 
ers to control the collection and payment in of funds. Notwithstanding counsel's conces- 
sion that the charge was fixed, Millet LJ stated that the charge floated. 
(e) The Royal Trust Bank case does raise some question& The problem is that c. 3(l)(i), 
even with cl 15, cannot create merely a charge. The words are "assigns" and "will ... reas- 
sign ... the agreements and other rights assigned hereunder". The references to assign- 
ment and reassignment are not mere labels. They are words of substance. In consequence 
they transfer nothing less than an equitable title over the relevant rights to RTB. A charge, 
102 [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 142. 
103 [1987] Ch 200. 
104 [1993] BCC 20 1. 
105 (1996) 14 ACLC 1799,1810-1814. 
105A [199311 IR 157 
106 [19931 BCC 96. 
107 [1996] 2 BCLC 682. 
108 [19941 BCC 563. 
109 [1994] BCC 626. 
109A [199612BCLC682. 
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whether fixed or floating, on the other hand, confers no title and no possession, as Lord 
Hoffmann expressly points out in Re BCCI (No 8). 110 
(f) Millett LJs analysis also suffers from the weakness that in a mere charge case there 
is no retransfer of any proprietary interest from chargee to chargor on redemption (see 
per Lord Atkinson in De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v British South Africa Co). 1 II That 
of course is precisely the opposite of the agreement which appears in Royal Trust Bank's 
debenture. 
(g) Furthermore, Millett LJs approach to the meaning of the debenture falls foul of the 
well-known rule of construction of contracts laid down by the House of Lords in 
Whitworth Street Estates Ltd v Miller' 12 that what the parties do about a contract after it 
has been made must not be allowed to affect its meaning. 
(h) In Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd' 13 the Court of Appeal held that the power of sale 
in the ICE standard form of contract created a floating charge on plant, materials and 
equipment on the employer's site nothwithstanding that the employer could refuse to let 
items go back to the contractor and could sell them to recoup loss caused by failure of the 
contractor to complete the contract. If this case had been decided in the 1790s instead of 
the 1990s, the facts here would constitute a novus actus sufficient to satisfy the sort of 
eighteenth century common lawyer who disdained a pillow in favour of Bacon's Maxims. 
SUMMARY 
Since this has been something of a sprawling exposition of long strands of law, a simpli- 
fied chronology may help. 
1.1709: specific security over changing assets accepted in equity (not law). 
2. Bills of sale over all of a trader's present and future assets become common through- 
out the eighteenth century. Debts were included by 1758 at the latest. The borrower 
deals with the assets. 
3.1804: Lord Eldon expressly implies the power to deal in order to give business efficacy 
to bills of sale. This was merely taken for granted before, though it is the basis of the 
"order and disposition" cases in bankruptcy. 
4.1862: Holroyd v Marshall ends the common law and equity dispute about the effect of 
future property mortgages. 
5.1870: Panama lays down some new ideas about the old Companies Clauses Act statu- 
tory form of mortgage borrowed for a Companies Act company (the floating charge). 
6.1882: the Bills of Sale etc Act outlaws future property bills of sale. - 7.1884-1887: decisions on the 1882 Act render nugatory the operation of the s 17 excep- 
tion for company debentures. 
8.189 1: Standard Manufacturing, a floating charge case, gives full scope to s 17. The float- 
ing charge takes off. 9.1979: Siebe Gorman raises the "modern" issue of fixed charges on book debts. Control 
of the bank account test is laid down. 
1 10 [199713 WLR 909,197H. 
... [19121 AC 52,69. 
1 12 [19701 AC 583. 
113 [199812 WLR 131; [1997] BCC 724. 
14 The Lmv Quarterly Review [Vol. 115 
Counsel for Arco pointed out that Allocation Agreements were fre- 
quently not signed until the last moment and that in this instance they had 
been only been a few days late in a contract that was intended to run for 14 
years. In these circumstances could it really have been the intention of the 
parties that the whole contract should go for such a small matter, especially 
bearing in mind the huge consequences? Lord Steyn and Lord Hope of 
Craighead, in particular, would like to have reached a decision in Arco's 
favour. But even they could not do so. 
The majority of the House thought that Aberfoyle Plantations Limited v. 
Khew Bain Cheng [1960] A. C. 115 was relevant but Lord Steyn thought it 
unhelpful because it concerned a land transaction. This apart, no differ- 
ences in law emerged in the House. What is important about the decision 
is that first Peter Gibson and Otton LJJ. and then the House of Lords did 
not follow some supposedly liberal rule of construction (perhaps even 
invent one) to find in favour of the merits of the case. Would the decision 
of today have been reached by a court a few years ago? This must be a 
matter of real doubt. Perhaps the Chancery judges (with the honourable 
exception of Peter Gibson L. J. ) thought overmuch about the consequences 
of their judgments, whereas the others thought more about what the parties 
had said in their professionally drafted agreement. The approach of Peter 
Gibson L. J. was surely the right one. Those who care about the proper 
construction of agreements, and statutes, must care that words are given 
their correct meaning and not some artificial meaning to suit a particular 
result. Everyone must be grateful to the House of Lords for their decision 
in this case. 
B. J. D"ENPORT. 
BOOK DEBT CHARGES-THE SAGA GOES ON 
IN Re Westmaze Ltd (May 15,1998) the company ("Westmaze") borrowed 
E53,000 from Excelsior and by a debenture gave a "first fixed" charge over 
"all book and other debts revenues and claims both present and 
future. .. . ". These were the "Charged Assets". The debenture also 
provided that Westmaze should "not (without the previous consent in 
writing of Excelsior) transfer lease or dispose of the Charged Assets". The 
Inland Revenue succeeded in its contention that the debt charge floated and 
Excelsior ranked behind preferential claims. 
Mr David Oliver Q. c., sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, held that 
Westmaze's power to deal with the proceeds was the badge of a floating 
charge and refused to construe , 
the negative pledge "as precluding the 
operation of a bank account in the ordinary course of that business". He 
also declined to enter into the Re New Bullas Trading Ltd [ 1994] B. C. C. 36 
distinction between a debt and its proceeds (though doubting whether they 
were always inseparable) on the ground that the charge here referred to 
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11 revenues" which "clearly" included "proceeds upon realisation". He was 
reinforced in his view by Re Brightlife Ltd [19871 Ch. 200 and Re Pearl 
Maintenance Services Ltd [1995] B. C. C. 657. 
In Re Double S Printers Ltd (March 25,1998), the chargee (as with 
Westmaze) was not the cheque clearing bank. The facts are, however, the 
converse of those in Westmaze-there was no contractual restraint on 
disposal or dealings but the chargee was a director, cheque signatory and 
actual controller of the company's bank account. Jonathan Parker J. sitting 
in Leeds, held that control of the bank account was relevant only if 
exercised by him as chargee, not as director, because in the latter capacity 
he could only act bona fide in the company's interests, rather than for 
collateral purposes. A further weakness in the chargee's case was that 
control and directorship were conterminous. The charge, therefore, floated 
and preferential claims ranked first. 
The apparent surefootedness of these two judgments only serves to 
emphasise the predicament of would-be fixed chargees. The vulnerability 
of floating charges until crystallisation to subsequent dealings, charges, set- 
offs and enforcements combined with deferment on crystallisation to 
preferential creditors and, pace Re Portbase (Clothing) Ltd [1993] B. C. C. 
96, the expenses of liquidation, render such security somewhat insecure. 
The great question is: Where, and how, is the line to be drawn between 
fixed and floating charges? There are no clear answers, even in relation to 
the most fundamental issues such as what a fixed charge actually is. For 
example, the Comptroller and Auditor General thinks it is a mortgage (see 
Report to the DTI, HC695 Session 1995-1996, October 17.1996 "Glos- 
sary of Terms"); Lord Hoffmann in Re BCCI (No. 8) [1998] A. C. 214 at 
p. 226, with whom we respectfully agree, points out that a charge confers 
neither title nor possession; according to Farwell J. "The very essence of 
a specific charge is that the assignee takes possession. .. " (Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch. 284 at p. 289); Holroyd v. 
Marshall (1862) 10 H. L. C. 191 actually decided that an equitable mort- 
gage of future personalty is complete without possession; in Re Keenan 
Bros Ltd (1986) 2 B. C. C. 98,970 at p. 98,973 Henchy J. said that the 
"distinguishing features of a fixed charge" would entail "assets ... 
withdrawn from ordinary trade use, put in the keeping of the debenture 
holder and sterilised and made undisposable save at the absolute discretion 
of the debenture holder". Millett L. J. wanted to see "control" vested in the 
debenture holder (Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [ 1997] B. C. C. 724); and in 
Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [ 1992] Ch. 505 and Re Atlantic Medical 
Ltd [19931 B. C. C. 386 the absence of control over the proceeds did not 
cause a charge covering lease income to float. 
Furthermore, in plotting this line "a floating charge is consistent with 
some restriction upon the company's freedom to deal with its assets" and 
a power to deal which is not "extensive" is consistent with a fixed charge 
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(respectively Brightlife, supra, at p. 209 and Re Chnex Tissues Ltd [ 1994] 
B. C. C. 626 at p. 635). 
As regards debentures in favour of clearers of the chargor's bank 
account, a direction to pay proceeds into the account plus minimal 
restrictions suffice to create a fixed interest. Non-clearing chargees stand on 
less certain ground. Non-contractual de facto control is insufficient 
(Double S Printers, supra), as is an unexercised contractual power to open 
and control a bank account (per Knox J. in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd 
[1993] B. C. C. 251 at p. 260). In addition, clauses restraining all dealings 
without prior chargee consent have been variously treated-they do not 
prevent the operation of the account in the ordinary course of business 
(Wetsmaze); they are in line with the kind of restriction to be expected in 
a floating charge (Re G. E. Tunbridge Ltd [1994] B. C. C. 563 at p. 567); and 
they are an "extreme commercial improbability" which cannot have been 
intended (Brightlife, supra, at p. 209). In a further contrast to Brightlife, the 
relevance to the construction of the charge document of (a) post contractual 
conduct and (b) extraneous agreements, such as bank mandates, has been 
doubted (see respectively Bryson J. in Whitton v. ACN (1996) 14 A. C. L. C. 
1,799 at p. 1,813 and Knox J. Re a Company No. 005009 of 1987 (1988) 
4 B. C. C. 424 at pp. 434-435). 
There is a question as to the true nature of the security interest acquired 
by the lender in Royal Trust Bank v. National Westminster Bank Plc [ 1996] 
B. C. L. C. 682. There RTB; took an assignment of the debts of Brookes (the 
borrower) and agreed to reassign them on redemption. Brookes was 
"agent" to collect debts and pay into an account at Natwest. RTB took 
further powers to open its own bank account with Brookes and require 
Brookes to credit proceeds or, on demand, terminate Brookes's power of 
collection and collect them itself. Natwest conceded that RTB's charge was 
fixed. Nourse L. J. held that the chargor/chargee relationship was insuffi- 
cient to create a trust and that Brookes was merely under a duty to account 
to RTB (supra, at p. 701). Millett L. J. held there was a floating charge (at 
p. 706). The issue was fogged by the concession. In the author's 
submission assignment and agreement to reassign on redemption are words 
of mortgage, not charge. Furthermore in a charge there is no retransfer on 
redemption (De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v. British South Africa Co. 
[1992] A. C. 52 at p. 69). 
The third of the recent cases, Coakley v. Argent, June 12,1998, invites 
a question on equitable interests in personalty. The chargee had a 
debenture, which Rimer J. held to float over book debts, and a later 
assignment (absolute in form) over certain claims to insurance proceeds. 
Applying the "improbable commercial miracle" test Rimer J. decided that 
the assignment was by way of charge and, since the right to the proceeds 
was not a "book" debt, it was valid without registration. The case 
resembles Pearl Maintenance, where the factor had a debenture floating on C, 
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debts and a separate assignment (absolute, unlike that in Coakley) of debts. 
In neither of these cases was merger of interests discussed, though it might 
have affected the nature of the argument in Coakley and the outcome of 
Pearl Maintenance. 
As Knox J. pointed out in Re a Company No. 005009 (1988) 4 B. C. C. 
424 at p. 435 this "class of work" is one in which the value of precedents 
and certainty is very important. The controversies which presently sur- 
round security over personalty are damaging to lenders and borrowers. 
ROGER GREGORY. * 
PETER WALTON. * 
MURDER, MENs REA, AND THE HOUSE OF LORDs-AGAIN 
ON August 16,1994, Stephen Woollin lost his temper. He threw his three- 
month-old son against a hard surface. The child's skull fractured and death 
ensued. Woollin was convicted of murder. At issue, both during trial and on 
appeal, was mens rea: whether he had intended to inflict serious injury 
upon the child. It was not contended by the Crown that he had intended to 
kill, nor that he had desired to cause death or serious injury. Rather, the 
prosecution's case was that Woollin must have realised that his actions 
were virtually certain to cause serious injury to the baby; therefore, in law, 
he intended to cause such injury. 
Summing up, the Recorder of Leeds had directed the jury largely in 
accordance with the guidelines set out by the Court of Appeal in Nedrick 
[1986] 1 W. L. R. 1025 at p. 1028, in which Lord Lane C. J. had said that 
where specific guidance on intention was required, "the jury should be 
directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless 
they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty 
(barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant's 
actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case. " 
Unfortunately, the summing up also contained the following passage: "[If 
you] are quite satisfied that he was aware of what he was doing and must 
have realised and appreciated when he threw that child that there was a 
substantial risk that he would cause serious injury to it, then it would be 
open to you to find that he intended to cause injury to the child and you 
should convict him of murder. " Before both the Court of Appeal ([1997] 
1 Cr. App. R. 97) and the House of Lords ([1998] 3 W. L. R. 382), the 
appellant claimed this passage constituted a misdirection, because it 
defined intention by reference to foresight of a substantial risk rather than 
(per Nedrick) of a virtual certainty. There is no question but that these are 
materially different definitions. What was at issue, therefore, was whether 
* University of Wolverhampton. 
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Introduction 
-The authors are not looking forward to the arrival of the New Zealand Court of 
-Appeal's decision in Re Brumark Investments Ltd' for hearing in the Privy Council lbecause their Lordships will probably have to come clean and finally tell us what 
a floating charge really is. In so doing they will probably blow the final whistle on 
, one of the most fascinating spectator sports in legal history which has engaged ]hundreds of players and commentators and has provoked stunning intellectual feats. 
In all the vagaries and contradictions which abound, ' especially in the fixed/ floating dichotomy of book debt charges, two things have appeared reliable: one is Professor Goode's statement that the "precise nature of the floating charge 
remains a matter of controverSy"3. - the other is that when the courts have to 
plaster over the cracks in the floating charge structure they need only apply a bit 
')f Yorkshire Woolcombers. 1 In the authors' view that leaves only Professor Goode 
standing. 
The Yorkshire Woolcombers' judgments are largely characterised by the famous 
exchange between Vaughan Williams L. J. in the Court of Appeal and Lord Mac- 
nag ten in the House of Lords. Vaughan Williams L J. 5 commented that Lord 
acnaghten's purported definition of a floating charge in Governments Stock and 
Other Securities Investment Co. Ltd v. Manila Railway Co. Ltd" used the word "dor- 
mant", ' which could not amount to definition because the word was applicable 
not directly but only by analogy. In response Lord Macnaghten readily disclaimed 
definitional significance for "dormant" but equally readily claimed it for "ambu- 
latory and shifting ... hovering over and so to speak floating. .. 
" On the day the 
difference between specific and floating security proved no less elusive than the 
difference between analogy and definition. 
The security document in Yorkshire Woolcombers had the following character- 
istics: 
(a) It was drafted as a mortgage not a charge. 
(b) It related simply to book debts. 
(c) The security holders were trustees who had the benefit of the following 
clause: 
"Ithey shall not I... be answerable for, or in anywise chargeable on account of, 
permitting or authorizing the association to receive all or any such debts, or to 
deal with the same or the proceeds as if they were not subject to the mortgage 
hereby created. "9 
The mortgage was not registered in the Companies Registry. The question was 
whether it was a floating charge which required registration. At that time a 
ýecurity over book debts was not a distinct category of registrable security 
"Iterest. 10 
1[19991 N. Z. C. A. 227. 
2 See e. g. Gregory and 
Walton, "Book Debt 
Charges-the Saga Goes On" 
(1999) 115 L. Q. R. 14. 
' "The Exodus of the Floating 
Charge" in Feldman and 
Meisel (eds. ), Corporate and 
Commercial Law: Modern 
Developments (Lloyds of 
London Press, 1996), p. 193 at 
p. 197. 
4 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers' 
Association Ltd [190312 Ch. 
284, High Court and Court 
of Appeal decisions reported 
together. The House of Lords 
adopted both courts' 
decisions sub nom. Illingworth 
v. Houldsworth [19041 A. C. 
355. 
5 [190312 Ch. 284 at 291-282. 
6 [18971 A. C. 81. 
7 ibid. at 86. This repeats 
Lord Macnaghten's 
characterisation of a floating 
charge in Tailby v. Official 
Receiver (1888) 13 App. Cas. 
523 at 541. 
8 [19041 A. C. 355 at 358. 
9 [190312 Ch. 284 at 287. 
10 Companies Act 1900, s. 14 
listed securities requiring 
registration. Companies Act 
1907, s. 10 added mortgages 
and charges over book debts 
to this list shortly after the 
decision in Yorkshire 
Woolcombers on the 
recommendation of the 
Warmington Committee 
(Report of the Company Law 
Amendment Committee 1906 
(Cd. 3052), para. 37). 
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The decision in all three courts was that the transaction amounted to a regis- 
trable floating charge. The judgments are notable for their conciseness and the 
absence of analysis and authority in support of some resounding ex cathedra 
propositions which appear in them. Some of these merit consideration rather than 
the unhesitating acceptance and citation which has followed. It is proposed to 
consider a few of them in this article. 
Yorkshire Woolcombers 
"The very essence of a specific charge is that the assignee takes possession, and is the 
person entitled to receive the book debts at once. "" 
This view was approved by Hutton J. in Re Armagh Shoes Ltd 12 in settling the test 
of control of the bank account in which proceeds of the chargor's debts are held . 13 Henchy J. 's "keeping", "sterilised and made undisposable" in Re Keenan Bros Ltd 14 
is to the same effect. Other book debt charge cases follow this pattern. " The 
consequence is that the only way to have a fixed charge on book debts is to give 
notice to the debtors or to take possession of the proceeds of book debts. It is 
interesting that Farwell J. did not cite any case law irr support, of his sentence. The 
reason for this is that there is none. In 1903 that sentence was erroneous, per 
incuriam and destructive of the root principle of the equitable charge. 
Cases decided prior to Yorkshire Woolcombers suggest overwhelmingly that a 
mortgage of assets which did not require possession to pass to the mortgagee and 
permitted the mortgagor to carry on business using the mortgaged assets in the 
ordinary way were standard commercial practice . 16 They were effective in equity and fixed on to future assets as soon as those assets came into existence. 17 In order 
to promote trade, equity always permitted either an express or implied power in 
the mortgagor to deal with the mortgaged assets. Mortgages over debts were 
treated in the same way as stock in trade, machinery and equipment. 
The decisions turned upon a number of issues. The common law refused to 
recognise a mortgage of future personalty without a novus actus, usually mort- 
gagee possession. Equity's view for centuries was that such possession was not 
required. Chancery also had to contend with disputes between moneylenders 
with mortgage securities and other creditors of the mortgagor. The outcome 
usually depended upon a variety of statutory provisions introduced piecemeal to 
alter the balance between the interests of secured and unsecured creditors. The 
most common disputes included the effect of the order and disposition clause in 
11 [190312 Ch. 284 at 289 per 
Farwell J. 
12 (1984) 1 B. C. L. C. 405 at 
415. 
13 In the context of bank 
accounts, the requirement of 
possession seems to be 
satisfied by the bank 
exercising control over the 
bank account: see Viscount 
Simonds in Rahimtoola v. 
Nizam of Hyderabad [19581 
A. C. 379 at 395. 
14 (1986) 2 B. C. C. 98,970 at 
98,976. 
's See e. g. Chalk v. Kahn 
(February 29,2000, 
unreported); Re ASRS 
Establishment Ltd, The Times, 
November 17,1999; Re 
Brumark Ltd [19991 N. Z. C. A. 
227, Re Westmaze Ltd 11999] 
B. C. C. 441; Re Double S 
Printers Ltd [19991 B. C. C. 303; 
Royal Trust Bank v. National 
Westminster Bank plc 119961 
B. C. C. 613; Re New Bullas 
Trading Ltd [19941 B. C. C. 36; 
Re Brightlife Ltd [19871 Ch. 
200; Siebe Gorman & Co. Ltd 
v. Barclays Bank Ltd [19791 
Lloyd's Rep. 142. 
16 See the list of cases in the 
Appendix to this article. 
17 Ryall v. Rolle (1749) 1 Atk. 
165 per Lord Hardwicke. In 
line with the bankruptcy 
practice at the time, however, 
Lord Hardwicke called in 
other judges, who came from 
the common law courts and 
firmly placed mortgages 
where the mortgagor 
remained in possession with 
power to deal within the 
order and disposition clause 
of the Bankruptcy Act 1623. 
The other landmark cases are 
Bucknal v. Roiston (1709) Prec. 
in Ch. 286; Nutbrown v. 
Thornton (1804) 10 Ves. Jun. 
160; Re Ship Warre (1817) 8 
Price 271. Cf. the common 
law proceedings in the same 
case reported as Robinson v. 
McDonnell (1816) 5 M. & S. 
228; Davenport v. Whitmore 
(1836) 2 My. & Cr. 521; 
Holroyd v. Marshall (1862) 10 
H. L. C. 191. 
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bankruptCy, 18 fraudulent conveyances as acts of bankruptcy, 19 the Statute of 
Frauds, 20 the Bills of Sale Acts" and competition between mortgagees on the one 
'8 In e. g. Re Eslick (1876) 4 
Ch. D. 496 a mortgage by an 
upholsterer of inter alia stock 
in trade and future goods 
was followed by the 
mortgagor filing for 
liquidation under the 
Bankruptcy Act 1869. He had 
remained in possession and 
carried on business for 
nearly four months following 
the mortgage. Due to 
attempts to enforce the 
mortgage prior to the 
liquidation, the court held 
that the goods were not at 
the time of filing any longer 
in the order and disposition 
of the mortgagor with the 
consent of the true owner. 
The mortgage was upheld. 
19 In e. g. Ex p. King (1876) 2 
Ch. D. 256 a brewer 
mortgaged inter alia the 
effects placed on the 
property during the 
continuance of the security. 
Substantially all the 
mortgagor's property was 
mortgaged but because the 
mortgage was in 
consideration of a fresh 
advance of money it was 
held not to be an act of 
bankruptcy. James L. J. 
commented at 263: "1 come 
to the conclusion that the 
advances were substantial, 
and were bona fide made for 
the purpose of enabling the 
debtor to carry on his trade". 
20 13 Eliz. 1 c. 5--codifying 
the common law rule. See 
Bucknal v. Roiston (1709) Prec. 
in Ch. 285 and Edwards v. 
Harben (1788) 2 T. R. 587. 
21 In order to combat the 
potential fraud of secret 
mortgages of chattels the 
Bills of Sale Act 1854 
required public registration. 
Non-registration had the 
consequence, inter alia, that 
the mortgage was void 
against a judgment 
creditor-see e. g. HaWtry v. 
Butlin (1873) 8 Q. B. 290. 
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hand and subsequent purchasers22 or judgment creditorS23 on the other. 
Prior to, and briefly for a period after, the invention of the floating charge, " it 
was extremely common for trade lending to be financed by mortgages of present 
and future personalty which attached to assets as they circulated, which per- 
mitted dealing with the mortgaged assets and substitution of newly acquired 
assets for those dealt with. As James L. J., one of the originators of the floating 
charge, stated in Ex p. Games": 
"The mortgagor was intended to remain in possession of the property and to 
carry on his business, substituting new chattels for those which he sold in the 
course of his business, and the security of the mortgagee was to remain upon 
the substituted chattels. He got the substituted chattels in place of those which 
he allowed to be withdrawn by the mortgagor. " 
Farwell J. 's requirement for possession is per incuriam. Holroyd v. Marshall 26 is clear 
House of Lords authority that possession is not a prerequisite of an equitable 
interest or title. It decided that in equity a mortgage of present and future 
"machinery implements and things" fixed in or placed about a mill, was complete 
as regards future items as soon as property covered by the terms of the mortgage 
came into the mortgagor's hands. Thilby v. Official Receiver" (Lord Macnaghten 
excepted) was to the same effect as Holroyd . 28 As a matter of principle there are deeper objections to Farwell J. 's dictum. 
(1) It subsumes a fixed equitable charge into a cornmon law pledge-the very 
thing equity fought against for several hundred years. 
(2) If Farwell J. is right, then the process of crystallisation of a floating charge 
through, for example, winding up, cessation of business or non-compli- 
ance with a demand, does not operate to convert the floating charge into a 
fixed charge since none of those events involves possession. 
(3) Farwell J. 's dictum entails the consequence that there is no such person as 
a specific chargee but 'only a specific chargee in possession. The severe 
consequences visited upon mortgagees in possession normally dictate that 
mortgagees do not take possession . 21 The notion that one cannot also 
acquire the status of a fixed chargee without the penalties of possession is 
difficult to comprehend. ' 
(4) Possession (or a right to it) would confer a special property in the person- 
alty subject to the charge and would, therefore, be protected by common 
law action. Such an action, however, is not available in support of an 
equitable interest simpliciter. If it were, MCC Proceeds Inc. v. Lehmann Bros 
International (Europe)31 would be wrongly decided. Interestingly, the Court 
of Appeal in that case relied on the future personalty mortgage cases of 
Joseph v. LyonS32 and Hallas v. Robinson33 to show that such mortgages, being 
purely equitable, did not carry common law remedies and that the Judi- 
cature Acts had not confounded legal and equitable interests. 
34 "A specific security is that which is given on specific property. " 
]Farwell J. 's insistence that a specific security was one given on specific property is entirely consistent with the future property mortgage cases, in which identifica- 
tion by class description was standard practice. The common law recognised class description but, unlike equity, regarded a mortgage transfer of future property, in 
--, 'the absence of a novus actus, as nothing more than a contract. This battle between 
the common law and equity was finally won by equity in the House of Lords case 
I& Holroyd v. Marshall. " Following the judicature Acts 1873-75, the equitable rule 
,,: had to be applied in all Divisions of the High Court. 36 
The ýnly dispute remaining was as to the meaning of specific property. In 
'11olroyd, certain dicta of Lord Westbury suggested that an equitable mortgage of future property would only be valid if, on the facts, specific performance would 
'be granted. The Court of Appeal used these dicta to introduce a new concept of 
, Vagueness, that is, if specific performance would not be available regarding the future property in question, the property was too uncertain and consequently 
'. there could be no equitable mortgage . 31 This fledgling doctrine was dismissed, gain by the House of Lords, in T ailby v. Official Receiver, " where it was held that 
120M] INSOLV. L ISSUE 40 SWEET & MAXWELL, I. L. A. AND CONTRIBUTORS 
22The mortgagee could 
challenge a sale by the 
mortgagor if not effected in 
the ordinary course of 
business-see e. g. Payne v. 
Fern (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 620 and 
Walker v. Clay (1880) 49 
L. J. Q. B. 560. 
23See e. g. Bradley v. Copley 
(1845) 1 C. B. 685 where a 
mortgage was executed over 
present and future property. 
The mortgagor was 
permitted under its terms to 
possess and make use of the 
assets until default. Prior to 
default the sheriff seized 
goods under a writ of fifa. 
An action by the mortgagee 
in trover failed because until 
default he had no right to 
possession. 
"Taken to be Re Panama, 
New Zealand and Australian 
Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 
Ch. App. 318. 
1 (1879) 12 Ch. D. 314 at 323. 
26 (1862) 10 H. L. C. 191. 
27 (1888) 13 App. Cas. 523. 
28As Halsbury says, "the 
grantor of a security bill of 
sale will almost invariably 
remain in possession 
himself". (Vol. 4 (1) Bills of 
Sale, para. 798). 
29See e. g. Mite v. City of 
London Brewery (1889) 42 
Ch. D. 437 for a consideration 
of the onerous duties of a 
mortgagee in possession. See 
also Medforth v. Blake [19991 
B. C. C. 771 at 766 per Scott 
V. -C. 30 See e. g. Fisher and 
Lightwood on Mortgages (10th 
ed., Butterworths, London, 
1988), P. 4: "A charge is the 
appropriation of real or 
personal property for the 
discharge of a debt of other 
obligation, without giving 
the creditor either a general 
or special property in, or 
possession of, the subject of 
the security". 
-11 [199814 All E. R. 675. 32(1884) 15 Q. B. D. 280. 
33 (1884) 15 Q. B. D. 288. 
-'4 [190312 Ch. 284 at 289 per 
Farwell J. 
35 (1862) 10 H. L. C. 191. 
'Anon [18751 W. N. 203. 
37 Belding v. Read (1865) 3 
H. & C. 955. 
1 (1888) 13 App. Cas. 523. 
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a mortgage of book debts from any business that might be carried on by the 
mortgagor was specific and, applying Holroyd, became effective as soon as future 
debts arose, without the need for any novus actus or any requirement to show that 
specific performance would be available. Width of language must not be confused 
with vagueness. 
"A charge on all book debts which may now be, or at any time hereafter become charged 
or assigned, leaving the mortgagor or assignor free to deal with them as he pleases until 
the mortgagee or assignee intervenes, is not a specific charge, and cannot be. "" 
One cause of the present contradictory positions taken up in relation to charges 
over book debts (as well as other personalty) is use of language. As Fisher and 
Lightwood say, "Both 'mortgage' and 'charge' are often loosely used as a generic 
term for all species of security... The mortgage and charge have, indeed, been 
gradually assin-dlated, so that today for practical purposes there is little difference 
between them ... though the fundamental difference in their nature remains". ' Judicial examples of this interchangeability approach to "mortgage" and "charge" 
are Yorkshire WoolcomberS41 itself, Royal Trust Bank v. National Westminster Bank plC41 
and Re Margart Pty Ltd . 43 Extrajudicially the Comptroller and Auditor General44 defined a mortgage as a fixed charge. 
Whatever the position may be in relation to land, corporate mortgages and 
charges over personalty are still the almost exclusive domain of common law and 
equity and there are practical consequences turning on the distinction. 
Legal Mortgage: This involves a transfer of the legal title. It also confers a right 
to possession (which can be contracted out of, waived or licensed away). 
Equitable Mortgage: This involves a transfer of an equitable title. Obtaining 
possession is somewhat more indirect than it is at law because the mortgage is 
complete without possession. It can be obtained by, for example, an express 
contractual provision, the exercise of any right to call for the legal title or a court 
order. In the case of choses in action the process of serving notice on the principal 
debtor to avoid problems such as the rule in Dearle v. Hal145and the bona fide legal 
purchaser for value without notice, also constituted, under the Bankruptcy Acts, 
"possession" for the (purely statutory) purposes of the order and disposition 
clause. 46 
Equitable Charge: This confers neither title nor possession. "" 
There are differences in relation to remedy, for example, remedies in tort are not 
available to protect purely equitable interests, a mere chargee cannot foreclose" 
and the power of sale is implied in mortgages of personal property The process 
of redemption is entirely different. "' As a consequence the judgments of Lord 
Hoffmann in Morris v. Agrichemicals Ltd 51 and Millett L. J. (as he then was) in Re 
Cosslett Contractors Ltd, 51 which expressly distinguish mortgages from charges, are 
very helpful. 
An example of the confusion of principle which may arise if the distinction 
between "mortgages" and "charges" is not maintained is Royal Trust Bank v. 
National Westminster Bank pIC. 52 There the words creating the security were that 
Brookes, the borrower, "assigns" the debts to Royal Trust and the latter agreed to 
reassign them to Brookes on redemption. In addition Brookes was appointed as 
agent of Royal Trust to collect the income from the leasing and hire purchase 
agreements, which constituted the subject matter of the security The Court of 
Appeal's judgments, apart from one reference '53 treat the transaction as one of charge (National Westminster conceded that Royal Trust had a fixed charge). This 
raises the following issues: 
(1) In the case of a charge there is nothing to retransfer upon redemption 
because no title is transferred to a chargee by virtue of a charge . 54 The clause in Royal Trust Bank is to the opposite effect. It created a mortgage, 
which is incapable of being a floating charge. 
(2) The implied term which Millett L. J. used to find a floating charge55 is 
inconsistent with Royal Trust's title and a term cannot be implied if it 
contradicts an express term. -6 
(3) The Court57 applied Henry v. Hammond., 511 The issue at stake there was 
whether the agency relationship (the only relationship between the parties) 
was of a proprietary character. It is perfectly clear that an agency may or 
may not have that character. It is equally clear that a mortgagor/ mortgagee 
39 [190312 Ch. 284 at 289 per 
Farwell J. 
40 Fisher and Lightwood on 
Mortgages (10th ed., 
Butterworths, London, 1988), 
P. 5. 
41 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers' 
Association Ltd [190312 Ch. 
284 and Illingworth v. 
Houldsworth [19041 A. C. 355. 
42 [19961 B. C. C. 613. 
43 [19851 B. C. L. C. 314. 
44 Report to the DTI HC695 
Session 1995-96, October 17, 
1996 "Glossary of Terms". 
4-1 (1823-28) 3 Russ. 1. 
46 An early discussion is Jones 
v. Gibbon (1800) 1 Ves. 461 per 
Lord Eldon. 
47 See e. g. Peter Gibson J. in 
Carreras Rothmans v. Freeman 
Mathews Treasure [19851 Ch. 
207 at 227 and Lindley Lj. in 
Re Marriage, Neave & Co. 
[189612 Ch. 663 at 673. 
48 MCC Proceeds Inc. v. 
Lehmann Bros. 1199814 All 
E. R. 675 and Carreras 
Rothmans v. Freeman Mathews 
Treasure [19851 Ch. 207 at 227 
respectively. 
49 There is no retransfer upon 
redemption in the case of 
charge since transfer is not 
involved in its creation (De 
Beers Consolidated Mines v. 
British South Africa Co. [19121 
A. C. 52 at 69). 
50 [19971 B. C. C. 965 at 972. 
-11 [19971 B. C. C. 724 at 733C. 
52 [19961 B. C. C. 613. 
53 ibid. at 618 per Millett L. J. 
54 De Beers Consolidated Mines 
v. British South Africa Co. 
[19121 A. C. 52 at 69. 
-1-1 [19961 B. C. C. 613 at 619D. 
-16 For when terms will be 
implied into contracts see 
generally e. g. Beatson, 
Anson's Law of Contract (27th 
ed., Oxford University Press, 
1998), pp. 143-156. 
57 [19961 B. C. C. 613 at 615 
and 618. 
-111 [191312 K. B. 515. 
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or chargor/chargee relationship is proprietary. 51 In Royal Trust Bank, 
Brookes' agency was merely ancillary to the mortgage. Nourse L. J. 's analy- 
sis' 10 that in the absence of a trust obligation to keep the property in specie 
there is a duty to account, empties the security relationship of its proprie- 
tary character. In fact, Lord Eldon settled this point nearly 200 years ago in 
Nutbrozvn v. Thornton 61 where he acceded to an application by a mortgagor 
to have the mortgaged assets which had been seized by the mortgagee 
returned to the mortgagor for the express purpose of allowing the mortga- 
gor to deal with them. Lord Eldon refused in terms to require the mortga- 
gor to keep the assets in specie, holding that Fells v. Read 62 was inapplicable. 
This is a feature of many of the cases cited in the Appendix to this arti- 
cle. 63 
(4) The Court of Appeal found that Royal Trust's notice to National West- 
minster (not sent to Brookes) of its interest in the debts was insufficient to 
give Royal Trust priority over the set-off by National Westminster. In the 
case of a mortgage this would have been sufficient. 
As has been stated, at the time of Yorkshire Woolcombers it elf there was no public 
registration requirement for specific securities over book debts. Floating charges 
though were subject to public registration. In a climate where fraud and uncon- 
scionable conduct by company participators; was common, it is no great surprise 
that the courts were keen to find that, what was expressed to be an assignment of 
book debts, on the facts constituted a floating charge. The Court of Appeal in 
Yorkshire Woolcombers specifically quoted a clause in the security agreement, 
which is quoted as point (c) in the introduction to this article. The clause contains 
an express reference to dealing and could be prayed in aid of the courts' conclu- 
sion that the charge floated. In the authors' view, the clause is no more than an 
exemption clause and may be regarded as unusual, given the circumstances in 
Which the agreement was executed. In the context of the agreement it is not 
surprising that the trustees would not wish to be made liable for allowing the 
Company to carry on trading. 
". ,. it is quite clear that anything which may take effect as a floating security is wholly inconsistent with, and is the antithesis of, a specific security". 64 
Parwell J. 's view that a floating charge is the antithesis of a fixed charge has 
lasUally been taken by company lawyers in conjunction with Romer L. J. 's three 
Characteristics of a floating charge: 
"(1. ) If it is a charge on a. class of assets of a company present and future; (2. ) 
if that class is one which, in the ordinary course of the business of the company, 
would be changing from time to time; and (3. ) if you find that by the charge it 
is contemplated that, until some future step is taken by or on behalf of those 
interested in the charge, the company may carry on its business in the ordinary 
way as far as concerns the particular class of assets I am dealing with . 1165 
thus, the present expositions of the book debt charge law often start with an acceptance of Romer L. J. 's characteristics and assume that a fixed charge must have the opposite characteristics. Hence Dr Gough considers it a "conceptual 4npossibility"66to postulate a fixed charge unless specific consent to the disposal rif any specific item of charged property is forthcoming from the fixed chargee. The book debt charge caseS67 probably represent the most sustained application W Farwell J. 's antithesis point-the floating charge subsisting in Romer L. J. 's tQrms and the fixed charge exhibiting none of the relevant characteristics. This approach was erroneous in 1903 and is, in the authors' view, no better traday. The apparently antithetical characteristics referred to were laid down with- % any ana sis or citation of authority. 611 This is unfortunate because had any of the cases cited in the Appendix to this article been taken into account, it would 
ave been overwhelmingly clear that much of what passes for the characteristics 
the floating charge was present in future personalty mortgages and had been llfl)r a ve long time prior to 1903. It is the authors' submission that Farwell J. was correct to describe fixed and 
oating charges as antithetical. The issue, however, is: what matters are anti- 
i hetical? 
59 For a recent informed 
discussion see Wily v. St 
George Partnership Banking 
[19991 B. P. I. R. 1030 
(Fed. Ct. Aus. ). 
60 [19961 B. C. C. 613 at 615G. 
61 (1804) 10 Ves. Jun. 159. 
62 (1796) 3 Ves. 70. 
63 See e. g. Hutton v. Cruttwell 
(1852) 22 L. J. Q. 13.78; Joseph v. 
Lyons (1884) 15 Q. B. D. 280 
and Re Neal 1191412 K. B. 
910. An early example is 
Ryall v. Rolle (1749) 1 Atk. 
165 where it was accepted 
that the mortgaged stock in 
trade underwent several 
changes. 
64 [190312 Ch. 284 at 289 per 
Farwell J. 
65ibid. at 295. 
"Gough, Company Charges 
(2nd ed, Butterworths, 
London, 1996), p. 368. 
67 See e. g. Chalk v. Kahn 
(February 29,2000, 
unreported); Re ASRS 
Establishment Ltd, The Times, 
November 17,1999; Re 
Brumark Ltd [19991 N. Z. C. A. 
227; Re Westmaze Ltd [19991 
B. C. C. 441; Re Double S 
Printers Ltd [19991 B. C. C. 303; 
Royal Trust Bank v. National 
Westminster Bank plc [19961 
B. C. C. 613; Re Nezv Bullas 
Trading Ltd [19941 B. C. C. 36; 
Re Brightlife Ltd [19871 Ch. 
200; Re Brightlife Ltd [19871 
Ch. 200; Re Keenan Bros Ltd 
(1986) 2 B. C. C. 98,970 Re 
Armagh Shoes Ltd (1984) 
B. C. L. C. 405; Siebe Gorman & 
Co. Ltd v. Barclays Bank Ltd 
[19791 Lloyd's Rep. 142. 
1,6 See also Watts, "Fixed 
Charges Over After-Acquired 
Assets Outside the PPSA 
Regime" 5 Banking & Finance 
La7v Reviezo (Nz) 208 at 210. 
BOOK DEBT CHARGES: FOLLOWING YORKSHIRE WOOLCOMBERS: [20001 INSOLVENCY LAWYER 163 
The answer does not reside in Romer L. J. 's three characteristics because the 
future personalty mortgage cases are too numerous and flatly contrary to such a 
notion. This approach has arisen partly because Professor Pennington' and Pro- 
fessor Goode7O found the development of the floating charge upon an analogy 
with the Roman Law hypotheca. The authors' dissent from this approach is that a 
mortgage is not and cannot be a charge-since the former involves title and the 
latter does not. 
A further oddity in this area of law is that at the time of the creation of the 
floating charge, the greatest champions of equity's new hypotheca such as Jessel 
M. R., 71 Giffard72and James73L. JJ. and Lord Lindley74were perfectly content to 
accept bills of sale granting future personalty mortgages where the assets 
changed in the ordinary course of business. In Re Rees75 even Lord Macnaghten 
was seemingly untroubled by the concept. 
It is a feature of the cases which produced the floating charge that future 
personalty mortgage decisions were rarely cited. 76The probable explanation for 
this is that the courts were initially asked to determine the effect of a charge over 
the company's "undertaking", a device borrowed from the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845.1 The term "undertaking" did not appear in future per- 
sonalty mortgages. It includes the right to carry on business, something which did 
not pass under a bill of sale. 
In our submission: 
(a) the fixed charge is the antithesis of the floating charge; 
M the antithesis does not reside in the dealing power, which was express or 
implied in the old bills of sale mortgages-there was no less of an implied 
dealing power with the mortgage than there is with the floating charge; 
Q if the floating charge was being compared with a mortgage, then the 
antithesis resides in the fact that the mortgagee has a title and the floating 
chargee does not; 
W the mortgagee has the remedy of foreclosure and the floating chargee does 
not; 
(e) the floating chargee, subject to exceptions, can only intervene on crystal- 
lisation whereas the mortgagee was not usually so limited; 
W on redemption the mortgagee has to make a re-transfer (unless the mort- 
gage is in the form of a sale subject to defeasance on payment) whereas 
there is nothing to re-transfer in the case of a charge; 
(g) the antithesis does not reside in questions of possession, 
W the floating charge was an accretion to the range of equitable security 
devices and did not subtract the equitable future personalty mortgage 
from that range. 
"... what you do require to make a specific security is that the security whenever it has 
once come into existence, and been identified or appropriated as a security, shall never 
thereafter at the will of the mortgagor cease to be a security. If at the will of the 
mortgagor he can dispose of it and prevent its being any longer a security, although 
something else may be substituted more or less for it, that is not a 'Specific secu- 
rity'. 1178 
The chargor's right to use the proceeds of debts in the ordinary course of business (with or without the words "for its own account") is often described as the badge 
of, a floating charge. 79It is not clear why this is the case. There seems to be some 
assumption that by carrying on business and disposing of an asset, the debtor is doing an act inimical to the concept of specific security. This assumption has no foundation. As Erle J. said in Bittlestone v. Cooke' in 1853: 
"There often may be a very good reason for taking a security over the whole of 
a trader's stock present and future, as then the stock may be used in the 
meantime and make a source of profit, whilst, if a portion of the existing stock is separated and set aside as a security, it is tied up from use. " 
69 "The Genesis of the 
Floating Charge" (1960) 23 
M. L. R. 630. 
" "The Exodus of the 
Floating Charge" in Feldman 
and Meisel (eds. ), Corporate 
and Commercial Law: Modern 
Developments (Lloyds of 
London Press, 1996), p. 193 
at p. 195. 
71 See Re Borough of Hackney 
Newspaper Co. (1876) 3 Ch. D. 
669; Collyer v. Isaacs (1881) 19 
Ch. D. 342; Ford v. Kettle 
(1882) 9 Q. B. D. 139; Ex p. 
Popplewell (1882) 21 Ch. D. 73 
and Ex p. Blaiberg (1883) 23 
Ch. D. 254. 
1 See Alton v. Harrison (1869) 
4 Ch. App. 622 and Allen v. 
Bonnett (1870) 5 Ch. App. 577. 
"See Ex P. Cohen (1871) 7 
Ch. App. 20, Ex p. King (1876) 
2 Ch. D. 256; Ex p. Ellis (1876) 
2 Ch. D. 797; Ex p. Wright 
(1876) 3 Ch. D. 70; Ex p. 
Attwater (1877) 5 Ch. D. 27, 
Ex p. Fletcher (1877) 5 Ch. D. 
809; Ex p. Games (1879) 12 
Ch. D. 314 (also included 
Thesiger L. J. ); Re Phillips 
(1880) 16 Ch. D. 104. 
74 See Walker v. Clay (1880) 49 
L. J. Q. B. 560; Ford v. Kettle 
(1882) 9 Q. B. D. 139; Ex p. 
Popplewell (1882) 21 Ch. D. 73; 
Ex p. Blaiberg (1883) 23 Ch. D. 
254. 
75 [18941 A. C. 135. 
71, A rare example is the Irish 
case Re Dublin Drapery Co. 
(1884) I. R. 13 Ch. D. 174. 
77 See (1897) 13 L. Q. R. 418 at 
420. 
78 [190312 Ch. 284 at 294 per 
Vaughan Williams L. J. 
7' See e. g. Re Brightlife Ltd 
[19871 Ch. 200 at 209 per 
Hoffmann J. 
(1853) 23 L. J. Q. B. 78 at 80. 
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lin Taylor v. Bank of New South Wales"' a farmer mortgaged his stock of sheep and 
t1he produce of them and continued to trade with the mortgaged flock. In con- 
-idering the terms of the mortgage, Lord Watson commented, "all persons who 
: toelled upon its provisions, must be held to have contemplated that, so long as the 
Xxiortgagor remained in possession, there would be sales from time to time, in 
t1he course of due administration, of portions of the mortgaged property... but 
Uhe management of the sheep stock was still with the mortgagor, and, until the "bank put an end to his management, he was entitled to deal with the stock in the 
'Q1rdinary course of his business as a sheep farmer". 2 
The House of Lords in Thilby v. Official Receiver83 held that a mortgage of future 
'Clebts from any business that might be carried on by the mortgagor was not too 
'Vague and, following Holroyd, became effective as and when debts arose without 
'Uhe need for novus actus. Lord Fitzgerald, however, refused to decide the case Iz)ecause the parties were mooting. In fact the handwritten copy of his judgment 
-i-ii the House of Lords' records gives rather more illumination to the case than the 1-aw Reports' omission of muchbf it. In the author's view the Official Receiver 
ýýIhould have succeeded on Lord Fitzgerald's analysis and the printed case in X-incolWs Inn. 
Izon, the mortgagor, borrowed two sums of ; E800 in 1879 and 1880 because he 11ad to meet instalments becoming due under a composition. The 1879 mortgage, Iti fairly standard form, covered present and future personalty; the 1880 mortgage 
"-: xisting personalty only. Izon subsequently bought and dealt in timber and car- ýtied on manufacturing using the mortgaged property. He was adjudicated bank- ýk'xipt in January 1885. 
On November 14,1884 the mortgagee's executors sought the final payment due 
`Zlf ; C122, took possession 15 minutes later under the 1880 deed, when Izon failed t, o pay, and sold furniture and stock to Tailby. The recitals to a contract between 'kllie executors and Thilby of November 15 record the fact of the sale of furniture for IQ70 and stock for E110 to Thilby the previous day The contract itself is an agree- 1-nent to assign certain book debts covered by the 1879 deed. Lord Fitzgerald "-cmsidered this significant because the debts in question arose after the 1880 ýtýortgage deed which did not cover future property. In the contract of November 15, therefore, the executors fall back on the 1879 deed. 
The difficulty, as Lord Fitzgerald points out, is that the demand for; E122 is fully baid by the mortgagees' receipt of 1: 180 acknowledged in the recitals of November tS for furniture and stock. At that point the debts are paid, the securities are fully 4ý1--Itisfied and the mortgagees cannot agree to assign to Thilby, under the authority 
, ýIf the 1879 mortgage, the subsequent arising debts. Tailby has no title because the ýtýortgages were fully satisfied securities as a result of the sale of the furniture and 'ýItock on November 14 and the mortgagees could no longer give a good title to 'ýCailby. Tailby therefore had no answer to the Official Receiver's claim to receive 
. 
tlie debts. 
Tailby is a graphic illustration of the bill of sale mortgage with express or ý' 'tnplied dealing power in operation. Its natural ancestors are Holroyd and Taylor `kxid the line of authority on such mortgages to which reference has already been 1'tiade, The authors' view is that if Holroyd, Taylor and Thilby are authorities then orkshire Woolcombers i  not one. In future personalty mortgage cases prior to Yorkshire Woolcombers it is clear that : kxi dealing with the subject matter of specific security the mortgagor was carrying "ýýIut the express (or implied) terms of the mortgage itself. 84 On the analogy of trust "'ýeises the trustee, in actively managing the trust property, is doing what the trust : t'*--quires. The fact that the composition of the assets changes constantly in the 't'-xecution of the trust does not alter the nature of the beneficiaries' interest in t1liern. The idea that the mortgagor, in dealing with the security, would be acting `4dversely to the mortgagee's rights has no basis in law because it was constantly '4ecided that the mortgagor had express or implied power to deal in the course of 11ýxisiness. 
just as a trustee must pay for services or goods or property in order to IAianage the trust, so does a mortgagor in the future personalty mortgage cases. If "lie trustee spends more than he gets in so that the trust assets are depleted or 1ý, 3(ha ted, the beneficiaries must look to the personal credit of the trustee to cover 
y bility. Powell on Mortgages'15 makes this point with regard to mortgagees ho Row their mortgagors to deal in the mortgaged assets. The three main grounds of principle which lead the authors to disagree with 
I 
ýVaughan 
Williams L. J. 's dictum are: 
81 (1886) 11 APP. Cas. 596. 
82 ibid. at 602. 
83 (1888) 13 App. Cas. 523. 
84 See e. g. Nutbrown v. 
Thornton (1804) 10 Ves. Jun. 
159; Hutton v. Cruttwell 
(1852) 22 L. J. Q. B. 78; Ex p. 
Games (1879) 12 Ch. D. 314; 
Walker v. Clay (1880) 49 
L. J. Q. B. 560; Joseph v. Lyons 
(1884) 15 Q. B. D. 280; Hallas v. 
Robinson (1884) 15 Q. B. D. 288 
and Re Neal [191412 K. B. 
910. 
85 Coventry (ed. ), Powell, A 
Treatise on the Law of 
Mortgages (6th ed., 1826), p. 
42. 
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(1) The enormous number of personalty mortgage cases (of which those cited 
in the Appendix to this article are just a fraction) where the mortgage with 
dealing power was held good. 
(2) The security was specific because the mortgagee could positively affirm 
that he had a title to each and every item caught by the security descrip- 
tion. It is of the essence that this should be the case otherwise, for example, 
the order and disposition clauses from the Bankruptcy Act 1623 onwards 
would have been incapable of applying to such mortgages since, without 
a title, the mortgagee could not have been the "true owner". It is clear from 
a long line of authorities starting with Ryall v. RoI106 that the mortgagee 
was the true owner. 
(3) Dealing is not the result of a unilateral exercise of will on the part of the 
mortgagor. It is an essential consequence of the contract between the par- 
ties that this is what the mortgagor will do. 
What is the floating charge? 
We have already referred to Romer L. J. s "description" of a floating charge's three 
characteristiCS87 which allowed also for such a charge to exist even though all 
three were not present. 811 Certainly where a security document provides for the 
described things to happen, one might have a floating charge. If, however, the 
transaction were couched as a mortgage, the three characteristics would equally 
well summarise what was happening under a present and future personalty 
mortgage with express or implied dealing power and which by 1903 had been 
developing over the previous 500 years. The security instrument in Yorkshire 
Woolcombers was a mortgage. 
The following passage from the judgment of Hutton J. (as he then was) in Re 
Amagh Shoes Ltd119 is useful in that it encapsulates the current controversy over 
the legal nature of the floating charge. Hutton J. begins by considering a dictum of Buckley L. J. in Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries Ltd9O: 
"... Buckley L. J. did state that: 'A floating security is not a specific mortgage 
of the assets, plus a licence to the mortgagor to dispose of them in the course 
of his business,.. . 'but the learned Lord justice did not state that there can be a specific mortgage of the assets, together with a licence to the mortgagor to 
dispose of them in the course of his business, and that the licence will not 
convert the specific charge into a floating charge. ""' 
Hutton J. 's view of Evans is virtually a denial of the notion of a specific security 
with a licence to deal as being either capable of separate existence or as anything 
other than a floating charge. In modem judgments no-one has sought to point out 
the existence and central importance of mortgage bills of sale in commercial financing when security expressed to be over the "undertaking" appeared in Re 
Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail C0.92 
One of the few writers who does consider these mortgages is Dr Gough in his 
magnificent work Company Charges . 93 He says that these mortgages "appeared in the early 1880's""' and suggests that "[iln reality they appear to constitute early 
examples of floating charges not recognised as such at the time". 95 He concludes 
that the "bills of sale cases in the early 1880's may possibly be considered as an isolated, but short lived, attempt by the courts of law to develop the concept of a 
specific security over fluctuating stock in trade". 96 The difficulty with this view, if 
we may respectfully say so, is that these mortgages not only appeared in the early 1880s but also in the 1780s and the 1680s. In fact mortgages over stock in trade 
and debts appeared in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. We have written at length on these matters in a forthcoming article. 
Once the real significance of the old mortgage bill of sale is understood, the 
confusion as to what a floating charge is disappears. The reason is that the charge in Panama over the "undertaking" was borrowed from the Companies Clauses 
" (1749) 1 Atk. 165. 
87See n. 65 above. 
11 [1903] 2 Ch. 284 at 295 
where Romer L. J. states he is 
not "prepared to say that 
there will not be a floating 
charge within the meaning of 
the Act, which does not 
contain all three 
characteristics". 
"1 [19841 B. C. L. C. 405. 
90 [1910] 2 K. B. 979 at 999. 
91 [198411 B. C. L. C. 405 at 
415. 
92 (1870) 5 Ch. App. 318. 
93 Gough, Company Charges 
(2nd ed., Butterworths, 
London, 1996). 
94ibid. p. 369. 
9-1 ibid. p. 371. 
96ibid. p. 372. 
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Consolidation Act 1845, where it was the prescribed form of mortgage. There is no 
question that in relation to companies to which the 1845 Act applied (public 
utilities incorporated by private Act of Parliament), that form of mortgage did not 
attach to anything until the company was wound up, abandoned its undertaking 
or ceased business. 97 
When that form of security was borrowed for a Companies Act company, 
Giffard LJ. 's judgment in Panama suggests that the same legal state of affairs was 
produced except that the debenture holder could intervene upon default. Thus 
the future assets theory of the floating charge, preferred by Professor Penning- 
ton, " must be correct. 
If something did happen in Panama in 1870-and it did-then the mortgage or 
charge over the undertaking (which is the fount of the floating charge) cannot be 
a specific charge with a licence to deal express or implied. The specific charge 
with a licence is in origin no more than a variant of the ancient mortgage bill of 
sale. 
Now that the courts have reasserted the proposition that a charge does not 
confer title or possession, " the fixed charge on book debts is said to require that 
the bank account be under the control of the chargee. 1 Some of the expressions 
used in earlier case's look distinctly possessory and will have to be jettisoned. 
The control test does, however, bring problems of its own: 
(1) Control, if exclusive, is the most important test of possession particularly 
in the context of a bank account. The bank has the legal title to the money 
representing the proceeds, the money is indistinguishable in the general 
mass of assets held by the bank and the bank has the right to determine 
whether or not to pay out on a cheque. 
(2) Control here largely resides in what steps the chargee takes in relation to 
the proceeds in the bank account. One consequence of this is that a charge 
is fixed only if it is policed adequately Thus what the parties do about the 
charge agreement after execution is, or may become, decisive of the nature 
of the charge. In the result one cannot draft a fixed charge, one can only 
conduct it. In the authors' view this is an unwholesome infraction of the 
principle that post-contractual conduct should not be allowed to affect the 
meaning of the contract, a principle re-stated by the House of Lords in 
Mitworth Street Estates Ltd v. Miller' in 1970. Some book debt charge cases 
follow the V"itworth line .3 
(3) The control test is incompatible with criticism of Nourse L. J. 's judgment in 
Re New Bullas (Trading) Ltd .4 If policing is the key test of specific security over book debts, there can be no objection to a provision which says in 
effect: "If at the time the proceeds are paid in, we the chargees have not 
taken the steps necessary for control of the proceeds, then we will sub- 
stitute a floating charge for the original specific charge", because: 
(a) no rule forbids the parties to agree to substitute one form of charge for 
another; 
(b) the indivisibility of the charge and its proceeds' argument misses the point 
in that the clause in New Bullas provides for the tennination of the fixed 
charge at the same moment as the floating charge arises; 
(c) it is logically indefensible in a contractual context to posit a rule that 
control is essential and at the same time posit a second rulc which prohibits 
the parties from providing for what happens if they do, or do not, exercise 
that control, where the provision reflects precisely the consequences of the first rule. 
(4) If control and its exercise are the crux of a fixed charge, it appears that the 
nature of the charge can hop from fixed to floating status upon each 
occasion that the chargee exercises control or fails to do so. The inconven- 
ient consequences of this to a person who takes a cheque from a company 
which has charged its book debts are obvious. 
97 See e. g. Gardner v. London, 
Chatham and Dover Railway 
Co. (1867) 2 Ch. App. 201. See 
also Cross v. Imperial 
Continental Gas Association 
[192312 Ch. 553 which is 
also a case involving a 
private act utility. 
11 Pennington, Company Law 
(7th ed., Butterworths, 
London, 1995), pp. 567-569. 
99 See e. g. Morris v. 
Agrichemicals Ltd [19971 
B. C. C. 965 at 972 per Lord 
Hoffmann. 
' See e. g. Siebe Gorman & Co. 
Ltd v. Barclays Bank Ltd [19791 
2 Lloyd's Rep. 142. 
2119701 A. C. 583. 
3 See e. g. Re Wogan's 
(Drogheda) Ltd [199311 I. R. 
157 and Whitton v. ACN 
(1996) 14 A. C. L. C. 1799. 
4 [19941 B. C. C. 36. 
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Overdraft financing 
In the classic case of a book debt charge to secure overdraft arrangements, in 
determining whether the charge is fixed or floating, the modern cases refer to the 
chargor having a right to use the proceeds in the course of business. There is a 
question whether this is the true analysis of the position. The authors would make 
the following points in relation to current account overdraft financing: 
(a) with an account current there is no debt until the line is drawn on the 
account; 
(b) the rule in Clayton's Case5 applies so that a payment into the account is set 
against the earliest extant debit entry on the account; 
(c) it follows that a payment in discharges pro tanto the amount of the earliest 
extant debit entry; 
(d) the payment is, therefore, applied in reduction of the secured creditor's 
debt; 
(e) any further drawings on the account are new lending; 
(f) the suggestion that it is the proceeds of the book debts which are being 
used by the chargor is, therefore, misconceived. 
Commercial realities 
In the commercial context it is clear that those who provide loan capital on the 
security of, inter alia, personal property turned over in trade are looking for three 
things: 
(1) a security which will catch the borrower's existing and future property; 
(2) the continuance of the borrower's trade using the assets comprised in the 
security since the lender looks to the borrower to make income from trade 
in order to pay the debt: and 
(3) if the borrower subsequently fails, the security will cover the assets which 
the borrower has at the time of failure. 
The floating charge meets those requirements. In practice, however, the require- 
inents of the banks and money lending houses in previous centuries were similar 
to those which modem banks have and the Chancery Court did everything in its 
power to promote them. Hence the dicta about not letting mortgages stop trade dealings and the willingness of equity courts to construe personalty mortgages as 
permitting dealingS6 or to imply a term to that effect .7 The commercial reason for the popularity of floating charges was nothing to do 
with trade paralysis. Rather it was the ban on future property security in the Bills 
of Sale Act 1882, wl-dch for a time enmeshed the corporate lending sector' coupled 
with the surge in company registrations by those in business. " In 1906 the War- 
mington Committee" found no evidence that lenders did not get out under their floating charges, indeed the main complaint was the fact that they did. 
, 
The modern problem is that a succession of cases has placed burdens on the floating chargeholder's security which were not felt in the early days and the floating charge is now a commercially weak security. The pressure of Romalpa 
clauses, the implications of Re Portbase Clothing Ltd, " modern forms of asset financing and the size of preferential claiMS12 have inter alia, exposed short- 
comings from the lender's point of view. 
If the banks and their customers prefer specific security of the kind contained in the future personalty mortgage cases (which often included debtS13) they 
should be entitled to have it. 
3 (1816) 1 Mer. 585. It may be 
possible for a bank, if the 
company does not exercise 
its power to appropriate 
payments in, to exercise its 
power to appropriate 
payments in to cover existing 
debts in an order different to 
that imposed by the 
application of Clayton's Case 
(see e. g. Re Hallett's Estate 
(1880) 13 Ch. D. 696 at 728 
and 738). 
6 e. g. Lord kardwicke in 
Ryall v. Rolle (1749) 1 Atk- 
165. 
7 e. g. Lord Eldon in Nutbrown 
v. Thornton (1804) 10 Ves. 
Jun. 159. 
8 See e. g. jenkinson v. Brandley 
Mining (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 568. 
9 Figures provided by 
Companies House show that 
company registrations 
virtually doubled decade on 
decade from the 1870s to the 
1890s. 
10 Report of the Company 
Law Amendment Committee 
1906 (Cd. 3052). 
11 [19931 B. C. C. 96. 
12 See e. g. Keay and Walton, 
[199913 Insolv. L. 112. 
13 See Re Neal [191412 K. B. 
910 for an example of an 
effective mortgage of book 
debts (post Yorkshire 
Woolcoinbers) where the 
mortgagor retained the order 
and disposition of the debts 
for four years. 
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PARTNERSHIP FLOATING' CHARGES 
OPENING A CAN OF WORMS? 
Peter Walton' 
In their recent Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership Law2 the Law 
Commission and Scottish Law Commission (hereafter "the Law Commission"), 
in proposing -that a, partnership which chooses 
to be registered centrally will have 
a legal personality separate from its partners, considered also whether such a 
partnership should be allowed to grant a floating charge over its assets. ' At first 
blush, this seems a sensible proposal in that if a registered company with separate 
personality from its members can execute floating charges, why should not a 
partnership with similar attributes? Indeed a similar suggestion'was made during 
the evidence taken by the Davey Committee" in 1895: "1 see no objectioli to 
either a company or an ordinary trader or partnership borrowing money upon a 
floating charge of the stock in trade or general assets of the business... ". ' 
Partnerships at present cannot create floating charges because the Bills of Sale 
Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882 prevents firms (and individuals) from executing 
Peter Walton, Senior Lecturer, School of Legal Studies, University of Wolverhampton, 
Molineux Street, Wolverhampton WVI ISB. Tel: (01902) 321557 Fax: (01902) 3,22 696. 
2 Law Commission for England and Wales and Scottish Law Commission "Partnership Law" 
A Joint Consultation Paper (2000) No. 159 (Hereafter "Law Commission Consultation 
Paper"). 
3 Ibid. Part XXII Floating and other Charges at pira. 22.27. 
Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed by the Board of Trade to Inquire what 
Amendments are necessary in the Act relating to Joint Stock Companies Incorporated with 
Limited Liability (1895) C. 7776 
3 Ibid. Appendix p. 69 statement by a Mr Samuel Ogden. 
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securities over future property. ' The Law Commission's proposal is to make 
registered partnerships exempt from the 1882 Act and so free them to create 
floating charges. 'f. A new system of security registration based upon the current 
charges registration requirements for companies under the. Companies Act is also 
suggested! 
The Law Commission seems to assume that, once free of the restrictions of the 
Bills of Sale Act 1882, partnerships will be able and willing to create floating 
charges. 'Mis assumption is disconcertingly unequivocal in that the Liw 
Commission does not appear to have considered the type of security partnerships 
gave for their borrowings prior to the introduction of the 1882 Act. if 
partnerships did not at that time execute floating charges, and they did not, would 
the new registered partnership not merely adopt the secured lending mechanisms 
that partnerships used before 1882 and ignore the possibility of a floating charge? 
Ilis would be particularly likely if the previous form of secured lending would 
today provide a better security for the lender than a floating charge. 
Business financing activity, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries provoked several policy considerations of what types of 
secured lending should be permitted and what form such lending should take both 
for incorporated and unincorporated business medi 
' 
a. An examination of what 
occurred in this period is crucial in understanding why the law on corporate 
secured lending is how it is today, and may point the way forward as to how 
incorporated partnership lending may evolve. As Professor Goode has stated, 
commercial law 
_developments 
are a response to commercial needs. 9 The 
commercial needs today may not be identical to those of a hundred or two 
hundred years ago but they are sufficiently similar to suggest that future 
commercial law developments may well mirror the efficient lending mechanisms 
from that period. 
See ss. 5 and 9. See also 27iomas v. Kelly (1888) 13 App Cas 506. For an explanation of 
how this restriction operates and for an argument that it still permits partnerships to execate 
a limited form of floating charge see Fitzpatrick "Why Not a Partnership Floating Charge? " 
[1971] JBL 18. 
Law Commission Consultation Paper Part XXII para. 22.27 at footnote 56. 
]bid. at paras. 22.20-22.2 1. The system of registratiofi of company charges is currently once 
again being examined by the Government. ThaSteering Group of the Company Law Review 
established by the Department of Trade and Industry has recently issued its seventh 
consultation document in its Modem CompanyLawfora Competitive Economy series entitled 
Registration of Company Charges. 
"The Exodus of the Floating Charge* in Corporate and Commercial Law: Modem 
, Developments (ed. Feldman and Meisel) London, 1996, at p. 193. 
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There is more than one reason that the limited liability company became so 
popular inthe twentieth century. Limited liability was clearly one of them but 
the ability to secure borrowing over changing assets by executing a floating 
charge was also significant. The purpose of this article is to attempt to predict, in 
light of certain historical facts, what effect the specific proposal of the Law 
Commission to release partnerships from the Bills of Sale Act 1882 would 
actually have in practice. It will be suggested that if the Law Commission's 
proposals were extended to limited liability partnerships' this could lead to a 
widespread rejection by the business community of limited liability companies in 
favour of limited liability partnerships. 
The Current Debate Over Fixed and Floating Security 
Much has been written on the nature of the floating charge and how it differs 
from a fixed charge. " ReRorence Land and Public Works Co" sowed the seeds, 
and the accepted wisdom on the distinction between fixed and floating charges 
came into full bloom in the Yorkshire Woolcombers 13 case. It is in modem days 
generally accepted that if a company gives a charge, over assets which by their 
n ature change day to day then the charge must float as the chargee does not have 
possession or control over the charged assets. " If the assets can be alienated only 
with the consent of the chargee then the charge will normally be fixed. " Some 
10 This is possible under section 15 of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 and it is 
submitted is likely to happen if the Law Commission proposal is adopted for registered 
partnerships without limited liability. 
11 See e. g. Pennington "The Genesis of the Floating Charge" (1960) 23 MLR 630 and "Fixed 
Charges over Future Assets of a Company" (1985) 6 Co Lawyer 9, Farrar "Floating Charges 
and Priorities" (1974) 38 Conv 315 and "The Crystallisation of a Floating Charge" (1976) 
40 Conv 397, Ferran "Floating Charges-The Nature of the Security" [1988] CLJ 213, 
Worthington "Floating Charges -An Alternative Theory" [1994] CU 81, Gregory and 
Walton "Fixed Charges over Changing Assets -The Possession and Control Heresy" (1998) 
2 CUR 68 and "Book Debt Charges: Following Yorkshire Woolcombers - Are We Sheep 
Gone Astray? " [2000] Insolvency Lawyer 157. 
12 (1878) 10 ChD 530. 
13 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers' Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284, High Court and Court of 
Appeal decisions reported together. The House of Lords adopted both courts' decisions sub 
nom. 171ingworth v Houldsworth [1904] AC 355. 
14 See e. g. Gregory and Walton "Book Debt Charges - the Saga Goes On'! (1999) 115 LQR 
14, Be Armagh Shoes Ltd (1984) 1 BCLC 405, Re Double S Printers Ltd [1999] BCC 303, 
Re Westmaze Ltd [1999] BCC 441, Re ASRS Establishments Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 727, Chalk 
v Kahn [2000) 2 BCLC 361. 
is See e. g. Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 LI Rp 142. 
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restriction on the power to alienate will not necessarily miake the charge fixed 16 
and some ability to alienate the charged property will not necessarily mean the 
charge floats. 17. 
No modem attempt has been made to uphold a fixed charge over stock in trade 
but fixed charges over book debts have, since the 1979 decision in Siebe Gorman 
& Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd, 18 become common where the debenture holder 
controls the chargor company's bank accoun *t 
into which the book debts are paid. 
Even if the debenture holder is no 
,t 
the clearing bank a hybrid type of charge 
which permits the charge to be fixed whilst the debts are outstanding but which 
floats once the debts are paid, will be effective according to Re New Bullas 
Trading Ltd. 19 The imminent arrival from New Zealand of Re Brumark 
Investments Ltd1O in the Privy Council may lead to some certainty in this area. It 
is not inconceivable that their Lordships may tidy up the whole area by overruling 
both Siebe Gorman and New Bullas and decide that only fixed assets such as land 
and machinery can be subject to fixed security. 21 
In New Zealand there is now in place the Personal Property Securities Act 1999 
("the PPSA") which makes Brunwrk of little local consequencelor the future. '
Control ceases to be the distinguishing feature under the PPSA, rather the type of 
asset being charged is the determining factor. This statutory result may be in 
effect the same as that which the Privy Council ends up with in Brumark if their 
Lordships remain rigidly loyal to Yorkshire Woolcombers. 13 
16 See e. g. Re Brightlifie Ltd [19871 Ch 200. 
17 See e. g. Re Cimex Tissues Ltd [1994] BCC 626. 
is [1979] 2 Ll Rep 142. 
19 [1994] BCC 36. 
20 [2000] 1 BCLC 353. 
21 See Picarda "Labels: A Voyage Round Fixed and Floating Charges" (2000) Vol. 4 Issue 
2 RALQ 109 at p. 136. 
22 "It is to be noted that this long troubling distinction between fixed and floating charges will 
disappear from our law when the Personal Property Securities Act 1999 comes into force. 
Until then it must be grappled with. " Re Brumark Investments Ltd. [2000] 1 BCLC 353 at 
354 per Gault J. 
23 For a critical analysis of Yorkshire Woolcombers see Gregory and Walton "Book Debts 
Charges: Following Yorkshire Woolcombers - Are We Sheep Gone Astrayr, [2000] 
Insolvency Lawyer 157. 
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The distinction between the two types of security is extremely important in 
practice due inter alia to the priority of fixed over floating charges, the 
preferential debts regime and the prýblems of Re Portbase Clothing Ltd . 
24 It is 
unfortunate that the law in this area remains subject to doubt. It was noted by the 
High Court in 1988, in referring to company secured lending generally, that "this 
is a type of transaction in respect of which judicial precedent is a particularly 
valuable guide to the commercial. adviser. "' This was perhaps true'in 1988 but it 
would be overly optimistic for a commercial adviser today to rely too heavily on 
any particular current judicial precedent. If commercial advisors could be certain 
of being able to draft a simple and effective fixed security over changing assets, 
their professional lives would be made considerably more straightforward. The 
Law Commission's proposal may be the first stepping stone across these hitherto 
turbulent waters. 
How Partnerships Borrowed Prior to the Floating Charge - 
In considering that charges granted over assets of partnerships without separate 
personality were outside its terms of reference, the Law Commission accepted 
that such charges were "indistinguishable from that of security granted by 
individuals". " One important and often overlooked question is, how did business 
secure finance prior to registered companies and the invention of the floating 
charge? The answer is very simple - the mortgage bill of sale. For centuries sole 
traders and partnerships borrowed money by mortgaging inter alia their stock in 
trade and book-debts but retained the power to deal with such assets in the day to 
day administration of their business. 
Security bills of sale expressly assigned the mortgagor's present and future assets 
with a proviso for reassignment on payment of the debt. Such bills were not 
charges, which by definition involve no title or possession in the chargee. 1 The 
courts had no problem with the mortgagor being given a power (either express or 
implied) to deal with the' mortgaged assets in the ordinary course of busineýss. 28 
Although it is impossible to assign future property as such, equity regards a 
covenant to assign future property as effective as soon as the assets come into 
24 [19931 BCC 96. 
25 Re a Company, exParte Copp [19891 BCLC 13 at 25 per Knox J. 
26 Law Commission Consultation Paper Part XXII at para. 22.14. 
27 See e. g. Morris v Agrichemicals Ltd [1997] BCC 965 at 972 per Lord Hoffman. 
28 See e. g. lyalker v Clay (1880) 49 LJQB 560 and Payne v Fern (1881) 6 QBD 620. 
246 The Receivers, Administrators & Liqýidators Quarterly, Volume 4, Issue 3,2000 
existence under the maxim "equity looks upon that as done which ought to be 
done". As assets changed from day to day the mortgage security merely attached 
to the new . assets as. soon as'they dame into existence. " This is the ratio of the 
House of Lords decision in Holroyd v MarshaIP' and of the majority of their 
Lordships in Tailby v OJficial Receiver. 31 The bill of sale mortgage is a specific 
security which attaches as soon as assets within the terms of the mortgage come 
into the hands of the mortgagQr. Such a mortgage by conferring an equitable 
title, did not and does not, paralyse the trade. 
Joseph v LyonS32 involved a mortgage by a sole trader of all the -goodwill of his 
business, all the current stock in trade and all future stock in trade. The Court of 
Appeal decided that no legal title to future stock passed to the mortgagee (there 
being no novus actus such as the mortgagee taking possession of the future 
property) but that the mortgage was valid in equity. The mortgage did not 
prevent the trader from continuing to turn over his stock in trade in the ordinary 
course of business for over two years. Joseph v Lyons has recently been 
approved by the Court of Appeal in MCC Proceeds Inc v Lehnzann Bros 
International (Europe). 33 
Dr Gough in his excellent book Company Charge? suggests that the security in 
Joseph v Lyons was in reality a floating charge" and the case was incorrectly 
decided because the ability in the mortgagor "to appropriate stocks for the 
purposes of sale* in the ordinary course of business would prevent appropriation 
necessary to cause the passage of. an equitable as well as legal title. "" In 
considering this criticism three points may be made: 1) the case dealt with a 
mortgage not A charge; 2) the security is specific not floating as the, mortgagee 
has an equitable title to the goods mortgaged; and 3) the title is complete due to 
the equitable maxim and requires no ftirther act by either party. The idea that 
some act, step or process amounting to appropriation is required to perfect the 
29 See e. g. Ex parte Games (1879) 12 ChD 314. 
30 (1862) 10 HLC 191. 
31 (1888) 13 App Cas 523. 
32 (1884) 15 QBD 280. 
33 [1998] 4 All ER 675. 
34 Gough Company Charges 2nd Ed (Butterworths, London 1996). 
35 Ibid at p. 371. 
36 Ibid. 
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security has no foundation in mortgage law. The proposed requirement for. some 
form of appropriation of future stock suggests that the mortgaged property' needs 
to be set aside in some way and n6t used by ýhe mortgagor in the ordinary course 
of business. "' This idea is contrary to scores of decisions which permit a 
mortgage containing a power in the mortgagor to deal with the mortgaged assets 
in the ordinary course. 39 It would certainly surprise Lord Hardwicke who in 
considering such a mortgage in 1749 stated that having executed the mortgage, 
the mortgagor "had it in his power to sell all the goods the next hour. "" 
An example of a typical mortgage bill of sale from 1866 states that the 
mortgagor: -, 
"assigned to the defendant the whole of his household goods, fiimiture, 
stopk-in-trade and effects then upon, or which should thereafter be upon, 
his premises, and also his book debts, and all other the personal estate to 
which he was then or should (so long as any moneys remained payable to 
the defendant) at any time thereafter be entitled. "" 
At this time the structure of bills of sale had changed little in a hundred years. In 
Worseley v Demattos' in 1758 the mortgagor had mortgaged, inter alia, "all his 
stock, utensils, and other things, used in his trades of brewing and malting, and 
of a corn factor and miller; consisting of coppers, tuns, backs, coolers, pumps, 
cisterns, screens, and ý other implements; and also all his changeable stock, 
consisting of debts, horses, carts, casks, hops, beer, ale, wheat, barley, malt, 
coals, wood, and all other goods and commodities belonging, employed, or made 
use of, in the said several trades, or any of them; and all his estate, right, title, 
interest, property, claim, and demand whatsoever thereto, and to every or any 
part thereof. "' 
37 This idea bears comparison with the view of Henchy J in Re Keenan Bros Ltd (1986) 2 BCC 
98,970 at 98,973 that assets subject to a fixed charge must be: "withdrawn froný ordinary 
trade use, put in the keeping of the debenture holder and sterilised and made undisposable 
save at the absolute discretion of the debenture holder. " 
38 See the cases listed in the Appendix to the article cited at footnote 23 above. 
39 Ryall v Rolle (1749) 1 Atk 165 at 183. 
40 Mercer v Peterson (1867) LR 2 Exch 304 at 306. See also cases listed in the Appendix to 
the article cited at footnote 23 above. 
41 (1758) 1 Burr 467. 
42 Ibid. at 468-9. 
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There were several problems with mortgage bills of sale in*practice. The most 
serious was th4t they were commonly used as an engine of fraud, namely that it 
was possible for ý person to mortgagd all his assets present and future but for the 
mortgage to remain secret. Only when, for example, a judgment creditor levied 
execution over the mortgagor's goods would the bill be held up and of course it 
took priority. 43 
Upon bankruptcy the secret bill of sale was less effective due to the order and 
disposition clause in the Bankruptcy Acts. 44 Assets which were in the order and 
disposition of the bankrupt but which belonged to another, for example a 
-mortgagee, who consented to the bankrupt's possession in the course of trade or 
business, were, treated as part of the bankrupt's estate. It was commonly the case 
that assets were mortgaged and the mortgagor was allowed to continue to trade 
with them with. the result that the mortgagee's security became worthless on the 
mortgagor's bankruptcy. 
In Lingham v Biggs' in 1797 it was accepted that most of the cases on the order 
and disposition clause were cases involving mortgages. 46 In the same case, 
counsel put forward the proposition that the order and disposition clause "was not 
intended to interfere with any thing but the stock in trade, the possession of which 
necessarily implies the order and disposition, sale and alteration &C. "47 A 
mortgage of stock does allow the mortgagor to deal with the mortgaged assets in 
the ordinary course of business. 
'Me Bills of Sale Act 1854 made bills publicly registrable with the intention of 
preventing fraudulent secret bills . 
4' A further Bills of Sale Act of 1878 amended 
the registration requirements in various ways but importantly also released bills 
49 of sale from the shackles of the order and disposition clause. Moneylenders 
were quick to exploit this release and there was a consequent explosion in the 
43 The priority point also depended upon a number of other issues. See generally Holroyd 
itself. 
44 introduced by ss. 10 and 
iI of 21 Jac I c. 19 (the Bankruptcy Act 1623) and only repealed 
by the Insolvency Act 198ý. 
45 (1797) 1 Bop and Pul 82. 
46 kid. at 88 per Eyre CJ. 
47 ibid. at 85 (statement by Adair Serjt). 
48 See Fitzpatrick "Why Not a Partnership Floating Charge? " [1971] JBI, 18 at p. 20. 
49 Section 20. 
Partnership Roating Charges - Opening a Ca n of Wo ?- Peter Walton 
249 
number of bills of sale being. exqcuted. The problems caused by the 1878 Act 
were remedied by a further Act in 1882" in which bills of sale securing relatively 
small amountg. were outlawed altogether" and bills over future property generally 
prohibited. " 
The 1882 Act did much to kill off the bill of sale as an everyday security device. 
This was largely due to the prohibition on future property security but was also 
due to the uncertainty the courts expressed in attempting to make sense of some 
of the 1882 Act's provisions. Lord Macnaghten commented in 1888 that to say 
that the Act "is well-drawn, or that its meaning is reasonably clear, would be to 
affirm a proposition to which I think few lawyers would subscribe ... it is beset 
with difficulties which can -only be removed 
by legislation. "53 Uncertainty was 
the constant companion of bills of sale after 1882. 
Some Interesting Figures 
Although the author has been unable to trace how many bills were registered in 
the early years of the operation of the 1854 Bills of Sale Act* some figures are 
contained within certain Parliamentary Papers. 54 These statistics contain'no 
differentiation between security and absolute bills and so the figures are of limited 
use, but they do show some definite trends. In 1875 a total of 11,216 bills was 
registered with a total value of E2,123,000.53 In 1877 the total was 13,22056 and 
50 Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882. 
51 ]bid. section 12. , 
52 Ibid. sections 5 and 9. Instead of merely returning to the Order and Disposition clause the 
1882 Act outlawed all bills over future property. The lesser step of repealing the order and 
disposition clause had been in the Bill at its second reading in the House of Commons 
(Hansard Col 397 8th March 1882) and had been supported by Mr Henry H Fowler, 
Member for Wolverhampton: "In 1878, what he was bound to call that foolish and disastrous 
Act was passed which repealed "the Order and Disposition" Clause" Hansard Col 1408-9 
20th March 1882. 
53 7homas v Kelly (1888) 13 App Cas 506 at 517. 
54 There are one or two discrepancies from different sources in terms of exact numbers but 
the differences are for present purposes de minimis. 
55 House of Commons Select Committee on Bills of Sale - British Parliamentary Papers 1881 
(34) VIII. I at paras. 12 and 13. 
56 Hansard HC Col 1401 20th March 1882. 
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in 1878 the total was 19,596.57 By 1880 the total was 54,252 bills with a value of 
'000.51 k4,333 In 1880 only 416 of the registered bills were for sums over ; ElOOO 51 
and it seems that many small bills f6r less than E15 were not registered at all. 
There is a slight difference of opinion as to how many bills of sale were 
registered in the first'decade of the twentieth century. The Principal Clerk in the 
Bills of Sale Registry of the Royal Courts of Justice at that time estimated the 
annual number to be between 8,000 and 10,000. A specific figure put forward 
for 1908 is 7,000 based upon perusal of weekly gazettes where registered bills 
were pubIicised. 1 Nowadays only ýabout 3500-4000 bills of sale are registered 
and nearly all of these are car financing agreements. 
It is clear from these figures that the removal of bills of sale from bankruptcy's 
order and disposition clause by the Bills of Sale Act 1878 had a huge impact in 
increasing the numbers of bills registered. The Bills of Sale Act 1882 did not 
reinstate the order and disposition clause to bills of sale but instead, with limited 
exceptions, prevented individuals and partnerships from executing bills of sale 
over future property. "' T'he 1882 Act consequently had an even more dramatic 
effect in reducing the number of bills of sale at a time when commerce generally 
was increasing. The upsurge in mortgage bills of sale after the 1878 Act was 
shortlived. The 1882 Act virtually killed off the mortgage bill of sale over 
changing assets. 
Contemporary Comment on Future Property BilI of SaIe Mortgages 
In questioning witnesses the House of Commons Select Committee on Bills of 
Sale' in 1881 confirmed how frequent future property mortgages had become by 
asking: "Of course you are aware it is a common form in bills of sale, in 
57 House of Commons Select Committee on Bills of Sale - British Parliamentary Papers 1881 
(34) VIH. I at para. 112. 
58 Ibid. at para. I 11. 
59 Hansard HC Col 394 March 8 1882. See also the evidence given to the House of Commons 
Select Committee ibid. at para. 1029. 
60 Evidence to Committee Appointed by the Board ofTrade to Inquire into the Bankruptcy Uw 
and its Administration 1908 Cd. 4068 the "Muir-Mackenzie Committee" Volume II 
Appendices and Index at pp. 232 and 301 respectively. 
61 Ibid ss. 5 and 9. The Act under section 12 also made void small bills of sale (for less than 
00) to protect those least capable of protecting themselves. 
62 British Parliamentary Papers 1881 (34) VIII. 1. 
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pledging stock, to include stock which he has not yet purchased, and which has 
therefore to come in? "" In questioning a moneylender over the proposed 
prohibition on future property mortgages (given effect to by the 1882 Act) the 
following exchange took place "You think that would hamper very much the 
power of people in'trade to borrow money legitimately for the purpose of their 
trade? -I believe they would not be able then to borrow money... "'. Another 
moneylender' in discussion of relatively small bills of sale for E100 over the 
"floating stock" of tradesmen was asked What effect a prohibition on mortgages 
of after acquired property would, have on such tradesmen's transactions. He 
responded: "It would stultify a great many of them. "' 
In moving the Bill which became the 1882 Act reference was made to the Select 
Committee and the numerous judges who had given evidence and it was stated: 
"They agreed generally that after-acquired property should not pass under a bill 
of sale, and that the law, as laid down in "Holroyd and Marshall" by the House 
of Lords, should be altered. "' 
Creditors' representatives before the House of Commons Select Committee 
regarded a bill of sale over floating stock as a fraud as it encouraged a mortgagor 
to obtain assets on credit which immediately became bound by the bill to the loss 
of creditors geneially. Their opinion was either that after acquired property 
should not be permitted to be mortgaged at all'or that if permitted the security 
should be limited to fixtures and machinery, things which the mortgagor was not 
intending to sell. " Similarly in debate in the House of Con , unons one 
Member: 
"... considered it unsound in principle that a trader should be able to give a 
preferential security to a particular creditor over goods which he might never pay 
63 kid. at para. 35 question put by Mr Serjeant Simon. 
64 Ibid. at para. 726 Mr BT Williams questioning amoneylender Mr William Usher. 
65 Although it would be dangerous to place too much reliance on the evidence of moneylenders 
at this period one member of the House of Commons later commented , 
that their 
"... testimony was of the most graphic and sensational nature. He thought he had never read 
anything more sensational in Dickens's novels; but, in saying that, he must do those 
professed money-lenders the justice to say that nothing could be more frank, straightforward, 
and impartial than the manner in which they gave their evidence. " Hansard HC Col 395 8th 
March 1882 comment of Mr Monk. 
66 British Parliamentary Papers 1881 (34) VHLI at para. 1184. 
67 Hansard HC Col 395 8th March 1882. 
68 See British Parliamentary Papers 1881 (34) VIII. I at paras. 1374-1378,14 10-11, 
1499,1596 and 1764. 
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for... ". 69 
I In addition to many relatively small traders giving all encompassing bills of sale 
to the detriment of their creditors generally, there had grown up a real social 
problem with moneylenders taking advantage of the . 1878 Act to prey on small 
debtors from all walks of fife. ' Small bills had become a real problem. Lord 
Coleridge commented in Parliament that: "In 1877 the number of bills of sale 
under E50 was 4,802 in England, and the amount secured by them was; E125,597. 
In 1880, the number was 38,177, and the sum secured E715,000. The smaller 
bills of sale given to money-lenders were undoubtedly very oppressive, and the 
interest exacted was often outrageous. "71 Mr James Motteram. QC, a 
Birmingham County Court judge, estimated in 1881 that between 80 and 90 per 
cent of all bills of sale were fraudulent. ' 
Bills of sale subject to statutory registration are by definitioe only capable of 
being executed over chattels. It is arguably no smaller a deception secretly to 
mortgage one's future book debts rather than one's future stock in trade. Book 
debts represent only stock in trade which has been or will be sold. Despite this 
the Bills of Sale Acts did not regulate mortgages of choses in action in general or 
of book debts in particular. 74 
69 Comment by Mr Lewis Fry, Hansard HC Col 402 8th March 1882. 
70 Evidence before the House of Commons Select Committee in 1881 included a list of the type 
of person who had executed bills of sale during a particular fortnight in the Nottingham area: 
"There is a fitter, butcher, widow, tailor, slater, labourer, widow, policeman, labourer, 
traveller (of what degree it does not specify), police constable, lacemaker, fitter, dry-salter, 
coal dealer, cowkeeper and farmer, miner, gardener, miner, fisherman, butcher and butter 
dealer, fitter, fishmonger, fanner, grocer and pleasure boat proprietor, dressmaker, tanner, 
beer-house keeper, joiner, widow, victualler, inn-keeper, shoemaker, lacemaker, blacksmith, 
boilersmith, market gardener, smith, householder, warehouseman, lodging-house keqper, 
contractor, &c., lacecutter, widow, framework-knitter, 'gaidener, brushmaker, moulder, 
charwoman, farmer, groom, coaldealer, groom, builder, &c., labourer, platelayer, labourer, 
farmer and grazier, miner.. " British Parliamentary Papers 1881 (34) VRI. 1 at para. 1172. 
71 Hansard HL Col 1545 June 19 1882. The Attorney General of the time, Sir Henry James, 
had different and even more damning figures - 1877 total 13,000 bills, 1880 total 51,000 bills 
(Hansard HC Col 1401 20th March 1882). 
72 British Parliamentary Papers 1881 (34) VIH. I at para. 1566. 
73 See Bills of Sale Act 1854 s. I and Bills of Sale Act 1878 s. 4. 
74 See e. g. Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523 and Re Neal [191412 KB 910. 
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Evidence before the Muir-Mackenzie Committee' in f 908 demonstrated that it 
was not ipfrquent for a general assignment of book debts to be taken which 
remained secret and, with the'collusion of the mortgagor just prior to his 
bankruptcy, notice would be given to the debtors with the result that unsecured 
creditors would find themselves with nothing in the bankruptcy. " Secrecy of 
such assignments was of potential benefit to banks but the chairman of Lloyds 
Bank (who was also the President of the Institute of Bankers) recommended 
compulsory registration of general assignments of book debts. With an. 
interesting mixture of imagery, he commented that the view of the "great banking 
houses". was "that all a man's cards should be on the table, and that he should not 
be sailing under false colours. "' 
Following the recommendation of the Muir-Mackenzie Committee 78 a general 
assignment of pre , sent or 
future book debts was made subject to registration as an 
absolute bill of sale under the Bills of Sale Act 1878" by s. 43 Bankruptcy Act 
1914.. 10 
Companies Subject to Bills of Sale Acts? 
Whether or not companies were subject to the Bills of Sale Acts was one of the 
great legal questions of the second half of the nineteenth century. It is clear that 
at one time companies executed bills in the same form as individuals and 
75 Committee Appointed by the Board of Trade to Inquire into the Bankruptcy Law and its 
Administration 1908 Cd. 4068. 
76 Ibid. Volume H Appendices and Index at para. 2364. 
77 Ibid. at. para. 4601 
78 Ibid. at para. 15 1. 
79 Not a security bill under the 1882 Act as presumably this would be impossible by virtue of 
the future assets rule in s. 5 and could not be in thd statutory form as required by s. 9 and the 
Schedule to the Act. 
80 See now Insolvency Act 1986 S. 344. 
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partnerships. " It is also clear that at least some companies . took the precaution of 
registering their securities. 82 
The point became a very live issue after the 1882 Act outlawed mortgages over 
present and future property. Section 17 of the 1882' Act contained a saving 
provision for "debentures of ... companies. " 
In keeping with the problems 
encountered with other provisions of the Act, the meaning of debentures and the 
types of company which could benefit from the s. 17 exemption gave rise to a 
great deal of difficult caselaw. Although the definition adopted by the courts of 
"debenture" 83 was wide enough to include bills of sale mortgages, the cases 
which settled that company debentures were outside the Act were all cases 
involving floating charges. 84 It was not until 1891" that the Court of Appeal 
finally established the floating charge to be subject only to the Companies Act 
registration requirements and to be outside those of the Bills of Sale Acts. Doubt 
still remained as to whether a chattel mortgage executed by a company was 
subject to registration under the Bills of Sale Act. 
The floating charge, which by this time had only been around for about twenty 
years, " in practical terms: (i) was much simpler to draft than a traditional bill of 
sale'; (ii) was arguably more encompassing; (iii) had the added advantage 'of 
allowing for the appointment of a receiver and manager to realise the security, as 
a charge over the undertaking (the usual form of a floating charge) includes the 
right to carry on the business; (iv) was certain to be above any attack based upon 
81 See question and answer detailed in House of Commons Select Committee on Bills of Sale - 
British Parliamentary Papers 1881 (34) VIII. I at para. 83 "Companies give bills of sale to 
their bankers? - Undoubtedly. " See also Hansard HC Col 1415 March 20 1882 where an 
attempt was made to introduce a provision not dissimilar to s. 245 Insolvency Act 1986: 
where a Company registered under "The Companies Act, 1862, is wound up either 
compulsorily or voluntarily within twelve months after execution by such company of a bill 
of sale, such bill of sale shall, as against the liquidator or liquidators of such Company, be 
void in respect of any personal chattels which at or after the date of the commencement of
such winding up are in the possession, or apparent possession, or the order and disposition 
of such Company. " 
82 See e. g. Shears v Jacob (1866) LR I CP 513, Deffell v Mte (1866) LR 2 CP 144 and 
Attenborough's Case (1885) 28 ChD 682. 
83 See e. g. Levy v Abercorfis Slate and Slab Co. (1887) 37 ChD 260. 
84 See e. g. Read v Joannon (1890) 25 QBD 300. 
95 Re Standard Manufacturing [189111 Ch 627. 
86 Introduction of the floating charge taken to be Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian 
- Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318. 
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invalidity under the Bills of Sale Acts; and (v) was not subject to public 
registration, This final point was highlighted in the House of Commons debate 
on the Preferential Payments in Býnkruptu Act 1897 (in the context the meaning 
of "debenture" is equated with "floating charge") where it was stated that: "A 
debenture need not be registered under the Bills of Sale Act, but a mortgage -a 
more formal instrument - if it included personal chattels, must be registered-A 
mortgage was at present in a position which was inferior in that respect to a 
" 17 debenture... . 
The Floating Charge 
In 1895 the Davey Committee" reported that "[t]here is no subject of greater 
importance connected with the administration of companies-than the question of 
the restrictions and limitations to be placed on the powers of a company to 
mortgage its property. ""' At the same time that the House of Lords was 
commenting judicially that the manner in which the floating charge operated was 
a "great scandal"' it was said in debate in the House of Commons that: 
"Debentures were constantly made the instruments of systematic fraud on the part 
of vendors, sometimes of very rotten concerns. A business was sold, a debenture 
was taken in payment - often at a very extortionate price - and in the end a secret 
hand was stretched out, to the prejudice of the shareholders, employees and 
creditors, and the same vendor could retake possession of the full property for 
which he had been paid. ""' 
Once it was certain that company debentures were outside the registration 
requirements of the Bills of Sale Acts there was a period up to 1900 when there 
was no obligation for companies publicly to register security instruments over 
their assets. There was merely a requirement for the company to keep its own 
register of charges- but, as was recognised'by the Davey Committee, "many 
87 Hansard HC Sir Albert Rollit Cols 80-8110 February 1897. 
88 Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed by the Board of Trade to Inquire what 
Amendments are necessary in the Act relating to Joint. Stock Companies Incorporated with 
Limited Liability (1895) C. 7776. 
89 Ibid. at para. 43. 
90 Salomon's Case [1897] AC 22 at 53 per Lord Macnaghten. 
91 Hansard HC Sir Albert Rollit Col 81 10th February 1897. Rollit's suggestion at Col 81 that 
preferential debts should have priority over both floating and fixed security would have saved 
a lot of trouble in that the difference between fixed and floating charges would not have 
become such a crucial point as it is today. 
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companies, even amongst the largest and best-managed, keep no register at all. 
On the recomm6ndation of Davey" the Companies Act 1900 made four types of 
charges publicly registrablq. 94 The Davey recommendation did not extend to 
compulsory registration of mortgages or charges on book debts. It will be 
recalled that at this time individuals and partnerships did not have to register 
general assignments of book debts and to require companies "to register any such 
mortgages as an individual trader is not required to register, would unfairly 
handicap them in competition with individuals and unincorporated firms carrying 
on a similar business". ' 
This rather large hole in the registration system was not patched up by Parliament 
until the Companies Act 190796 which gave effect to the recommendation of the 
Loreburn Committee7 to make book debt charges registrable. The House of 
Lords' decision in the Yorkshire Woolcombers" case had to a large extent already 
achieved this result by interpreting what was ostensibly a mortgage of book debts 
as a floating charge. The House of Lords' decision is open to many fundamental 
criticisms" and may in the author's view only be defended on the basis that the 
public interest demanded that such book debt securities should be publicly 
registered. I 
Although Companies House does not hold figures for the numbers of company 
charges registered each year there is a reference in the Loreburn Report"o that in 
1904 there were 4,400 company charges registered. Ile total number of 
92 Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed by the Board of Trade to Inquire what 
Amendments are necessary in the Act relating to Joint Stock Companies Incorporated with 
Limited Liability (1895) C. 7776 at para. 47. 
93 Ibid. at para. 48. 
94 Section 14. 
95 Para. 48. 
% Section-10. 
97 Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee (1906) Cd 3052 the "Loreburn 
Committee" Report at para. 37. 
98 Sub nom. 111ingworth v Houldsworth (1904]AC 355. 
99 See Gregory and Walton "Book Debt Charges: Following Yorkshire Woolcombers - Are We 
Sheep Gone Astray? " [2000] Insolvency Lawyer 157. 
Loreburn Report Appendix at p. 91 Memorandum by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. 
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companies registered in 1904 was 3,477 made up of ý, 068 private companies 
with onlY 409 going to the public. 101 
It is worthy of some consideration that in 1904 there were more debentures 
registered than companies. This in itself proves nothing but does suggest the 
likely frequency of a Salomon v Salomon" type situation, that is, mostly private 
companies being registered with many being subject to debentures. Bearing in 
mind the fall in bills of sale registrations at this time it is likely that as far fewer 
individuals and partnerships were 
, 
borrowing by way of bill of sale, many were 
incorporating their businesses and those companies were securing their 
borrowings by issuing debentures. 
Although there is no suggestion that Mr Salomon himself was in anyway 
fraudulent, the "calamitous""' decision in Salomon certainly opened the way for 
less scrupulous businessmen. In evidence to the Loreburn Committee in 1906 the 
Timber Trade Federation highlighted a common practice: " 
"It is within the knowledge of the Federation that cases have occurred in which 
traders foreseeing that markets are likely to go against them have converted their 
businesses into limited liability companies worked by themselves or their 
nominees, and have then taken debentures for the purchase price. By this means 
it may happen that they acquire the goods supplied by their creditors in order to 
replace their lost capital and so transfer the loss from themselves to their 
creditors. It is certain that such operations are practically impossible to an 
individual trader, as his power of giving security upon his future property and 
book debts IS so restricted by law that he is practically debarred from raising 
money upon such security. A trader by converting his business into a limited 
company can sell to such company (which is practically himself) the goodwill of 
his business at an unduly inflated figure and then lend money represented by such 
goodwill to the company (i. e. ) to himself on the security of debentures. A 
company conducted by fair minded and honest directors, however constituted, 
101 Lorebprn Report Appendix at p. 93 Further Memorandum by the Registrar of Joint Stock 
Companies. Companies registered in 1901 (the first year of 1900 Act which restricted the 
more questionable activities of promoters) totalled 3,132 with 2,485 being private and 647 
going public. It is interesting to note the impact of the 1900 Act as in 1900 the last year 
before the 1900 Act came into force a total of 4,509 companies were registered - see 27th 
General Annual report by the Board of Trade I st August 1918. 
102 [18971 AC 22. 
103 Kahn-Freund "Some Reflections on Company Law Reform" (1944) 8 MLR 54 at 54. 
104 Memorandum by the Timber Trade Federation of the United Kingdom at p. 81 of the 
Appendix to the Loreburn Report. 
258 The Receivers, Administrators & Liquidators Quanerly, Volume 4, Issue 3,2000 
would not take advantage of any facilities which the Companies Acts may afford 
to defraud its, creditors, and in such cases an amendment of the law would involve 
no hardship whatever to such comýanies, of which there are excellent examples 
in the wood trade. " 
This type of activity was still being complained of in evidence to the Wrenbury 
Comn-fittee" in 1918. 
Choice of security instruments may- not have been the only reason to incorporate 
small businesses but along with limited liability Salomon* promised the 
businessman his money back if the company failed, as long as he had taken a 
debenture for some or all of the price of the business transfer to the company. 
Evidence from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries certainly shows 
that the limited company took over a lot of business from previously 
unincorporated business and issued a lot of debentures. During the same period, 
sole traders and partnerships issued far fewer bills of saleýll Floating charges 
have never been subject to bankruptcy's order and disposition clause. It has 
already been demonstrated what that can do for the popularity of a security over 
after acquired property. 
The Loreburn Committee cornmented in 1906 that: "If the practice of raising 
money by floating charges had recently commended, or had been adopted only to 
a small extent, some of us would have been inclined to prohibit this mode of 
raising money by a security upon future assets. "" 
A minority report by some of the members of the Loreburn Committee explained 
the fraud perpetrated where a company carries on business with money borrowed 
from banks and guaranteed by the participators of the company who take a 
floating charge over the company's undertaking. The participators carry on 
business, are paid their salaries, receive interest on the loan even if no profit is 
made and at the end of the day when the company fails, seize the assets and get 
105 Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee Cd. 9138 paras. 63 and 64. 
106 Figures for companies and individuals do not include book debt securities as these were not 
registrable by companies until 1907 and by individuals until 1914 (and then only for general 
assignments of book debts). 
107 Loreburn Report at para. 41. The Appendix to the Report contains the evidence of many 
interested parties who were strongly in favour of abolition of floating charges and for 
companies to be put in the same position as traders under the Bills of Sale Acts e. g 
Manchester, Edinburgh, Nottingham and Wakefield Chambers of Commerce. 
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their money back at the expense of the unsecured creditors. 'O' Such "sharp 
practice"'T was not, however, the main ground for objecting to floating charges. 
A bigger, concern was that a company has not the same sense of restraint an 
individual fearing' bankruptcy has and "little or no personal discredit falls upon 
them if their company fails to pay a dividend to its trade creditors. ""O The 
floating charge it was argued encourages trading wholly or almost wholly with 
borrowed capital - "a very common practice in the establishment of small 
concerns. ""' Loans carry interest even if no profit is made and consequently 
there is a greater risk of failure. Although by 1906 floatIng charges were 
registrable, because* they were so universal they were no longer a "danger 
signal"I" and to refuse credit to such companies would hamper any manufacturer 
or merchant's trade greatly. 
The minority report recommended putting companies on the same footing as 
individuals in preventing them from charging future chattels. The long term 
thinking behind this recommendation was that although it would reduce the 
amount that could be borrowed on such debentures "companies will obtain a 
larger general credit by reason of trade creditors no longer having the fear that 
the whole of the assets will be swept away by the debenture holders. "113 
The minority report was ignored and the floating charge continued its rise as the 
most popular form of corporate loan security in the twentieth century. It has 
been subjected to criticism almost throughout its lifetime. 114. The main threat to 
the floating charge in recent years has not been that it is likely to be outlawed but 
that it has become vulnerable to other claims in insolvency taking priority. 
108 The minority cited as examples of this type of conduct Re Crigglestone Coal Co. (1906] 2 
Ch 327 and Re London Pressed Hinge [1905] 1 Ch 576. 





114 See e. g. Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 
8558, the "Cork Committee" Report at paras. 105,437 and 1480. 
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Conclusions 
There is a strong argument that floating charges and all other securities over 
future property remain as fraudulent against the unsecured creditor today as they 
did in 1882,1906,1918 and 1982. In 1895 it was stated that the power to 
mortgage future book debts and chattels and to execute floating charges was "the 
main reason why private partnerships are turned into joint stock companies. " 115 
Is it sensible for the Law Commission to consider expansion of the floating 
charge empire when for nearly a hundred years the best thing that can be said 
about the floating charge is that it is too late now to abolish it? It could be argued 
that because everyone is so familiar with the popularity and the workings of the 
floating charge in the corporate field that everything should be left alone for 
companies. Would people dealing with registered partnerships have the same 
view or wouldthey be caught out by a twenty-first century registered partnership 
version of Salomon? 
If the Law Commission's suggestion that registered partnerships should be made 
exempt from the 1882 Bills of Sale Act became law, would such partnerships 
jump on the floating charge bandwagon? Companies did so largely because they 
wanted to avoid the problems of the 1882 Act and at least until 1900 they did not 
have to register publicly their charges. Companies up to that point enjoyed all 
the benefits that the pre-1854 moneylenders wallowed in when they took secret 
bills of sale, but without the pitfalls of, inter alia, the order and disposition clause 
in bankruptcy. 
If a bank was allowed to lend money to a registered partnership free from the 
restrictions of the 1882 Act, it would be best advised to take an old style 
mortgage bill of sale Iisting all assets present and future, coupled with a 
"lightweight" floating charge"' to ensure it could still appoint an administrative 
receiver to enforce the security effectively. All of the old nineteenth century 
advantages that a floating charge had over the mortgage bill of sale would no 
longer be present. The bank would have all the benefits of an all encompassing 
fixed security and would maintain the advantage of'the floating charge for 
enforcement. 
115 Evidence of the Walsall Chamber of Commerce to. the Davey Committee - Appendix at 
p. 130. 
116 See generally Oditah "Lightweight Floating Charges" [1991] JBL 49. 
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It has been suggested that most partnerships nowadays Would not wish to take up 
the possibility of executing a floating charge. 117 This may be so, at least partly 
because partnerships, without the "benefits" of limited liability and the floating 
charge, have generally conducted their business responsibly in the sobering 
knowledge that if they did not, the full weight of bankruptcy would land upon 
them. In an echo of the Loreburn minority report, it could be argued that 
partnerships enjoy a larger general credit because their creditors do not fear a 
debenture holder sweeping off all the firms' assets should they become insolvent. 
The question of whether or not existing partnerships take up the proposed 
extended power of lending ignores the general commercial need for a fixed 
security over changing assets. This need is apparent by the banks' quest over the 
last 30 years for this particular holy grail. It may be, therefore, that existing 
partnerships decid 
,e 
not to execute this type of security, but that existing limited 
liability companies re-register as limited liability partnerships in order to take 
advantage of it. The partners would retain the benefits of limited liability but the 
banks could take a far more effective form of security over the partnership's 
assets than they could ever do if the business remained a company. 
It is interesting to note that the courts have somewhat astonishingly always closed 
their eyes to the obvious contradictions between the old bills of sale mortgage 
cases dealing with individuals and partnerships, where the dealing power was 
either express or implied, and the more recent corporate security cases. Ile 
present obsession with the idea that fixed security causes paralysis of the business 
is a product only of the company cases though its origins lie in an unfortunate 
aberration in the common law courts. "8 The company cases, typified by 
Yorkshire Woolcombers, have at times struggled to maintain the illogical party 
line that where there, is any security over changing assets with a power in the 
chargor to deal with the charged assets, the charge must float and cannot be 
fixed. 119 
Although the position for corporate security appears to be set in stone, it would 
be difficult for a court considering a partnership morigage bill of sale when freed 
from the 1882 Act to do anything other than follow Holroyd. The absence of 
117 "Alternative Company Structures for Small Businesses" Chartered Association of Certified 
Accouniants, Research Report 42 by Andrew Hicks, Robert Drury and Jeff Smallcombe 
1995. 
118 See Graham v Chapman (1852) 12 CB 85. This matter has been explained in a forthcoming 
article in Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law, Quarterly, 
119 Consider Re Atlantic Computer SystemspIc [1992] Ch505, Re Atlantic Me&cal Ltd [1993] 
BCLC 386 anq Re Cimex 7-Issues Ltd [1994] BCC 626. - 
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pre-existing supporting author , 
ity 
, 
for'the Yorkshire Woolcombers decision -a 
company caýe - would make it unlikely that it would be used to overhaul cases 
dealing with security issued by individuals or partnerships. This is especially so 
when it is realised that Holroyd itself was the product of several centuries' 
equitable wisdom. The decision in Yorkshire Woolcombers is at best full of legal 
problems and is not made the more convincing by the courts' modem day 
constant unquestioning accepta4ce of it. If the banks want specific security with 
dealing power, and they obviously do, then registered partnerships could be the 
answer to their dreams. The only- remaining benefit to company participators 
would be limited liability 12' but this would disappear as limited liability would be 
available to the partners if they registered as a limited liability partnership. 
Permitting partnerships to execute securities over future assets may well open a 
can of worms. The future under this proposed new regime holds the added 
excitement of the courts potentially having this rather ridiculous divide between 
partnerships, where secured lending has one set of rules as to what a specific 
security is and companies, where a completely different set of rules applies. The 
worm of secured lending would be chopped into two halves, each having its own 
lifestyle. If this does happen it would not be until after the Privy Council has 
decided Brumark. If the Privy Council adhere to the reasoning in Yorkshire 
Woolcombers, the decision in Brumark may in a few short years end up looking 
not unlike its fellow Privy Council decision of Downsview Nominees Ltd v'First 
City Corpn Ltd121 - not overly convincing and by no means universally popular. 
120 Often this is merely an illusion as banks will frequently demand personal guarantees from the 
directors on top of any security. I 
121 [1993] AC 295. The consideration inDownsWew of the duties owed by receivers has largely 
been superseded by the Court of Appeal's decision in Medforth v Blake [2000] Ch 86. 
Fixed and floating charges-a revelation 
Roger Gregory* and Peter Waltont 
The accepted theory of the creation of thefloating charge has no basis in law or 
fact. The sole reason for adopting the statutory "undertaking" mortgage (later 
thefloating charge) was to evade an 1852 common law bankruptcy ruling that 
mortgages over changing assets paralysed business. This doctrine was expunged 
in 1883 as heresy, thereby destroying the basis of the "paralysis" dicta in early 
floating charge cases. Paradoxically, modern company lawyers are re-engaging 
in the defunct 19th century "paralysis" battle, whereas in truth the modern law 
is that mortgages with implied dealing power are in full force and effect 
today. 
In Siebe Gorman & Co. Dd v. Barclays Bank Ltd, ' in 1979, Slade, J., said: 
In my judgment, however, it is perfectly possible in law for a mortgagor, by way of continuing 
security for future advances, to grant to a mortgagee a charge on future book debts in a form which 
creates in equity a specific charge on the proceeds of such debts as soon as they are received and 
consequently prevents the mortgagor from disposing of an unencumbered title to the subject matter 
of such charge without the mortgagee's consent, even before the mortgagee has taken steps to 
enforce its security. 
In Slade, J. 's dicta on the book debt fixed charge, many banking lawyers saw the 
prospect of new and exciting forms of specific security cover for bank lending. Oddly, for 
those who had obtained not dissimilar results over the profits of Eastern Haddon Church 
in the reign of Henry VI2 there was only that dull satisfaction which stems from following 
established practice. " In this way the confident expectations of the sophisticated modem 
practitioner and the settled routine of the simpler ancients ran in harmony. The reason for 
excitement in 1979 was that Slade, J., tendered book debts as suitable material for specific 
* Visiting Professor. University of Wolverhampton. 
t Senior Lecturer, University of Wolverhampton. 
The authors are most grateful for the very considerable assistance furnished by David Graham, Q. C., who 
before his retirement was the doyen of the bankruptcy Bar and whose knowledge of the history of his subject 
is vast. A debt of similar magnitude is owed to Dr Pamela Nightingale, whose work on medieval economics 
shows that there is surprisingly little that is new under the sun. 
1. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 142,159. 
2. Early Chancery Proceedings Cl 7/154 in the Public Record Office system 8 Henry V1. 
3. Memorandum of assignment of the revenues of the See of Winchester to the King's Sureties for payment 
of money advanced by certain London merchants for payment of debts due to Peter of Savoy (C47 13/11 in the 
Public Record Office system 43 Henry 111). 
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security notwithstanding that they are a form of property which constantly circulates in 
business. To any company lawyer they are quintessential floating charge property. 4 
Modern faith in the floating charge rests largely upon Professor Pennington's great 
article "The Genesis of the Floating Charge" ("the Genesis"), which argues that English 
common law rejected the Roman hypotheca altogether and equity remedied this defect 
only in 1862 in the "first leading case" of Holroyd v. Marshall. 7 Professor Goode, in 
"The Exodus of the Floating Charge"' ("the Exodus") follows the same sweep of history, 
noting that English courts could not reconcile a dealing power with an attached security 
interest. "Astonishingly", " he says, the Romans developed hypotheca, which took root 
here, as the floating charge, 800 years after the decay of Roman dominance. 
Given that commercial law developments are a response to commercial needs, 10 it 
follows that both Roman and late Victorian commerce were convinced of the utility of a 
security over present and future assets which left the grantor, without let or hindrance, to 
deal with them in the course of business. This all sounds very respectable. But, one 
wonders, was trade so diminished in the intervening centuries that security having these 
features was unnecessary? Was it available? The answers, respectively, are-No and 
Yes. 
If "No and Yes" (as expanded hereafter) constituted the whole story, the hypotheca 
would be little more than a picturesque antiquity drafted into English law to delight the 
intellect. It was anything but that. Contrary to popular belief, however, its initial creation 
was not for the purpose of giving substance to what had hitherto always been a void in the 
law, rather it was a slightly desperate attempt to recover from the common law's 
paralysing attack in 1852, in Graham v. Chapman, " upon equity's future property 
mortgage with dealing power. As we shall see, the attack was aberrational and short-lived. 
But the timing of it and its vigour were such that twinges of paralysis afflict the corpus 
iuris even today. It was a later event-the Bills of Sale legislation of 1882-that thrust the 
hypotheca into a permanent place in English law. The dominant position which it rapidly 
achieved was the result of simple commercial pragmatism at the time rather than 
considerations of doctrinal accuracy. Unfortunately one or two impurities remain in the 
system. 
The authors' preferred culprit for the misunderstandings as to the origin and nature of 
security over company personalty, and in particular the floating charge, is the failure to 
give due weight to the role of the bankruptcy law. In fact, the state of the bankruptcy law 
4. The Chancery Division has ever since Siebe Gorman required: (a) chargee possession or control of the 
security while the charge lives--e. g., Royal Trust Bank v. National Westminster Bank PIc [ 1996] B. C. L. C. 682; 
Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [ 19971 B. C. C. 724; Re Brightlife Ltd [ 1987] Ch. 200; Re Westmaze Ltd [ 1999] 
B. C. C. 441 and Re Double S Printers Ltd [1999] B. C. C. 303-and (b) further chargor/chargee conveyancing 
whenever property of the security description is acquired or alienated by the chargor--e. g., Re Croftbell [ 19901 
B. C. L. C. 840,947, per Vinelott, J., and Re Keenan Bros Lid(1986) 2 B. C. C. 98,970,98.974-975, per McCarthy, 
J., citing and approving the court below. This was an "extreme commercial improbability" (Re BriRhtlijle [ 19871 
Ch. 200,209, per Hoffmann, J. ). Acquisitions would require new deeds of substitution. 
5. (1960) 23 M. L. R. 630. 
6. Ibid., 634. 
7. (1862) 10 H. L. C. 19 1; 11 E. R. 999. 
8. D. Feldman and F. Meisel (eds), Corporate and Commercial Law: Uodern Developments (London. 1996) 
193,195-198,203. 
9. Ibid, 195. 
10. Ibid., 193. 
11. (1852) 12 C. B. 85; 138 E. R. 933. 
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in the latter half of the l9th century was decisive: for example, the Judicature Act 1875 
applied bankruptcy law as to "the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors"' 
wholesale to insolvent winding up. 
The authors' aim here is to demonstrate that, unless the courts are prepared to hold 
(a) that there is no difference between a mortgage and a charge and (b) that companies are 
unable to grant mortgages over their present and future personal property, then that which 
has been English law since the Middle Ages, with a short interruption in the period 
1852-1883, is good law in 2001. 
I. THE PERSONALTY MORTGAGE 
A. Early beginnings 
From the latter part of the 14th century and into the 15th a very large amount of trade was 
conducted on credit so that security became a significant issue. 13 Postan'14 who did signal 
work on medieval trade, described credit requirements and the state of financial 
instruments in this period. He notes, particularly, the use of conditional bills of sale and 
the increasing use of assignments of debt to finance trade. " Dr Pamela Nightingale, the 
distinguished economic historian, has expounded the vicissitudes of the money supply in 
this period and the concomitant requirement for credit both to cope with shortages and to 
finance expansion. 16 She, too, testifies to the value of gifts of goods and chattels (i. e., 
mortgages) at this time and analyses such a gift executed by one John Hall in 1396 by 
reference to prin 
, 
ciplei in Sir Frederick Pollock's "Gifts of Chattels Without Delivery" 17 
and Sir William Holdsworth's History. " 
In his learned introduction to the Calendar of Select Pleas and Memoranda of the City 
of London 1437-1457, " Philip E. Jones states that the practice of mortgaging personalty 
spread from London and, just as landowners mortgaged their estates, so the citizens of 
London used to pledge their goods, comprising stock in trade, household chattels and 
implements of their craft, without parting with actual possession. He highlights the fact 
that many of these "gifts of goods and chattels" and the debts behind them were only 
acknowledged in the courts years after execution, probably for the purposes of enforce- 
ment When the donor was "unable to meet the debt as a security for which the deed was 
made". 20 Along with those in the Close Rolls, 2,000 of them were acknowledged in court 
alone in the period 1437-1457. Dr A. H. Thomas's introduction to the 1413-1437 
12. Judicature Act 1875, s. 10. 
13. Therý is a large body of literature on the subject of post- 1300 credit. See, e. g., the sources cited by P. 
Nightingale, "Monetary Contraction and Mercantile Credit in Later Medieval England" (1990) Economic 
History Review 560. 
14. M. M. Postan, Medieval Trade and Finance (Cambridge, 1973). 
15. lbid., 30-33,40-42. 
16. "Monetary Contraction and Mercantile Credit in Later Medieval England" (1990) Economic History 
Review 560. 
17. (1890) 6 L. Q. R. 446. 
18. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. III, 5th edn (London, 1942). 336-338,346-349. 
19. "Introduction: Gifts of Goods and Chattels". Calendar of Select Pleas and Memoranda of the City of 
London 1437-1457 (Cambridge, 1954), esp. XXII-XXV. 
20. Ibid.. XXIII. 
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Calendar 121 refers to the "ever larger space 1122 in the London rolls and 
in Chancery 
records taken up by these debts and deeds. He cites a transaction of 10 September 1392,23 
in which a recognizance of debt was entered, followed one month later by a deed giving 
all goods and chattels to the creditor, and a marginal note in the Roll recorded that three 
years later "satisfaction" was acknowledged and the "obligations" were cancelled. 
Thomas notes that there were other instances where "all goods and chattels" passed under 
the deed and trade nevertheless continued . 24 A slightly later example 25 is a transfer on 6 September 1455 by Richard Bonde (a tailor) of all his "vessels utensils and brewing 
hustlements of leade and wood" in the "Brewhouse le Thre nonnes super le Hoope" in 
Sketeboume Lane, St Mary Woolnoth along with the public house and, as the Calendar 
says, "all his other goods and chattels and debts owing to him". The deed was enrolled 
on 30 March 1457. 
Four points emerge at this early stage-there were thousands of transactions; it was 
possible to mortgage chattels by class description as well as by individual identification; 
in very many cases there was only a token delivery to the mortgagee of one (trifling) item 
out of the chattels mortgaged, which left the balance of secured assets in the actual 
possession of the mortgagor; and, lastly, the mortgagor carried on trade using and turning 
over the security. 
The commercial practices established in the Middle Ages carried on. These mortgages 
(usually in the form of a sale subject to defeasance upon repayment) were' reduced to 
standard terms in, for example, Phayer's Newe Boke of PresidenteS26 (1543), William 
West's two part Symbolmographie 27(1590 and 1594, revised several times), Sheppard's 
President' (1603) and The Young Law Clerk ý Tutor" (1682). Thus far the progress of the 
personalty mortgage looks like one of continuous plain sailing. Continuity was never in 
doubt so long as business needed to borrow (and it did). The sailing, however, was not 
always plain. 
B. The battle between the common law and equity: statutory intervention 
By a private transaction the lender had security, the borrower the advance and the, 
borrower's credit was unimpaired because no-one else knew about it. In the event of 
financial collapse, however, trade creditors received nothing from the borrower's 
bankruptcy because the assets were all swept up in the conditional bill of sale, a secret 
21. "Introduction: Gifts of Goods and Chattels", Calendar of Select Pleas and Memoranda of the City of 
London 1413-1437 (Cambridge, 1943), esp. XIX-XXIII. 
22. Ibid., XX. 
23. Ibid., XXII. 
24. Ibid, XXIII. 
25. Plea and Memoranda Rolls. Roll All I membr. 2v. 
26. T. Phayer, A newe boke of Presidentes in Maner of a Register wherin is comprehended the very trade of 
makying all maner euydence and instruments of Practyse. etc. (London, 1543). 
27. W. West, Symboixographie; which may be termed the Art, Description, or linage (! f Instruments. 
Couenants, Contracts, etc. (London, 1590). 
28. W. Sheppard, The President of Presidents: or One General Presidentfor Common Assurances by Deeds 
(London, 1603). 
29. Edward Cocker, The Young Clerk ý Tutor... To which is annexed, several of the best copies both court 
and chancery-hand now extant (London. 1682). 
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document. Thus a large and visible stock, which created the appearance of ownership, 
wealth and creditworthiness, was, or could be, a delusion. 
The common law had (by the 16th century) long harboured an antipathy to secret 
transfers of chattels and delusive credit. Secret transfer of chattels was anathema in Anglo- 
Saxon society. Addison on ContraCtS30 refers to the Laws of Athelstan and other Anglo- 
Saxon kings proscribing transfers of chattels in the absence of publicity such as sales at 
market or in the presence of credible witnesses. The common lawyers had had one 
instance struck down by statute in 1379.3 1 By the Statute of Elizabeth 157032 they struck 
again and invalidated transfers of real or personal property for the "... Purpose and 
Intent, to delay, hinder or defraud Creditors and others of their just and lawful Actions, 
Suits, Debts 
... 
". 33 The personalty mortgage with grantor possession and trade dealing 
had grown largely by the efforts of the Customary Law Merchant and Chancery, which 
saw it as a vital institution to promote trade. The Statute of Elizabeth was merely 
declaratory of the common law, 31 but Chancery could not override a statute as easily as it 
overrode the common law. 
The high watermark of the common law was Twyne's Case '35 where Pierce assigned his 
goods to Twyne but remained in possession at a time when he owed more than their value 
to TWyne plus a debt to a third party whose action was pending. The Star Chamber's fifth 
resolution was "[h]ere was a trust between the parties, for the donor possessed all, and 
used them as his proper goods, and fraud is always apparelled and clad with a trust, and 
36 a trust is the cover of fraud". In his report Coke, with evident satisfaction, advised his 
readers to make their deeds public, have "good people t137 appraise the value of the goods, 
assign expressly in satisfaction of the debt and, lastly, take possession because grantor 
possession is a trust "per nomen speciosum "M and such a trust "is in truth, as to all the 
creditors, a fraud, for they are thereby defeated and defrauded of their true and due 
debts" . 39 Coke's rally still stiffed common lawyers in the 19th century. 40 Coke's suggestion, that secrecy plus grantor possession and dealing was per se fraud, 
would have been fatal to the personalty mortgage. Two points, however, should be noted: 
(a) Twyne's Case involved an absolute assignment rather than a mortgage; and (b) in the 
case of mortgages it was not usual for the mortgagee to take possession if for no other 
reason to avoid the mortgagee in possession's liability to account for wilful default. In the 
case of mortgages, since transfers "upon good Consideration and bona fide lawfully 
conveyed or assured to any Person"" without notice were excepted by the Statute of 
Elizabeth, where grantor possession was consistent with the deed, it was held no fraud. 
Thus, in Bucknal v. Roiston 42 a supercargo embarking on a trading voyage mortgaged the 
30.3rd edn (London, 1853), 249-250. 
31. Statute For Relief of Creditors against Fraudulent Deeds made by Debtors 2 Ric. 11 c. 3. 
32.13 Eliz I c. 5. 
33. Ibid., the preamble. 
34. See Ryall v. Rolle (1749) 1 Atk. 165,178; 26 E. R. 107,115. 
35. (1601) 3 Co. Rep. 80b; 76 E. R. 809. 
36. (1601) 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 81b. 
37. IbU. 8 Ia. 
38. lbiti, 81b. 
39. IbU 
40. See, e. g., Graham v. Chapman (1852) 12 C. B. 85. 
41.13 Eliz I c. 5, s. 6. 
42. (1709) Prec. in Ch. 285; 24 E. R. 136. 
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outgoing goods and the "produce and advantage that should be made thereor'. 11 The court 
held that the supercargo's possession was consistent with the mortgage (here expressed in 
the old language of a letter of trust) and there was no fraud. The mortgagee prevailed over 
an execution creditor with respect to the end products of the voyage. 
In 1788 Buller, J., complained about Bucknal but accepted it as correct. ' Nearly a 
century later in Ex p. Games's a farmer mortgaged his stock and debts and any subsequent 
items of that description. He then ran the business for four years before default provoked 
seizure. James, L. J., refused to find fraud: "The mortgagor was intended to remain in 
possession of the property and to carry on his business, substituting new chattels for those 
which he sold in the course of his business, and the security of the mortgagee was to 
remain upon the substituted chattels. He got the substituted chattels in place of those 
which he allowed to be withdrawn by the mortgagor. "" 
Returning to our narrative, even within 20 years of Twyne's Case it was apparent to the 
common lawyers that the Statute of Elizabeth was inadequate to suppress delusive credit. 
After two abortive attempts in 1614 and 1621, the Bankruptcy Act 1623'11 was passed 
which introduced the order and disposition clause . 413 Coke had a hand in its Parliamentary 
passage. One member remarked in the debate that: "This possession of the bankrupt the 
grant being concealed was the motive of the Bankrupt's great trust and credit. This 
possession of the Bankrupt is a badge of fraud, and lyeth in the desck many yeeres thus 
concealed. 9949 It was enacted that, where at the time of becoming bankrupt any persons 
"shall by the Consent and Permission of the true Owner and Proprietary have in their 
Possession, Order, and Disposition, any Goods or Chattels whereof they shall be reputed 
tt 4so Owners, and take upon them the Sale, Alteration or Disposition as Owners... , the 
goods and chattels fell into the bankruptcy estate. 
The progress of the personalty mortgage under the order and disposition clause is 
slightly unexpected. In 1740 Lord Hardwicke" noted that, apart from a case before Lord 
Talbot in 1736,52 there had been no decisions on these conditional sales (mortgages) under 
the clause. Stressing the inconvenience to trade should the clause apply but acknowl- 
edging the delusive credit problem, he denied its applicability to conditional sales. Lord 
Hardwicke also said that, if it really had been considered possible that mortgages were 
within the 1623 Act, the point would not have taken more than 100 years to come before 
the court. His Lordship adhered to this approach in Brown v. Heathcote. `" 
In Ryall v. Rolle; ̀ however, Lord Hardwicke recanted his previous views. Harvest, a 
brewer, had entered into seven mortgage transactions (and one absolute sale to an 
incoming partner) between 1725 and 1738 and became bankrupt in 1740. The mortgages 
43. Ibid. 
44. Edwards v. Harben (1788) 2 TR. 587; 100 E. R. 315. 
45. (1879) 12 Ch. D. 314. 
46. Ibid., 323. See also Martindale v. Booth (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 498; 110 E. R. 180; Alton v. Harrison (1869) 
4 Ch. App. 622; and Allen v. Bonnett (1870) 5 Ch. App. 577. 
47.21 Jac. I c. 19. 
48. Ibid., s. 11. 
49. Notes in Parliamentary Debates, Vol. Vil, Appendix A, at 107. 
50.21 Jac. I c. 19, s. 11. 
51. Bourne v. Dodson (1740) 1 Atk. 154,157; 26 E. R. 100,101. 
52. Stephens v. Sole (1736) 1 Ves. 352; 27 E. R. 1077. 
53. (1746) 1 Atk. 160; 26 E. R. 103. 
54.0 749) 1 Atk. 165. 
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involved brewing utensils and stock in trade and in three instances his house, brewhouse 
and out-houses. The assignees in bankruptcy claimed, inter alia, the personal property as 
being in Harvest's possession, order and disposition in his trade at the time of becoming 
bankrupt. Lord Hardwicke called in Lee, L. C. J., Parker, L. C. B., and Burnet, J. (respec- 
tively King's Bench, Exchequer and Common Pleas). His earlier attempts to protect 
mortgages from the order and disposition clause on the basis that the mortgagee 
(conditional vendee) was not the true owner were abandoned. It was held both at law and 
under the order and disposition section that the mortgagee was the owner. Lord Hardwicke 
explained the policy of the order and disposition clause as follows: 55 
The general view of the provision now under consideration, was to prevent raders from gaining a 
delusive credit from a false appearance of their circumstances, to the misleading and deceit of those 
who should trade with them, and the legislature thought hey had done this by subjecting all things 
remaining in the possession of the bankrupt, to the creditors under the commission, because where 
the vendee leaves the goods bought in the possession of the bankrupt, he confides as much in. the 
general credit of the bankrupt, as that creditor who has taken only a bond or note. In such cases, the 
bankrupt had it in his power to sell all the goods the next hour, and the vendee or assignee could 
not claim them from the buyer, but could only have a personal remedy against he bankrupt. All this 
holds as well in the case of conditional, as of absolute sales. 
From the standpoint of the main thesis being developed, that mortgages with dealing 
power were commonplace, it must be added that Lord Hardwicke's view of the power of 
the mortgagor to deal with the security was supported, not opposed, by the common law 
judges. Burnet, J., put choses in action within the clause "... as the specifick goods, by 
being left in the bankrupt's possession, would be subject to the commission, so must the 
profits be in choses in action, arising from these goods ... 
". -" Parker, L. C. B., stated: "It 
is allowed to be out of the question, that the stock mortgaged underwent changes, for there 
is no doubt, but the produce is subject to the mortgage of the stock itself. "57 
The common law was not opposed to the concept of a mortgage with a power to deal. 
Its dislike was reserved merely for certain consequences. Such mortgages would be struck 
down if entered into fraudulently (entrenched by the Statute of Elizabeth). They were 
perfectly effective, however, as regards property existing at the creation of the mortgage. 
As regards future property the legal title would depend on a novus actus such as 
possession or a new deed. Prior to a novus actus the mortgagee (conditional vendee) had 
only a contract, not a property in the goods. It was nevertheless a good covenant. 
Furthermore, Ryall v. Rolle 511 is authority that, where future property fell within the terms 
of the order and disposition clause as mortgaged property, the courts would strike it down 
on that ground, rather than upon some notion of intrinsic invalidity. 
The practical consequence of the order and disposition clause was to make mortgagees 
watch their trade mortgagors' progress more carefully. Grantor possession and consent to 
it by the mortgagee only defeated the mortgagee if it occurred at the time when the 
mortgagor became bankrupt. So long as mortgagees obtained possession or took available 
steps before bankruptcy, the clause had nothing to bite on. 59 If, however, they failed to do 
55. IbU, 183. 
56. Aid., 172. 
57. Ibid., 174. 
58. (1749) 1 Atk. 165. 
59. See, e. g., Re Wright (1876) 3 Ch. D. 70 and Rutter v. Everett [1895] 2 Ch. 872. 
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so, their priority was lost. For example, in Longman v. Tripp 60 a printer mortgaged his 
interest in a newspaper and the profits, carried on business for six months and became 
bankrupt. The mortgaged property including intangible interests fell to the bankruptcy 
assignees. Similarly, in Re Neal, " where an artistic interior decorator mortgaged his 
present and future property including intangibles such as goodwill and debts and carried 
on for four years up to bankruptcy, the mortgagee lost to the trustee in bankruptcy. 
C. The Graham v. Chapman saga 
In this running battle, the common lawyers fired their most serious shot, ironically, just 
before compulsory registration of bills of sale 62 ended the delusive credit aspect of their 
dispute with equity. The bullet was derived from an old design. While the bankruptcy law 
was from its inception in 1542 a statutory process, the judges had developed rules which 
they engrafted on to it (the "policy of the bankruptcy laws"). Contraventions were 
described as a "fraud on the bankrupt laws" or an attempt to "defeat" them. Its rationale 
was that insolvents' proper estates should be distributed rateably to creditors. 
11us, in Worseley v. DemattOS63 a miller mortgaged all his present and future property 
including "all his changeable stock"64 including debts for five shillings. "By the express 
tenor of the deed 1165 the grantor had absolute power to act as owner and dispose of 
mortgaged property. Lord Mansfield held the mortgage a fraud on the bankrupt laws and 
as such an act of bankruptcy. The banker had made no advances. Evidence that he 
intended to lend did not save the deed from being an act of bankruptcy (honesty is not the 
test here, unlike under the Statute of Elizabeth). In WhitWell v. Thompson 61 Lord Kenyon 
said that mortgages to secure fresh advances were outside the common law policy of the 
bankruptcy laws altogether. 
In Graham v. Chapman '67 however, Jervis, C. J., in the Exchequer, purportedly drawing 
on earlier authorities, expounded a revolutionary extension of them which had devastating 
effects. Larke, a Norwich draper being indebted to Chapman, borrowed further from him 
on a mortgage securing both loans. The mortgage covered all present and future property 
including stock and debts. Larke carried on trade for six months, defaulted (was 
dispossessed) and went bankrupt. In an issue between the bankruptcy estate and Chapman, 
the mortgage was held a fraud on the bankruptcy laws and liable to be defeated as an act 
of bankruptcy. After a full argument, Jervis, C. J., expressed the decision: the goods 
remaining in the trader's keeping gave him a false credit, whereas, in truth, he had legally 
no power to continue his trade, or to dispose of a single article of his stock, if the deed was 
good"; 6' and "... the deed here is not for future advances, but for a present payment and 
a by-gone debt: it conveys all the trader's property, including the advance, and any 
60. (1805) 2 Bos. ý& Pul. (N. R. ) 67; 127 E. R. 547. 
61. [191412 KB. 9 10. 
62. Under the Bills of Sale Act 1854. 
63. (1758) 1 Burr. 467; 97 E. R. 407. See also Hassells v. Simpson (1785) 1 Doug. 89; 99 E. R. 60 and Devon 
V. Watts (1779) 1 Doug. 86; 99 E. R. 59. 
64. (1758) 1 Burr. 467,468. 
65. Ibid., per Lord Mansfield. 
66. (1793) 1 Esp. N. P. C. 68,72; 170 E. R. 282,284. 
67. (1852) 12 C. B. 85. 
68. Ibid., 102. 
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property purchased with the advance: it necessarily defeats and delays creditors and is, 
therefore, an act of bankruptcy". " Jervis, C. J., referred to Lord Kenyon's view in 
Whitwell, 'O that "... it never can be taken to be law, that a trader cannot sell his property 
when his affairs become embarrassed, or assign them to a person who will assist him in 
his difficulties, as a security for any advances such person may make to him" and gave it 
short shrift-Lord Kenyon could not have intended his remarks to apply to facts not 
before him. 
Bankruptcy estates thus had a new weapon with which to attack mortgages of all 
present and future property: 
(i) everything including the loan went immediately to the mortgagee; 
(ii) the mortgagor's express or implied power to deal was jettisoned; and 
(iii) the deed itself stopped the business and it was invalid per se as an act of 
bankruptcy. 
The consequence was that the very transaction by which the trader sought to escape 
from financial difficulty (borrowing on present and future property mortgage) was itself 
the fatal blow to the business. In metaphorical terms it was somewhat worse than merely 
shooting oneself in the foot. Not surprisingly, bankruptcy estates founded arguments on 
Graham frequently7l because mortgage borrowing was a commercial mainstay of trade 
financing. The rejection of the power to deal, primarily a matter of construction of 
documents, was particularly crucial and was irreconcilable with the large body of cases 
which had implied it where it was not expressed . 72 Lord Eldon would have found it incomprehensible. In Nutbrown v. Thornton 73 in an qCtion by the mortgagor farmer his 
Lordship had expressly ordered the mortgagee to return the seized goods to the mortgagor 
on an implied term that the mortgagor should continue business (which included cattle 
dealing) either for seven years or until the debt exceeded E500, deciding that the 
mortgagor was under no obligation to keep the mortgaged property in specie. 
69. Ibid, 106. 
70. (1793) 1 Esp. N. P. C. 68,72. 
71. See, e. g.. Hutton v. Cruttwell (1852) 22 L. J. Q. 13.78; Young v. Waud (1852) 22 L. J. Ex. 27; Smith v. 
Cannan (1853) 2 El. & 131.35*, 118 E. R. 682; Leake v. Young (1856) 5 El. & 131.955; 119 E. R. 736; Bittlestone 
v. Cooke (1856) 6 El. & 131.296; 119 E. R. 875; Pennell v. Dawson (1856) 18 C. B. 355; 139 E. R. 1407; Hale 
v. Allnutt (1856) 18 C. B. 505; 139 E. R. 1467; Lee v. Hart (1856) 11 Ex. 880; 156 E. R. 1089; Bell v. Simpson 
0 857) 2 H. & N. 410; 157 E. R. 169; Harris v. Rickert (1859) 28 L. J. Ex. 197; Jones v. M'Kenzie (1859) 13 Moore 
1; 15 E. R. 1; Ex p. Cottrell (1860) 35 L. T. 465; Pennell v. Reynolds (186 1) 11 C. B. (N. S. ) 709,142 E. R. 974; 
Lacon v. Liffen (1862) 4 Giff. 75; 66 E. R. 626; Smith v. rimms (1863) 1 H. & C. 849; 158 E. R. 1127; Topping 
v. Keysell (1864) 16 C. B. (N. S. ) 258; 143 E. R. 1127; Young v. Fletcher (1865) 34 L. J. Ex. 154; Merver v. 
Peterson (1867) L. R. 2 Ex. 304; (1868) L. R. 3 Ex. 104; Allen v. Bonnett (1870) 5 Ch. App. 577; Lomax v. Buxton 
0 871) 6 C. P. 107; Kevan v. Mawson (1871) 24 L. T. 395; Ex p. Bolland (1872) 41 L. J. Bky. 60; Ex p. Fisher 
(1872) 7 Ch. App. 636; Ex p. Greener (1877) 46 L. J. Bky. 76; Ex p. Games (1879) 12 Ch. D. 314; Re Rees [ 1894] 
A. C. 135. 
72. The following cases involved mortgages of stock or other personalty which were attacked as acts of 
bankruptcy, where possession remained in the mortgagor and where the parties either expressly or by necessary 
implication agreed that the mortgagor should continue to deal with the assets in the course of business: Carr v. 
Burdiss (1834) 1 C. M. &R. 443; 149 E. R. 1153; Lindon v. Sharp (1843) 6 Man. & G. 895; 134 E. R. 1154; Hutton 
v. Cruitwell (1852) 22 U. Q. 13.78; Ex p. Sparrow (1852) 2 De G. M. & G. 907; 42 E. R. 1127; Young v. Waud 
(1852) 22 L. J. Ex. 27; Stranger v. Wilkins 0 855) 19 Beav. 626; 52 E. R. 493; Harris v. Rickett (1859) 28 L. J. Ex. 
197, Ex p. Cottrell (1860) 1 L. T. (N. S. ) 465; Young v. Fletcher (1865) 34 L. J. Ex. 154; Ex p. Fox1ey (1868) 3 Ch. 
App. 515; Ex p. Winder (1875) 1 Ch. D. 290, Ex p. Burton (1879) 13 Ch. D. 102; Er p. Dann (1881) 17 Ch. D. 
26; Ex p. Johnson (1884) 26 Ch. D. 338. 
73. (1804) 10 Ves. Jun. 159; 32 E. R. 805. 
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Graham was resounding but later judges did not consider it very sensible. " Comment- 
ing upon it, Bramwell, B., stated "[t]hat case has never been convicted, but has been in 
trouble a good many times". " 
While accepting it as law the courts sought (earnestly) to avoid it when possible. At 
least three stratagems were employed: 
(a) The first was to ask whether the advance was made bona fide to enable the 
mortgagor to carry on in business, albeit this is the very question which the decision in 
Graham forbids to be put. Willes, J., in Pennell v. Reynolds, "I stated: "The advance may 
be the means of enabling the assignor to go on with his trade, and so the transaction may 
be beneficial for the creditors. " 
In Re Colemere"I Lord Cranworth, L. C., said: "But if it is for the purpose of enabling 
him to raise money to go on with his trade, that cannot be called a fraudulent act as tending 
to defeat and delay his creditors, for it probably is or may be the wisest step he could take 
to promote the interests of his creditors. " In Exp. King"' James, L. J., concluded "... that 
the advances were substantial, and were bona fide made for the purpose of enabling the 
debtor to carry on his trade". In Bittlestone v. Cooke 7' Erle, J., said: "There often may be 
a very good reason for taking a security over the whole of a trader's stock present and 
future, as then the stock may be used in the meantime and made a source of profit, whilst, 
if a portion of the existing stock is separated and set aside as a security, it is tied up from 
use. " 
(b) In Lomax v. BuxtoOl Willes, J., attempted to distinguish and contain Graham: 
I think that in dealing with the case of Graham v. Chapman we must take it to have turned on the 
particular terms of the deed, and the mode in which the advance was there made, and that though 
there was an advance in point of form, it came into the hands of the debtor under such circumstances 
that he did not get the real enjoyment of the money so advanced. 
(c) The courts further differed from Graham in their construction of the mortgage deed, 
holding that trade stopped, not by virtue of the creation of the mortgage, but only when 
the mortgagee later enforced his rights under it. 81 
One judge who refused to have anything to do with Graham was Lindley, J. In Walker 
v. Clay 82 he held: 
The object of the bill of sale is obviously not to paralyse the trade of the grantor, but to enable him 
to carry on his trade, and the bill would be worthless if we were to construe it otherwise ... I think, 
therefore, that the covenant not to remove is a covenant that the grantor will not remove or dispose 
of the goods otherwise then [than] in the ordinary course of his trade. 
74. See, e. g., 1, omax v. Buxton (1871) 6 C. P. 107; Kevan v. Mawson (1871) 24 LT. 395 and Er p. Bolland 
(1872) 41 LJ. Bky. 60. In Kevan, at 397, Bramwell, B., who had been counsel in Grahain, observed: "I distinctly 
remember that Jervis C. J. had a strong opinion against me at the trial, and this may have slightly influenced his 
judgment. " 
75. Kevan v. Mawson (1871) 24 LT. 395,397. 
76. (1861) 11 C. B. (N. S. ) 709,722. 
77. (1865) 1 Ch. App. 128,132. 
78. (1876) 2 Ch. D. 256,263. 
79. (1856) 6 El. & Bl. 296,3 10. 
80. (1871) 6 C. P. 107,113. 
8 1. See, e. g., Young v. Waud (1852) 22 L. J. Ex. 27; Stranger v. 'Wilkins (1855) 19 Beav. 626; Young v. Fletcher 
(1865) 34 LJ. Ex. 154 and Ex p. Fox1ey (1868) 3 Ch. App. 5 15. 
82. (1880) 49 LJ. Q. B. 560,56 1. 
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Then, having been elevated to the Court of Appeal, he overruled Graham in Ex p. 
Hauxwell: '-' 
[Graham], it is said, shews that if a bill of sale is so worded as to enable the grantee to seize, not 
merely all the property of the grantor, but all his property including that which may be bought by 
him by means of the advance then made of him, it is necessarily an act of bankruptcy. Well, if 
Graham v. Chapman did decide that, it appears to me that it is distinctly wrong. It has been so 
considered ever since it was decided. 
With these words the unloved doctrine of Graham v. Chapman was unceremoniously 
despatched. The importance of the case lies in the fact that in 1852 the vast bulk of private 
trade was conducted by individuals and partnerships and that when, a few years later, 
incorporated trade started to increase there was nothing inherent in the new company law 
system which would exempt companies from the Graham v. Chapman principle. Apart 
from matters such as ultra vires, due execution according to the articles of association, the 
Turquand" rule and registration, there is very little company law which is relevant to 
mortgages. Jervis, C. J. 's bolt from the blue threatened those financing the new companies 
and hence the supply of capital. 
D. Bills of sale legislation 
After Hauxwell the courts had no difficulty in cases upon pre-1882 bills of sale in 
upholding the mortgage with grantor possession and dealing. Ile problem was the Bills 
of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882, which outlawed bills of sale not in statutory 
form and prescribed a form which did not allow for future property. The Act did, however, 
grant some exceptions, the largest of which did permit future property where this was 
necessary for the "maintenance ... of the security". " In Coates v. Moore"' the mortgage duly scheduled the chattels and covered "all chattels and things which may at any time 
during the continuance of the security be substituted for them or any of them". "' The 
mortgagor possessed for what appears to be a number of years after executing 
the mortgage, before suffering execution over his assets. The Court of Appeal decided that 
the mortgagee took priority over the execution creditor. 18 
The Bills of Sale Act 1854 had introduced compulsory registration of bills of sale 
(renewable every five years), which spawned its own difficulties. In Karet v. Kosher Meat 
Supply Assn" the mortgage covered stock in trade. The mortgagee failed to re-register his 
security after five years and so lost his priority. Ile mortgagor traded on during this period 
and in the authors' view the chances that stock was left untouched for over five years are 
slender. In Re Phillips' an unregistered mortgage of growing crops lost priority because 
the statutory exemption for growing crops did not apply once the crops were cut. Jessel, 
M. R., said of the mortgage: "Is not the real meaning of this deed this-that the farmer 
83. (1883) 23 Ch. D. 626,638. 
84. Royal British Bank v. Turquand (1856) 6 E. & B. 327; 119 E. R. 886. 
85. Schedule to the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882. 
86.1190312 K. B. 140. 
87. lbid., 142. 
88. See also Seed v. Bradley [ 1894] 1 Q. B. 319. 
89. (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 36 1. 
90. (1880) 16 Ch. D. 104. 
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shall carry on his business in the ordinary way? "91 The court did not consider it worth 
discussing a covenant against removal without mortgagee consent. 
E. Legal and equitable mortgages 
As we have seen, the dispute between courts of law and of equity over present and future 
property mortgages was longstanding. Each held certain tenets which it was not willing to 
abandon. Delusive credit was a sticking point for common lawyers and their Parliamen- 
tary presence produced the Statute of Elizabeth and later the order and disposition clause. 
They nearly won the battle as a result of Jervis, C. J. 's judgment in Graham, which at a 
stroke destroyed the dealing power and branded the deeds as intrinsically fraudulent (in 
the bankruptcy sense) as contrary to the policy of the bankruptcy laws. The bankruptcy 
courts were in something of a frisson over it for 30 years. 
The other main ground of dispute was the effect to be given to the future property 
provisions in bills of sale. The first point to note is that until Graham in 1852 both 
common law and equity accepted that they were perfectly capable of becoming effective. 
Divergence related to conditions of existence. Reduced to its simplest form, at common 
law a novus actus was required, which, as regards personalty usually involved taking 
possession, though a new deed of transfer would also suffice and possibly an attornment. 
Then the legal title passed. Equity, on the other hand, recognized the mortgagee's interest 
as soon as a future item came into the mortgagor's hands without further conveyancing or 
other steps and priority existed as from the moment of acquisition by the mortgagor. 
Common law courts did not give effect to equitable mortgages. 
The great case of Holroyd v. MarshaII92 ended this dispute in favour of equity. A 
mortgagee of present and future "machinery implements and things" fixed in or placed 
about a mill had an equitable title to after-. acquired items which the House of Lords held 
to prevail over an execution creditor. The law report summarizes the illuminating 
arguments of counsel on the nature of legal and equitable proprietary interests. Graham 
did not apply-the mortgage did noi cover all present and future property, there was no 
bankruptcy estate involved and the Holroyds were simply mortgagees for the purchase 
price. - 
The principle in Holroyd was taken to the House of Lords again in Tailby v. Official 
Receive? 3 because Lord Westbury had made certain remarks about specific performance 
of the mortgage deed, which provoked the Court of Appeal in Belding v. Read" to decide 
that, if for any reason, specific performance were not available, there would be no 
equitable mortgage (though in Re Clarke" Cotton, Bowen and Fry, L. JJ. had refused to 
countenance Belding). 
The House of Lords in Tailby readily held that a mortgage of future book debts from 
any business that might be carried on by the mortgagor was not too vague and, following 
Holroyd, became effective as and when debts arose without the need for novus actus. All 
their Lordships' substantive judgments decided that in equity a mortgage of future book 
91. Ibid., 105. 
92. (1862) 10 H. L. C. 19 1. 
93. (1888) 13 App. Cas. 523. 
94. (1865) 3 H. & C. 955; 159 E. R. 812. 
95. (1887) 36 Ch. D. 348. 
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debts attached to them as soon as the debts came into existence on the basis that equity 
looks upon that as done which ought to be done. There is, however, a small self- 
contradiction in Lord Macnaghten's judgment on a fundamental point. Near the beginning 
his Lordship comments on the mortgage in question that: " 
It belongs to a class of securities of which perhaps the most familiar example is to be found in'the 
debentures of trading companies. It is a floating security reaching over all the trade assets of 
the mortgagor for the time being, and intended to fasten upon and bind the assets in existence at the 
time when the mortgagee intervenes. In other words, the mortgagor makes himself trustee of his 
business for the purpose of the security. But the trust is to remain dormant until the mortgagee calls 
it into operation. 
Later, his Lordship refers to the mortgage "... in equity as a contract binding on the 
conscience of the assignor and so binding the subject-matter of the contract when it comes 
into existence" . 
97 
The inconsistency is that a security cannot both bind future property as soon as it comes 
into existence and bind it only when the mortgagee intervenes. Lord Macnaghten confuses 
the operation of a floating charge with that of the traditional mortgage of future property. 
A mortgagee can before or aftir default, subject to contractual restraint, express or 
implied, seize any or all of the mortgaged assets, " while a floating chargee can only 
enforce the charge over all. the charged assets once crystallization has occurred. 91 Lord 
Macnaghten's dicta in Tailby May be one of the causes of the ensuing confusion as to the 
true nature of the floating charge. 
Il. CONSTRUCTING THE FLOATING CHARGE 
A signal feature of the institution of the floating charge is the absence of clear and 
accepted definition. As Professor Goode says, its "precise nature ... remains a matter of 
controversy". " Lord Macnaghten never got beyond purple prose analogy'01 and he was 
not pleased with the institution which he had not managed to define., 02 Paradoxically, this 
elusiveness is the key to understanding. 
In the authors' view the development of the floating charge was much more fraught, and 
the date of practical completion somewhat later, than current theory allows. The theory, 
taken from the Genesis, is that: (i) security over present and future property with a dealing 
power (equated with the hypotheca) was impossible at common law and only in 1862 did 
equity intervene (Holroyd v. Marshalo; (ii) this case, combined with the Schedule C 
public utility mortgage over the "undertaking" pointed a way forward which was 
"promptly" 103 recognized because in the 1860s mortgages were created over the 
96. (1888) 13 App. Cas. 523,541. 
97. Ibid., 543. 
98. See, e. g., Er p. Dann (1881) 17 Ch. D. 26 and Greenbirt v. Smee (1876) 35 LT. (N. S. ) 168. 
99. See, e. g., Robson v. Smith [1895] 2 Ch. 118. 
100. Feldman & Meisel (eds). Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments (1996) 193,197. 
10 1. See, e. g., Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co. Ltd v. Manila Railway Co. Ltd [ 1897] 
A. C. 81,86 and Illingworth v. Houldsworth [19041 A. C. 355,358. 
102. Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd [1897] A. C. 22,53 describing the operation of floating charges in 
winding up as "a great scandal*. 
103. Pennington, "Genesis" (1960) 23 M. 1-11.630,642. 
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"undertaking" which established the floating charge; (iii) judicial recognition was a little 
slow and only in Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co. "M did the 
break with earlier cases occur; (iv) the principle in Panama was confirmed in Re Florence 
Land and Public Works Co. 'I-' and Re Colonial Trusts Corp. " and the floating charge had 
arrived. It is submitted that the arduous process of constructing the edifice of the floating 
charge was only finished when all the stages outlined below were completed. 
A. Holroyd-the "first" case? 
While future property covenants had not been considered by the House of Lords in a 
mortgage context before Holroyd, " there is otherwise nothing "first"108 about Holroyd 
at all. 10' The House merely confirmed the unbroken chain of principle running in the 
equity courts for a very long time, that it was possible to create a mortgage over present 
and future property, with mortgagor possession and express or implied dealing power, 
whose validity and priority were expressed when future items came into the mortgagor's 
hands. 
Furthermore, after the Judicature Acts 1873-1875 all divisions of the High Court had 
to apply this rule. "'The case did not give new impetus to some doctrinal possibility 
hitherto unknown or merely shadowy. We noted earlier that the heretical doctrine of 
Graham v. Chapman did not impinge upon Holroyd itself. 
B. Adapting the Schedule C "undertaking" mortgage 
In the field of company law the term "undertaking" seems to have been first used by the 
draftsmen of companies created by Royal charter. A group of people who were formed 
into a body corporate were commonly referred to as "undertakers", and the meaning of 
"undertaking" signified something different from merely all the company's assets. ", 
From the latter half of the 18th century the term "undertaking" was borrowed by 
draftsmen of private Acts of Parliament which incorporated companies to construct public 
utilities such as canals, railways and waterworks. Parliament included a power in these 
statutes for the companies to borrow large sums on mortgages of the "undertaking". ̀  
These were eventually standardized in Schedule C of the Companies Clauses Consolida- 
tion Act 1845. The courts interpreted such mortgages as over the business as a going 
concern. They did not give any rights to the mortgagee to enforce the security while the 
104. (1870) 5 Ch. App. 318. 
105. (1878) 10 Ch. D. 530. 
106. (1879) 15 Ch. D. 465. 
107. For a consideration of future property covenants in a different context, see the House of Lords' decision 
in Bette, sworth v. Dean and Chapter of St Paul: r (1728) 1 Bro. P. C. 240; 1 E. R. 54 1. 
108. Pennington, "Genesis" (1960) 23 M. L. R. 630,634 states that Holýqyd was the "first leading case in 
which equity intervened to remedy the defects of the common law". 
109. See Tailby v. Official Receiver (1888) 13 App. Cas. 523,535 (Lord Watson), 546 (Lord 
Macnaghten). 
I 10. Anon. Case [ 1875] W. N. 203. 
I 11. See the Charter of the Mine Adventurers of England, Patent Rolls, 3 Anne. Pt. iii. 
112. See, e. g., Hopkins v. Worrester and Birmingham Canal Proprietors ( 1868) L. R. 6 Eq. 437, where the 
canal company's power to mortgage its undertaking dates from its incorporating statute of 1791. See also the 
Trent and Mersey Canal statute of 1770. 
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company continued its business. The mortgagee had no lien over "every spade or barrow 
which the company may possess""' because if it did, and it were enforced, it would 
paralyse the company's business. 
The company's undertaking while it was a going concern would not be allowed to be 
broken up as the public good would thereby be harmed. The mortgage of the undertaking 
could not be enforced for public policy reasons, it was not like an ordinary mortgage .,, 4 
In the leading case of Gardner v. London, Chatham and Dover Ry Co. "" in 1867, a 
mortgage of the undertaking of a statutory railway company was held not to give the 
mortgagee an immediate interest in specie over all the assets of the company. Cairns, L. J., 
distinguished away the ordinary commercial mortgage then labouring under Graham 
where mortgagees could "from the first, have asserted their rights as mortgagees by taking 
and impounding not merely the proceeds of surplus lands, but the capital, the cash 
balances, the rolling stock, and even their own money advanced"., 16 
The only remedy available for an unpaid mortgagee was against the income of the 
company by obtaining the appointment of a receiver. ' 17 The mortgage could be enforced 
once the company's undertaking had ceased. ' 18 While the undertaking continued to trade, 
the company's assets were still at the mercy of execution creditors but the mortgagees 
maintained their primacy over such creditors by injunction. 119 Execution was only 
allowed over surplus assets not required for the provision of the public service. 
When draftsmen of securities issued over the assets of companies formed under the 
Companies Acts borrowed the term "undertaking" from the statutory companies,, 2" the 
courts' interpretation of them relied partly on the established reasoning in the public utility 
cases, but without applying to Companies Act companies the protection and permanence 
enjoyed by public utility companies. 
In Re Panama, New Zealand, and Australian Royal Mail Co. 121 the company's charge 
was a straight lift from Schedule C. The company relied heavily on the fact that Gardner 
governed the case and that the charge holder could not be allowed to enforce its charge. 
This argument is not entirely without merit as it can be seen from Kennedy v. Panama, 
New Zealand, and Australian Royal Mail Co. 122 that the company carried on a business 
of delivering mail to Australasia and could therefore quite legitimately be regarded as a 
113. Russell v. East Anglian Ry Co. (1850) 3 Mac. & G. 104,146; 42 E. R. 201,217, per Lord Truro. 
114. In Marshall v. South Staffordshire Tramways Co. 11895] 2 Ch. 36,50, Lindley, L. J., explained the 
raionale behind the protection of statutory companies: "Speaking generally, the owner of an equitable charge or 
lien on property as a security for money which is due and payable has a right to a judicial sale of that property 
in order to satisfy the charge or lien ... But this right does not extend to property, of what is called an 
undertaking, which has been acquired under statutory powers for public purposes, if those purposes will be 
defeated, or at all events seriously affected, by ajudiciall sale. This exception to the general rule is as well settled 
as the rule itself. " 
115. (1867) 2 Ch. App. 201. 
116. Ibid., 217 per Cairns, L. J. 
117. Great Eastern Ry Co. v. East London Railway (18 81) 44 LT. 903. 
118. This could be because the company had sold the undertaking and the mortgage could be enforced against 
the proceeds of sale: Furness v. Caterhant Ry Co. (1859) 27 Beav. 358; 54 E. R. 140; Re Woking Urban Council 
(Basingstoke Canal) Act 191111914] 1 Ch. 300,314, or because the company was in winding up: Re Glyn Valley 
Tramway Co. [1937] 1 Ch. 465. 
119. Legg v. Mathieson (1860) 2 Giff. 71; 66 E. R. 31; Wildy v. Mid-Hants Railway Co. (1868) 18 L. T. 
73. 
120. See Edward Manson, "The Growth of the Debenture" (1897) 13 L. Q. R. 418,420. 
121. (1870) 5 Ch. App. 3 IS. 
122. (1867) 2 Q. 13.580. 
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public utility company. The fact that the company was created under the Companies Act 
rather than a private Act was in later cases not treated as a relevant factor in determining 
the public nature of the company's business. 123 The Court of Appeal decided that there 
were no public policy considerations to prevent the charge holder from enforcing the 
charge against the company once it had entered liquidation and therefore ceased to carry 
on its business. This in itself goes no further than the private Act mortgage cases. 
In the words of Giffard, L. J.: "the moment the company comes to be wound up, and the 
property has to be realized, that moment the rights of these parties, beyond all question, 
attach. My opinion is, that even if the company had not stopped the debenture holders 
might have filed a bill to realize their security. " 121 This last sentence is the change from 
the public utility approach. Either the company being wound up or its entering 
receivership would lead to the company's inability to carry on its undertaking, which in 
turn wquld cause the charge to become enforceable. In modern parlance, it is the inability 
to carry on its undertaking which causes the floating charge to crystallize. 
Although it is generally heralded as the case which introduced the floating charge to fill 
a yawning gap in the range of secured lending available to companies, Panama did no 
such thing. It largely followed the reasoning in Gardner but extended it by lifting the 
restriction on the enforcement of the charge prior to winding up. This is how the floating 
charge started. In the authors' view it is one source of the difficulty in settling the precise 
nature of the floating charge. Giffard, L. J., was presented with afait accompli in that in 
Panama he had to construe a set of words whose meaning was largely driven by questions 
of public policy when translated to a context in which that public policy was not merely 
not decisive, but actually inappropriate. The traditional law of bills of sale would not be 
a useful guide because "undertaking" was not used in such bills and would be inapposite 
in the case of an individual trader executing a bill over all his present and future 
property. 
C. Schedule C mortgages under the Companies Acts 
Although Professor Pennington suggests that after Holroyd businessmen "promptly" .1 
25 
appreciated the possibilities of allying this decision to the Schedule C mortgage of the 
"undertaking", because debentures based upon this approach appeared in the 1860s, the 
first debenture he discusses is from 1859,126 which pre-dates Holroyd. In the authors' 
view, the undertaking mortgage derived from Schedule C was attractive to a company's 
advisers in 1859 for entirely different reasons. Although the meaning of Schedule C was 
not fully worked out in 1859 in relation to public utilities, 127 the courts had been at one 
in thinking that the mortgage did not impede the carrying on of business. In 1859 that was 
important because financing of unincorporated trade was being utterly plagued by Graham 
123. See Blaker v. Herts and Essex Waterworks Co. (1889) 41 Ch. D. 399 and Marshall v. South Staffordshim 
Tramways Co. [189512 Ch. 36. 
124. (1870) 5 Ch. App. 318,322-323. 
125. (1960) 23 M. L. R. 630,642. 
126. King v. Marshall (1864) 33 Beav. 565; 55 E. R. 488. 
127. See generally C. Stebbings, "Statutory Railway Mortgage Debentures and the Courts in the Nineteenth 
Century" (1987) 8 J. Legal Hist. 36. 
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under Jervis, C. J. 's "paralysis" argument in the case of mortgages over all present and 
future property. 
Bearing in mind (a) that mortgages of all present and future property with express or 
implied power in the mortgagor to deal with it in the ordinary course. of business had 
always been the central mechanism of the trade financing system and (b) that. company 
registrations started to increase after the Limited Liability Act 1855,1211 it was not long 
before the "paralysis" argument started to surface in corporate financing. Both Jessel, 
M. R., 129 and Giffard, L. J., 130 argued the point when counsel. It was accepted in the leading 
Schedule C mortgage case of Gardner v. London, Chatham and Dover Ry. 131 Jessel, M. R., 
put it in his judgment in Florence Land '31 and it is still repeated in modern times. "' 
The source of this doctrine is Graham (discounting isolated earlier cases such as 
Hassells v. Simpson). "" The important point is that it was good law in bankruptcy from 
1852 '35 and corporate mortgages were not intrinsically immune to the doctrine. In 1879, 
the year after Florence Land, Baldwin 136 cited it as authority for the following 
proposition: 
Even though there be a present advance, if the assignment operate so as to convey the whole of the 
existing property, and also to vest in the assignee specific property as and when such should be 
subsequently acquired, it is probably an act of bankruptcy, as the present advance would generally 
only purchase property for the assignee. 
In the case of private Act public utilities, a mortgage over the "undertaking" implied 
that the company could go on because public policy required the utility to continue its 
activities for the public good. Advisers to Companies Act companies were presumably 
hoping that the public utility interpretation of "undertaking" would be applied to the 
debentures of such companies and, given the constant attempts being made to avoid the 
sheer inconvenience of Graham, felt it was worth trying. 
128. Figures provided by Companies House show that there were 5,000 incorporations in the period 
1862-1869,9,900 in the 1870s, 18,000 in the 1880s, 36,600 in the 1890s and 45,000 in the first decade of the 
20th century. 
129. King v. Marshall (1864) 33 Beav. 565. 
130. Re Marine Mansions (1867) L. R. 4 Eq. 601. 
131. (1867) 2 Ch. App. 201,217, per Cairns, U. 
132. (1878) 10 Ch. D. 530 (supra, fii. 105). 
133. See, e. g., Wheatley v. Silkstone and Haigh Moor Coal Co. (1885) 29 Ch. D. 715,719, per North, J.; Re 
Yorkshire Woolcombers' Assn Ltd (1903] 2 Ch. 284,296, per Romer, L. J.; Re Benjamin Cope and Sons Ltd 
191411 Ch. 800,805-806, per Sargant, J.; and Re Cn-)ftbell Ltd [ 19901 B. C. L. C. 844,847, per Vinelott, J. 
134. (1785) 1 Doug. 89,92, where Lord Mansfield stated: " ... if a trader makes a conveyance of all his 
property, that is, instantly, an act of bankruptcy. It is fraudulent: it destroys the capacity of trading. In this case, 
[the mortgagor) could not fairly sell an ounce of merchandize after the assignment. Ilie whole belonged to 
another man. " See also Maughant v. Sharpe (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S. ) 443,144 E. R. 179, where the common law 
court held that a subsequent mortgagee had no interest in property subject to a prior mortgage, because at the 
time the mortgagor executed the subsequent mortgage, he had no interest left in the property as hi had already 
transferred it to the first mortgagee. 
135. Hutton v. Cruttivell (1852) 22 LJ. Q. B. 78. The court distinguished Graham but "without impeaching" 
its authority (per Lord Campbell. CJ., at 80). 
136. E. T. Baldwin, The Law of Bankruptcy (London, 1879), 26 (emphasis in original). See also Williams on 
Bankruptcy (London, 1884), 11-15, recounting the effects of Graham and the overruling of it in Erp. Hauxwell 
(1883) 23 Ch. D. 626. 
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D. Panama confirmed by Florence Land? 
Although Re Florence Land and Public Works CO. 137 confirms Panama, it is not an 
unreserved confirmation. After considering the terms of the company's articles, which 
were expressly mentioned in the debenture document, Jessel, M. R., held on the facts that 
the charge on the "estate, property and effects" was to be interpreted as "a security on the 
property of the company as a going concern, subject to the powers of the directors to 
dispose of the property of the company while carrying on its business in the ordinary 
course". 138 In contrast to Jessel, M. R., James, L. J., equated "estate, property and effects" 
with "undertaking" 119 (a seemingly small expansion in the meaning of those words) and 
stated: "I am of opinion that the law does allow such a company as this to charge its 
undertaking, meaning by 'charging the undertaking' charging the assets for the time 
being. "" 'ne two judges therefore arrived at the same point but by a slightly different 
route. It is important to note that security over the "undertaking" was, and is, unknown 
to the financing of the unincorporated trade sector. It could conceivably be used to sidestep 
any possible problems thrown up by Graham as being outside the grasp of the law on 
individual insolvency. 
In his judgment Jesse], M. R., drew a distinction between the type of charge created on 
the facts of Florence Land (shortly thereafter to become known as a floating charge) from 
the more conventional specific type of security: "' 
It is therefore inconsistent tosuppose that the moment you executed a bond or debenture you 
paralysed the company ana prevented it carrying on its business, for if you read the words to mean 
a specific charge on the property of the company, then, of course, no practical use could be made 
of the money borrowed, because that would become the property of the company, and anybody with 
notice would be liable on that view to repay it to the mortgagee or debenture holder. 
The theory that fixed charges, by definition, prevent dealing and cause paralysis of the 
company's business with regard to the charged assets has this statement as its origin. 
Jessel, M. R. 's dictum is a clear reflection of Jervis, C. Ps views in Graham that the deed 
"... passes, not only all the trader's stock, and the money advanced, if he then had it in 
his possession, but it also professes to give the defendant a right to take all future-acquired 
property, even though it should be purchased with the money which is alleged to be the 
consideration for the transfer" 142 and that "... [the trader] had legally no power to 
continue his trade, or to dispose of a single article of his stock, if the deed was 
good It. 14.3 
It is significant that James, L. J., upheld the debenture in Florence Land because 
the things are given for money lent, and therefore the company and the creditors of the 
company have had the benefit of the money". 144 The benefit-of-the-money argument was 
one of the devices employed by the bankruptcy courts to sidestep the principle in 
137. (1878) 10 Ch. D. 530. 
138. Ibid, 540-54 1. 
139. Ibid., 546. 
140. Ibid. 
141. Ibid., 54 1. 
142. (1852) 12 C. B. 85,104. 
143. Ibid.. 102. 
144. (1878) 10 Ch. D. 530,546. 
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Graham. "" Although the judgments in Florence Land show a willingness to follow 
Giffard, L. J. 's lead in Panama, a fresh question mark was placed over the future of the 
floating charge. Both Jessel, MR., "' and James, L. J., " expressly reserved the question 
of what effect the Judicature Act 1875, s. 10 had on the floating charge. Ilis reservation 
did not so much strengthen the Panama case as threaten it with extinction. This will be 
considered under the next heading. 
E. Judicature Act 1875, s. 10 
The provision in the Judicature Act 1875, s. 10 applied the bankruptcy law to insolvent 
winding'up with regard to "the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors". It 
was a troublesome piece of drafting. 
In Re Printing and Numerical Registering Co. "18 Jessel, M. R., said of it: "In putting a 
construction on obscure enactments or instruments no single Judge is entitled to say 
another is wrong; all he can say is that he differs from the other Judge as to the meaning 
of the obscure enactment or instrument before him. " In Re David Lloyd & Co. "" his 
Lordship also stated: "... by virtue of sect. 10 of the Judicature Act 1875, the law as to 
secured creditors is the same in winding up as in bankruptcy. The Companies Act, so far 
as it is inconsistent with the law of bankruptcy, is repealed. " 
Although his Lordship refused to import into winding-up law the Bankruptcy Act 1869, 
ss 15 and 32 (to the effect that property in the reputed ownership of the bankrupt passed 
to the trustee in bankruptcy and that certain debts such as local rates were to be treated as 
preferential in bankruptcy), he did apply s. 87 (that in bankruptcy an execution creditor for 
more than E50 loses the benefit of his execution if the sheriff, within 14 days after a sale, 
has notice of the bankruptcy) in the liquidation of a company. 15"Ibe reason for raising s. 
10 here is that in the reported argument in Florence Land"' Jessel, M. R., questions 
counsel as follows: 
Can a company, any more than an individual, charge its future property? This is not a charge on the 
'undertaking" as in other debentures, but on the "estate, property and effects". By the Judicature 
Act 1875 s. 10, the administration of the estates of companies in winding up has been assimilated 
as to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors to the administration of estates in 
bankruptcy. Would it not be contrary to the policy of the bankruptcy laws that a mortgage security 
should affect after-acquired property? 
The form of the questions put--can the company charge future property and is it not 
contrary to the policy of the bankruptcy laws to do so%-coupled with the distinction 
expressly taken between "undertaking" and "estate, property and effects" point directly 
to Jervis, C. J, 's judgment in Graham, in which it was held that a mortgage of all present 
145. See, e. g., Willes, J., in Lomax v. Buxton (1871) 6 C. P. 107,113. 
146. (1878) 10 Ch. DL 530,543. 
147. Ibid.. 547. 
148. (1878) 8 Ch. D. 535,538. 
149. (1877) 6 Ch. D. 339,342-343. 
150. In Re Crumlin 
- 
Viaduct Works Co. (1879) 11 Ch. D. 755; Re Albion Steel and Wire Co. (1878) 7 Ch. D. 
547 and Re Printing and Numerical Registering Co. (1878) 8 Ch. D. 535 respectively. 
151. (1878) 10 Ch. D. 530,535. 
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and future property was at common law a fraud on the bankruptcy laws which by itself 
invalidated the mortgagee's security and stopped the business. 
Jessel, M. R. 's question is not directed at the order and disposition clause' . 12 becauseit 
is an essential pre-condition of applying the clause that the mortgage is valid and the 
mortgagee's title is good, otherwise the mortgagee could not be the "true owner" for the 
purposes of the clause. Jessel, M. R., clearly appreciated the danger that the principle in 
Graham (which destroyed the dealing power in cases of all present and future property 
security, paralysing the business and necessitating security holder consent to all dealing) 
might apply to companies through the operation of the Judicature Act. 
This was not a welcome prospect and Jessel, M. R., attempted to prepare the ground by 
suggesting that the security in Florence Land was unattached (in the Panama sense). 
James, L. J., in equating "estate, property and effects" with "undertaking", "' opened up 
a possible argument that, since "undertaking" was not a feature of individual security law, 
there was nothing in the bankruptcy law to import into the winding-up law. The question 
reserved by Jessel, M. R., 154 and James, L. J.. '" left open the possibility that s. 10 could 
strike down even floating security. The reserved question, however, was not argued 
because, as the last paragraph of the law report shows, the parties came back with a settled 
form of order. 156 
The question of mortgages over all present and future property and s. 10 was disposed 
of in 1885. In Re Mersey. Wood, 1-17 Kay, J., accepting a distinction between "undertaking" 
and "estate, property and effects", imade two points: (i) the mortgage validity issue was 
not covered by any provision in the Bankruptcy Act itself, so there was nothing for s. 10 
to import into the winding-up law (this, if we may respectfully say so, must be 
correct-Jervis, C. J. 's judgment in Graham is on the common law of bankruptcy, not the 
statute); and (ii) the only Bankruptcy Act provision dealing with such mortgages was the 
order and disposition clause and there were no materials before the court to raise that 
clause. 
The Irish Court in 1884 also considered Jessel, M. R. 's question in Re Dublin Drapery 
Co. ""' There debentures had been issued in 1876 over the "undertaking, stock in trade, 
lands, premises, works, plant, property and effects (both present and future)" of the 
company. The effect of the Irish equivalent of s. 10 was raised. In answer to whether or 
not a company, any more than an individual, could charge its future property, the court 
found no shortage of corporate and individual authorities, '" untainted by s. 10 or 
152. A suggestion made by Dr Gough in Company Charges, 2nd edn (London, 1996), 53, but difficult to 
justify, given Jessel, M. R. 's clear opinions expressed only four months after Florence Land in Re Crumlin 
Viaduct Works Co. (1879) 11 Ch. D. 755,758-759, where his Lordship refers to the "utter absurdity" of the result 
of such a suggestion. 
153, (1878) 10 Ch. D. 530,546. 
154. Ibid., 543. 
155. Ibid., 347. 
156. Ibid., 550. 
157. (1885) 1 T. L. R. 566. 
158. (1884) I. R. 13 Ch. D. 174. 
159. E. g., Holroyd v. Marshall (1862) 10 H. L. C. 191; Clements v. Matthews (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 808; Collyer 
v. Isaacs (1881) 19 Ch. D. 342; Re Marine Mansions (1867) L. R. 4 Eq. 601; Re Panama. New Zealand and 
Australian Royal Mail Co. (1870) 5 Ch. App. 318, and Re Florence Land and Public Works (1878) 10 Ch. D. 
530. 
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Graham, where such securities had been found to be valid, either in the form of a 
mortgage of specified property or as a floating charge over a company's undertaking. 
The traditional future personalty mortgage with dealing power and the floating charge 
were extricated from Graham in 1883" and s. 10 in 1885.161 Thereafter any suggestion 
that a company could not specifically mortgage all its present and future property and still 
maintain a power to deal with those assets must be mistaken. Nevertheless, Jessel, M. R. 's 
views on the paralysing effect of specific security (which accurately represented the 
Graham principle which was law at the time) continue up to the present day. Thus 
Graham, despite having only a brief and troubled lifespan of 31 years, continues to haunt 
the law of corporate security over 100 years after reports of its death. 
In the authors' submission the principle of communis errorfacit ius is not a sufficient 
answer to this issue because the courts have never adopted a single approach to the dealing 
power' 62 and the law on specific and floating security remains uncertain . 161 
E Bills of Sale legislation 1882 
Even before the traditional mortgage bill of sale and floating charge were rescued from 
Graham and s. 10, they became embroiled in something far worse-the Bills of Sale Act 
(1878) Amendment Act 1882. Commercially speaking, the traditional mortgage did not 
recover and it took some years for the floating charge to emerge safely. The authors have 
considered this issue elsewhere, "4 so that a bare outline only is tendered here. 
Security bills had to conform to*a statutory model which, with few exceptions, did not 
permit security over future property to be taken. From the company law standpoint, there 
was an important saving in s. 17 for "debentures issued by any mortgage, loan or other 
incorporated company" which were "secured upon the capital stock or goods, chattels, 
and effects of such company". By the end of the 1880s s. 17 was in dire straits as serious 
doubts surrounded the above expressions. In two cases 165 it had been held that "other 
incorporated company" did not mean any incorporated company but only one which was 
eiusdem generis with a "mortgage" or "loan" company (whatever that was). In one of 
them, Jenkinson v. Brandley Mining Co., 166 Grove, J., was close to propounding a sinful 
theory of the development of the floating charge, namely an attempt to assume (and 
pervert) the public policy based injunctive rights of a public utility Schedule C mortgagee 
against would-be execution creditors, with the consequence that any ordinary trading 
company with co-operative debenture holders could trade on free from creditor enforce- 
ments (described by Grove, J., as a "manifest injustice" 167). 
160. By the Court of Appeal overruling Graham in Er p. Hauxwell (1883) 23 Ch. D. 626. 
16 1. Kay, J., in Re Mersey Wood (1885) 1 T. L. R. 566. 
162. See, e. g., Holroyd v. Marshall (1862) 10 H. L. C. 19 1; Tailby v. Official Receiver (1883) 13 App. Cas. 
523; Taylor v. Bank of New South Wales (1886) 11 App. Cas. 596, Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc 11992) Ch. 
505; Re Atlantic Medical Ltd [1992] B. C. C. 653; Re Cimex rissues Ltd [1994] B. C. C. 626; and Goode, Legal 
Pn)blems of Credit and Security, 2nd edn (London, 1988), 56. 
163. See, e. g., R. Gregory and P. Walton, "Book Debt Charges-The Saga Goes On" (1999) 115 L. Q. R. 
14. 
164. R. Gregory and P. Walton, "Fixed Charges over Changing Assets-The Possession and Control Heresy" 
[19981 CfiLR 68. 
165. Brocklehurst v. Railway Printing and Publishing Co. [ 1884] W. N. 70 and Jenkinson v. Brandley Mining 
Co. (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 568. 
166. (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 568. 
167. Ibid., 571. 
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In 1891 in Re Standard Manufacturing Co. '" (in judgments which owed more to the 
wisdom of the judges than that of the legislators) the Court of Appeal resolutely plucked 
the trade financing system from its predicament. It is worth noting that Bowen, L. J. 's 
ground of decision'" was that bills of sale issued by companies were not subject to the 
Bills of Sale Act 1878 and therefore the 1882 Act was inapplicable to such bills. One 
consequence of this is that present and future property mortgages issued by companies are 
almost exclusively governed by the principles of common law and equity rather than 
statute. In the authors' view it was Standard Manufacturing which established the charge 
on the "undertaking and all its property both present and future" in an undoubted niche 
in both law and commercial practice. 
III. HOLROYD AND THE HYPOTHECA 
Both Professor Pennington 170 and Professor Goode"' tie the juridical nature of the 
floating charge to the hypotheca and see Holroyd as the instrument by which the 
hypotheca surfaced in English law. In the authors' submission Holroyd is nothing to do 
with the hypotheca and, insofar as a Roman originating analogy is apposite, it is to be 
found elsewhere. 
Holroyd involves a mortgage of chattels and its ancestry is not the--hypotheca (nor the 
pignus) but is in fact the venditio. Dean Wigmore 172 provided excellent insights into the 
Roman use of the institution of sale as a mechanism for creating a mortgage. He describes 
the difficulty experienced in Roman law in returning to the debtor the surplus above the 
mortgagee's proper monetary entitlement and discusses the role of the commisaria and 
fiducia in achieving that end. 
From early times the English mortgage was a sale transferring title to the mortgagee 
subject to defeasance on payment of the amount reserved by the agreement. The concept 
of the equity of redemption efficiently protected, inter alia, the surplus on realization for 
the debtor. While the common law courts and the equity courts expounded the mortgage, 
the serious differences between them have been discussed earlier. All that Holroyd did was 
to give primacy to the equity side. At no point was Holroyd concerned with hypotheca. 
This raises a second point. The reason that the hypotheca had not been an issue in English 
law was that it had nothing to offer commercial people which they did not in practice 
enjoy through the present and future personalty mortgage bill of sale with dealing 
power. 173 
Principles, well honed, much older and much more fundamental to the common law and 
equity, were (and are) at work in giving effect to the personalty mortgage as a means of 
combining specific security with the power to deal. As Maitland'71 points out, seisin was 
168. [18911 1 Ch. 627. 
169. Ibid., 645. 
170. "T'he Genesis" (1960) 23 M. L. R. 630,634. 
171. Feldman, & Meisel (eds), Corporate and Commervial Law: Modem Developments (1996) 193,195. 
172. "The Pledge-idea: A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas. 111. " (1897) 11 Harv. L. R. 18,21-36. 
173. Advocates of the idea of importing the hypotheca into English law are not thick on the ground. In 1686, 
however, Malynes suggested adoption of a form of hypotheca at that time in use in Europe: Malynes, Lex 
Mercatoria (London, 1686). 153, under the heading "Of Merchant's Oppignorations". 
174. "The Seisin of Chattels" (1885) 1 L. Q. R. 324. 
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not just a real property notion, and although later "possession" took over, seisin and 
possession in relation to personal chattels meant the same thing. 
Because of the central role of possession and transfer of it in the nature of title to 
chattels and their transfer, in the early days (before conversion) even a tortious taker had 
seisin and could transfer it to a third party. The transfer of possession with the intent to 
pass title would in most circumstances pass title to the transferee. This basic concept, 
nowadays shorn of its medieval complexities and the forms of action, is still at 
work-although, in fairness, it was precisely these complexities and the forms of action 
which provoked early judges and writers into highly developed analysis of the nature of 
personal property interests. 175 
Thus, extrapolating from cases such as Ryall v. Rolle, 176 Joseph v. Lyons, 177 Hallas v. 
Robinson '71 and Re Neal, 179 the mortgagor had a bare legal title to future acquired 
chattels; he also had possession of all mortgaged property and, acting under the express 
or implied power to deal, he was perfectly able under a sale to transfer possession and title 
to items of the mortgaged chattels to a buyer. 
The basis of the buyer's title here is: (i) not that the mortgagor has no title to transfer 
to the buyer but the mortgagee is estopped from denying the buyer's interest; but rather 
(ii) that the mortgagor has sufficient of the elements of a disposable title in his hands plus 
the right to transfer, so that he can make a full title. These elements are actual possession, 
a right to possession and a right to transfer possession and title. The mortgagor is no more 
and no less than a seller in possession at common law. 180 It is no accident, therefore, that 
both the common law judges and Lord Hardwicke on the equity side in Ryall v. Rolle"' 
said that Harvest, the mortgagor, could turn over mortgaged stock in trade in the course 
of his business. Lush, J., was similarly following these fundamental principles when in 
National Mercantile Bank v. Hampson"I he said that a purchaser under a bona fide sale 
would acquire a good title (note: this is not the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchaser 
of the legal title for value without notice). Powell on Mortgages"-' takes the same view 
when discussing the order and disposition clause. 
Thus the incidence of the personalty mortgage, either in the form of a sale subject to 
defeasance on payment or (later) a proviso for re-assignment on redemption, was fully 
able to accommodate the mortgagor's ability, under common law rules as to passing of 
property in chattels, to make title to, say, stock in trade to a buyer under a contract of sale. 
175. A basic introduction may be found in F. Maitland, "The Seisin of Chattels" (1885) 1 L. Q. R. 324; J. B. 
Ames. "The Disseisin of Chattels" (1889) 3 Harv. L. R. 23,313,337; F. Pollock, "Gifts of Chattels Without 
Delivery" (1890) 6 L. Q. R. 446 (and the judgment in Cochrane v. Mooie (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 57. to which Pollock's 
piece is a note); and the sources referred to in these materials. R. L. V. Williams, Law of Personal Property 
(London, 1848) is also intructive. S. D. Roper, A Treatision the Law of Property, arisingfrymn the relation 
between husband and wife (London, 1820), contains useful analysis on the equity side. 
176. (1749) 1 Atk. 165. 
177. (1884) 15 Q. B. D. 280. 
178. (1884) 15 Q. B. D. 288. 
179. [191412 K. B. 910. 
180. In Colonial Bank v. Whinney (1886) 11 App. Cas. 426.435-456, Lord Blackburn accepted that the result 
of applying either of the two principles was very similar, citing his dicta in Cole v. North Western Bank (1875) 
10 C. P. 354,362. The mortgagor is not carrying on business as agent for the mortgagee but in his own behalf- 
see Joseph v. Lyons (1884) 15 Q. B. D. 280,285 per Brett, M. R. 
181. (1749) 1 Atk. 165. 
182. (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 177. 
183. T. Coventry (ed. ), J. J. Powell, A Treatise on the Law efMortgages, 6th edn (London, 1826). 42. 
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This state of affairs was generally what both the mortgagor and mortgagee wanted, 
because only by continuing in trade would the debtor be able to repay and, as Lindley, J., 
pointed out, "' without the power to deal the bill of sale would be worthless. 
The hypotheca had n6t taken off in England because the mortgage law satisfied 
commercial requirements. "' Holroyd merely made the efficacy of such mortgages 
unassailable by upholding the old equity principles. The vexed question of possession and 
control and the power to dispose in the current book debt charge debate is irrelevant to the 
institution of the mortgage. 
IV. A FEW REFLECTIONS 
Although the authors appear to have done their best to disguise it, their purpose in writing 
this article is strictly modem. If we may pay a final tribute to the perspicacity of the 
simpler ancients, it is that the mortgage covering present and future property with an 
express or implied dealing power is, quite simply, vastly superior to the floating charge in 
satisfying the current commercial needs of both borrowers and lenders. 
In a valuable passage in the Exodus, '116 Professor Goode describes seven legal 
conditions essential to maximize any company's ability to raise funds on the security of 
its enterprise, precised here as: (1) the company retains possession of trade assets; 
(2) intangible assets are susceptible of charge; (3) future property is included to catch 
circulating assets; (4) security is grantable over all, or classes of, the assets rather than by 
individual identification; (5) present and future advances are within the security; 
(6) security over circulating assets avoids business paralysis and allows free disposal in 
course of business; and (7) priority of purchase-money security to avoid first financier 
monopoly. 
At the time of its commercial demise as a result of the Act of 1882 the mortgage of 
present and future personalty (including debts) had held a pre-eminent position as the 
mechanism for secured loan financing to trade and business since the Middle Ages. It had 
developedý to the following pitch: 
" the mortgage could cover present and future property; 
" individual identification of assets was not essential-class description sufficed, as did 
the global "all"; 
" further advances could be included; 
" intangible assets were mortgaged from the very beginning; 
" the mortgagor almost always kept possession of the assets; 
" there was a power to deal, express or implied; 
" in cases of land equity had shown some tenderness toward the mortgagee for the 
purchase price and in Re Connolly Brothees Ltd (No. 2) 187 it was held that in 
184. Walker v. Clay (1880) 49 U. Q. B. 560,561. 
185. The authors are very grateful to Dr Trevor Hart, Chief Archivist of ANZ Grindleys Bank, who very 
kindly supplied us with a copy of an Australian mortgage over a fluctuating herd of cattle from 1857. We are 
also very grateful to Dr John Booker, Chief Archivist of Lloyds Bank Pic, who gave us access to archives of the 
bank which contain a number of examples of mortgages of fluctuating personal property including debts from 
the middle of the 19th century. 
186. Feldman & Meisel (eds), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modem Developments (1996) 193,194. 
187. [1912] 2 Ch. 25. 
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simultaneous purchase and mortgage cases the mortgagor beneficially acquired only 
the equity of redemption. These developments might have matured further to meet 
Professor Goode's "first financier monopoly" problem in his seven optimum 
conditions in his Exodus; a good opportunity to do this was lost in Stroud 
Architectural Systems Ltd v. John Laing Construction Ltd; "' 
0 business was not paralysed by the execution of the mortgage right from the earliest 
times; except for a tiny number of cases of the Hassells v. Simpson'89 type, from 
which Lord Kenyon rescued mortgages in Whitwell v. Thompson, " and the very 
damaging Graham v. Chapman9' interlude, nearly all the reported cases cited 
hitherto involved the turning over of the mortgaged property in the course of 
business. Phillip E. Jones'91 and Dr A. H. Thomas' 93 report the same state of affairs 
in their discussions of the 15th century practice. Unlike the landed aristocracy, many 
traders had only their stock in trade, debts, trade implements and household contents 
to offer as security. Furthermore, the writings of Postan'91 and Dr Nightingale, ' 9-` 
referred to earlier, demonstrate the economic conditions which rendered such forms 
of mortgage necessary. 
In the result the nation traded, borrowed, mortgaged and traded the security on without 
much legal hindrance for 500-years without the hypotheca. Despite the simplicity of the 
ancients, they very nearly achieved all of Professor Goode's optimum conditions. By 
contrast, the floating charge is still wholly unsettled as to its fundamental nature. 
Discussion of it is notable for confusion and contradiction. While the accepted theory is 
intellectually satisfying, in that it poses an expressed commercial need which received a 
requisite legal response, the actual development of the floating charge does not fit the 
theory. Moreover, it was a lame and lurching affair. 
Nevertheless, Professor Goode is quite right to say that commercial law developments 
are prompted by commercial needs and it is no part of the argument here to say that the 
floating charge was always mere surplusage. In the authors' view, however, the position 
was not that suddenly there was a need for security with dealing power and nothing was 
in place at the time, but rather that the all present and future property mortgage with 
dealing power had been in place for a very long time, when it was wrested from its central 
position in the trade financing system by the common lawyers in Graham v. Chapman. 
Ile borrowing of the Schedule C mortgage was no more than an attempt on the part of 
those advising financiers to the newly emerging corporate trade sector to ward off the 
unfortunate effects which Jervis, C. J. 's judgment in Graham was having on the 
unincorporated sector. As things turned out it was an inspired attempt. - 
The courts' difficulties in trying to formulate floating charge principles stem from: 
(i) the paramount public policy concerns which imbued the meaning of the Schedule C 
188. [19941 B. C. C. 18. 
189. (1785) 1 Doug. 89. 
190. (1793) 1 Esp. N. P. C. 68. 
191. (1852) 12 C. B. 85. 
192. "Introduction: Gifts of Goods and Chattels", in Calendar of Select Pleas and Memoranda of the City of 
London 1437-1457 (Cambridge, 1954). 
193. "Introduction: Gifts of Goods and Chattels, " in Calendar of Select Pleas of Memoranda of the City of 
London 1413-1437 (Cambridge, 1943). 
194. Supra, fn. 14. 
195. Supra, fn. 16. 
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mortgage but were wholly inapposite to an ordinary Companies Act company; (ii) the 
pervasive influence of a long history of mortgage bills of sale with express or implied 
dealing power; and (iii) the Graham paralysis heresy, which in the 1860s and 1870s the 
courts had to accept as good law, although struggling determinedly to circumvent it, until 
it was overruled in Hauxwell. 
The difficulty with 20th century understanding of the floating charge is that the 
paralysing effect of specific security referred to in early floating charge cases (when 
Graham was a live issue) retains life and force as an element in legal thought today 
notwithstanding that it was expunged from the law in 1883. This oversight is entirely 
understandable, however, because Lord Lindley's restoration of the mortgage law to its 
proper state in Hauxwell arrived at roughly the same time as trade financing ceased to 
operate through bills of sale mortgages because the legislation of 1882 destroyed their 
commercial efficacy. It may even be that the strong upturn in company registrations after 
this time was a response to the finance requirements of those c*onducting business. 711e 
state of the mortgage bills of sale law would not be an everyday rhatter in the minds of 
those involved in company financial instruments for very long after the 1882 statute. 
The superiority of the mortgage with express or implied dealing power over the floating 
charge lies in its greater subtlety, flexibility and safety of dealing: 
(1) Subject to considerations such as jeopardy, the floating chargee generally has to 
wait until crystallization to protect or realize the security. Mortgages, in the 
absence of express terms, do not carry that restraint. 
(2) One of the dangers of clauses giving rise to automatic crystallization is that 
accidental crystallization can ocqur. 71bis is not a feature of the mortgage. 
(3) Crystallization which is accidental and unappreciated by the parties involves 
messy (in commercially practical terms) problems of safety of dealings with 
third parties, directors' authority, estoppel, possible refloating and title to 
property. Again this is not a mortgage problem. 
(4) Floating charges are equitable and through the registration provisions of the 
Companies Act 1985, ss 395-401 everyone who deals with the company risks 
the requirements of the bona fide purchaser for value of the legal title for safety 
of dealing. True safety consists in enquiry of the chargee. 
Mortgages provide a safer dealing power so far as third parties are concerned. 
The reason is that the bill of sale mortgage is a sale in which the mortgagor has 
possession, a right of possession under the express or implied dealing power and 
a right to transfer a title arising also from that power. 7bus, at common law, not 
statute, the mortgagor can make a good title. The principle of the bona fide 
purchaser of the legal title for value without notice is not, therefore. constantly 
in play in relation to personal property. Land conveyancing involves separate 
issues. The mortgagor is at common law a seller in possession. 
(5) When crystallization occurs, it affects all the assets to which the floating charge 
applies (unless partial crystallization becomes a settled institution). Mortgagees 
and mortgagors are not so hamstrung because the mortgagee can dip into the 
assets mortgaged and take a fraction even though the mortgage is expressed to 
apply to all present and future property. 196 
196. See, e. g., Ex p. Dann (1881) 17 Ch. D. 26 and Greenbirt v. Stnee (1876) 35 LT. (N. S. ) 168. 
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(6) As Dr Oditah" rightly expresses it, the effect of crystallization is to bring 
"management autonomy" over the assets to an end. Under a mortgage, a 
mortgagee can dip in and leave management autonomy otherwise unaffected. 
(7) A potentially serious practical problem in receivership arises from Re Real Meat 
Co. Ltd. 198 Chadwick, J. (as he then was) held that, where a receiver is 
appointed under a second charge, a sale by the receiver in the course of 
realization does not overreach the prior charge. In that case a bank had financed 
on secured terms the buyout by a new company formed by the management of 
the old company. It was held to be constructive trustee for the prior charge 
holder of the proceeds of the old company's book debts which the receiver had 
sold to the new company and which were charged to the bank. The court 
considered that, unless the overreaching provisions of the Law of Property Act 
1925 could be invoked (and they could not), the receiver's statutory power of 
sale under the Insolvency Act 1986'19 was not sufficient to achieve that effect. 
The inconvenience of this decision to a trading receivership is obvious and 
considerable. In relation to the old bill of sale type mortgage of present and 
future property with express or implied dealing power, this issue does not arise. 
A five-member Court of Appeal settled the principle in Re Morrilt . 200 It was 
held there that a personalty mortgage implies a power to realize by sale. In 
particular, the court held that the provisions of the statutory predecessor to the 
1925 Act (the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881) were neither 
relevant nor necessary to achieve a fully effective sale. 
Compared with the mortgage, the floating charge is a crude and blunt instrument. For 
those seeking a more subtle, flexible, lender-efficient and management-friendly form of 
security instrument for the 21 st century-there is a strong case here for looking backwards 
in order to move forward. 
197. F. H. Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, 199 1), 111. 
198. [19961 B. C. C. 254. 
199. Sched. 1. para. 2. 
200. (1886) 18 Q. B. D. 222. 
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Introduction 
Recently the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Peter Mandelson M-P, 
made some comments at the Confederation of British Industry's Annual Con- ference which have reopened the debate as to whether the Crown should enjoy 
any preferential position when it comes to the distribution of the assets of com- 
panies which are in insolvent liquidation. ' The Secretary of State said that he was 
going to'earnestly consider the abolition of such preferential treatment. Subse- 
quently, the Treasury has indicated its resistance to such a move, and the National 
Audit Office2 and the House of Commons Public Accounts CommitteeP have 
urged government departments to be more aggressive in pursuing debts owed by insolvent companieS. 4 
The general rule, known as the paripassu principle and embodied in section 107 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 for voluntary liquidations and in rule 4.181(l) of the Insolvency Rules for compulsory liquidations, as far as the distribution of assets 
in a liquidation is concerned is that the company's property is to be applied 
equally towards its liabilities. The principle of equality of division among credi- 
tors is one of the (if not the most) fundamental principles of the law of liquidation (and of insolvency in general)' and is at the very heart of the whole statutory 
scheme of winding up. The idea of giving certain creditors preferential treatment is, therefore, an exception to the general rule which has attracted widespread and 
sustained support over the years. 
While the granting of preferential treatment to some creditors of insolvents is 
an exception to the inveterate pari passu principle, it must be acknowledged that 
the concept of preferential status has a long lineage, emanating initially from the Crown's ancient prerogative rightS. 6 However, after recognising the longevity of 
preferential treatment, it seems that the development of the law dealing with 
preferences has largely been an accident of history rather than a matter of policy. 
'There were minor changes to the preferential debts regime as a result of the 
reports of the Warmington. 7 Cohený and Blagden? Committees but only the Report of the Cork Committee'O looked at the issue in any real depth and led to 
significant reform. For instance, the recommendations of the Cork Report led 
eventually"' to the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 ("the Act") c-artailing the 
Preference to which the Crown was entitled. The preferential debts regime is now found in section 386 of and Schedule 6 to the Act. Notwithstanding the reform of 
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the regime in 1986, there undoubtedly remains significant creditor discontent, 12 
Mr Graham Mason, the business environment director of the Confederation of 
British Industry, has said, "Once the government and the banks have had their 
share there is often not much left for the other creditors. "13 
In its report considering the National Audit Office report on the Redundancy 
Payments Services, "' the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee15 pro- 
vides some idea of the amount of preferential debt owed to the government. The 
Redundancy Payments Service (part of the Department Trade and Industry or 
DTI) administers payments out of the National Insurance Fund to, inter alia, 
employees of insolvent businesses. These payments are made under the Employ- 
ment Rights Act 1996 and give employees more extensive protection than their 
preferential status under the Act. In making these payments the Crown is sub- 
rogated to the employees' rights under the Act, which include a preferential 
element. In the five years prior to the Audit Office report the Redundancy Pay- 
ments Service paid out approximately E240 million each year to employees of 
insolvent businesses, of which only: E2O million each year was recovered. As at 
March 31,1996f C177 million of preferential debt was owed by insolvent busi- 
nesses to the DTI. In the five years up to April 5,1996, insolvent businesses owed 
the Department of Social Security or DSS; E596 million of preferential debt. 
Somewhat surprisingly, neither H. M. Customs and Excise nor the Inland Reve- 
riue kept separate figures for preferential debt owed by insolvent businesses. The 
Inland Revenue estimated that it was owed between E100 and 050 n-dllion of 
preferential debt as at October 31,1995. H. M. Customs and Excise had written off 
E198 million of preferential debt in the year ending December 31.. 1995. 
Following the National Audit Office report, the DT1 and H. M. Customs and 
Excise have been pursuing their preferential claims more aggressively. The Public 
Accounts Cornmittee recornmended that the Inland Revenue and the DSS should 
follow their lead. The various government departments have set up a joint work- 
ing group to co-ordinate their attempts to recover more preferential debt. 
This is the backdrop to the Secretary of State's announcement. Its timing is 
somewhat ironic. just as government departments are beginning to chase their 
respective entitlements to preferential debts with new found tenacity, the govern- 
ment is considering abolishing their preferential status. Three years ago, abolition 
would have had an impact on government coffers. Its impact now would be 
considerably more dramatic. 
Mr Mandelson's comments cause one to wonder whether the regime should be 
maintained in any shape or form. The arguments in favour of and against the 
existence of preferential debts have been well documented in legal literature over 
the past 20 years or so, *I'k but it seems from our investigations that there has been 
no analysis of the question ba: sed on empirical data. This is not unusual: insol- 
vency issues have rarely been examined in light of such data,, " and several 
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'2 Goode, "The Death of 
Insolvency Law" (1980) 1 Co. 
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normative approaches to the law of insolvency have 
been developed by com- 
mentators without considering any empirical data whatsoever. 
" 
It is both timely, given Mr Mandelson's comments, and appropriate, 
that 
empirical data should be examined as to whether the preferential 
debts regime 
("the regime") contained in the Act should be retained. 
In mid-1998 we sent a 
questionnaire to 225 licensed insolvency practitioners in which 
they were asked 
several questions concerning the regime. We received 77 responses-a 
good 
response rate of a little over 34 per cent. This article discusses the regime 
in the 
light of those responses in an attempt to arrive at some view as to whether 
the 
regime should be reformed or even abolished. 
The Empirical Data 
General Issues 
An analysis of the legal position as far as the regime is concerned only takes us 
so far. It does not tell us what is actually happening in practice; only an empirical 
study can do that. Determining what empirical data should be obtained is not an 
easy task. It is probably correct to say that technically the only way of deciding 
empirically whether the regime should be abolished or not would be to collect 
data during the course of two time periods, one in which the regime operates and 
one where it does not, then compare the results. For obvious reasons this is not 
practical. We decided that the best course of action was to prepare and send a 
questionnaire addressing issues pertinent to the regime and how it impacts on 
relevant aspects of insolvency law to the persons who would have most informa- 
tion concerning the operation of the regime in practice, licensed insolvency practi- 
tioners. While some solicitors who are licensed insolvency practitioners were sent 
questionnaires the majority were sent to accountants, who handle the vast bulk of liquidations and, in general, have greater experience when it comes to the admini- 
stration of estates and the distribution of assets. The questionnaires were sent to 
practitioners in England and Wales. We would like to thank the practitioners who 
took the time to complete the questionnaire. 
In order to secure as many responses as possible, we kept the questionnaire 
telatively short. It was divided into three parts. Section A sought responses in 
order to gauge whether respondents felt that the regime precipitated problems: 
are its effects positive, neutral or negative in relation to certain specific issues, 
rýmely creditor attitudes, the administration of estates, rescues and the initiation f Wh inding up proceedings? Section B sought estimates from practitioners regard- 
Mg the general fate of funds payable by liquidators to creditors. Section C can- 
vassed the views of practitioners, in light of their experience, on the abolition or 
alteration of the rights of preferential creditors. In the following discussion we have rounded percentages to the nearest whole number. 
Section A 
ln this section we gave the practitioners a number of statements and asked them 
tO respond. There were five options: strongly disagree, disagree, no view, agree or 
*ongly agree. 
In response to the statement, "The current regime for the payment of prefer- 
ýAtial debts precipitates unsecured creditor discontent, " 68 per cent of our respon- dents either agreed or strongly agreed. Ten per cent of respondents did not have 
I view and 22 per cent disagreed with the statement. Of those who disagreed, 
Only four per cent disagreed strongly. 
The second question asked practitioners whether the resolution and payment of 
Preferential debts prolonged the winding up process. Fifty per cent of the respon- dents felt that it did. Eleven per cent had no view on the matter, and 39 per cent k1t that the process was not prolonged. The third question asked whether the resolution and payment of preferential debts increased the costs of winding up. In response, 47 per cent of the practitio- 1ýfts were of the opinion that it did, 15 per cent had no view and 38 per cent kught that it did not increase costs. 
Insolvency Practice" (1998, 
GTI Specialist Publishers). 
Is In the U. S. this can be seen 
in both Professor Jackson's 
creditors' bargain theory 
("Bankruptcy, 
Nonbankruptcy Entitlements 
and the Creditors' Bargain" 
(1982) 91 Yale L. J. 857) and 
Professor Korobkin's 
bankruptcy choice model 
("Contractarianism and the 
Normative Foundations of 
Bankruptcy Law" (1993) 71 
Texas L. Rev. 541). 
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In the light of the emphasis now laudably placed on rescuing viable business 
undertakings, respondents were asked to comment on what effect, if any, the 
Crown's priority had on proposed corporate rescue packages. Seventy-eight per 
cent of respondents said that the priority enjoyed by the Crown diminished the 
possibility of rescue. Three per cent had no view, and 19 per cent felt that the 
priority did not affect the prospects of a rescue. 19 
Further on the question of corporate rescues we asked practitioners to comment 
on whether the Crown seemed to have a general policy of voting against rescue 
packages. Sixty-two per cent took the view that it did. Eleven per cent expressed 
no view and 27 per cent said that it did not. In the same vein, we asked if 
practitioners thought that the Crown would become more amenable to agreeing 
to rescue packages if its preferential status was abolished. Fifty-one per cent said 
yes, 15 per cent had no view and 34 per cent said no. 
Finally, we asked whether practitioners thought that having a priority made the 
Crown less likely to initiate winding up proceedings. Eighty-two per cent of 
respondents took the view that it did not. Twelve per cent had no view, and only 
six per cent felt that the priority made it less likely that the Crown would initiate 
liquidation proceedings. 
Section B 
It was thought important and highly relevant to ascertain to what extent divi- 
dends paid to preferential creditors absorbed the company's assets; this would, 
inter alia, give some idea of the extent to which unsecured creditors were affected 
by the regime. Along the same lines we inquired as to how often dividends were 
paid to unsecured creditors and how the satisfaction of floating chargeholders, 
who had priority over unsecured creditors but not over preferential creditors, 20 
affected dividends that would have been paid to unsecured creditors. 
Only 65 respondents replied to the question "In what percentage of insolvent 
windings up have distributions to preferential creditors absorbed the company's 
assets? " Fifty-five per cent of respondents said that preferential creditors took the 
assets of companies in over 60 per cent of cases. 
In response to the question, "In what percentage of insolvent liquidations has 
a dividend been paid to unsecured creditors? ", 85 per cent of the 65 practitioners 
who responded said that it was in 30 per cent of cases or less. 
Finally, respondents were asked, in relation to those insolvent windings up 
where there were floating charges, had the floating charges absorbed the com- 
pany's assets? Sixty-one practitioners responded and the views given demon- 
strated no pattern. Twenty-nine per cent said 10 per cent or less. Ten per cent said 
that charges absorbed the assets in 21-30 per cent-of cases, while another 10 per 
cent gave 41-50 per cent as their answer. At the other end of the spectrum, 13 per 
cent said that the answer was in the range of 71-80 per cent and 13 per cent took 
the view that this happened in 91-100 per cent of liquidations. 
Section C 
In this section of the questionnaire, practitioners were asked a preliminary ques- 
tion: would you abolish preferential debts? The answer to this question deter- 
mined whether the respondent needed to answer the rest of the questions in the 
section. Forty-six per cent of respondents said that they would abolish prefer- 
ences, and were not asked to answer any further questions. Fifty-four per cent of 
respondents answered the remaining questions, which are discussed in this sec- 
tion of the article. 
The first question asked practitioners whether they felt that the Crown's prefer- 
ential status should be abolished. Thirty-two per cent said yes. In answer to the 
second question, whether the Crown's priority should be extended in any way, 
only one practitioner said that it should. All of this means that 62 per cent of all 
respondents thought that the Crown's preferential status ought to be abolished. 
As far as the preferential status of employees was concerned, 95 per cent of 
respondents said that they would not abolish the priority enjoyed by employees, 
although only 43 per cent said that they would extend the employees' preferential 
position. 
From time to time, publicity and professional support have been given to the 
idea of" instituting a new category of preferential creditor-the consumer debtor 
19 It seems that the 
preferential status of the 
Crown is regarded in the 
business world as an 
inhibitor to the 
implementation of rescues: 
Wighton, "Tax bodies may 
lose preferential creditor 
status", Financial Times, 
November 3,1998. 
20 See Insolvency Act 1986, 
s. 175(2)(b). 
21 Samuels, "Prepayments: 
The Lost Consumer 
Deposits" [1987] J. B. L. 30. 
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who has made prepayments for goods and/or services to companies which end 
up in insolvent liquidation. As Samuels has indicated, the examples of prepay- 
raents being' made to companies which have not made prepayments to their 
suppliers and which enter liquidation are legion, with clothing, furniture, carpets, double-glazing and home improvements being particularly vulnerable. 22 It has been argued that consumer creditors in this type of situation are not to be classi- fied in the same way as other unsecured creditors, such as traders, because, inter 
alia, traders are aware of the risks, they can make inquiries, they make commercial judgments, they can use Romalpa clauses and they can offset losses against gains for tax purposes. Prepayment consumers are laypersons who are generally igno- 
rant of , the law and commercial practice and do not understand the risks involved. 23We decided to broach this issue with our respondents. Sixty per cent 
Said that they would not introduce a new preference category for prepayment 
consumer creditors. 
Finally, when asked whether they would advocate the introduction of any other 
new class of preferential creditors, 97 per cent of the practitioners said that they 
would not. 
Commentaty 
It is notable that, with corporate rescue generally regarded as a critical aim of insolvencyý law , 24 78 per cent of our respondents took the view that the priority enjoyed by the Crown diminished the possibility of rescue. It could be said that the Crown, from a narrow financial point of view, has no need to see companies 
survive as it is likely to get paid in a winding up. Sixty-one per cent of our 
respondents said that the Crown seemed to have a general policy of voting 
against rescue packages. If its priority was abolished, the Crown would have to be more concerned about the fate of companies, and perhaps take on a more 
Proactive role. This would surely be consistent with the aims which Peter Man- delson outlined in his recent speech to the Confederation of British Industry. It was somewhat surprising that 82 per cent of respondents did not agree that the Crown's priority makes it less likely to initiate winding up proceedings. ' It has frequently been argued26 that because the Crown is assured of preferential 
rights it is not encouraged to take action to recover what it is owed or to initiate ! vinding up proceedings to stop insolvent companies trading. 271f this latter view 
is correct, it is likely that companies with an accumulated tax liability which 
continue to trade would run up further tax habilitieS. 28This may well be delete- 
rious to ordinary creditors who extend further credit and who may not be aware 
Of the tax liability. 
The traditional argument that the revenue authorities do not initiate winding tip proceedings as often as one would expect does seem to have a degree of creditability. While the Crown has the ability to monitor debtors it lacks, for a 
number of reasons, the appropriate incentives: government does not bear the cost of default itself-it is passed on to taxpayers. The people responsible for admin- istering the Revenue's affairs have no stake in the recovery of debts owed to the government. 29 
On the issue of abolishing employees' preferential status, our respondents were split almost exactly down the middle. This may be the fault of the question, which failed to differentiate between employees' preferential position under the Act and the more extensive protection afforded them under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) scheme funded by the National Insurance Fund. It is submitted that as long as employees of insolvent companies maintain their employment protec- tion rights under the ERA they do not need overlapping protection under the Act. The preference under the Act serves only to give the Crown rights of subrogation to claw back some of the money expended under the ERA scheme. Sixty-'two per cent of the responses we received in relation to the distribution of dividends indicated that, in a clear majority of cases, preferential creditors take the assets of insolvent companies. Further, a large majority of practitioners said that unsecured creditors receive a dividend in less than 30 per cent of liquida- tions. This makes it easy to see why there is significant creditor discontent in the community. 
With the preferential regime as it stands, and current levels of creditor dis- content, creditors may well refrain from initiating winding up proceedings against an insolvent company where it is known that there are substantial 
I ibid. 
21 ibid. at 31. 
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Ziegel, Current Developments 
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Clarendon Press, Oxford), 
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21 Eleven per cent of the 
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"Preferred Priority in 
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amounts owed to the Crown. Creditors would not proceed on the grounds that 
they were unlikely to see any of what was owed to them. If creditors commence 
winding up proceedings and succeed in obtaining an order, they may -well 
recover the taxed costs of obtaining the order, but they would be liable to pay. 
their solicitors and counsel more than is likely to be awarded to them on a 
taxation. Undertaking the proceedings would be a waste of time. There is a public 
policy issue here. If creditors do not initiate proceedings there is nothing to stop 
a hopelessly insolvent company obtaining more and more credit from people who 
are unaware of its predicament, with no hope of repaying what is borrowed. Ultimately, it is the creditors who will lose out. 
, Besides the fact that the abolition of the regime would prevent the unfairness which exists where some unsecured creditors get paid and others do not, the 
responses we received indicated that there would be other benefits of abolishing 
preferential treatment. First, it is likely that abolition would save costs and lead to 
more speedy windings up. 30 Secondly, there would be more chance of rescuing a 
company. 3' Thirdly, more funds would be paid to the unsecured creditors . 32 A likely further benefit would be that banks would not spend the time and 
money which they presently do seeking ways of circumventing the effects of the 
regime. At the moment, preferential creditors are entitled to be paid before a 
creditor who holds a floating charge over company assets. 33 Banks and other lenders have sought ways of ensuring that their security is subject to fixed 
charges, because the holders of such charges are not subject to the preferential 
creditors' regime. 34 
It is acknowledged that abolishing preferential debts would benefit the holders 
of floating charges, as there would no longer be any class of debt with priority 
over such creditors. This is an unintended benefit which unsecured creditors can do nothing about. This article does not purport-to comment on the rights of floating charge holders, which is a separate question. But if the regime was 
abolished the fact is that unsecured creditors would receive more than they do at 
present. As indicated above, under the present regime lenders continue to expend 
enormous resources on attempting to draft and then enforce fixed charges over 
changing assets. The difference between fixed and floating charges remains at best 
uncertain . 35 If the preferential debts regime was abolished, the 
distinction 
between a fixed and a floating charge would become less crucial to lenders, whose 
position would generally be much more secure. The struggle to find a fixed 
charge over changing assets would lose much of its practical significance. Should the government decide to abolish preferential debts, it may also wish to 
reconsider the Cork Committee's recommendation36 for a 10 per cent fund to be 
set aside for the benefit of unsecured creditors. In a letter to Insolvency Practitio- 
ner , 37 Mr Gerry Weiss, the former Technical Director of the Society of Practitioners 
of Insolvency, strongly advocates the resurrection of this recommendation. Mr 
Weiss believes that, although the 10 per cent fund would reduce the money 
available to secured lenders, the impact of this on lenders would be eased by a 
quid pro quo in the form of the abolition of preferential debts: what the banks lose 
on the swings, they gain on the roundabouts. The 10 per cent fund could lead to 
a dividend for unsecured creditors where before there would have been none at 
all. In addition, the fund could be used by the liquidator as a kind of "fighting fund" to investigate the company's failure in more detail and to help fund litiga- 
tion to swell the company's assetS. 311 According to Professor Milman's editorial 
comment in an earlier issue of this journal, 39with which we respectfully agree, 
this is part of "the most fundamental issue in insolvency law and it is one where 
least progress has been made in recent years. There must be action here if our 
system of insolvency law is to regain public respect. " 
Conclusion 
From an empirical study of the preferential debts regime it would seem that the 
regime needs to be reformed. We would argue that this accords with sound 
arguments calling for the abolition of the regime and the fact that historically the 
regime has not developed pursuant to any policy reasons, or certainly not on any 
policy basis that can be defended. We would submit respectfully that Peter Man- delson was on the right track in considering the abolition of the Crown's right to 
30 The response to the 
question concerning the 
effect of the regime on the 
winding up process which 
attracted the most support 
was that the regime did 
prolong the process (50 per 
cent). Again, the response 
which attracted the most 
support in relation to 
whether the regime increased 
costs was that it did (47 per 
cent). 
31 Seventy-eight per cent of 
all respondents to our 
questionnaire felt that the 
Crown priority reduced the 
possibility of a rescue 
package being implemented. 
32 For example, a clear 
majority of respondents (62 
per cent) said that 
preferential creditors 
absorbed the funds available 
for distribution. 
33 Insolvency Act 1986, 
s. 175(2)(b). 
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priority in an insolvent winding up. Clearly, the majority of the practitioners who 
responded to our questionnaire believe that the time is right for the abolition. of 
the Crown priority. The claims of tax authorities have tended historically to be 
given priority in most legal systems, but in recent years there has been a trend 
towards either abolition or a reduction in the advantages granted. For instance, 
while countries such as France, Spain, Ireland and Italy retain wide preferential 
rights for tax liability, other countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany, Portugal and Australia have all abolished any priority status for the 
revenue authorities in recent years. 
As long as the ERA scheme remains in place, there seems no reason-other than in order to maintain the Crown's subrogation rights-why employees should not 
also lose their preferential position under the Act. This would have the con- 
sequence of relegating the Crown's subrogation rights to those of an unsecured 
creditor. 40 
Total abolition of the regime would certainly be favoured by the many unse- 
cured creditors who regularly lose out in insolvent liquidations and who are dearly disillusioned by the winding up process: 68 per cent of respondents agreed 
that the present regime causes creditor discontent. The Cork Committee took the 40 As was recommended by same view when it said that: the Cork Committee, para. 
"We are left in little doubt that the elaborate system of priorities accorded by 
1435 
11 Para. 1397. 
the present law is the cause of much public dissatisfaction, and that there is a 
42 See the comments of 
widespread demand for a significant reduction, and even a complete elimina- Millett J. (as he then was) in 
tion, of the categories of debts which accorded priority in an insolvency. 
1141 Re Barlow Clowes Gilt 
Managers Ltd [19911 B. C. L. C. 
It is submitted that if abolition occurred and there was true equal treatment of 750 at 760. 
creditors, there would be more chance of more creditors of insolvents surviving 
43 Of 
course, there will be 
liquidations where no the collapse of debtors. At present many creditors, as a result of the liquidation of dividend whatsoever is paid their debtors, either struggle financially or themselves enter liquidation or bank- to creditors. However, where rUptcy. The equality principle obviously means that the impact of liquidation will be spread among all classes of creditorS42 and there is a greater likelihood of more I 
the equality principle exists, 
a creditor is more likely to creditors continuing to trade . 43 This is particularly so for less powerful creditors, receive something where 
who may not have the option of using influence and threats to extract the pay- there are assets to be 
Ment of their debts prior to winding up. distributed. 
THE PREFERENTIAL DEBTS REGIME IN 
LIQUIDATION LAW: 
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 
Andrew Keay* and Peter Walton" 
For many years certain creditors oj'companies in insolvent liquidations have been 
entitled to preferential treatment when it comes to the payment of dividends by 
liquidators. This article examines the rights oj'preferential creditors historically, legally 
and empirically and comes to the conclusion, inter alia, that these rights have not been 
developed pursuant to any considered policy and that it is unfair that unsecured credi- 
tors often lose out on any benefit in a liquidation because of the existence of preferen- 
tial rights. The government has recently acknowledged the need to reconsider the 
Crown's preferential status. This article submits that it is timely to abolish all preferen- 
tial rights. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When liquidators come to the point of distributing the property of the companies whose 
affairs they are winding up, they are not able simply to distribute the property equally 
among the creditors who have proved their debts. Before consideration is given to mak- 
ing any payment in favour of the unsecured creditors, the proceeds from the realisation of 
any property which constitutes a creditor's security will be paid to the secured creditor to 
the extent of the secured creditor's debt against the company' and the expenses of the liq- 
uidation will be satisfied out of the general funds received by the liquidator. 2 Even once 
these payments have been made the fact is that in most liquidations the unsecured credi- 
tors will still not share in the funds remaining. 3 The reason is that before they get paid 
anything the liquidator is required to pay out certain unsecured creditors who, while hav- 
ing no priority under the general law, are given by the Insolvency Act 19864 a special pri- 
ority to payment. These creditors are often known as "preferential creditors" and the 
amount which they are owed can often be so large that there is nothing left for the gen- 
Professor of Law, University of Wolverhampton. 
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Wolverhampton. 
The holders of floating charges will have their right to payment postponed until the payment or both the 
expenses of the liquidation and the preferential creditors referred to in the Insolvency Act 1986, s 175(2Xb) 
Sched 6. 
1 See the Insolvency Rules 1986, r 4.218. 
3 The Business Environment director orthe Confederation of British Industry, Mr Graham Mason has said, 
"Once the government and the banks have had their share there is often not much left for the other creditors": 
D Wighton, "Tax bodies may lose their preferential creditor status" Financial Times, 3 November 1998. 
" All references in this article to sections will, unless the contrary is indicated, be references to the Insolvency 
Act 1986. 
Company Financial andInsolvency Law Review 3,1999, pp 84-105 84 
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eral unsecured creditors. This state of affairs has provoked unsecured creditors to feel 
frustrated and to complain that they are poorly dealt with by the insolvency system. 5 
Such discontent has meant that there is a constant debate as to whether there should be 
any preferential creditors and, if so, who should qualify. 6 
The obvious problem faced by a legislature is that with an insolvent company not every 
creditor can be satisfied in full. Consequently the law has to decide which creditors are 
paid in full and the extent to which others are paid, if at all. The law seeks to find a proper 
balance between the claims of persons affected by the insolvency and to do this on the 
basis of public poliCy. 7 for there is no doubt that issues of public policy have influenced 
and will continue to influence the debates in relation to the resolution of problems pre- 
cipitated by the insolvency of companies (and individuals). The real question is what sys- 
tem carries out best that which is in the public interest. Is it in the public interest to ensure 
that debts owed to the government, as a representative of the public, are paid in priority 
to ordinary unsecured creditors? Is a system which balances the government's claims 
even-handedly with those of ordinary unsecured creditors one which, in the words of 
Lord Eldon, gives effect to the "preponderance of good". 8 
The regime which provides for preferential debts in England is found in a combination 
of s 386 and Schedule 6 of the Act. The same regime applies also to bankruptcies but this 
article limits itself to a consideration of the regime as it affects liquidations. 
The article examines the situation which currently exists in England as far as preferen- 
tial creditors are concerned. In the first part we trace the historical roots of the priorities 
given to certain classes of creditors in England. Second, we consider the present regime 
for the preferring of those creditors. Third, the article examines briefly the granting of 
preferential treatment to certain creditors in light of the paripassu principle, the foremost 
principle in the law of insolvency around the world. Fourth, we consider whether the pre- 
sent law is in need of reform and the shape any reform might take. The reform issue is dis- 
cussed in light of an analysis of both the arguments which can be mounted for and against 
the granting of priorities and the empirical data which we collected. 
We felt that the topic of this article warranted not only analysis based on historical, pol- 
icy and legal considerations, 9 but also analysis founded upon some empirical data. 
Consequently, we sent a questionnaire to 225 licensed insolvency practitioners in which 
they were asked several questions concerning the preferential debts' regime. We received 
77 responses and those responses are discussed where appropriate. 
RM Goode, "The Death of Insolvency Law" (1980)1 Co Law 123,127; J Ziegel. "Preferences and Priorities 
in Insolvency Law: Is There a Solution? " (1995) 39 Saint Louis LJ 793. The disillusionment of creditors is men- 
tioned in Justice, Insoh-ency Law: An agendaforrefin-m, (London, 1994), 22-2i We sent out a questionnaire to 
a large number of licensed insolvency practitioners. Out of those responding, 68%, were of the view that the prcf- 
erential debts' regime precipitates discontent among unsecured creditors. 
6 The Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law And Practice, (Cmnd 8558,1982) 
(hereafter "the Cork Report"), para 1398 was of the opinion that preferential treatment was only to be granted 
if it could be justified on the basis of fairness and equity. See the comment of J Garrido, "The Distributional 
Question in Insolvency: Comparative Aspects" (1995) 4 International Insolyency Review 25. 
7D Allan and U Drobnig, "Secured Credit in Commercial Insolvencies: A Comparative Analysis" (1980) 44 
Rabel's Zeitschrift 615,623. See also R Nimmer, "Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans : Absolute 
Priority and New Value Contribution" (1987) Emory U 1009,1024-1026. 
8 Re Wydown's Case (1804) 14 Ves Jun 80,88; 33 ER 451,454. 
11 For a discussion of comparative aspects of preferential debts. see Garrido. "The Distributional Question in 
Insolvency : Comparative Aspects" (1995) 4 International Insolvency Review 25. 
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B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND"ý 
Preferential debts have been recognised and developed in an entirely ad hoc manner for 
centuries and have only rarely been subject to serious consideration by any official body. 
The reports of the Warmington, II Cohen 12 and Blagden 13 Committees suggested some 
minor amendments to the preferential debts regime. Only the Cork Committee of the DTI 
committees of the twentieth century looked at the issue in any depth. Since the 
Bankruptcy Act 1825, which for the first time introduced a preference in bankruptcy for 
certain employees, 14 the history of preferential debts has not been a study in careful, 
methodical planning. Rather it has been a mixture of ancient rights being slowly whittled 
away and combined with occasional piecemeal additions. 15 
1. Crown debts 
At common law the Crown's prerogative rights include the right to prevail over the unse- 
cured debt of a subject, wherever their respective rights compete in a bankruptcy or wind- 
ing Up. 16 This right to priority, like other prerogative rights, is subject to statutory 
abrogation, whereby the Crown may assent to restrictions being placed upon such a wide 
ranging preferential position. 17 Until 188318 the Croývn was not expressly stated to be 
bound by the Bankruptcy Acts. The rule of statutory interpretation, that the Crown is not 
bound by any Act of Parliament unless it is named in it, 19 effectively gave the Crown for 
centuries a priority over all other creditors in bankruptcy. 
As a trustee (or assignee as they were formerly called) in bankruptcy takes possession 
of a bankrupt's assets as the bankrupt's representative, the trustee takes subject to equi- 
ties. Statute apart, this formerly gave the Crown a kind of super priority in bankruptcy 
over other creditors as it had the right to be paid ahead of others. Once the bankrupt's 
property had passed under the Bankruptcy Acts by the appointment of assignees in bank. 
ruptcy, the property was deemed to be wholly changed, to have passed from the bankrupt 
"I As the current preferential debts regime is essentially limited to a variety of Crown debts and claims of 
employees, this brief historical overview deals only with such debts. Local authority rates for example, intro- 
duced as a preferential debt into bankruptcy law by the Bankruptcy Act 1861, s 156 by way oranalogy to the 
Crown's preferential position at the time (see Hansaid2l March 1861,163) lost their priority position follow- 
ing the recommendations or the Cork Committee (see paras1426 and 1427) and are not considered in this 
article. 
II Cd 3052. (1906). para 84. 
12 Cmd 6659, (1943). para 153. 
13 Cmnd 221, (1957). paras 86-97. 
14 See the Bankruptcy Act 1825, ss 48 and 49. 
15 For an early example ora statutory preference see the Friendly Societies Act 1793 (33 Geo 3c 54). 
16 See eg Re Henle), & Co 0 878) 9 Ch D 469; New South Wales ravation Commiffioners Y Palmer [19071 AC 
179; Re Hi Webb & Co Lid [192212 Ch 369. 
17 The old forms of prerogative procedure were abolished by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s 26 of which 
limited the Crown's rights of execution to those of a subject. For a modern day discussion of the Crown's pre- 
rogative rights in liquidation, see Herbert Ber)-y Associates Lid P IRC [1977] 1 WLR 1437. 
18 Bankruptcy Act 1883, s 150. 
19 See eg Uarivel/on the Interpretation of Statutes, Ist ed (Maxwell& Son, London, 1875), 112: "The Crown 
is not reached except by express words or by necessary implication in any case where it would be ousted oran 
existing prerogative. " 
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and to be no longer subject to the Crown's process. 2(l Before the appointment of the 
assignees, until the cessio bonorum, the property of the bankrupt was subject to the 
Crown's writ of extent. 21 An ordinary creditor of the bankrupt was unable to claim 
the benefit of any execution over the bankrupt's assets after the act of bankruptcy, due to 
the doctrine of relation back22 which was introduced by the Bankruptcy Acts. As there 
was no statement in the Bankruptcy Acts binding the Crown, it could enforce its prerog- 
ative rights after the act of bankruptcy right up to the time of the assignment of the bank- 
rupt's estate to the assignees. 23 An example of the Crown's prerogative rights is Brassey Y 
DaivsonU where a collector of land tax became bankrupt whilst holding outstanding 
amounts owing to the Crown. Seizure under a warrant (rather than a by writ of extent) of 
the bankrupt's goods by the land tax commissioners 
, 
was held valid against the assignees 
in bankruptcy because of the Crown's prerogative. The seizure occurred after the bank- 
ruptcy had commenced but before assignment of the bankrupt's property. Such rights of 
the Crown were exercisable against any debtor of the Crown. The debt did not have to 
relate to any particular type of debt. 25 
The Crown's priority over general unsecured creditors was first put on a statutory foot- 
ing by the Bankruptcy Act 1849. Section 166 provided that the court was to order pay- 
ment 'of "assessed duties" but the Crown's rights were for the first time limited to 12 
months' unpaid assessed taxes. Other debts and taxes owed to the Crown by implication 
lost their preferred status by this provision. The statbtory priority for taxes was reworded 
under the Bankruptcy Act 1869, s 32 to include "assessed taxes, land tax, and property or 
income tax" but was still limited to one year's arrears. This provision was again replicated 
by the Bankruptcy Act 1883, s 40. 
Section 150 of the 1883 Act also contained a provision for the first time expressly bind- 
ing the Crown. 26 This at first sight may seem to be an unnecessary and rather tardy clar- 
ifying position. It appears to have been assumed that the Crown had, by assenting to s 166 
20 See RY Cotton (1751) 2 Ves 295; 28 ER 186 
21 See Audley v Hal. ve), (1628)Cro Car 148; 79 ER 731; Rv PLYley (1725) Bunb 202; 145 ER 647; Rv Beiville), 
(1712)] PWms 207; 24 ER 357, Lechmere v Thorowgood(1689) Comb 123; 90 ER 381; Rorke v Dayrell(1791) 
4 TR 402; 100 ER 1087. 
22 See eg the Bankruptcy Act 1914, s37which had the effector relating back, the title or the trustee in bank- 
ruptcy to the bankrupt's property, to the act of bankruptcy relied upon for the adjudication order. The doctrine 
of relation back can be traced back to the Bankruptcy Act 1571 (13 Eliz 1, c 7). 
23 It became common in practice to ask the court for an order of provisional assignment immediately after 
the bankruptcy order. This was designed to prevent the Crown from exercising its powers to seize the bankrupt's 
estate and in so doing frustrating the claims of the Crown's subjects, see generally E Christian, Present Practise 
In the Luiv of Bankrupts. 2nd ed (1818). 
24 (1734) 2 Str 978,93 ER 980. 
23 Independently of its prerogative rights, the Crown also enjoyed further specific rights under the various 
Excise Acts. which, as well as imposing duties on certain items. usually also gave the Crown a lien over the sub- ject matter orthe duty and the equipment used to produce it, In Stacey Y Hulse (1780) 2 Doug 411; 99 ER 264, 
a candlemaker became bankrupt and was later convicted for non payment or single duty on candles he had 
made. Under the Statute of 8 Anne c 9, s 19, the candlemaker became liable to pay double duties and the Crown 
was given a right to distrain the candles, utensils and other materials in the hands orthe assignee in order to sat- isfy the outstanding sum. See also Allorney-General v Senior (1739) 2 Doug 416; 99 ER 267, a case involving 
unpaid malt duties. and Re Day (1824) 1 M'Cle 384; 148 ER 160, which involved unpaid stagecoach duties. 
26 S 150 states: "Save as herein provided the provisions of this Act relating to the remedies against the prop- 
erty of a debtor, the priorities of debts. the effect of a composition or scheme of arrangement. and the effect of 
a discharge. shall bind the Crown". 
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of the 1849 Act, already agreed to its priority position's being limited. 27 The perceived 
need for absolute clarity may be due to the confusion which followed Parliament's 
attempt to introduce a regime for preferential creditors into company insolvencies. 
The position of the Crown in the winding up of a company remained unaffected by the 
bankruptcy statutes. The Companies Act 1862 provided that, once a company entered liq- 
uidation, proceedings against the company were prohibited without leave of the court, 
any distress or execution against the company's assets would be void and the property of 
the company would be distributed to its creditors paripassU. 28 No mention was made in 
the Act of the Crown's rights and so the Crown was not bound by these restrictions. 
The next development was for Parliament o act to assimilate the position of preferen- 
tial creditors under bankruptcy and winding up. The Judicature Act 1875, s 10 
provided that "the same rules shall prevail and be observed as to the respective rights of 
secured and unsecured creditors" in windings up of companies as existed for bankruptcy 
of individuals. 
At first sight this provision appears to incorporate by reference the preferential debt 
regime of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 into the winding up of companies. This was not the 
view of the Court of Appeal in Re Henley & Co. 29 In an action brought by the Crown for 
unpaid propirty and income tax, the Court appeared to proceed entirely upon the 
Companies Act provisions and did not consider the Judicature Act 1875, s 10 to have 
introduced bankruptcy priority provisions into company liquidations. The result was 
that, because the Crown was not mentioned in the Companies Act, it was not bound by 
it and therefore had a right to be paid in full for the debt owed to it. This right survived 
even the liquidator's taking office, as in winding up there is no equivalent o bankruptcy's 
cessio bonorum. The company's property is not vested in the liquidator and so the Crown's 
rights to enforce its prerogative rights are not affected. The Henley decision was subse- 
quently approved of by the Irish Court of Appeal" and the Privy Council. 31 It also 
received tacit support from Parliament itself in that the Companies Act 1883, s4 expressly 
introduced some of the Bankruptcy Acts' preferential creditors to liquidations. This 
would have been unnecessary if they had already been introduced by s 10. 
The Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1888 listed together the categories of 
preferential debts for both bankruptcy and liquidations. Section l(l)(a) included ". .. all 
assessed taxes, land tax, property and income tax assessed on the bankrupt or the com- 
pany ... not exceeding in the whole one year's assessment". 
The Act does not expressly 
state that the Crown is bound by it. The intention of this Act seems quite clearly to be to 
apply the same rules to preferential debts in liquidation as in bankruptcy. This is not how 
it was viewed. The practice in bankruptcy continued as before, that is, under the assump- 
tion that the Act gave priority to certain Crown debts but abrogated the Crown's priority 
P See eg CJ B Hertslet, The Bankrupt Low Consolidation Act 1849 (John Crock rord. London. 1852). 85; AA 
Doria, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy (Horace Cox, London, 1874), 662; E Baldwin. The Law of 
Bankruptcy. I st ed (Stevens and Haynes, London, 1879), 150. Although the trustee's title was held not to relate 
back as against the Crown, see EY p Postmavtet-General (1879) 9 Ch D 595. Section 150 of the 1883 Act made 
the Crown subject to the doctrine of relation back. 
2K Ss 87,163 and 133 respectively. 
29 (1878) 9 Ch D 469. 
30 Re Galvin [189711 1R 520. 
31 New South Wales Ta. vation Commissioners v Palmer [ 1907] AC 179. 
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in respect of its other debtS. 32 In liquidations the decision in Henley continued in force. It 
was widely accepted that all Crown debts had a priority in winding up even after the 
Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (which in ss 186,207 and 209 consolidated respec- 
tively the provisions of the Companies Act 1862, s 133 the Judicature Act 1875, 
s 10 and the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1888, s 1). There was still no cor- 
responding provision to the Bankruptcy Act 1883, s 150 expressly binding the Crown. 
Surprisingly, the belief that the Crown retained its universal priority over other creditors 
in winding up seems to have been unaniMOUS. 33 The debate in the House of Commons on 
the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1897, which made floating charges subject 
to preferential creditors, proceeded solely on the grounds that the Act would benefit 
employees of companies in receivership and liquidation. No mention was made of the 
Crown benefiting from the Act. 34 
It was not until 1922 and the Court of Appeal's decision in Re HJ Webb & Co Ltd, 35 
that it was finally decided that the Crown was bound by the preferential debt framework 
set out in statute. In this case the company had been appointed by the Board of Trade's 
Food Controller as its agent on a commission basis to sell and distribute frozen rabbits 
imported from Australia. The company collected purchase money on behalf of the Food 
Controller. The company entered insolvent liquidation owing money to the Food 
Controller. The issue before the Court was whether this Crown debt was entitled to pri- 
ority of payment (as it would if the Henley decision was binding) or whether the debt 
merely ranked pari passu with other unsecured creditors. The Court of Appeal decided 
that at the latest the 1888 Act had superseded the Crown's prerogative rights to be paid in 
priority to other creditors and that remained the position under the 1908 consolidation 
Act. The Henley case was decided purely on the Companies Act 1862 and the Court of 
Appeal in that case "did ignore entirely the existence"36 of the Judicature Act 1875, 
s 10. Webb finally settled that the Crown's rights to priority in liquidation were limited to 
only those taxes specifically mentioned in the Companies Act. The Crown was not enti- 
tled to an exclusive preferential position but enjoyed only an associated priority along 
with wages, rates and the other debts listed in the statute. Finally the Crown's position in 
liquidation and its position in bankruptcy were identified as being virtually identical. 
The basic provision of s 209 of the 1908 Act survived into the Companies Acts 192937 
and 194838 with only minor modifications, Parliament gradually acted to redress the 
balance back in favour of the Crown by adding various Crown debts to the statutory JiSt. 39 
32 See eg GL Hardy Law and Practice of Bankruptcy (Effingham Wilson, London, 1914), 130. 
33 See eg Lindley on Companies, Vol 2,6th ed (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1902), 998; Goix-Brown 
Handbook on Joint Stock Companies 34th Ed (Jordan. London, 1919), 568 ; Palmer's Company Law, II th ed 
(Stevens& Sons, London, 1921), 429. 
34 See Hansard 10 February 1897.70-87. 
35 [1922] 2 Ch 369; affd sub nom Food Controller v Cork [1923] AC 647. 
36 Ibid, 392, per Younger I. J. 
37 S264. 
38 S319. 
39 See eg the National Insurance Act 1911. s 110 (national insurance contributions-which predates the 
Webb decision); the Finance Act 1952. s 30(2) (PAYE deductions); the Finance Act 1972, s 41 (VAT); 
s 52(l 1) and Sch7 paras I and 18 Finance Act 1972 (car tax); the Finance Act 1969, s 3(9). Sch 9, para 16 and 
Betting and Gaming Duties Act 1972. Sch I para 14, Sch 2, para II and Sch 3. para 16 (general betting duty, 
gaming licence duty, bingo duty and pool betting duty); the Development Land Tax Act 1976, s 42 (develop- 
ment land tax). 
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This process continued until the recommendations of the Cork Committee 40 were largely implemented in re-structuring the current system. 
2. Employees 
The Bankruptcy Act 1825, s 48 introduced a preference Dyer other creditors for clerks and 
servants where their employer became bankrupt. The preference allowed the Bankruptcy 
Commissioners to order payment of UP to six months' wages or salary without limit. 
According to Doria4l the origin of this preference lies in Parliament adopting the same 
scheme which at that time existed in Scotland. 
The Bankruptcy Act 1849, by s 168, placed a limit of three months not exceeding L30 
upon the priority of servants and clerks, and introduced by s 169 a priority in favour of 
labourers and workmen subject to a maximum payment of 40 shillings but without any 
time limit. The Bankruptcy Act 1869, s 32 altered the priority of servants and clerks to a 
maximum of L50 for up to four months wages or salary, and labourers and workmen were 
-limited to a claim for up to two months wages but with no maximum limit. As we have 
seen, the Court of Appeal decided in Henley that these provisions were not introduced 
into corporate insolvencies by the Judicature Act 1875, s 10. 
The Bankruptcy Act 1883; s 40 brought labourers and workmen into line , with servants and clerks by providing for a preference in bankruptcy of up to four months wages up to 
a maximum of E50 for both groups of workers. The Companies Act 1883, s l(l) somewhat 
strangely repeated the same preference for servants and clerks in liquidations of compan- 
ies but labourers and workmen were limited to two months wages with no monetary limit. 
Section 1 (1) Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1888 for the first time applied the 
same categories of preferential creditors in bankruptcy as for winding up. It maintained 
the position of servants and clerks at a maximum claim of L50 for up to four months work 
but limited the claims of labourers and workmen to a maximum of 925 for up to two 
months work. 
The Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1897 was passed as a response to the 
decision in Richards v overseers of Kidderminster42and comments made by the House of 
Lords in Saloman v Saloman & Co W43 The Act gave preferential creditors priority over 
floating charge holders in both liquidations and receiverships. It did not alter the details 
of the claims of workers. The Companies Act 1929 retained the same distinctive priorities 
for servants and clerks on the one hand and labourers and workmen on the other. The 
1929 Act included provision for workers'claims to include pay earned partly or wholly by 
commission. The welter of case law which had been spawned by the need to distinguish 
between "servants and clerks" and "labourers and workmen"44 was rendered redundant 
when the Companies Act 1948, s 31945made the period four months and the maximum 
411 See paras 1409-1425 
41 AA Doria, The Law and Praclice In Bankruptcy (Horace Cox. London. 1874), 664 
(189612 Ch 212. 
4-1 [1897] AC 22,53 per Lord Macnaghten: "Everybody knows that when there is a winding-up debenture. 
holders generally step in and sweep off everything; and a great scandal it is. " 
44 See eg Re Beeton & Co Ltd[l 91312 Ch 279; Re Lonelon Casino LOO 942) 167 LT 66. 
45 Acting on the recommendation of the Cohen Committee, para 153. 
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sum E200 (later increased to L800)46 for both groups of workers. This was the scheme in 
place when the Cork Committee reported and which remains the basic framework for the 
current system. 
C. THE REGIME 
Section 386 and Schedule 6 of the 1986 Act detail the present categories of preferential 
debts for both individual and corporate insolvencies. Following the Cork Committee's 
recommendations the Crown lost its general preference in respect of unpaid taxes. Its 
rights were reduced to include generally only those taxes where the debtor was in effect 
the tax collector on behalf of the Crown. 47 
The Act contains the following preferential debts. (it should be noted that the "relevant 
date" is defined in s 387 and differs depending upon the circumstances. In limiting the dis- 
cussion to liquidation the date will generally be the date of the winding up order (com- 
pulsory liquidation) or the date of the passing of the winding up resolution (voluntary 
liquidation)). 
1. PAYE income tax deductions made from emoluments paid during the period. of 12 
months prior to the relevant date; 48 
2. Unpaid VAT for the 6 months prior to the relevant date, 49 
3. Unpaid car tax, general betting duty, bingo duty, certain pool betting duty, 
gaming licence duty which became due in the 12 months prior to the relevant date; 511 
4. Unpaid social security contributions for the period of 12 months prior to the relevant 
date; " 
5. Any sums in relation to occupational pension schemes;. 52 
6. Remuneration 53 of employees for up to four months prior to the relevant 
date subject currently to a maximum payment of L800; 5A 
7. Any amount of employees' holiday pay accrued in respect of any employment prior 
to the relevant date; 55 
8. Any sum loaned and used for the specific purpose of paying employees' remunera- 
tion . 
56 
Since the Act came into effect the following Crown debts have been added to the list: 
'16 L800 figure introduced bythe Insolvency Act 1976. s I (I) and (3). Sch 1, Part I and Part 11, para 6. 
47 See Cork Committee, parasl4l8-1425, although it should be noted that not all these recommendations 
were incorporated into the Act: eg para 1424 recommended a preference for only three monthe PAYE income 
tax. 
411 Sch 6 paras I and 2. 
Sch 6 para 3. 
Sch 6 paras 4 and 5. 
31 Sch 6 paras 6 and 7. 
52 Sch 6 para 8. 
53 a term defined widely in Sch 6 para. 13. 
1 Sch 6 para 9; the L800 figure is fixed by the Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) Order 1986 (SI 1986 
No 1996), art. 4. 
Sch 6 para 10. 
Sch 6 para 11. 
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9. Levies on coal and steel production; 57 10. Beer duty which became due in the 6 months prior to the relevant date, 58 H. Lottery duty which became due in the 12 months prior to the relevant date, 59 12. Insurance premium tax referable to the 6 months prior to the relevant date; 60 13 
* Air passenger duty which became due in the 6 months prior to the relevant date, 61 14. Landfill tax referable to the six months prior to the relevant date. 62 
In addition to the above, a separate statutory scheme exists for the protection of employees whose employers are unable or unwilling to meet certain of their liabilities to their workers. 
Where payments are made under this scheme to employees, by the Secretary of State out Of the National Insurance Fund under the Employment Rights Act 1996, the Secretary of State is subrogated to the employees' preferential rights to the extent that the Payments made are in respect of the insolvent employers' liabilities which have preferen- tial status under the Act. 
D. PREFERENTIAL CREDITORS AND THE PARI PASSU PRINCIPLE 
The general ruleý embodied in s 107 of the Act for voluntary liquidations and in the Insolvency Rules 1986, r 4.181 (1) for compulsory liquidations, as far as the distribution 
of assets in a liquidation are concerned, is that the company's property is to be applied 
equally towards its liabilities. The principle of equality of division among creditors is one 
of the (if not the most) fundamental principles of the law of liquidation (and of insolvency in general)63 and is at the very heart of the whole statutory scheme of winding up. One 
commentator has regarded the principle as the most universal of all insolvency 
principles. 64 The principle is an old equitable principle and is known as the pari parsu 
PrinCiple. 65 
The principle is very important in that it "marks off the rights of creditors in a winding UP from their pre-liquidation entitlements. '166 Prior to the commencement of winding up creditors are able to avail themselves of self-help measures, with the swiftest gaining sat. 'sfaction 
at the expense of the not so swift, but once winding up begins such action can- 
57 Sch 6 Para 15A; introduced by the Insolvency (ECSC Levy Debts) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987 No 2093). 
'38 Sch 6 Para 5A; introduced by the Finance Act 1991, Sch 2 Para 22. 59 Sch 6 Para 513, introduced by the Finance Act 1993. s 36(2). "0 Sch 6 Para 3A; introduced by the Finance Act 1994, Sch s 36(2)7 Para 2. 6, Sch 6 Para 5C- introduced by the Finance Act 1994, Sch 7 Para 13(l). "" Sch 6 Para 3B-'introduccd by the Finance Act 1996, s 60 and Sch 5 Para 12(l), 63 R Goode, p, -m-'ciples of Coiporale Insolveno, Law, 2nd ed (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London. 1997). 141; 
J Farrar, N Furey, R Hannigan &P Wylie, Farrar's Company Law 3rd ed, (Butterworths, London, 1991), 709; Cork Report Para 233; V Finch. "Directors' Duties ": Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor" in A Clarke (ed), 
L. W 
C111"'ent Wsuew in Insohency Law (Stevens. London. 1991), 87. A Keay, Insohency: Personaland Colporelle 
"d P"actice, 3rd ed (John Libbey and Co, Sydney. 1998). 15 and 440; J McCoid, "Bankruptcy Prcrerences and Efficiency. * An Expression of Doubt" (1981) 67 Virginia LR 249.260. C Fortgang and L King, "The 1978 Bank uptc e: Some Wrong Policy Decisions" (1981) 56 NYULR 1148,116. J est ok, "A Functional Analysis of ExecutorY Contracts" (1989) 64 Minnesota LR 227,252. rOfessor oo e sees parlpassu distribution as one of two purposes orcorporate 
insolvency law: "The Death 
Of In lven aw- 0 980) 1 Co Law 123. 63 J arrar, - ublic Policy and the Pari Passu Principle" [1980) NZLJ 
100. 
66 
ood rinciple. vof colpmute Involyency Law, 2nd ed (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1997), 142. 
CfiLR The Preftrential Debts Regime in Liquidation Law 93 
not be taken. Liquidation ushers in an orderly satisfaction of the debts and claims of cred- 
itors based on the paripassu principle. 
The principle of equality has been affirmed in recent days in the UK'67 and may be 
traced back at least to the bankruptcy statute of 1542 '68 which stated, that: 69 
"... for true satisfaction and payment of the said creditors :That is to say, to every of the said 
creditors, a Portion Rate and Rate alike, according to the Quantity of their Debts. " 
The principle found favour with Lord Mansfield in 1758 in the case of Wors/ey Y 
DemattoS. 70 where his Lordship indicated that an equal distribution of a bankrupt's assets 
amongst his or her creditors was one of two objects of the laws of bankruptcy. 71 
But, theparipassu principle is not absolute in that for policy reasons the legislature pro- 
vides for exceptionS. 72 The legislature's provision for preferential debts is the most 
significant inroad into the principle73 and means that the aim of obtaining an equal dis- 
tribution is seldom achieved. 74 In fact the Cork Report said that the paripassu principle 
had been so greatly eroded that it remains only as a theoretical doctrine, having little 
application in practice. 75 Notwithstanding that, the Committee indicated that the pari 
passu principle was to be seen as paramount. 76 
The fact of the matter is that in England unsecured creditors will usually bear the bur- 
den of the insolvency of a company as it is they who depend on the fullest extent of the 
application of the pari passu principle. As the legislature has provided for preýrerentiai 
creditors one must assume that it is government policy that the unsecured creditors 
should bear the burden of the liquidation of insolvent companies. 
The existence of priorities is predicated on the belief of the legislature that certain per- 
sons warrant some form of protection, and should be insulated from the insolvent's finan- 
cial failure. The Cork Report was of the opinion that creditors should not receive priority 
under statute unless there was general public acceptance of the fairness and equity of 
granting such priority. 77 An example of a clear policy decision to grant preferential sta- 
tus on the basis, inter alia, of fairness is that of employees, who it has been determined 
should not be out-of-pocket because their companies have gone into liquidation. 
The underlying aim behind the use of the equality principle is to produce fairnesS, 78 So 
67 Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Praclice, Cm nd 85 58 (1982) ("Cork 
Report"). para 1220. 
68 34 &35 Hen 8 c4. Garrido, "The Distributional Question in Insolvency: Comparative Aspects" (1995)4 
International insolvency Review 25,29 briefly considers the origins of the principle in the middle ages in Italy. 
69 S2. 
70 (1758) 1 Burr 467; 97 ER 407. 
71 (1758) 1 Burr 467,476,97 ER 407,412. 
72 See R Goode, Principles of Corporate insolvency Law, 2nd ed, 151. 
73 Justice. Insolvency Law: An agendafor reform. (London, 1994), 24. '
74 Cork Report, pard 1396. The Australian Law Reform Commission. General insolvency Inq1thy, Report No 
45,1988 ("Harmer Report"), para 713 was of the same view. Paripassu is very much at the heart or the ratio- 
nale for the avoidance of pre-liquidation transactions: see A Keay, Avoidance Provisions in Insolvency Law (LBC 
Information Service% Sydney, 1997). 40-49. 
73 Cork Report, para 233. 
76 lbid, para 1072. Australia's Law Reform Commission Report on General Insolvency (the Harmer Report) 
in 1988 also affirmed the principle and said that, to the maximum extent possible, the principle should be main- 
tained (para 713). 
77 Cork Report, para 1398. 
78 Harmer Report, para 629; J McCoid. "Bankruptcy, Prellerences and Efficiency: An Expression or Doubt" 
(1981) 67 Virginia LR 247.271; T Ward and J Shulman. "in Defence of the Bankruptcy Code : Radical 
Integration of the Preference Rules Affecting Commercial Financing" (1983) 61 Washington ULQ 1,16. 
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that every creditor is treated in the same way. Another aim, linked to the need for fairness, 
is to minimise the inevitable social and economic costs associated with liquidation. 79 For 
instance, when a company goes into liquidation many businesses may be owed substan- 
tial sums. A liquidation, particularly of large companies, "" can precipitate financial prob- 
lems for many of the company's trading partners, and can lead to a chain of failed 
enterprises; 81 this is the so-called "ripple effect". If equal treatment of creditors were not 
invoked there is a greater chance that more creditors would not be able to survive the col- 
lapse of a debtor. The equality principle obviously means that the impact of liquidation 
will be spread among all classes of creditorS, 82 and there is a greater likelihood of more 
creditors continuing to trade. 83 This is particularly so for the less powerful creditors, who 
might not be able to use influence and threats to extract the payment of their debts prior 
to winding up. 
Before a creditor is entitled to claim a preferred position it must be demonstrated that 
deviation from the inveterate and equitable pari passu principle is warranted. 
E. REFORM 
Unquestionably the pari passu principle is nothing more, and has little relevance, other 
than to act as a convenient default principle. Despite this fact most commentators, courts 
and law commissions affirm its appropriateness and support its employment. It is fair to 
say that the impact of the preferential creditor regime on the general body of unsecured 
creditors was lessened somewhat by the amendment of the regime in the wake of the rec- 
ommendations of the Cork Committee. The Cork Committee said that it had received a 
considerable volume of evidence on the subject of preferential debts, that most of it was 
critical of the law that existed at that time and "much of it deeply hostile to the retention 
of any system of preferential debts. "84 As a result of the Cork Committee's recommenda- 
tions the legislature, somewhat reluctantly, "s decided, in the Act, to abolish unpaid rates 
and unpaid tax as preferential debts as well as reducing the amount of VAT having pref- 
erential status. 86 At issue is whether the Cork Committee's recommendations went far 
enough. 
79 T Jackson and A Kronman, "Voidable Preferences and Protection of the Expectation Interest (1976) 60 
Minnesota LR 971,989. 
Notable is the collapse of building companies. 
Jackson and Kronman, "Voidable Preferences and Protection of the Expectation Interest (1976) 60 
Minnesota LR 971,989. It would appear that smaller undertakings are less able to absorb losses caused by the 
insolvency or their creditors and they make up the bulk or traders in Britain : "in 1997 there were 3.7 million 
firms in Britain. 99A of them had fewer than 50 employees" (Mr P Mandelson, former Secretary for Trade and 
Industry. Speech to the Annual Conference of the Confederation or British Industry, 2 November 1998). 
2 1hid. 
3 Of course, there will be liquidations where no dividend whatsoever is paid to creditors. However, where the 
equality principle exists a creditor is more likely to receive something where there are assets to be distributed. 
:4 Para 1397. 
5 Professor DL Milman records in "Priority Rights on Corporate Insolvency" in A Clarke (ed). Current 
Issues in Insolvency Law, (Stevens, London, 1991), 74 and n 34 that the government only agreed to relinquish 
certain preferential rights while the Insolvency Bill was making its way through Parliament. 
116 Note the cautionary words of Professor Milman ibid. 76, where the learned commentator wonders whether 
the legislature will be tempted to restore some claims and he points out that the government added unpaid EEC 
levies to Schedule 6 (insolvency (ECSC Levy Debts) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987 No 2093)). 
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The main preferential debtS87 which remain are amounts owed to the Crown in relation 
to taxes for items such as unremitted deductions of income tax during the period of 12 
months before the relevant date and amounts owed to the company's employees. 
1. The legal arguments 
(a) Crown debts 
Over recent years there has been a lively debate as to whether debts owed to the state in 
the form of taxes ought to enjoy preferential status. There are a number of arguments 
which can be made in favour of eliminating any priority for tax claimants. They probably 
can be reduced to four, possibly five, arguments. 
First, debts owed to the Crown are insignificant compared with total government 
expenditure and government can distribute its losses among many taxpayers, while the 
amount lost by an unsecured private creditor because of the preference shown to the rev- 
enue could be the difference between financial survival or failure. 88 In response to this it 
has been argued that national governments operate at deficits89 and every loss of tax 
aggravates the plight of the nation. 911 Governments are always in need of money - there 
are always projects waiting for funds before they can be initiated. The simple fact is that 
governments will never have enough money. It is well accepted that there is a substantial 
wastage factor in the administration of the affairs of government and it seems unfair that 
this is allowed to occur while a creditor may not survive because the claims of the revenue 
have demolished his or her dividend. It has been argued further that the resources of gov- 
ernment are irrelevant and it is not appropriate to use an argument based upon the "depth 
of a person's pocket". 91 But the riposte to that argument is twofold: the whole idea ofpari 
passu distribution is to ensure parity of benefit, no matter what resources one has-if 
there were no paripassu distribution we would return to the "first come, first served" pol- 
icy of mediaeval times, which saw those with the greatest resources and power taking the 
debtor's estate; and preference has been accorded to people like employees for some years 
because they can least afford to miss out on their wages. 
Second, the Crown authorities have access to a lot of the important information about 
a debtor, as well as the resources to engage personnel to provide accurate risk assess- 
ment; 92 and, if they permit a debtor to continue to trade, given the information which 
they have, then it seems unfair that the unsecured creditors will usually end up "picking 
up the tab. " 
The third argument, and allied to the latter argument, is that, as the Crown is assured 
of preferential rights, it is generally said that it is not encouraged to take action to recover 
'" See Sched 6. 
88 Harmer Report, para 735. The Cork Committee said that "a bad debt owed to the State is likely to be 
insignificant in terms of total Government receipts; the loss of a similar sum by a private creditor may cause sub- 
stantial hardship, and bring insolvencies in its train" (para 1410). 
89 Recently President Clinton declared that the United States was no longer running at a deficit. 
90 M Shanker, "The Worthier Creditors (and a cheer for the King)" (1975-76) 1 Can Bus U 341.343. 
"I Ibid. 
92 S Cantlie. "Preferred Priority in Bankruptcy" in J Ziegel. Current Developments in Inlet-national and 
Comparative Corporate Involvenc), Lasp. (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1994). 438. 
96 Company, Financial and In-folven(y Lair Review [ 19991 
what it is owed or to initiate winding up proceedings; 9-1 the accumulation of tax liability, 
which involves less risk to the Crown, could be deleterious to ordinary creditors who may 
not be aware of the tax liability. Interestingly, while the Harmer Committee in Australia 
accepted the fact that the Crown's right to a preference means that it is not under any pres- 
sure to take action to recover its debts through winding up or other proceedingS, 94 82% 
of the respondents to the questionnaire which we circulated did not agree that the Crown's 
priority makes it less likely to initiate winding up proceedings. 95 The Cork Committee 
noted that there was often criticism directed at the revenue for being heavy handed in pur- 
suing the collection of tax debts, resulting in the collapse of businesses which could have 
"weathered the storm" had more time been granted . 
96 Running counter to the view 
expressed by our respondents is the assertion of Cantlie in relation to the Canadian posi- 
tion, that while governments have the ability to monitor debtors they lack the appropri- 
ate incentives to monitor for a couple of reasons : government does not bear the cost of 
default itself - it is passed onto taxpayers; and the people who have the responsibility of 
administering the revenue's affairs have no stake in the recovery of debts owed to the gov- 
ernment. 97 
Fourth, if the preferential treatment of the Crown was to end, creditors would be will- 
ing to take more interest, and a greater part, in the administration of liquidations. " As it 
is, ordinary unsecured creditors see involving themselves in the administration ofestatcs 
as "equivalent to volunteering as agents of the public treasury. "99 
Finally, it has been argued that because the Crown's priority originates with the debts 
of the monarch being paid first, the right to priority is anachronistic and is not worthy of 
a place in western society. "I 
There are two main arguments which have been articulated in favour of giving prefer- 
ential treatment to revenue authorities. 101 First, the revenue is an involuntary creditor; 102 
it is not, unlike trade and secured creditors, able to choose its debtors. 103 The Crown por- 
93 See the recommendations made by the Comptroller and Auditor General in the Department orTrade and 
Industry, "Redundancy Payments Service: Management and Recovery or Debt" HC 695 Session 1995/96, 
" Harmer Report. paras 735 and 737. Garrido appears to adopt the same view : "The Distributional 
Question in Insolvency : Comparative Aspects" (1995) 4 International Insolvency Review 25,47. 
95 11% of the respondents had no view and 7% agreed that the Crown's priority makes it less likely to initi- 
ate winding up proceedings. 
96 Cork Report, para 1421. After saying that the Report acknowledged that there were many complaints 
that the revenue was too complacent in collecting debts But the Committee was satisfied that the complaints 
were mistaken (at para 1422). 
97 Cantlie, "Preferred Priority in Bankruptcy" in J Ziegel, Current Developments In Inlet-national and 
Comparative Corporate Insolvency lzivv, (1: 1arendon Prm Oxford, 1994), 438. 
98 Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation, Canada, (1970), pard 3.2.076, 
n 46 and para 3.2.077, referred to by Shanker, "The Worthier Creditors (and a cheer for the King)" (1975-76) 
1 Can Bus U 341,343; Cork Report, para 1434. 
99 Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation. Canada, (1970), para 3.2.077. 
100 Shanker, "The Worthier Creditors (and a cheer for the King)" (1975 -76) 1 Can Bus U 341,343. 10, Only two arguments in ravour of retention of the preference were put to the Cork Committee: para 1409. 
102 M Arner, "The Worthier Creditors (And a Cheer for the King) - Revisited" (1979) 53 Am Bank U 389. 392. 
103 In director disqualification proceedings under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. s 6. it 
was once thought that non-payment or preferential Crown debts was in itself evidence of unfitness. In Re 
Stanford Set-vices Ltd(1987) 3 BCC 326,334, Vinclott J suggests that it is evidence of unfitness partly because 
the Crown is an involuntary creditor and partly because no director should continue to allow the company to 
trade whilst insolvent using monies which ought to be paid over to the Crown. The judicial approach to Crown 
debts in this type of action has not always been consistent (see eg Re Daivson Print Ltd(1987) 3 BCC 322,325, 
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trays itself in a noble and righteous light, yet it is not the only involuntary creditor. As the 
Cork Committee pointed out there are many suppliers of goods and services who are con- 
strained to permit credit as it is part of the custom of the trade, 104 notably in the building 
industry. Furthermore there are people who have actions in tort and contract who are also 
involuntary creditors. 1(15 Such persons, for example, the victims of the negligence of the 
debtor, are owed money for no fault of their own. It is not unusual these days to see one 
person businesses, mainly in the building industry, where the person has little or no choice 
but to extend credit to the head contractor. 
It has been argued that the government, unlike a private creditor, has no practical way 
of requiring a cash advance or security. 106 However, the same can be said about most 
creditors. Yes, the banks can demand security and the supplier of essential services may 
be able to get "money up front" but most creditors either do not know that they could 
consider taking such action or, more likely, it is just not practical for them to make such 
demands. If they were to demand security or a cash advance then it is more than likely 
that the customer will find someone else to do the job or supply the goods. 
There are other aspects to the voluntary creditor argument which are often ignored. 
Referring to many of those peoplewho line up as creditors as "voluntary creditors" is illu- 
sory. Today it is not unusual to see people who may have been employees in the past being 
required by their employer to become sub-contractors, as this frees the employer from the 
payment of certain amounts and allows the employer to put off the contractors as and 
when it is convenient. Such sub-contractors' 07 may have little choice as to whether they 
work for the former employer. Also some contractors are so big in particular industries 
that if a supplier were not to supply the contractor then the supplier could not exist. 
Another consideration is that it is impossible practically and financially for most, if not 
all, small to medium sized creditors of a company to embark on any action to ascertain 
the creditworthiness of companies before they agree to supply goods or services. Goods 
and services usually have to be supplied promptly. The costs involved in screening com- 
panies would be out of proportion to what profit would be earned. 
The second argument is that the debts owed to the government must be seen in a dif- 
ferent light from those owed to trade creditors because the former are owed by the debtor 
to all of the community in which the debtor trades and resides rather than to one credi- 
tor. 108 The argument, as far as the priority for unremitted PAYE tax deductions and VAT 
payments are concerned, is that it would be unfair not to allow a preference because the 
debtor is acting as a tax collector and it would be inequitable if the deductions and pay- 
ments increased the amount available to the unsecured creditors. "' With respect, as far 
as unremitted tax deductions and VAT payments are concerned, it is submitted that the 
per Hoffman J). The Court of Appeal has found it "very difficult" to treat non payment ofCrown debts any dif- 
ferently from other debts (Re Sevenoaks Stationers Lid [1990] BCC 765,779, per Dillon U). The consensus of 
judicial opinion is that Crown debts in themselves are not deserving of any greater consideration than other 
debts. This approach echoes the sentiment in 1804, or Lord Eldon who considered it his duty "to hold an even 
hand between the Crown and the subject": Re Wydotvns Case (1804) 14 Ves 80,87-88; 33 ER 451,453-454. 
104 Cork Report para 1414. 
105 Ihid. 
1*6 Shanker, "The Worthier Creditors (and a cheer for the King)" (1975-76) 1 Can Bus U 341.345. 
107 They are not entitled to any priority: Re CW& ALHughe. iLtd[196611 WLR 1369. 
"I S Cantlie, "Preferred Priority in Bankruptcy". in J Ziegel, Current Developmenis In International and 
Comparative Curporate Insolven'Q1 Law, (Clarendon Press. Ox rord, 1994). 439. 
11 Cork Report, para 1418. 
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loss sustained by the Crown is akin to a form of misappropriation and consequently it 
should only be entitled to the same as any other person who has lost out because of the 
misappropriation by an agent. I"' Persons who lose out in such a way can only claim as 
unsecured creditors, having no priority rights. 
The claims of tax authorities have tended historically to be given priority in most legal 
systems, but there has been a trend in recent years for either abolition or a reduction in 
the advantages granted. For instance, while countries such as France, Spain, Ireland and 
Italy retain wide preferential rights for tax liability, and can be seen at one end of the spec- 
trum, other countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany, Portugal 
and Australia are at the other end of the spectrum as they have abolished any priority sta- 
tus for the revenue authorities. The United States, New Zealand and England are repre- 
sentative of countries which have reduced the level of preference. Consequently, since the 
reforms introduced in the Act, England cannot be seen, as it once was, ' II as ajurisdiction 
in which tax authorities are strongly favoured. However, there are still preferences avail- 
able that are very attractive to the revenue and which anger some. Calls for total abolition 
are not hard to find. ' 12 It is appropriate to note that the former trade and industry secre- 
tary, Peter Mandelson, told the Confederation of British Industry at a recent conference 
that the government was considering. the position of the Crown in insolvency law. 113 
However, it is probable that the government will face opposition from the Treasury. ' 14 
Surely, the burden must be on the Crown to demonstrate why it, compared with other 
deserving ordinary creditors, should be accorded preferential treatment. We submit that 
when evaluating the arguments for and against preferential status the Crown is unable to 
prove its case. ' 15 In the words of the Brookings. Institution in the United States the tax 
priority is "based upon dubious logic and indefensible social policy". 116 
This is supported somewhat by the fact that 62% of those who responded to our ques- 
tionnaire were of the view that Crown priority ought to be abolished. Of note is the fact 
that while the Crown may lose out if its preference is abolished, a substantial proportion 
of the tax lost would be able to be recovered from the tax paid by unsecured creditors in 
relation to the dividends which they will be paid and a reduction in the amount of bad 
debts written off against profits. ' 17 
An option which the government could pursue if it decided to abolish Crown priority 
is that inititiated in Australia when that country totally abolished the Crown's priority. in 
lieu of the priority which the Crown formerly had in relation to unremitted tax deduc- 
tions, a new regime was introduced into the tax legislation whereby the Commissioner of 
Taxation is now able to make estimates of outstanding tax instalment deductions. In a 
nutshell, if the Commissioner of Taxation suspects that a company which is liable to remit 
deductions has failed to do so by the due date he may make a reasonable stimate of the 
Seethe Harmer Report, para 735. 
Seethe views of ProressorR Goode in "The Death of Insolvency Law"(1980)l Co Law 123. 
For example. the Confederation of Business and Industry: see Justice, Insolvenc), Law: An agendafor 
rtybrm (London. 1994), 7. 
113 D Wighton, "Tax bodies may lose preferential creditor status", Financial Times, 3. November 1998; 
Atkinson, -Soft line on bankruptcy angers Whitehall", The GuaivIian, 3 November 1998. 
114 D Atkinson, "Soft line on bankruptcy angers Whitehall", The Guardian, 3 November 1998. 
115 This was the conclusion reached by the Cork Committee, para 1413. 
116 D Stanley and M Girth, Bankruptcy. - Problems, Procesx Reform. (The*Brookings Institution. 1971). 
117 Cork Report, para 1416. 
118 See the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), Part VI, Division 9. 
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liability and include this in a notice sent to the company which is liable; 119 there is no need 
to establish the actual amount deducted and not remitted. The sending of the notice con- 
taining the estimate creates a liability to pay the estimate. 120 
On receipt of an estimate directors are required to cause their company to adopt one of 
four courses of action: 
" remit the amounts due; 
" enter into a payment agreement; 
" initiate a voluntary administration (equivalent to administration under Part 11 of the 
Act); or 
" initiate winding Up. 121 
The directors may become liable personally for the unremitted deductions if one of these 
events does not occur. 
(b) Employees. 
It is not infrequently said that employees rely upon their wages, and should be paid before 
a creditor who, if it does not receive any or all of what is owed by the company, will sim- 
ply be required to endure a reduction in profits. Hence, the -employee priority 
is to "ease 
the financial hardship caused to a relatively poor and defenceless section of the commu- 
nitY by the insolvency of their employer". 122 
The arguments, in favour of employees enjoying some priority in the insolvency of the 
employer, have been recited by several writers. 123 An early discussion of the problems fac- 
ing employees can be found in the House of Commons debate upon the Preferential 
Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1897.124 The debate considered that employees, unlike other 
creditors, had no way of assessing the financial standing of their employer& Employees 
were deserving of some special treatment because their efforts increased the value of the 
total assets available to all the creditors. Also the effect of the insolvency of the employer 
was more keenly felt by an employee than by other creditors. 
The employee has for a long time attracted the sympathy of the legislature. The 
employee is seen as being in a weak bargaining position compared with other creditors 
and investors. Employees, when negotiating the terms of their employment contract do 
not usually. insist upon a provision to protect them should the employer become insol- 
vent. The effect of an employer's insolvency on the employee is likely to be more serious 
than the effect on other creditors. Wages are likely to be the only source of income for an 
employee whilst other creditors are likely to have other sources of income. These are some 
of the reasons why employees have been given preferential status under the Act. 
"I lbids222AG130). 
1211 lbid, s 222AHA(l). 
121 Mel, s 222AOB. 
122 Cork Report. para 1428. 
123 See particularly S Cantlie, "Preferred Priority in Bankruptcy" in J Ziegel, Current Developments In 
International and Comparative Cotporate Insolvency Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994); B Gleig. -Unpaid 
Wages in Bankruptcy- (1987) 21 UBCLR 61; C Symes. "The Protection of Wages when Insolvency Strikes" 
(1997) 5 Insolvency LJ 196; D Zatzman, "The Unpaid Employee as Creditor: Case Comment on Homeplan 
Realty" (1980) 6 Dalhousie U 148 
"' Hansard, 10 February 1897,84-85 
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This picture of the defenceless and prejudiced employee is no longer a full and accurate 
portrayal of the system. The Harmer Report'25 questioned whether this rationale was still 
valid, because it felt that the development of a sophisticated social welfare system had 
changed things, and the fact that some unsecured creditors may be dependent upon pay- 
ment to maintain the solvency of their business. These persons are, according to the 
Report, in an employee-like relationship with the insolvent. However, the Report did 
accept that there was strong community support for retaining the employee prioritieS. 126 
On the insolvency of an employer in England, the scheme of the Employment Rights 
Act 1996 ("ERA") provides for different and generally more extensive protection for an 
employee than under the Insolvency Act. As we have seen, the latter Act provides essen- 
tially for unpaid wages up to a maximum of L800 and any accrued holiday pay. ERA, 
s 182 provides inter alia for up to 8 weeks arrears of pay, wages during the statutory min- 
imum notice period, 127 up to 6 weeks holiday pay and a basic award for unfair dis- 
missal. 128 "Pay" is defined widely. Where payments are to be calculated by reference to 
weekly pay, the maximum amount which can be used in the calculation is L220.129 
The ERA scheme is beneficial to employees as payment from the Secretary of State is 
likely to be quicker than from a liquidator. It is also likely to be a larger payment than the 
employee will receive under the Insolvency Act. This is because the financial limits are 
potentially higher, eg 8x E220 is more than L800, and also because certain payments such 
as a basic award for unfair dismissal do not have preferential status under the Insolvency 
Act. 
The Secretary of State must make the payments out of the National Insurance Fund 
and stands in the shoes of the employee in attempting to recoup such money from the liq- 
uidator. A large proportion of the payments made do not have preferential status. In his 
report on the Redundancy Payments Service, which makes the payments on behalf of the 
Secretary State, the Comptroller and Auditor General1311 highlights this point. As at 31 
March 1996, E762 million was owed by insolvent employers to the Fund, of which only 
L177 million (23 per cent) ranked as preferential. The Fund was an unsecured creditor for 
the remaining E585 million. 131 
The preferential debts' regime appears to benefit the Crown and employees. However, 
once employees' rights under ERA are factored into the overall picture, it can be seen that 
the Crown, by subrogation, takes over the claims of employees in a very large proportion 
of cases and is often the sole preferential creditor. 
Less than a quarter of the money paid out under the ERA scheme can be claimed back 
by the Crown as preferential. The public interest demands that protection is given to 
employees of insolvent employers. Out of the respondents to our questionnaire who 
wished to retain some preferential debts, 22% wanted to see increased protection for 
employees under the Insolvency Act. Our question was not sophisticated enough to dis- 
tinguish between those who wanted an increase in employee entitlement under the 
125 Para 722. 
126 Mid, Para 726. 
127 As laid down in ERA, s 86. 
128 Under s167 ERA redundancy payments may in certain circumstances also be made by the Secretary or 
State out of the National Insurance Fund. 
129 Employment Rights (increase or Limits) Order 1998 (SI 1998 No 924). 
130 HC 695 Session 1995-96. 
131 Mid, Para 1.9. 
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Insolvency Act and those who wished to see the ERA scheme extended further. It is sub- 
mitted that wide ranging protection already exists to a large extent under the ERA 
scheme. If employees' preferential status was lost under the Act the loss would fall on the 
National Insurance Fund, not on the employees. Again, it could be argued that such a 
loss to government coffers would be insignificant compared with the government's total 
expenditure but would free up significant sums for unsecured creditors. 132 
It might be argued that trade unions would vigorously oppose the abolition of the pri- 
ority granted to employees. Certainly unions made submissions to the Cork 
Committee133 that the priority of employees should not only be retained but should be 
without limit. It is submitted that the opposition of the unions would not be as robust as 
often portrayed because of the fact that in practice benefits are paid by the National 
Insurance Fund and employees do not lose out. 
2. The empirical evidence 
In considering the subject of this article we felt that it was appropriate not only to exam- 
ine the historical and legal aspects of the preferential debts' regime, but also to seek to 
secure some empirical data concerning its effects and workings in practice. Hence, we sent 
a questionnaire to 225 licensed insolvency practitioners and received 77 replies. 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. Section A sought responses in order to 
gauge whether respondents felt that the regime precipitated problems - are its effects pos- itive, neutral or negative in relation to certain specific issues, namely creditor attitudes, the 
administration of estates, rescues and the initiation of winding up proceedings? Section B 
sought estimates from practitioners in relation to what is the fate of funds payable by liq- 
uidators. Section C canvassed the views of practitioners, in light of their experience, on 
the abolition or alteration of the rights of preferential creditors. In the following discus- 
sion we have rounded percentages to the nearest whole number. 
(a) Section A 
In this section we gave the practitioners a number of statements and asked them to 
respond. Five options were open to the respondents. They could answer under any one of 
the following: strongly disagree, disagree, no view, agree or strongly agree. 
In response to the statement, "the current regime for the payment of preferential debts 
Precipitates unsecured creditor discontent, " 68% of our respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed. Ten percent of respondents did not have a view and 22% disagreed with 
the statement (only 4% disagreeing strongly). 
Fifty per cent of the respondents were of the view that the resolution and payment Of 
Preferential debts prolonged the winding up process. While 11% had no view on the mat- 
ter, 39% felt that the process was not prolonged. In relation to whether the resolution and 
payment of preferential debts increased the costs of winding up, 47% were of the opinion 
that it did, 15% had no view and 38% thought that it did not increase costs. 
132 The commentators mentioned supra, n 125 generally all favour inter alla some rorm of wage earner pro. 
tection fund similar to the ERA scheme. 
113 At para 1430. 
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Due to the modern emphasis on rescuing viable business undertakings, we also asked 
our respondents to comment on what effect, if any, the Crown's priority had on proposed 
corporate rescue packages. Seventy eight per cent of respondents aid that the priority 
enjoyed by the Crown diminished the possibility of rescue. Only Wo had no view and 19% 
felt that the priority did not effect the prospects of a rescue. 134 Still on the issue of corpo- 
rate rescue, we asked practitioners to comment on whether the Crown seemed to have a 
general policy of voting against rescue packages. Sixty two per cent took the view that the 
Crown did appear to have such a policy. Eleven per cent expressed no view and 27'A said 
that the Crown did not appear to have that policy. Following on, practitioners were asked 
if they thought that the Crown would become more amenable to agreeing to rescue pack- 
ages if its preferential status was abolished. Fifty one per cent answered in the affirmative, 
15%) had no view and 34%, responded in the negative. 
Finally, 821/0 of respondents took the view that having a priority did not make it less 
likely that the Crown would initiate winding up proceedings. Twelve per cent had no view 
and only 6% felt that the priority made it less likely that the Crown would take liquida- 
tion proceedings. As discussed earlier in the article, this response is contrary to the fre- 
quently expressed views of the great majority of commentators. 
(b) Section B 
In answer to the question, in what percentage of insolvent windings up have distributions 
to preferential creditors absorbed the company's assets? only 65 of the respondents 
answered the question. Fifty five per cent of respondents said that preferential creditors 
took the assets of companies in 60% or more of cases. 
When it came to responding to the question of what percentage of insolvent liquida- 
tions has a dividend been paid to unsecured creditors 85% of the practitioners (again only 
65 responded to the question) said that it was in 30% or less of cases. 
Finally, respondents were asked, in those insolvent windings-up where there were float- 
ing charges, had the floating charges absorbed the company's assets? Sixty one practi- 
tioners responded and the views given demonstrated no pattern. Twenty-nine percent 
gave as their answer : 10% or less. Ten per cent said that charges absorbed the assets in 
21-30% of cases, while another I O'Yo gave 41-50% as their answer. At the other end of the 
spectrum 131A said that the answer was in the range of 71-80% and 13% took the view 
that it was in 91-1001/6 of liquidations. 
(c) Section C 
In this section of the questionnaire practitioners were asked a preliminary question: 
would you abolish preferential debts? The answer to this question determined whether the 
respondent needed to proceed to answer the balance of the questions in the section. Forty 
six percent of respondents aid that they would abolish preferences, and their answer to 
any further questions was not requested. The other 54% went on to answer several more 
questions. First, 32% of practitioners who answered indicated that they would advocate 
the abolition of the Crown's preferential status. In answer to another question only one 
134 It seems that the preferential status of the Crown is regarded in the business world as an inhibitor to the 
implementation of rescues: D Wighton. "Tax bodies may lose prerercntial creditor status", Financial Times, 3 
November 1998. 
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practitioner said that the Crown's priority should be extended in any way. This meant 
that, out of all our respondents, 62% would abolish the Crown's preferential status. 
Ninety five percent of respondents who answered this section of the questionnaire said 
that they would not abolish the preferential status of employees, although only 43% said 
that they would extend the employees' preference position. It is not clear whether those 
wanting to retain the preferential treatment of employees wanted to retain the rights pro- 
vided in the ERA scheme or the benefits granted pursuant to the Insolvency Act. What is 
not to be forgotten is that overall, when one takes into account the respondents who wish 
to see the abolition of all preferences, 47% of all respondents were in favour of abolishing 
employee preferences. 
Sixty per cent of respondents aid that they would not introduce a new category of pref- 
erential creditor - the consumer debtor who has made prepayments for goods and/or ser- 
vices to companies which end up in insolvent liquidation. Finally, 97% of practitioners 
said that they would not introduce any other new class of preferential creditor. 
3. Summary 
With the preferential regime as it stands at the mome-fit, we could see the situation where 
creditors refrain from taking winding up proceedings against an insolvent company 
because it is known that there are substantial amounts owed to the Crown. Creditors 
would not proceed because they would realise that it is very possible that they would not 
see any of what was owed to them. They may well recover the taxed costs of obtaining a 
winding up order but they would be liable to pay their solicitors and counsel more than 
is likely to be awarded to them on a taxation and in any event they would be wasting their 
time in taking the proceedings. There is a public policy issue here. If creditors refrain from 
taking proceedings, we end up with a hopelessly insolvent company that could continue 
to trade and obtain more and more credit, from people who are unaware of the company's 
predicament, with no hope of repaying what is borrowed. The ultimate result is that cred- 
itors will obviously lose out. 
Besides the lack of fairness which exists where some unsecured creditors get paid and 
others do not, there are other benefits of abolishing preferential treatment. First, it is 
likely that abolition would save costs and lead to more speedy windingS-Up. 135 Second, 
there would be more chance of a rescue of a company. 136 Third, more funds would be paid 
to the unsecured creditors. 137 Fourth, if the regime were abolished, banks would not 
spend the time and money which they presently do seeking ways of circumventing the 
effects of the regime. At present the preferential creditors are entitled to be paid prior to 
a creditor who holds a floating charge over company assets. 138 Banks and other lenders 
135 The response to the question in our questionnaire concerning the effect of the regime on the winding up 
process which attracted the most support was that the regime did prolong the process (50Y. ). Again the response 
which attracted the most support in relation to whether the regime increased costs was that it did (471A). 
1`16 Seventy-eight of all respondents to our questionnaire felt that the Crown priority reduced the possibility 
of a rescue package being implemented. 
137 For example, a clear majority of respondents (55%) said that preferential creditors absorbed the funds 
available for distribution in more than 6YY6 of cases. 
138 S 175(2Xb). 
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have sought ways of ensuring that they hold fixed charges as the holders of such charges 
are not subject to the preferential creditors' regime. 1-19 
It is acknowledged that, if preferential debts were abolished, the holders of floating 
charges would benefit, as there would be no class of debt having priority over such cred- 
itors. This is an unintended benefit which unsecured creditors can do nothing about and 
this article does not purport to comment on the rights of floating charge holders, as that 
is another question. 140 But, if the regime were abolished, the fact is that unsecured cred. 
itors would receive more than they do at present. In any event many banks and other 
lenders are not securing their loans with floating charges as often as in the past; more 
and more they are now taking fixed charges over property which has traditionally been 
the subject of floating charges, as there is more of an arguable case that this is permissi- 
ble. 141 
F. CONCLUSION 
The creditors who lose out when it comes to a winding up are creditors who are not within 
any of the classes included in the preferential creditors' regime, and who are unable to 
maximise their benefits and minimise their risks by obtaining security or other forms of 
priority such as retention of title. These creditors who constitute the general body of unse- 
cured creditors are clearly disillusioned by the winding up process, 142 as is clearly mani. 
fested by thefact that 68%of the respondents to our questionnaire agreed that the present 
regime causes creditor discontent. 
The present preferential regime was developed in an ad hoc fashion and, for the most 
part, not based on sound, or any, policy considerations. It is submitted that there are few, 
if any, adequate policy reasons for retaining the present regime, and no conclusive argu. 
ments have been proferred to support retention. It is contended that there are a number 
of sound historical, legal, practical and philosophical reasons which favour abolition. it 
has been argued here that on balance the better view is that the Crown's priority should 
be abolished and this was the opinion of 62% of our respondents. The issue of employee 
priority is not so clear-cut. Clearly there is significant sympathy for employees and so 
there was not such a high degree of support for the abolition of the employee preference 
when compared with the Crown priority, but it may be that respondents did not take into 
account the role played by the National Insurance Fund, which means that employees do 
not lose out in a winding up. 
139 Re Lewis Menhyr Consolielated CoMerles Lid f 192911 Ch 489; Re GL Seamilers Ltd [ 198611 W LR 215. 
140 If Parliament did decide to abolish preferential debts, it may also wish to reconsider the Cork Report's 
recommendation. at para 1538jor a 10% fund to be set aside for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The secured 
creditors' position would in the round not begreatly affected as, although they would lose theirclairn to the IOY* 
fund, they would benefit from the abolition of prererential debts. 
141 See R Gregory and P Walton, "Fixed Charges Over Changing Assets--Thc Possession and Control 
Heresy" [ 19981 ChLR 68. 
142 While the preferential debts regime is the focus orthis attitude, it would be wrong to laY all of the blame 
at the door or the regime. Creditors are also not helped by the impotence or the avoidance provisions in 
ss 238-245 of the Act. See the comments orA Keay in "Preferences in Liquidation Law: Time ror a Change" 
[19981 CfiLR 198. 
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The abolition of all preferential debts may seem to be rather radical. Yet Professor 
Goode canvassed that exact step way back in 1980.143 It is respectfully submitted that the 
1980 plea made by Professor Goode that English insolvency law recaptures the spirit of 
equitable distribution "which is at the heart of any civilized bankruptcy system" 144 needs 
to be repeated; for, although the 1986 reforms improved the lot of unsecured creditors, 
they continue to be the poor relations of liquidations, and, for the most part, equal dis- 
tribution remains only as a theoretical concept. 
113 "The Death of Insolvency Law" (1980) 1 Co Law 123,129, although it must be pointed out that the 
learned commentator saw the drastic reduction in scope or preferential debts as a possible alternative to aboli- 
tion. 
144 Ibid. 
The landlord, his distress, the insolvent tenant 
ancl the stranger 
Peter Walton 
At a glance 
Ile landlord's self-help remedy of distress re- 
mains complex and rooted in antiquity. 
Its operation in relation to the goods of insolvent 
tenants and third parties is inconsistent and a 
product of piecemeal amendments rather than 
informed study. 
If insolvency law is to be tidied up, theparipassu 
principle needs to apply to all unsecured creditors. 
Root and branch alterations to distress can be 
overlooked no longer. 
Introduction 
A landlord's power to distrain for unpaid rent 'is a remedy 
vvhich enables landlords to recover arrears of rent, without 
going to court, by taking goods from the demised property and 
selling them'. ' The landlord can levy distress personally or 
authorise court-licensed bailiffs to carry out the distraint. It 
may be levied as soon as rent is in arrears without prior notice 
to the tenant. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the goods 
distrained need not belong to the defaulting tenant. The origin 
of tlýs common law self-help remedy lies in pre-Norman ýMeO It has been subject to common law and statutory 
r1lodificatiOns, introduced in an entirely ad hoc manner over a 
Period of a thousand years. Some restrictions have been placed 
Upon its operation, importantly, for example, landlords of 
residential tenancies will usually be required to obtain the 
Permission 
* of 
the court before distraining. 3Certain goods, 
those with absolute privilege, cannot be distrained at aW 
Although Lord Denning MR regarded distress in 1968 
as 'an archaic remedy which has largely fallen into disuse', $ it made something of a comeback during the recent reces- 
sion and remains an effective tool in the landlord's armoury 
Of weapons against a defaulting tenant .6 Distress is of Particular use where the tenant is insolvent as it may enable 
the landlord to jump the queue of unsecured creditors. The 
extent o which the landlord is entitled to gain such a priority 
Position varies considerably depending upon which insol- 
vency procedure the tenant has entered. The purpose of this 
article is to examine how distress is treated when the tenant becomes insolvent and why the law is as it is. It will also 
consider possible reforms of the system. 
Distress against the goods of a stranger (or other third party) 
Even if the tenant is hopelessly insolvent with no assets, a landlord may still be able to distrain effectively. At 
common law the general rule is that all goods on the 
premises, including those belonging to a third party, are 
subject to the distress. Before considering how distress is 
treated in the various formal procedures under the Insol- 
vency Act 1986, it is first important to understand how 
distress affects third parties. 
The fact that a landlord is able to seize and sell goods 
belonging to third parties was judicially described in 1908 
as 'extraordinary ... in a country which 
boasts of civiliza- 
tion, which purports to protect the property of the law- 
abiding citizen ... 1.7 Largely as a result of this 
dictum the 
Law of Distress Amendment Act 19081 was passed as an 
attempt to protect the goods of third parties from distress. 
In general terms, when the goods of a third party are 
distrained, the third party may serve a notice on the landlord 
under section I of the Act declaring ownership of the goods. 
The landlord cannot thereafter proceed with the distresO 
In practice, there are a number of problems with the 
notice procedure. First, third parties cannot serve a section 
I notice if they have 'any beneficial interest"' in the 
tenancy. A debenture holder, for example, with a fixed and 
floating charge over a corporate tenant's lease and under- 
taking, could not, it seems, claim section I protection for 
any of the goods on the premises, as the debenture holder 
would have a beneficial interest in the tenancy by its fixed 
charge or by its crystallised floating charge. " 
Second, the third party May not even know that the 
goods havi been distrained. Often WalkiDg POSRSSiOll 
iS 
taken by a landlord which means that he goods remain on 
the demised premises., Even an extremely vigilant third 
party may be unaware that the seizure has occurred. A 
landlord can usually sell goods seized after a delay of only 
fi 
* 
ve days. As there is no requirement that notice be given to 
a third party whose goods are distrained, there is every 
chance that a landlord who acts quickly can sell the goods 
before any section I notice can be served. 
- Third, not all goods can be protected under section 1. 
Section 4 of the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1908 lists 
a number of exceptions including goods belonging to the 
tenant's spouse or business partner. Section 4A12 generally 
denies protection for any goods subject to a bill of sale, 13 
conditional sale agreement or hire purchase agreement. 14 
Hire purchase companies can in certain circumstances 
sidestep this exception by inserting a contractual provision 
that the hire purchase agreement is to determine if the 
landlord threatens to or does take steps to levy a distress. " 
Goods which belong to the hire purchase company are 
thereafter no longer goods subject to a hire purchase 
agreement and so fall within the general protection of 
section 1.11 
Under section 4, goods which are in the order and 
disposition of the tenant with the consent of the true owner, 
and in such circumstances that the tenant is the reputed 
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owner, are not protected. This may apply to hire purchase 
goods even if the agreement has been effectively terminated 
by the distress. The order and disposition clause is borrowed 
from the old Bankruptcy Acts. It first appeared in 1623" 
and was only removed from bankruptcy law in 1985. " The 
general policy behind the order and disposition clause, in 
the context of distress, is that any third party who allows a 
tenant to have possession of the third party's goods, as if the 
tenant were the true owner, cannot complain if the landlord 
is deceived by this appearance of ownership and distrains 
the goods. 
At first blush it would appear that the order and 
disposition clause would cover most hire purchase, condi- 
tional sale and hire goods as well as goods supplied on a sale 
or return basis or subject to retention of title. However, a 
recent Court of Appeal decision appears to'limit the ambit 
of the clause. In Salford Van Hire (Contracts) Ltd v Bocholt 
Developments L09 a plain white van had been hired out to 
a tenant company and following non-payment of rent by the 
tenant, had been distrained by the landlord. The van was 
three years old and had no markings on it which identified 
the true owner. It had also undergone a specific conversion 
to make it suitable for the tenant company's business. If any 
hire goods could be said to be in the reputed ownership of 
the tenant, this van was it. 
The court decided that the van was not in the compa- 
ny's reputed ownership and therefore the hire company was 
able to claim the protection of section 1.20The court adopted 
a very strict test for reputed ownership. Only if, in all the 
circumstances, the tenant held the van in such a way that it 
appeared it 'must' have been the owner would it be 
considered to be in its reputed ownership. The court took 
judicial notice of how common such hiring agreements are 
in business, and concluded that the landlord was unable to 
show that the goods fell within the section 4 exception. 
Indeed, the court suggested that the landlord should have 
Inade enquiries of the DVLC in Swansea in order to 
ascertain who was the true owner . 
21 As the register of 
vehicle ownership at Swansea is not open to public inspec- 
tion, this appears to put an impossibly onerous burden on a 
distraining landlord. What it does seem to indicate is a very 
restrictive approach by the modem courts in limiting 
landlords' attempts to use the order and disposition clause 
to distrain a third party's goods. The Court of Appeal's 
decision seems logically to extend to all conditional sale, 
hire purchase and retention of title agreements. Therefore 
creditors under such agreements, who are able to claim the 
benefit of section 1, are less likely to fall foul of a successful 
claim by a landlord that the goods are within the tenant's 
order and disposition and capable of being distrained. 
Although the power of the order and disposition 
clause may have been largely diminished by Salford, the 
landlord can quite clearly still distrain a third party's goods 
and may, if swift to sell, still be successful. Of course, a 
section I noticeis of nouseto athirdparty if thegoods have 
already been sold. 
In considering any statutory or common law restric- 
tions on the right to distrain against an insolvent tenant, it 
needs to be bome in mind that the restrictions will not 
extend to the goods of a third party. Subject to the rules 
Outlined above, a third party's goods will still be at the 
rnercy of a landlord. 
Individual insolvency 
Bankruptcy 
Prior to 1825 there was nothing to prevent a landlord 
distraining against the estate of a bankrupt tenant. Section 
74 of the Bankruptcy Act 182522 introduced one mild form 
of limitation. Once the bankruptcy had commenced, the 
landlord was limited in distraining for no more than one 
year's rent accrued due prior to the bankruptcy order. The 
landlord was reduced to proving for any amount over that 
figure as an unsecured creditor. There remained no restric- 
don on distraining before the bankruptcy commenced2l for 
the whole amount owed. 
This limited protection of the bankrupt's estate has 
survived in substance through subsequent Bankruptcy 
Acts. Ile period of one year prior to the commencement 
of bankruptcy was reduced to six months by section 28 of 
the Bankruptcy Act 1890. The relevant provision today is 
section 347 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Bankruptcy 
nowadays commences on the date of the bankruptcy 
order. 24 However, in the context of distress, this is effec- 
tively backdated in that, if a landlord distrains after the 
petition but before the order is made, any sum realised in 
excess of six months' rent is to be held for the bankrupt as 
part of his estate. 25 The impact on landlords of section 347 
is not always too serious. For example, if rent is paid 
quarterly and the tenant becomes bankrupt, the landlord 
can still distrain at the end of the quarter for the full 
quarter's rent. 26 
The restriction on claiming six months' rent only 
applies to rent due before the bankruptcy order. If subse- 
quent to the order, the trustee in bankruptcy remains in 
possession of the demised premises without disclaiming the 
lease, the landlord can distrain for all rent accruing after the 
bankruptcy order. 27 Essentially this means that a trustee who 
remains in possession of 
, 
the demised premises mustpay rent 
for occupying the premises. 
If a landlord distrains and the tenant becomes 
bankrupt within three months the landlord may lose some 
or all of the benefit of the distress under section 347(3). 
This subsection applies if the bankrupt's estate is insuf- 
ficient to meet the debts owed to preferential creditors. 29 
If section 347(3) applies, the goods which have been 
distrained or the proceeds of their sale are charged for the 
benefit of the bankrupt's estate with the preferential 
debts. Therefore, although distress allows the landlord to 
jump the queue of unsecured creditors, it does not, in the 
circumstances of section 347(3), give the landlord prior- 
ity at the expense of preferential creditors. A similar 
provision to section 347(3) applies in the compulsory 
liquidation of companies. 29 
Bankruptcy law is only concerned with adnfinistering 
the bankrupt's estate for the benefit of creditors. It has no 
impact upon the goods of third parties. The section 347 
restriction cannot therefore be relied upon by any third 
party. " In this context a 'third party' may include a 
mortgagee of goods. 
A mortgage of goods involves the transfer of title to 
the mortgagee which is transferred back to the mortgagor 
upon payment of the debt. " Although title is transferred to 
the mortgagee, the mortgagor retains the equitable right to 
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redeem the mortgage. In equity the mortgagor remains the 
owner of the goods subject to the mortgage. As a general 
rule it would be 'flying in the face of all equity to hold that 
the goods are the "property" of the mortgagee'. " 
However, where the sum secured is in excess of the 
value of the goods, the court has held that the mortgagee 
is the owner of the whole property in the goods. " 
Therefore such a mortgagee in being treated as the owner 
of the mortgaged goods cannot rely upon section 347 but 
can rely upon the general rules relating to third party 
protection. However, as the mortgage would be a bill of 
sale34 it would usually fall within the exceptions listed in 
section 4A and therefore fall outside the protection of 
section I of the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1908.35 
The landlord could therefore distrain the goods without 
being subject to the six months' limitation under section 
347. It has been held that the power to distrain goods 
subject to a bill of sale survives even after the holder of 
the bill of sale has seized the goods and is about to have 
them sold at auction. 36 
Goods which are merely subject to a charge are still 
strictly speakingownedby thebankruptas achargedoesnot 
involve 'a transfer of legal or equitable ownership'37 and 
would therefore fall within the scant proteption of section 
347 b4 outside the third party protections of section 1.39 
Individual voluntary arrangement 
Since the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 came into 
force, debtors wishing to avoid bankruptcy have been able 
to reach a binding agreement with their creditors, by 
obtaining a majority greater than 75 per cent in value of the 
creditors, voting in favour of an individual voluntary 
arrangement (IVA) proposal. Once the IVA is approved it 
binds every person who had notice of, and was entitled to 
vote. at, the creditors' meeting called to consider the 
proposaV9 If the arrangement covers rent owing to the 
landlord, it will prevent the landlord from distraining on the basis of it, even if the landlord voted against the proposal. There is nothing to prevent the landlord from distraining 
Prior to the creditors' meeting if rent is unpaid. By doing so, 
the landlord will avoid being bound by the IVA. A distress 
Zt this time will almost certainly have the knock on effect 
13f destroying any possibility of the IVA being workable. 
An attempt to prevent creditors in general frustrating IVA proposals, is the interim order procedure. 10 Its pur- 
Dose is to allow an individual debtor time to prepare an IVA proposal to put to the creditors. It creates a temporary I)reathing space during which time no bankruptcy petition 
lbay be presented or proceeded with and 'no other pro- 
lZeedings and no execution or other legal process may be 
1ýotnmenced or continued' except with leave of the court. 4fcMullen & Sons Ltd v Cerrone" decided that this tboratorium on actions only covers rights of creditors \Ivhich require the court's assistance for enforcement. bistreýs 
patently does not, and therefore there is nothing 110 revent a landlord ignoring the interim order, distraining %eptenant's goods and in so doing, destroying the pros- bects of the IVA proposal being successful. This gap in the tboratorium is currently being considered by Parliament" 41id it is envisaged that the moratorium will be extended 4J cover distress. 
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Corporate insolvency 
Compulsory liquidation 
Compulsory liquidation is a winding up of a company by 
order of the court. The most common winding-up order is 
based upon a creditor's petition that the company is unable to 
pay its debts. It is, in effect, the corporate equivalent of an 
individual's bankruptcy. The rules for governing how dis- 
tress is treated in compulsory liquidation have a different 
origin from the rules in bankruptcy. Under the Winding Up 
Acts 1848 and 1849 there were hardly any limitations on the 
rights of creditors generally to enforce their rights against the 
companyýl However, "Ibe Companies Act 1862 proceed[ed] 
upon an entirely different principle; the leading idea being 
that when the winding up of a company has once commenced, 
its creditors ought to be paid pari passu. 1 
To this end, section 85 of the 1862 Act stated that at 
any time after the presentation of the petition but before 
the making of a winding-up order, the court could, on the 
application of the company or any creditor or contribu- 
tory, restrain any action, suit or proceeding pending 
against the company. Section $7 provided that after a 
winding-up order was made, no action, 'suit or other 
proceeding could be proceeded with or commenced against 
the company without leave of the court. Also, under 
section 163 any attachment, sequestration, distress or 
execution put in force against the company following the 
commencement of winding up's was void to all extents. 
Under section 163 'put in force' as it applied to distress 
refers to when the distress was levied initially. The distress 
need not have been completed by sale. "' 
Ilese provisions of the Companies Act 1862 have 
survived today. Sections 85,87 and 163 are now substan- 
tially re-enacted in sections 126,130 and 128 respectively 
of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
A landlord's distress has always been held to be a type 
of 'proceeding' for the purposes of sections 126 and 13V 
even though the principle upon which the courts have acted 
would seem, at best, questionable. The meaning of 'pro- 
ceeding' usually implies a court process. " In 1887 Cotton 
IJ thought it: 
'... doubtful whether, having regard to the express 
wordsof section [128], which says, "Ibat any distress 
shall be void", it was right to say that section [130] 
included distress among the "proceedings which the 
court might allow"' . 
49 
Despite this opinion his Lordship felt bound by the 
previous decision of Turner IJ in Re Exhall Coal Mining 
C650 to hold that 'proceeding' included distre 
, ss. 
Therefore 
the ultimate result was, that alandlord could apply forleave 
under what is now section 130 to distrain even after the 
commencement of the winding up. Despite judicial doubts 
this remains the law today. " - A distress put in force after the'commencement of 
winding up is void under section 128 unless the court gives 
leave under section 130. The courts will not usually permit 
a landlord to levy distress after the winding up has 
commenced for rent accrued due before the winding up 
which is provable in the winding Up. 52 This would offend 
49 
the policy of pari passu distribution amongst all the 
unsecured creditors. 
Rent accrued due after the commencement of the 
winding up is in general required to be paid otherwise leave 
will be given to distrain for it. If the landlord applies to the 
court for leave to distrain under section 130, he must usually 
show that it is inequitable for the liquidator to insist upon 
section 128. If the liquidator wishes to use the dernised 
premises for the purposes of the winding up the rent must 
be met. " The rent is seen as an obligation for the benefit of 
the estate. " Nowadays, it seems Ukely that the rent will need 
to be met unless the liquidator chooses to disclaim the lease 
under section 178-9 of the Insolvency Act 1986.11 
If the distress has been levied before the commence- 
ment of winding up, but has not been completed by sale, the 
court will almost certainly not restrain the sale. After the 
petition but before the winding-up order the company, any 
creditor or contributory may apply to restrain the distress 
under section 126. Once the winding-up order is made, in 
order to continue with the distress the landlord must apply 
for leave under section 130. The courts will only stay the 
distress if there are special reasons which show that to allow 
it would be inequitable . 56 This will require evidence of fraud or unfair dealing. 57 In this context it is not unfair 
dealing for the landlord to prevent the pari passu rule 
applying by sweeping off all the assets in the distress. 59 
Voluntary liquidation 
A voluntary liquidation is one where the company's mern 
bers commence the winding up out of court by passing a 
resolution to wind up the company. In relation to voluntary 
liquidation there is no provision in the Insolvency Act 1986 
preventing the landlord distraining. However, under sec- 
don 112 of the Insolvency Act 198639, a liquidator, creditor 
or contributory of a company in voluntary liquidation may 
ask the court to exercise any power it has in relation to 
companies in compulsory liquidation. This includes the 
power to stay any distress. 60 The court's discretion will be 
exercised on the same grounds as for a compulsory liquida- 
don. A landlord who acts swiftly by completing the distress 
before the liquidator applies to the court is safe, as the 
distress cannot later be invalidated. 
In either type of liquidation the landlord is not 
prevented from distraining on the goods of third parties 
(subject to the rules on privileged goods and the Law of 
Distress Amendment Act 1908). If the third party itself is 
in liquidation, the landlord is not prevented from distraining 
its goods as the restrictions in the Insolvency Act, upon 
distress, only apply to landlords who are creditors of the 
third party in liquidation. 61 
Administrative receivership 
A company which borrows money will frequently give 
security in the form of a debenture which charges its entire 
undertaking (which has been interpreted as meaning all its 
assets both present and future). 62 The debenture will 
normally be in the form of (a) a fixed charge over assets 
Which by their nature do not change day to day such as 
Plant, machinery and buildings; and (b) a floating charge 
over circulating assets such as stock in trade. If the 
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company defaults under the terms of the debenture the 
chargee will usually appoint a receiver to realise the 
charged assets and pay off the chargee. If the debenture 
includes a floating charge and is over the whole or 
substantially the whole of a company's undertaking the 
receiver will be an administrative receiver. " Such a 
receiver owes a primary duty to the appointing debenture 
holder but is also deemed to be the agent of the company. " 
There appears to be no restriction on a landlord 
distraining against the goods of a corporate tenant in 
receivership. " This is logical in that the receiver acts as the 
agent of the company and therefore the property charged 
still belongs to the company and is under the control of its 
agent. There is no statutory provision preventing the dis- 
tress and so it should be allowed. 
The problem with this simple solution is that a 
numberof cases may notbe consistentwith it. It is clearthat 
a landlord may distrain over the assets of a company which 
are subject to a floating charge if the charge has not yet 
crystallised. 66 The assets charged remain the company's 
property and so are capable of seizure by the landlord. The 
position with regard to crystallised floating charges or 
charges which. originate as fixed charges is not so clear. 
The 'ordinary meaning' of what constitutes an equi- 
table charge was given by Peter Gibson J as: 
'... an appropriation of specific property to the 
discharge or other obligation without there being any 
change in ownership either at law or in equity, and it 
confers on the chargee rights to apply to the court for. 
an order for sale or for the appointment of a receiver, 
but no right to foreclosure (so as to make the property 
his own) or take possession 
Lord Hoffman has stated that a charge is 'created 
without any transfer of title or possession'. " Millett IJ has 
stated that a mortgage involves a transfer of legal or 
equitable ownership but that an equitable charge does not. 69 
The conclusion from these dicta is that a charge does not 
involve a transfer of title oi ownershipw There is no 
assignment of the secured assets. 10 If this is correct, both 
fixed charge assets and assets subject to a crystallised 
floating charge will be the company's property and will not 
become the 6argee's property. 'On this basis a landlord 
wishing to distrain such goods after the appointment of a 
receiver can do so free of any restriction. 
There exist, however, several authorities which state 
that the crystallisation of a floating charge has the effect of 
assigning the charged assets to the chargee. 71 If this is So, 
when an administrative receiver is appointed the floating 
charge will crystallise7l and effect an assignment of the 
secured assets to the chargee. One conceptual problem with 
this theory, which has been judicially expressed; is that it is 
difficult to see how, as agent of the company, the receiver 
is able to deal with and sell goods belonging to a third party 
(the chargee). 73 
If it is accepted that crystallisation completes an 
assignment to the chargee, upon crystallisation the chargee 
as owner of the charged goods would be able to claim the 
protection of section I of the Law of Distress Amendment 
Act 1908. If, as is almost invariably the practice, the 
floating charge is taken over the tenant company's under- 
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taking, this would include any lease and would therefore 
preclude the chargee from asserting the protection of 
section 1, as the chargee would have a beneficial interest in 
the tenancy. 74 The chargee will be in no better position than 
if crystallisation had not completed an assignment of the 
goods. If the company is also in liquidation the chargee will 
be in a worse position as under the Insolvency Act 1986, 
protections from distress do not extend to goods belonging 
to third partieS. 75 Only if the charge does not cover the 
demised property will the chargee be able to claim third 
party protection under section 1. 
Two recent decisionS71 dealing with distress seem 
diametrically opposed as to whether or not crystallisation 
completes an assignment to the chargee. It may be that the 
decisions can be reconciled on the basis that an assignment 
of charged goods occurs only if, at the time of enforcement, 
the value of the goods is less than the security. This is how 
Kay J dealt with the matter in Re New Constitutional Club 
Co. 77 and it would be consistent with how the courts have 
dealt with bills of sale.? & Certainly there is no clear answer. 
All that can be said, is that however the issue is viewed, a 
landlord should, in most instances, be able to distrain over 
the goods of a company in receivership. 
Administration 
A company which is insolvent may apply to the court for 
an administration order. 19 If the order is granted an 
administrator will be appointed to manage the company's 
affairs. The order will be made if the court believes it is 
likely that any one or more of the statutory grounds are 
satisfied. The order may be made (a) on the basis that it 
will lead to the survival of the company and at least part 
of its undertaking; (b) on the ground that it is likely to lead 
to a more beneficial realisation of the company's assets 
than would be possible under an immediate winding up 
(the order can be made even though winding up is 
envisaged in due course); or (c) on the ground that it will 
lead to the company reaching an arrangement with its 
creditors such as a company voluntary arrangement. 
, An administration order is only a temporary measure intended to give the administrator the opportunity to achieve 
the statutory ground(s) upon which the order was made. 
Similarly to an interim order in IVA's it creates a morato- 
rium on creditor actions against he company. The admin- 
istration order moratorium is in wider terms than that for 
IVA's in that it specifically prevents distress without the 
leave of the court or consent of the administrator. The 
Moratorium comes into effect as soon as the petition is filed 
and continues after the order is made. 80 The purpose of the 
Moratorium is to give the administrator time to put together 
a proposal for the creditors to consider, free from the 
Molestation of creditors enforcing their rights against com- 
Pany assets. 
The Court of Appeal in ReAdantic ComputerSystenis 
NO' has given general guidance on what matters the court 
should consider in an application for leave to enforce 
Creditor rights. A landlord who applies for leave to distrain 
against a company in administration must convince the 
court hat in the circumstances it is fair to allow distress. The 
court will balance the legitimate interests of the landlord, including the extent of the loss which the landlord would 
suffer should leave not be granted, with the effect distress 
would have on the administrator's plans to maximise 
payments to the other creditors of the company. The case 
contains general guidance but it seems likely that, by 
analogy with the position in liquidation, an administrator 
who does not pay rent for at least the period after the order 
is made, will not convince the court to uphold the morato- 
rium. Otherwise the landlord would effectively be financ- 
ing the administration to the benefit of all the other 
unsecured creditors. 
In addition to the possibility of distress, the landlord 
also has the power to forfeit by peaceable re-entry. This 
remedy has been held not to be within the moratorium and 
therefore can be exercised without the requirement of leave 
from the court. 92 An administrator who needs the demised 
premises to carry on the business is unlikely to risk forfei- 
ture by not paying rent. 
Company voluntary arrangement 
A company may enter into a voluntary arrangement in the 
same way as an individual. " The main difference between 
a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) and an IVA is 
that there is no corporate equivalent to the interim order. If 
a company wishes to put forward a CVA proposal to its 
creditors it has no protection from creditors' enforcements 
whilst it puts together the proposal. In order to achieve a 
freeze on creditors' rights the company must first obtain an 
administration order on the ground that a CVA is likely, If 
there is no administration order in place and a landlord is 
given notice of a creditors' meeting to consider a CVA 
proposal, there is nothing preventing the landlord distraining. 
The landlord will be bound by the terms of any approved 
CVA, where notice was given of the creditors' meeting to 
the landlord and the landlord was entitled to attend and 
84 vote. It is binding even if the landlord did not attend or did 
attend and dither did not vote or voted against the proposal, 
Parliament is currently considering a proposal to 
introduce a moratorium, to the CVA procedure similar to the 
interim order for IVA's. This proposal is designed to put an 
end to the requirement for an administration order to be 
obtained before a CVA proposal can realisticallybe drafted. 85 
Reform 
The way in which distress has been dealt with by insol- 
vency legislation is not an object lesson in clear thinking 
and careful planning. Whenever a provision has been 
introduced into the law, such as the landlord's rights in 
bankruptcy, it has generally remained intact. The longer 
the rule survives, the less likely it seems it will be changed, 
even if it leads to an illogical and unfair system. Professor 
Goode has stated that the fundamental principle of insol- 
vency law 'is that of pari passu distribution, for creditors 
participating in the common pool in proportion to the size 
of their admitted claims'. 81 The remedy of distress is a 
classic example of one unsecured creditor being able to 
ignore this principle. 
Distress is remarkable in its disregard for the pari 
passu principle but even on its own terms it is inconsistent. 
In bankruptcy or receivership there appear to be no or only 
very minor limitations on its exercise. The law of distress 
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treats holders of bills of sale over individuals' property 
differently from holders of debentures over companies' 
property. Distress is treated in compulsory liquidation 4. 
differently than it is in voluntary liquidation. It is prevented 
where a company is in administration and considering a 
CVA, but not where an individual has the benefit of an 
interim order and is considering an IVA. Although the 
insolvent tenant's assets may, to a greater or lesser extent, 
be protected, the landlord can usually still seize goods 
belonging to a third party. Much of the caselaw from the 
nineteenth century is still law even though it may lack 6. 
clarity or has been heavily criticised by subsequent courts. 
This is all quite illogical. 
The Law Commission 17 (and others)" has on more 7. 8 than one occasion called for the total abolition of distress. . 
Its proposals lie in the Lord Chancellor's department 
waiting in vain to be put into effect. The reason for inaction 9. 10 
appears to be a concern that landlords will be left with no . 11. 
effective remedy against a defaulting tenant. This seems a 
somewhat unconvincing reason. Once a tenant becomes 12. 
insolvent, even disregarding the power to distrain, a land- 
lord is still in a strong position. The landlord can usually 13. 
forfeit the lease on the insolvency of the tenant. If the lease 
is valuable and the insolvency practitioner who is realising 
the estate wants to sell it, the landlord can demand payment 
of outstanding rent to prevent forfeiture. The landlord will 
14. 
frequently also have the right to demand rent from previous 
lessees due to the benefit of a chain of indemnity. " This 
latter right will still be available even if the lease itself is 
unsaleable and the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator 
disclaims it. 90 It is clearly time for the Law Commission's 
recommendations of aboliti 
I 
on to be implemented. 15. 
Conclusion 
The Department of Trade and Industry has put forward 
16. 
17. 
some limited amendments to the Insolvency Act in relation 18. 
to when distress may be levied against an insolvent tenant, 19. 
but this is merely tinkering at the edges of a far larger 20. 
problem. If the total abolition of distress is not possible, it 
is incumbent on Parliament to amend the law so as to bring 
certainty, fairness and consistency to all the types of formal 
insolvency procedure which a tenant may enter. It is 
Particularly difficult to justify the right landlords have to 21. 22 distrain a third party's goods. There appears to be no . 23. 
convincing reason, even if distress as a remedy continues to 
exist, why it should be allowed to be levied once formal 24. 
insolvency proceedings of any type have been commenceVI 
25. 
26. If the Government is serious about abolishing the preferen- 27. 
tial debts regime92 it would be anomalous to retain the 28. 29 Priority right which distress accords landlords. Fairness . 30. 
demands that there should be no exceptions to theparipassu 31. 
Principle for any unsecured creditors . 
32. 
33. 
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LANDLORD'S DISTRESS-PAST ITS SELL BY 
DATE? 
By Peter Walton 
Introduction 
A landlord's power to distrain for unpaid rent "is simply a right to 
resort to the chattels on the land in the occupation of the 
tenant". ' It is a common law self help remedy requiring no order 
of the court to put into effect. It can be levied as early as the day 
after the rent falls due without any notice being given to the 
tenant. Nearly a hundred years ago, its effect on third parties was 
described as "extraordinary ... in a country which boasts of 
civilization, which purports to protect the property of the law- 
abiding citizen. .. ". 2 In feudal times distress was a new and 
useful remedy. In more modern times it has been commented 
that "[ilts very existence as a legal remedy besmirches the fabric 
of English civil justice. ", 3 
The primary purpose of this article is to consider the efficiency 
and fairness of how the remedy of distress operates today and to 
assess whether it has a future. Not surprisingly, as a thousand- 
year-old remedy, it has endured a great many amendments over 
time and the law of distress consequently constitutes a very 
complicated remedy- in practice. Its development needs to be 
traced in order to assess whether any of the historical justifica- 
tions for its retention still hold good in the 21st century. Some of 
the more important problems with the remedy will be high- 
lighted. Although Lord Denning M. R. regarded it in 1968 as "an 
archaic remedy which has largely fallen into disuse", 4 distress has 
enjoyed a certain return to popularity amongst landlords in recent 
recessionary years. Frequent calls for amendment or abolition of 
distress have generally been met with parliamentary inaction. 
The controversy over distress remains very much a live issue and 
the remedy is currently being examined as part of the Lord 
'Re Coal Consumers' Association (1876) 4 Ch. D. 625 at 629-630 per Malins V. -C. ' Challoner v. Robinson [190811 Ch. 49 at 55 per Neville 1. 
3 Jacob, The Fabric of English Civil justice (Stevens, London, 1987) p. 179. 
"Abingdon Rural District Council v. O'Gorman [196812 Q. B. 811 at 819. 
508 [2000164 CONV., Nov/DEc Q SWEET & MAXWELL 
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Chancellor's wide ranging Review of Enforcement of Civil Court 
ludgmentS. 5 
This article examines both the approach other jurisdictions 
have taken to distress and the potential impact of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. The latter examination is undertaken in order to 
assess whether the Human Rights Act holds the key to forcing 
Parliament finally to being about the demise of this most ancient 
of legal landmarks of the common law world. 
Historical Development 
The precise origin of the landlord's power to distrain for unpaid 
rent is not clear. Enever" traces its origins to pre-Norman times 
with the first specific reference to distress being in the laws of 
Canute made between 1027 and 1034.7BullenO suggests that the 
law relating to distress was adopted by William I and became a 
means oi enforcing feudal dues. By the reign of Henry I (if not 
before) it was necessary to obtain judicial approval before a 
distress could be levied. 9 It seems the formality of a lord applying 
to his own court to obtain the necessary licence to distrain was 
soon dispensed with. The lord would distrain a tenant into the 
fulfilment of his feudal services without bothering to clothe 
himself with the authority of his own court. It thereafter became 
customary for the power of distress to be regarded as an incident 
of a lord's or landlord's status. The requirement for judicial 
authority disappeared altogether. 10 At this time the right to 
distrain was limited to the right to seize and detain goods, 
whether belonging to the tenant or not, which were on the 
tenanted premises. 
From this starting point the development of distress for rent 
may be divided into three separate stages. Firstly, the power of the 
lord to distrain was initially cut down by several statutes in order 
' The Lord Chancellor's Department has to date Issued four Consultation Papers: Enforce- 
ment Review. How can Enforcement of Civil Court judgments be made more effectivel CP 
June 1,1998; Enforcement Review. Key Principles for a New System of Enforcement in the 
Civil Courts, CP May 2,1999) Enforcement Review. Attachment ofearnings orders, charging 
orders and garnishee orders, CP October 3,1999, Enforcement Revie%- Warrants and Writs, 
Oral Examinations and judgment Summonses, January 2000 and has now reported on the 
review process thus far Enforcement Review-. Report of the First Phase of the Enforcement 
Review, July 2000. 
1 Enever, Law of Distress (Routledge, London, 1937) pp. 2-3. 'Il Cnut c. 19. See also Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 14th ed., 
Butterworths, London. 1948) pp. 86 and 570. 
Dodd and Bullen, Bullen on Distress (2nd ed., Butterworths, London, 1899L pp. 5-7. 
Ibid. at 4. 
"' See also Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law 12nd ed. reissued, University Press, Cambridge, 19681, Vol. 2, pp. 574-578. 
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to protect the tenant from oppressive use of the remedy. Second, 
in a change of direction the rights of the distrainor were 
increased. Third, third parties whose goods became subject to 
distress were given some protection. 
Powers of Distrainor Restricted 
It is schoolboy history to recite that following the reign of 
William I the power of the barons grew substantially. What is not 
so widely known is that amongst the armoury of the barons was 
the power to distrain. The power was exercised upon fictitious 
allegations; excessive distresses were levied; services were 
wrongfully compelled; " the right to replevin ignored. Replevin 
was and is a remedy available to anyone who has had their goods 
distrained illegally. The procedure involves firstly the replevy, 
which is an application to the court for an order returning the 
goods to the tenant. This will normally be granted provided 
adequate security, is given to cover the amount of alleged rent 
outstanding and the likely costs of the replevin action. Second, 
there is the action of replevin, where a hearing is held to consider 
if the distress was illegal and if so, to order that the claimant is 
entitled to the goods. If successful the claimant retains the goods 
and recovers costs and damages. Replevy will normally have to be 
made within five days of the distress. 
Many statutes were passed which inter alia limited the 
amounts which could be distrained, 12 prevented the distrainor 
impounding goods and then taking them out of the county 13 and 
later it was provided that the "pound" where the goods were to be 
held could not be more than three miles from the place of 
distress. 14 With the gradual diminishing of the barons' powers 
further restrictions on distress became unnecessary. Throughout 
this period it should be noted that the distrainor was only 
empowered to seize goods and impound them off the premises. 
There was no power to sell the goods seized. Any attempt to sell 
the goods would impose liability on the landlord in conver- 
sion. 's 
Landlords Accorded Additional Rights 
Thus far statutory intervention had been limited to protecting 
the rights of the tenant. As the centuries rolled by and the full 
See the preamble to the Statute of Marlbridge (or Marlborough) 11267) 52 Hen. III c. 1. 
Statute of Distresses of the Exchequer (1266) 51 Hen. III stat. 4. 
Statute of Marlbridge (or Marlboroughl 11267152 Hen. III c. 4. 
An Act for the Impounding of Distresses (1554) 1&2 P. & Mary c. 12. 
Comersall v. Medgate (1610) Yelv. 194. 
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rigours of the feudal system disappeared, tenants became more 
sure of their rights. The royal courts' authority could not be 
challenged and the courts would enforce tenants' rights. The 
landlord's position became considerably weaker and so gradually 
Parliament began to redress the balance by giving new rights to 
the landlord. The following are some of the more important 
additions to the landlord's rights. They are discussed in the 
present tense as, somewhat surprisingly, these ancient provisions 
remain law today. 
The Distress for Rent Act 168916 provides that if the tenant or 
owner does not, within five days 17 of the distress, replevy it with 
sufficient security, the distrainor shall be entitled to sell the 
assets seized. The distrainor must obtain the best price possible 
and hand over any surplus to the tenant. 18 The Act specifically 
draws attention to the fact that holding the assets seized merely 
as a pledge with no power of sale, had given "little benefit"19 to 
the distrainor. 
Fraudulent removal of goods from dernised premises could 
avoid a distress until the Landlord and Tenant Act 170911 per- 
mitted the landlord to follow and seize the goods wherever they 
could be found. 21 This power was augmented by the Distress for 
Rent Act 1737 22 which expressly refers to the fact that previous 
statutes being "made for the better security of rents, and to 
prevent frauds committed by tenants, have not proved suffi- 
cient ...... This latter Act also allowed distress to be levied over livestock and growing crops which was previously not possible. M 
The Act also introduced the ability to take walking possession, 
that is, leaving the assets on the tenant's premises on a specifIc 
undertaking by the tenant not to remove or dispose of them. 24 
Until the, 1737 Act any irregularityin the levyingof the distress 
led to the distraint being rendered void ab initio and the tenant 
entitled to recover the full value of the unpaid rent. The rule at 
common law was that in such circumstances the distrainor was 
deemed to have intended a tortious act. 25The levying of distress 
and selling of the assets had by'now become a very complex 
16 2 W. & M. c. S. 
17 Section 6 of the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1888 subsequently gave the tenant the 
right to apply for an extension to 15 days in which to replevy. 
See, e. g. Hawkins V. Walrond (187611 C. P. D. 280. 
Section I of the Distress for Rent Act 1689. 
8 Anne c. 14. 
21 See Dodd and Bullen, Bullen on Distress 12nd ed., Butterworths, London, 1899), p. 13. 
22 11 Geo. 11 c. 19, ss. 1-7. 
23 Ibid. s. 8. 
21 Ibid. s. 10. 
23 See Six Carpenters' Case 11610) 8 Co. Rep. 147. 
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matter and the consequences of any error by the distrainor were 
serious. Section 19 of the 1737 Act displaced the ab initio rule 
with a rule allowing for damages to be awarded commensurate 
with the loss suffered. 
Third Party Protection 
Until the landlord was given a power to sell the assets seized, the 
rights of third parties were rarely interfered with. Whilst the 
landlord was limited to seize and hold property as a pledge 
pending payment, any third party whose assets had been seized 
could demand their return on threat of an action in detinue. The 
power of sale introduced in 1689 covered all assets on the 
premises regardless of who was the owner. The landlord therefore 
would seize whatever was on the premises even if aware that the 
tenant was not the true owner. In Victorian times Parliament 
passed a number of statutes which gave some protection to third 
parties . 26 The interests of lodgers of a defaulting tenant were first given 
protection under the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act 1871. This 
protection was repeated and extended to under tenants and other 
third parties by the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1908. This 
latter Act was introduced largely to remedy the faults highlighted 
by Neville J. in. Challoner v. Robinson . 27 His Lordship was critical 
of a landlord's ability to seize and sell goods on the demised 
premises which belonged to a third party. 28 Under the 1908 Act, 
when the goods of a lodger, under tenant or stranger are distrai- 
ned, that third party may serve a notice on the landlord under 
section 1 declaring ownership of the goods. On receipt of such a 
notice a landlord or bailiff who then proceeds with the distress is 
deemed guilty of an illegal distresS. 29 If a notice is served by a 
lodger or sub-tenant, the relief under section 1 is conditional 
upon paying future rent to the landlord directly. One important 
restriction upon a third party's ability to serve a section I notice 
is that no notice can be served by a person who has "any 
11 See, e. g. s. 14 of the Casworks Clauses Act 1847, s. 44 of the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 
and s. 25 of the Electric Lighting Act 1882 which had the effect of protecting the assets of 
utility companies such as pipes and other fittings on a tenant's premises from distress. Section 
3 of the Railway Rolling Stock Protection Act 1872 protects railway rolling stock which belongs to third parties. 
1[ 190811 Ch. 49. 
2* Neville JA comments quoted in the introduction to this article are part of his Lordship's 
criticism. 
21 Section 2 of the Lw of Distress Amendment Act 1908. 
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beneficial interest" in the tenancy. A secured creditor, for exam- 
ple, with a fixed and floating charge over a corporate tenant's 
lease and undertaking, would be unable to claim the protection of 
section 1 for any of the goods on the premises as the creditor 
would have a beneficial interest in the tenancy by its fixed 
charge., 30 
Although an impressive looking protection for third parties, 
the notice procedure is flawed in practice as there is no duty on 
the landlord or tenant to notify the third party that the goods in 
question have been seized. Frequently walking possession is 
taken and so the goods remain on the premises and the fact that 
a distress has occurred may not be obvious. If the landlord acts 
swiftly by selling as soon as the five day period is over, the third 
party who has yet to serve a section 1 notice has no remedy 
against the landlord and is left to chase the (probably insolvent) 
tenant for the value of the goods seized. 
The protection is also weakened in that not all goods can be 
protected in this way. Section 4 contains a number of exceptions 
including goods belonging to the spouse or business partner of the 
tenant. Under section 4A31 the holder of a security bill of sale 
cannot claim section 1 protection unless the bill of sale is a 
regulated agreement under the Consumer Credit Act 1974, and 
even then the protection is only available during the period 
between service of a default notice and the date on which the 
notice expires or is complied with. 
The owner of goods subject to a hire purchase or conditional 
sale agreement can in theory claim the protection of a section 1 
notice. However, section 1 protection is not available for agree- 
ments -which have not been terminated, except in relation to 
agreements regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974, during 
the period between service of a default notice and the date on 
which the notice expires or is complied with . 32The potential risk to persons who finance hire purchase or other types of sale 
agreements can in certain circumstances be avoided by the 
insertion of a corltractual provision whereby the agreement is 
terminated if the landlord threatens to or does take steps to levy 
Cunliffe Engineering Ltd v. English Industrial Estates Corp. 119941 B. C. C. 972. 
Added by s. 19213) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and brought into force by the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 (Commencement No. 8) Order 1983, S. L 1983 No. 155 1. 
32 Section 4A of the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1908 as inserted by 8.19213) of the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 and brought into force (except as to consumer hire agreements) by 
the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (Commencement No. 8) Order 1983, S. I. 1983 No. 1551. 
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a distress. Goods seized by the landlord are thereafter no longer 
subject to the agreement and the creditor can claim section 1 
protection . 33 if the agreement 
is regulated by the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974, such automatic termination clauses are pro- 
hibited, with the consequence that the creditor may only claim 
the protection of section I of the 1908 Act if a default notice is 
already in existence. 
A particularly problematic exception under section 4 involves 
goods which are in the order and disposition of the tenant with 
the consent of the true owner in such circumstances that the 
tenant is the reputed owner. This may apply to hire purchase 
goods even if the agreement has been successfully terminated by 
the distress. The order and disposition clause is borrowed from 
the old Bankruptcy Acts. It first appeared in 1623 . 34 The policy behind the rule in a bankruptcy context was explained by Lord 
Hardwicke in Ryall v. Rolle: 35 
It was to prevent traders from gaining a delusive credit from a 
false appearance of their circumstances, to the misleading and deceit 
of those -who should trade with them, and the legislature thought 
they had done this by subjecting all things remaining in the 
possession of the bankrupt, to the creditors under the commis- 
sion.. . 11.36 
In applying the order and disposition clause to distress, Parlia- 
ment was in effect warning third parties that if they allowed 
tenants to possess the third party's goods and to permit them to 
appear to be the owner of those goods, the goods would be subject 
to a landlord's distress. 
The order and disposition clause appears to be of concern to 
anyone who hires out goods a7 However, a recent Court of Appeal 
case suggests that such concern may be unwarranted. In Salford 
Van Hire (Contracts) Ltd v. Bocholt Developments Ltd, 38 a van 
which had been hired by the tenant company had been distrained. 
It was a three year old, plain white van without any markings on 
it identifying the owner. It had been specifically converted to the 
use of the company. Despite a very strong looking argument to 
See Times Furnishing Co. Ltd v. Hutchings 1193811 K. B. 775. 
Sections 10 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Act 1623 (21 Jac. I c. 19). 
35 (1749) 1 Atk. 165. 
Ibid. at 183. 
Although consumer hiring agreements are within sAA of the 1908 Act, this part of the 
section has not been brought into force, which leaves hirers of goods free to claim the 
protection of s. l. 
[19951 C. L. C. 611. 
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the contrary, the court held that it was not in the company's 
reputed ownership. 
The court took judicial notice that such hiring agreements 
were commonplace. In order to be in the company's reputed 
ownership the van would need to be in its possession in such 
circumstances that it I'MUSt"39 belong to the tenant. As hiring 
agreements are so much a part of modern commercial life there 
could be no inference that the van "must" belong to the tenant. 
This very restrictive interpretation of the order and disposition 
clause would seem to cover all conditional sale, hire purchase and 
retention of title agreements. If this is the case, it will drastically 
affect the ability of a landlord when distraining commercial 
premises for the very reason that goods subject to such types of 
agreement are so common. If such goods are not within the order 
and disposition clause, (assuming the agreement has terminated 
bringing the goods prima facie within the protection of section 1 
of the 1908 Act) a landlord will not be safe in distraining without 
making careful enquiries as to ownership of the assets on the 
premises . 40 In the latter part of the 20th century residential tenancies 
received extra protection. If the tenancy is a protected tenancy 
under the Rent Act 197741 or an assured tenancy under the 
Housing Act 1988,42 the landlord must obtain a court order before 
levying distress. Landlords of other residential tenancies such as 
secure tenancies, 4-3which would include most local authorities, 
may continue to distrain without judicial permission. 
Privileged Goods 
In addition to the above provisions both statute and case law have 
added further complexity to the law by limiting what goods are 
capable of being distrained. Some goods are absolutely privileged. 
A landlord who distrains such goods is guilty of an illegal distress. 
The following are examples of absolutely privileged goods: 
1) tenant's fixtureS44, 
31 Ibid. at 620 per Hirst L. J. 
10 Enquiries as to ownership would have been appropriate in Salford; ibid. At 621. 
Section 147. 
Section 19. 
Under the Housing Act 1985. 
See, e. g. Pitt v. Shew (182114 B. & ALL 206. 
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2) wearing apparel and bedding"i 
3) tools of the tenant's trade 46 j 
4) items of public trade. This covers items "delivered to a 
person exercising a public trade, to be carried, wrought, 
worked up, or managed in the way of his trade ... 11.47 Examples of this category given in Halsbury are "a horse 
in a smith's shop, materials sent to a weaver, or cloth 
sent to a tailor ... 11.48 In terms of protecting the goods of 
third parties this privilege has been largely taken over by 
the protection afforded by the Law of Distress Amend- 
ment Act 1908; 
5) perishable items which cannot be returned to the owner 
in the same state as when distrained 49 1 6) things in actual use at the time of distress. In a modern 
setting it would seem likely that a shop full of tele- 
visions, video recorders and computers etc., if switched 
on to encourage customers to purchase them, would be 
regarded as things in actual use. 50 
A landlord who commits an illegal distress may be liable in 
damages. The tenant may apply to the court to order up delivery 
of the goods under the Torts (Interference with Goods Act 
1977). " An aggrieved tenant is also entitled to rescue the goods 
before they are impounded52 (a self help counter remedy). The 
tenant will also have the right to replevy. The tenant will even be 
able to sue a purchaser in conversion as the distress is unlawful 
and void ab initio which prevents the landlord from giving a good 
title. 53 
Other goods are given qualified privilege which means that 
they can only be distrained if there are no other non-privileged 
goods sufficient to satisfy the outstanding rent. Most examples of 
qualified privilege apply to agricultural tenancids. 54 A landlord 
" Section 4 of the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1888 as amended by s. 89 of the County Courts Act 1984 which itself is amended by &. 15 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. 
Ibid. 
Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed., Vol. 13) distress at para. 23 1. 
Ibid. 
See, e. g. Morley v. Pincomba (184812 Exch. 101-20 dead pigs. 
See, e. g. Field v. Adames (1840) 12 Ad. El. 649-horse drawing a cart. See generally 11978) 41 M. L. R. 713. 
Keen v. Priest (1859) 4 H. & N. 236 atp. 24 1. 
Mennie v. Blake 11856) 6 E. & B. 842. 
See, e. g. Simpson v. Hartopp 11744) Willes 51 2--sheep and beasts which "gain" the land. 
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who acts in breach of qualified privilege risks being sued for 
excessive distress and being held liable in damages. 
Procedural Complexities 
As well as illegal and excessive distress a landlord may be guilty 
of an irregular distress. This is where, although the goods have 
been properly seized, the distrainor commits some subsequent 
unlawful act. An example of this would be proceeding to sell the 
goods after the tenant had tendered payment of the arrears and 
costs of the seizure. Under section 19 of the Distress for Rent Act 
173755 such an irregularity does not make the distress void ab 
initio and the tenant is limited to a claim in damages. The 
distinction between illegal and irregular distresS56 has been 
described as "somewhat artificial"57 and "the practical result is 
much confused". -58 
A tenant who incorrectly believes a distress is illegal who then 
retrieves the goods after they are seized but before they are 
impounded, commits the tort of "rescous". This entitles the 
landlord to recover the damages to the value of treble the unpaid 
rent. "' It is possible that rescous is also an indictable offence . 
60 
Once the goods are impounded, whether lawfully or not, they are 
in the custody of the law and cannot be retaken. 61 A tenant who 
retrieves them after impounding is guilty of the indictable offence 
of "poundbreach" and is again liable civilly for treble damages. 62 
Although it was once common for the landlord to remove goods 
to a separate "pound", in recent times it is more common to take 
walking possession of the goods on the demised premises. It is not 
clear whether walking possession is a type of impounding or an 
alternative to it. 63 When a walking possession agreement is 
breached it is therefore unclear whether rescous or poundbreach 
has been committed. 
There are many other rules of which a distrainor needs to be 
aware. Levying distress is not permitted on a Sunday. 64 It may 
II Gen. H c. 19. For further discussion of illegal and irregular distress see H. Edmund-Davies, The Law of 
Distress for Rent and Rates (Waterlow & Sons, London, 1931), pp. 77-87. " Law Commission Landlord and Tenant Distress for Rent No. 194 (19911 at para. 2.69. 
Ibid. at para. 2.70. 
Section 3 of the Distress for Rent Act 1689. 
'0 See Law Commission Working Paper No. 97 Distress for Rent 119861 at para. 4.32. 
Cotsworth v. Betison (1696) 1 Ld. Raym. 104. 
See Law Commission Working Paper No. 97 Distress for Rent (1986) at para. 4.32. 
No clear answer is to be found in Abingdon Rural District Council v. O'Gorman 119681 2 Q. B. 811 although Russell L. J. at 827 believed it did amount to an impounding. " Werth v. London and Westminister Loan and Discount Co. (1889) 5 T. L. R. 521. 
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only take place between sunrise and sunset. 6s The distrainor has 
a right to enter the dernised premises but cannot force entry. 
Entry by opening a door in the normal way is permissible 66 but it 
is not clear whether entry by using a spare key is forcible entry or 
not. 
Problems with Distress 
Many criticisms have been levelled at distress and suggestions 
have been made to amend or abolish the whole doctrine . 67 As has been demonstrated, it has become an extremely technical rem- 
edy. In Order to levy distress according to the law, a landlord or 
appointed bailiff68 would ideally have memorised all the detailed 
Provisions listed in nearly 100 pages of Halsbury. 69The general 
rule that all the goods on the dernised premises may be distrained 
is subject to so many exceptions that uncertainty haunts every 
distraint. 
In many instances distress can be levied without judicial 
authority and this is of concern because there is evidence of abuse 
of position by distraining bailiffs . 7' Although there is a duty to 
sell distrained goods at the best possible price, second hand goods 
in a "fire sale" rarely achieve a price commensurate with the 
value of the. goods to the tenant. 71 
A tenant suffering a distress is in a far worse position than a 
debtor suffering judicial debt enforcement. The tenant has no real 
opportunity to prevent the distress occurring even though it may 
be proceeding illegally. Any remedy the tenant has will normally 
only be exercised after the distress has already been levied . 72Even if the tenant succeeds in an action for damages, this will often be 
7btton v. Darke (1860) 5 H. & N. 647. 
Ryan v. Shilcock (1851) 7 Exch. 72. 
See, e. g. Report of the Committee on Bankruptcy Law and Deeds of Arrangement Law 
Amendment Cmnd. 22111957) Blagden Committee, Law Commission Landlord and Tenant 
Interim Report on Distress for Rent (1966), Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of 
Judgment Debts Cmnd. 3909119691 Payne Committee, Report of the Review Committee on 
Insolvency Law and Practice Cmnd. 8558 (1982) Cork Committee, Law Commission Working 
Paper No. 97, Distress for Rent (1986), Law Commission Landlord and Tenant Distress for Rent No. 194 (1991). 
" The Law of Distress Amendment Act 1888 introduced the requirement that bailiffs 
employed to distrain on behalf of a landlord have to be licensed by the court. Halsbury's Laws ot England 14th ed., Vol 13) distress paras 201-396. 
Law Commission Working Paper No. 97, paras 2.7-2.11, Loveland, "Distress for Rent: An 
Archaic Remedy? " (1990) 17 J. of Law & Soc. 363 at 366-7 and Alison Creen Undue Distress: 
CAB Clients'Experience of Bailiffs NACAB, May 2000. 
Law Commission No. 194 at para. 3.16. 
Equitable set-off is available against a claim to levy distress and may allow for injunctive 
relief (Eller v. Grovecrest Investments Ltd 119951 Q. B. 272). 
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some time after the distress is complete. If the tenant carries on 
business at the demised premises the majority of stock and 
equipment needed in the trade may have been seized and sold and 
a judicial remedy some time later may be too late to save the 
business. 
Where the distress is illegal the right to replevy is frequently 
illusory as it requires the complainant to provide security for all 
the alleged unpaid rent prior to any hearing of the merits. If the 
tenant has such security available, it is unlikely that the distress 
would have occurred in the first place. 
The impact upon third parties whose goods are seized is 
extremely difficult to justify. The privileges attached to third 
party goods are subject to exceptions which appear to lack any 
logical basis and are largely inappropriate in the modern world. 
There is no requirement to notify the third party and so the 
relevant goods can be sold to satisfy the rent demand before the 
third party even discovers what is happening. - - 
-Frequently a defaulting tenant will, in addition to not paying 
the landlord, have failed to pay other creditors. The remedy of 
distress discriminates 
, 
against other creditors of the tenant by 
giving the landlord the means to achieve priority over those other 
creditors. Distress is seen at its most effective when the tenant is 
insolvent as it can give the landlord the ability to jump the queue 
of unsecured and in some circumstances even secured creditors. 
It is outside the scope of this article to consider the operation of 
distress in the procedures under Insolvency Act 1986 . 73 Professor Goode has stated that the fundamental principle of insolvency 
law "is that of pari passu distribution, for creditors participating 
in the common pool in proportion to the size of their admitted 
ClaiMS". 74 No unsecured creditor should be given priority over 
other unsecured creditors. Perhaps not surprisingly for a remedy 
which has developed in an entirely ad hoc manner, the operation 
of distress in an insolvency context is arbitrary. There are no real 
restrictions on levying distress where a tenant is in bankruptCy7S 
or receivership. 76This permits the landlord to obtain payment 
ahead of unsecured and even secured creditors. Different rules 
apply for compulsory liquidation" compared with voluntary 
'13 See Walton "The landlord, his distress, the Insolvent tenant and the stranger" (2000) 16 
I. L. & P. 47 and Chapter 3 of the excellent Mcloughlin, Commercial Leases and Insolvency (2nd ed., Butterworths, London, 1996). 
14 Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1990), p. 
59. 
'15 Section 347 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
'6 Purcell v. Public Curator of Queensland (1922) 31 C. L. R. 220. 
" Sections 126,128 and 130 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
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liquidation. " Distress is prevented where a company is in admin- 
istration and considering a company voluntary arrangement79 but 
not where an individual has the benefit of an interim order and is 
considering an individual voluntary arrangement . 
81' There 
appears to be no convincing reason why distress should be 
permitted once any formal insolvency proceeding has com- 
menced. 81 
Other Common Law jurisdictions 
Most of the common law world has already abolished or 
restricted the use of distress. Many American states refused to 
allow distraints on the ground that they are founded on the feudal 
system. 82 Those American States that did have distress have 
generally abolished or restricted its operation . 
83 New Zealand has 
retained it notwithstanding recommendations 
' 
that it should be 
completely abolished. 84 The Australian states of New South 
Wales (as long ago as 1930), 's Western Australia in 1936,86 
Victoria in 1958 87 and Queensland in 197488 have all wholly 
abolished the remedy. In South Australia the remedy has recently 
been restricted to commercial tenancies. 89 Of all the Australian 
states only Tasmania has left it untouched, but this seems more 
by accident than design. As part of a temporary rent restriction 
programme in 1949 distress was abolished for residential ten- 
ancies. Once the time limit on the programme expired, the 
previous law, including the remedy of distress, became effective 
again. 90 It seems only a matter of time before distress is com- 
pletely abolished in Australia. 91 
Section 112 ibid. 
Sections 10 and II ibid. 
80 McMullen a) Sons Ltd v. Cerrone 11994) B. C. C. 25. 
61 As was recommended by the Cork Committee at para. 1667. 
"I See Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant (22nd ed., Sweet & Maxwelli Stevens & Sons, 
London, 1928) notes to p. 528. 
" See e. g. Osowski "Alaska distress law in the commercial context: ancient relic or functional remedyl" (1993) 10 Alaska Law Review at 33-63. 
04 See the New Zealand Property Law and Equity Reform Committee Final Report on Legislation relating to Landlord and Tenant (1986). 
" Landlord and Tenant Amendment (Distress Abolition) Act 1930. 
" Distress for Rent Abolition Act 1936. 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1958. 
Property Law Act 1974. 
Residential Tenancies Act 1995. 
See Law Commission Landlord and Tenant Distress for Rent No. 194 (19911 at para. 3.31. 
" Guthleben "Distress for Rent" (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 301. 
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92 In Northern Ireland distress has also been wholly abolished. 
The main difference between the Australian approach to aboli- 
tion and that of Northern Ireland is that the Australians have 
tended to abolish the remedy with a single simple isolated 
provision, whereas in Northern Ireland distress was viewed along 
with other debt enforcement mechanisms and the whole system 
was overhauled together. The abolition of distress was seen as a 
necessary consequence of making enforcement a fairer and sim- 
pler system. -There appear to be no hidden consequences of 
abolition. The landlord is merely reduced to the same position as 
any other creditor, albeit usually retaining the power to forfeit the 
lease or chase prior assignees of the lease. 9a 
Reforms 
In England and Wales the Law Commission in its Interim Report 
on Distress for Rent in 1966 suggested that distress should not be 
abolished until the introduction of an effective method of debt 
enforcement generally. It consequently recommended nothing 
should be done until the Payne Committee 94 had reported. The 
Payne Committee recommended abolition of distress as (i) it 
would be almost impossible to amend satisfactorily such a 
complex doctrine and (ii) the retention of distress would be 
inconsistent with the Committee's proposals for an improved 
system of debt recovery. The Payne recommendations were not 
put into effect. The Law Commission returned to distress again in 
19869' and reported in 1991.96 Again it recommended abolition 
but only at a time in the future when landlords could be assured 
of "an efficient means of enforcing payment of rent arrears, but 
the remedies [in existence at the time] fall short of the ideal, 
primarily because the court machinery within which they oper- 
ate is overburdened and no longer permits them to function 
properly 11.97 It seems perhaps over protective of landlords who 
may have other remedies in addition to distress, not to abolish 
' Abolished by the judgments (Enforcement) Act (NI) 1969 following the recommendations 
of the Anderson Report (the Report of the joint Working Party on the Enforcement of 
Judgments, Orders and Decrees of the Courts in Northern Ireland 1965ý-the Northern Irish 
equivalent of the Payne Committee. 
93 See e. g. Hunter, Northern Ireland Bankruptcy Law and Practice ISLS Legal Publications 
(NI), Belfast, 19841, p. 257. 
" Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of judgment Debts (1969) Cmnd. 3909. 
" Law Commission Working Paper No. 97 Distress for Rent (1986). 
" Law Commission Landlord and Tenant Distress for Rent No. 194 (1991 
" Ibid. at paras 5.22. 
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the remedy and place landlords' claims for unpaid rent on the 
same footing as claims by other unsecured creditors. 
The Payne recommendations were not adopted in 1969, but the 
current Lord Chancellor, following on from the Woolf reformS, 98 
has put into effect a Review of Enforcement of Civil Court 
Judgments. " It may be that England and Wales will shortly 
follow the example of Northern Ireland and completely overhaul 
the system of debt enforcement. If the system of debt recovery is 
improved so that the courts did provide "an effective system" for 
landlord enforcement, why not follow the example of some of our 
antipodean colleagues and simply abolish distress? Under Woolf 
the conduct of litigation is to a large extent taken away from the 
parties and given to the court. The self help remedy of distress is 
even more anomalous in this context as it retains control firmly 
in the hands of the landlord. 
Human Rights Act 1998 
The Human Rights Act 19981 incorporates into U. K. law some of 
the rights granted to persons under the European Convention on 
Human Rights ("Convention"). Although it has previously been 
possible for an individual to petition the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg direCtly, 2 until the passing of the 
Act, Convention rights have not been directly enforceable in U. K. 
domestic courts. It is inappropriate here to attempt more than a 
bare outline of the operation of the Act and some of the Conven. 
tion rights which may be relevant in considering how distress 
stands under the new law. -3 
in general, domestic courts will have to decide all cases based 
upon statute or common law in a manner which is compatible 
91 Civil Procedure Rules 1998. 
" The Lord Chancellor's Department has to date issued four Consultation Papers: Enforce- 
ment Review. How can Enforcement of Civil Court judgments be made more effectivel CP 
June 1,1998; Enforcement Review, Key Principles for a New System of Enforcement in the 
Civil Courts, CP May 2,1999; Enforcement Review: Attachment ofearnings orders, charging 
orders and garnishee orders, CP October 3,1999) Enforcement Review-. Warrants and 
Writs, oral Examinations and Judgment Summonses, January 2000 and has now reported on 
the review process thus far Enforcement Review: Report of the First Phase of the Enforce- 
ment Review, July 2000. 
1 In force October 2,2000. 
2 Even prior to the Act coming into force it has been possible in domestic courts to base 
arguments on the Convention see Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart 
Publishing, London, 1997). 
3 For a more in depth account of how the Act is likely to operate generally see Wadham and 
Mountfield, Introduction to the Human Rights Act 1998 (Blackstone, London, 1999). 
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with Convention rights .4 Any question of statutory interpreta- tion must be resolved consistently with Convention rights wher- 
ever this is possible .5 In making 
decisions the courts must take 
into account relevant case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. 6 This last point may suggest to a U. K. lawyer that the 
Strasbourg Court's decisions will be binding precedents. This may 
not be so for two reasons: 
i) Section 2 of the Act requires the court to take account of 
the European Court's decisions but does not state that 
they are binding. It may be that the United Kingdom 
courts will in time develop its own human rights juris- 
prudence, albeit one with European influences. 
ii) The European Court has interpreted the Convention in 
such a way as to give the signatory state in question a 
margin of appreciation when it considers the state's 
domestic law. This Means that the state is permitted 
some flexibility in how it decides it is best to give effect 
to the Convention. For example in James v. United 
KingdOM7 where the validity of a tenant's right to 
purchase the freehold under the Leasehold Reform Act 
1967 was considered under Article 1, the Court allowed 
the United Kingdom a wide margin of appreciation. The 
case concerned the United Kingdom's social and eco- 
nomic policy and so a wide margin was deemed appro- 
priate. The margin of appreciation varies from 
Convention right to right and from case to case. The Act 
does not expressly include this margin of appreciation 
and so the United Kingdom courts appear to have a 
discretion whether or not to adopt this approach. 8 
If a claim is made against a public body the Act creates directly 
enforceable rights for the claimant. A public body in this context 
would include local authorities. Local authority tenants will 
often hold under secure tenancies which would not prevent the 
local authority landlord from distraining without judicial permis- 
sion. Under section 6 it is unlawful for a public body to act in a 
manner incompatible with a Convention right. Section 7 allows 
an individual to sue the public body and to enforce directly the 
" Section 6(IH3). 
s Section 3. 
6 Section 2(l). Account must also be taken of decisions of the Commission on Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers. 
'(1986) 8 E. H. R. R. 123. 
' Wadbarn and Mountfield, Introduction to the Human Rights Act 1998 (Blackstone, 
London, 1999), p. 18. 
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Convention right which has been infringed. If distress is incom- 
patible with a Convention right, a local authority tenant suffering 
distraint may wish to use the Act to enforce the Convention right 
in the local court. 
If a claim is between two parties acting in only a private 
capacity, the Act does not permit Convention rights to be 
enforced directly. This would include the common case of a 
private landlord levying distress. The tenant will not be able to 
enforce Convention rights directly. The Act will have an indirect 
effect in that the court, as a public body itself, must apply 
common law principles compatibly with the Convention and 
must, if possible, interpret statutes so as to conform with the 
Convention. If a statute is not capable of an interpretation which 
is compatible with Convention rights, the court has no power to 
declare it void and ignore it. The court must still apply the 
statute. If this happens the court does have the power to issue a 
"declaration of incompatibility", and Parliament can subse- 
quently use a new fast-track procedure to pass legislation to 
remedy the problem. 
Distress may be seen as breaching rights given under Article 6 
and Article 1 of the First Protocol of the Convention. 9 
Article 6 
The first sentence of Article 6(1) states: 
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. " 
A tenant who suffers a distress does not usually have any right to 
challenge the landlord's claim prior to the levy. There is no right 
to a hearing prior to the levy. If the distress was illegal, irregular 
or excessive the tenant will have a right to a hearing to determine 
the parties' respective rights but this will be after the levy. If the 
distress is lawf 
, ul 
under common law and statutory rules, there is 
no right whatsoever to a court hearing. In this latter situation if 
rent is outstanding, the landlord can in effect act as judge and debt 
enforcer. 
The position of a third party under Article 6 is potentially 
much stronger. If aware of a distress involving his or her goods, 
the third party may have protection by serving a notice under the 
P There may also be an argument, in the context of residential leases, that distress offends Article 8 which states that everyone "has the right to respect for his private life, his home. .. ". "Home" has been interpreted as including the office of a professional in Niemetz v. Germany (1992) 16 E. H. R. R. 97. 
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Law of Distress Amendment Act 1908. It may be that the goods 
do not fall within the Act's protection or that the third party has 
no knowledge of the distress at all. If this is the case the landlord 
may sell the goods lawfully and the third party loses out. As there 
is no obligation to inform the third party of the distress there is 
clearly no right to a trial to contest the distress. 
It is submitted that, depending upon the individual circum- 
stances, both a tenant and more convincingly a third party, would 
have a strong argument that the statutory provisions under which 
the landlord has distrained were incompatible with Article 6. 
Although the 1908 Act gives. some rights to the third party it 
allows others to prevent the enforcement of those rights by not 
notifying the third party that the goods are imperilled. If the 
landlord is, for example, a local authority, the Human Rights Act 
would give directly enforceable rights to the aggrieved party. If 
the distrainor was a private landlord a claim could lead to a 
declaration of incompatibility. 
Article 1 of the First Protocol 
Article I states: 
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except 
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control 
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. "10 
The protection under Article I applies except where the public 
interest demands it should not. in fames v. United Kingdom" it 
was decided that the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 did deprive the 
petitioner of its possessions. However, it did not breach Article 1 
as the compulsory transfer of property in such circumstances 
could be a legitimate means of promoting the public interest. It 
was crucial to the decision of the Court that compensation had 
been paid for the freehold. The compensation was not the full 
market value, but because it was a reasonable amount, the 
deprivation of possessions was not seen as so serious as to 
amount to a breach of Article 1. The loss to the freeholder was 
10 The second sentence of Article I deals with "control" of the use of property not 
deprivation and would therefore appear not to cover distress. 
11 1198618 E. H. R. R. 123. 
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not disproportionate when the overall public benefit was factored' 
in. 12 
Clearly distress deprives a person of his or her possessions. A 
tenant who suffers a distress may be seen as acquiring some form 
of compensation in that the proceeds of sale go to paying the rent 
owing. It could also be argued that it is in the public interest to 
allow landlord's the right to obtain payment of rent by these 
means. 
A third party whose goods are distrained has been deprived of 
possessions and may have no remedy against anyone. Certainly 
no remedy lies against the landlord if the distress is lawful. There 
would appear to be no right to any compensation in any form. it 
would be very difficult for a landlord to claim that it is in the 
public interest to allow distraint of a third party's goods. It is in 
the interest of the landlord only. 
It is submitted that a third party whose goods are distrained and 
who cannot rely upon the protections of the 1908 Act could rely 
upon Article 1. If the landlord is a public authority the right will 
be directly enforceable. If the distrainor is a private landlord, the 
court may attempt to interpret the law relating to distress in a 
manner compatible with Article 1. If, as seems likely, it fails to 
achieve this, the consequence may be a declaration of. incom. 
patibility. 
As part of the Lord Chancellor's Review of Enforcement of 
Civil Court judgments, Professor Beatson has carried out an 
independent review of the law relating to bailiffs. " One of 
Professor Beatson's conclusions is that there is a "real risk" 14 that 
certain aspects of distress breach the Human Rights Act and he 
makes a number of recommendations's to minimise the risk of a 
challenge under the Act. 16 The Lord Chancellor is likely to 
respond to these recommendations by the end of the year. 
Conclusions 
Distress is deeply rooted in antiquity and all the reasons for its 
existence, apart from giving the landlord a convenient means of 
obtaining an unfair priority over other creditors, are entirely 
" See also Holy Monasteries v. Greece (1994) 20 E. H. R. R. 1. 
13 Independent Review of Bailiff Law, June 2000 available at http: //www. open. gov. uk/lcd/ 
enforcement/beatson. pdL 
Ibid. at para. 2.26. 
Ibid. at para. 2.27. 
Professor Beatson's terms of reference assume that some system of enforcement by 
distress will be retained and so his report does not consider outright abolition as an option. 
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historical. Amendments have been made to the law on an entirely 
ad hoc basis over a period of centuries. Additions or changes to 
the law have generally remained in place as new provisions have 
been added, thus creating ever greater complexity. It has not 
evolved into a modern remedy. It is an out of date doctrine full of 
practical uncertainties. Its effect on third parties is particularly 
arbitrary and unfair. The abolition of distress has been recom. 
mended frequently. Other jurisdictions have managed to rid 
themselves of its blight, yet the United Kingdom Parliament has 
refused to act no matter how often called upon to do so. At the 
beginning of the last millennium distress was considered as 
attractive as fresh spring greens but today appears to have all the 
allure of rotten old cabbage. It is past its sell by date and it is 
hoped that the Human Rights Act 1998 will finally force Parlia- 
ment to take it off the shelf of remedies available to landlords. 
Peter Walton 
University of Wolverhampton 
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Execution Creditors- 
(almost) the Last Rights in 
Insolvency 
Peter Walton* 
Abstract The Lord Chancellor's Department is improving methods of 
enforcing judgments and Parliament is revamping insolvency law. Little, 
if any, analysis appears to have been made as to how enforcement 
operates in formal insolvency procedures. The case law dealing with 
whether or not an execution creditor becomes a secured creditor is a 
maze if not a minefield. The issue is of paramount importance when the 
judgment debtor is insolvent. Depending upon which insolvency proce- 
dure is in operation and which type of execution has been chosen, the 
creditor may be either in a very strong or a pitifully weak position. 
1. Introduction 
The most fundamental policy of insolvency law is that creditors 
should be treated equally. ' This pari passu rule is in practice subject to 
a great many exceptions. An unsecured creditor will often see no 
return on a debt owed by an insolvent debtor. Creditors with security 
will have priority, as will, to a limited extent, employees of the in- 
2 solvent debtor in relation to their preferential debts. Any creditor 
with the benefit of a retention of title clause under a contract of supply 
or a creditor under a hire purchase or conditional sale agreement will 
have title to the goods supplied and can repossess such goods. Land- 
lords owed rent by an insolvent debtor have the benefit of the self- 
help remedy of distress which, subject to exceptions, prima facie 
Senior Lecturer, University of Wolverhampton. 
R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 2nd edn (Sweet and Maxwell: 
London, 1997) 141; Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency 
Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558 (1982) ('the Cork Report') para. 233; V. Finch, 
'Directors' Duties: Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor' in A. Clarke (ed. ), 
Current Issues in Insolvency Law (Stevens: London, 1991) 87; A. Keay and M. 
Murray, Insolvency. Personal and Corporate Law and Practice, 4th edn (Law Book 
Co: Sydney, 2002) 26 and 293. 
Insolvency Act 1986, s. 386 and Sch. 6. Section 251 of the Enterprise Act 2002 
abolishes the Crown's preferential status, although employees' limited preferential 
rights remain. For the background to preferential debts and for a discussion as to 
whether they should be abolished, see A. Keay and P. Walton, 'The Preferential 
Debts Regime in Liquidation Law: In the Public InterestT (1999) 3 Company, 
Financial and Insolvency Law Review 84. 
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enables landlords to seize and sell any goods on the tenanted prem- 
ises regardless of their true ownership. 3 In the feeding frenzy which 
follows a debtor's insolvency unsecured creditors frequently struggle 
to get a look in. 
Although the Woolf reforms' have now been brought into effect, 
access to justice is not yet complete. The reforms deal with proceed- 
ings leading up to judgment only. Provisions dealing with enforce- 
ment of judgments remain largely as before although some changes 
to procedure and terminology have been made recently. ' The need for 
a complete revamp of enforcement of judgments has long been recog- 
nized' and is currently the subject of a long running review by the 
7 Lord Chancellor. 
The purpose of this article is to consider generally how unsecured 
creditors can improve their chances of being paid by obtaining judg- 
ment against their debtor and enforcing that judgment by way of 
execution. It will be seen that there are a number of different ways of 
executing a judgment depending upon the type of assets owned by 
the judgment debtor. Depending upon the context of the judgment 
creditors' claim they may or may not be viewed as secured creditors. 
If they are viewed as secured, they will be able to leapfrog over at least 
some of the debtor's other creditors. It is for the judgment creditor to 
decide how best to enforce the judgment. ' 
This article will consider the effect 'of execution on the debtor's 
property and also the priority position of the execution creditor in any 
formal insolvency procedure which the debtor may enter. Although 
such a scenario is extremely common, the applicable law and proce- 
dure are not entirely straightforward and, apart from the ongoing 
review by the Lord Chancellor, have not been the subject of recent 
3 See e. g. P. Walton, 'Landlord's Distress-Past Its Sell By DateT [20001 Conv 508 
and id., 'The Landlord, his Distress, the Insolvent Tenant and the Stranger' (2000) 
16 Insolvency Law and Practice 47. 
4 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132) 'the CPR'. 
5 Provisions dealing with enforcement in the High Court, formerly contained in the 
Rules of the Supreme Court (SI 1965/1776) 'the RSC', are now found in Parts 
70-73 and Sch. 1 to the CPR. On the coming into force of the CPR the old RSC 
rules were transferred intact into Sch. 1. These provisions have been partly 
amended by the Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules 2001 (SI 2001/2792) 
which came into force on 25 March 2002. Although changes have been made to 
procedure and terminology there appears to be no intention to change the legal 
effect of the amended methods of enforcement. 
6 Report of the Committee on the Enforcement ofJudgment Debts, Cmnd 3909 
(1969) ('the Payne Committee). 
7 The Lord Chancellor's Department, inter alia, issued four Consultation Papers: 
Enforcement Review. How can Enforcement of Civil Court Judgments be made 
more effective? CP 1, June 1998; Enforcement Review; Key Principles for a New System of Enforcement in the Civil Courts, CP 2, May 1999; Enforcement Review. 
Attachment of Earnings Orders, Charging Orders and Garnishee Orders, CP 3, October 1999; Enforcement Review. Warrants and Writs, Oral Examinations and Judgment Summonses, January 2000 and has reported on the review process thus far: Enforcement Review: Report of the First Phase of the Enforcement Review, July 2000. 
8 CPR r. 70.2. 
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commentary. 9 It will be seen that execution creditors often find them- 
selves in a difficult position. No matter how diligent they are in obtain- 
ing and executing their judgment, they may find that other creditors 
still have priority, or that their execution is halted at the final hurdle 
and that all they have achieved is to throw good money after bad. 
II. Types of Execution 
Before considering the position of an execution creditor where the 
debtor has entered a formal insolvency procedure, it is first necessary 
to consider the various enforcement methods available to the creditor. 
In considering the principal methods of execution it is intended to 
analyse the legal rights which each method gives to the creditor. 
Execution can be taken to mean 'the process for enforcing or giving 
effect to the judgment of the court'. 10 A judgment for the payment of 
money may be enforced in the High Court by a writ of fleri facias, " a 
third party debt order, " a charging order 13 or the appointment of a 
receiver. 14 There is also the comparatively rare possibility of seques- 
tration under the court's contempt jurisdiction. " The creditor may 
also have the right to have the judgment enforced in the county 
court 16 or rely upon some other rights such as petitioning for the 
bankruptCy17 (if the debtor is an individual) or winding up" (if'a com- 
pany) of the judgment debtor. " 
A judgment for the giving of possession of land may be enforced by 
a writ of possession . 
20 A judgment for the delivery of goods may be 
enforced by a writ of specific delivery. 21 
9 But see the excellent D. Hare and D. Milman, 'Debenture holders and judgment 
creditors-problems of priority' [19821 LMCLQ 57; R. Calnan, 'Priorities Between 
Execution Creditors and Floating Chargees'(1982-3) 10 NZULR 111; and P. 
Blanchard, 'The "Security' of an Execution Creditor' (1982-3) 10 NZULR 332. 
10 Re Overseas Aviation Engineering (GB) Ltd [19631 Ch 24 at 39 per Lord Denning 
MR. See also Blackman v Fysh [189213 Ch 209 at 217 per Kekewich J. 
11 See CPR Sch. I Ord. 47. 
12 CPR Part 72. 
13 CPR Part 73. 
14 See CPR Part 69 brought into force by the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 
2002 (SI 2002/2058) which revoke CPR Sch. I Ord. 51. If the judgment or order is 
to do or restrain from doing any act, which would include a judgment which 
specifies a time for payment of the money to a person (very unusual in practice), it 
may be enforced by order of committal or writ of sequestration (CPR Sch. I Ord. 
45, rr. 5,6 and 7). 
15 See e. g. Pratt v Inman (1889) 43 Ch D 175. 
16 See County Courts Act 1984, s. 105(l) under which a High Court judgment may 
be enforced in the county court under s. 85 as if it were a judgment of that court. 
17 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 264. 
18 Ibid. s. 124. 
19 Enforcement may also be possible under the Debtors Acts 1869 and 1878 subject 
to the Administration of Justice Act 1970, s. 11. 
20 CPR Sch. I Ord. 45 r. 3. 
21 CPR Sch. I Ord. 45 r. 4(l)(a). A judgment for the delivery of any goods or 
payment of their assessed value in the alternative may be enforced by a writ of 
delivery to recover the goods or their assessed value or, with leave of the court, a 
writ of specific delivery. 
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For the purposes of this article it is intended to concentrate upon 
the modes of execution most likely to be sought by a commercial 
creditor, namely the writ of fleri facias, third party debt orders and 
charging orders. As will be seen, the legal effect of charging orders is 
relatively certain. The same cannot safely be asserted in relation to 
third party debt orders or the writ of fleri tacias. 
L Third Party Debt Orders (previously Garnishee ProceedingS22) 
In third party debt proceedings an interim order is served on a third 
party who is a debtor of the judgment debtor. The third party is 
frequently a bank with whom the judgment debtor holds an account 
in credit and the intention is to require the bank to pay the execution 
creditor, rather than the judgment debtor, the money held in the ac- 
count. The procedure to obtain a third party debt order is a two-stage 
process. 23 An application for an interim third party debt order is made 
without notice. No hearing is held. 21 The interim order directs the 
third party not to make any payment to the judgment debtor which 
reduces the amount owed to the judgment debtor to less than the 
amount specified in the order. The interim order is binding upon the 
third party when it is served. 25 
A return date is set for a hearing to consider whether or not to 
make the order final. This hearing is the second stage of the process. 
Unless there are grounds for objecting to the order it will be made 
final. The grounds upon which such objection may be made include 
the third party claiming a right of set-off or some other party claiming 
some prior right to the money. If the order is made final it becomes 
enforceable against the third party as an order to pay money'26 and 
can thereafter be enforced against the third party. 
Effect of Third Party Debt Orders 
Under the previous enforcement regime of garnishee proceedings, 
the equivalent of the interim order, the garnishee order nisi, was 
expressly stated to bind the debt as from the service of the order on 
the garnishee: 
Such an order shall bind in the hands of the garnishee as from the 
service of the order on him any debt specified in the order or so much 
thereof as may be so specified. " 
22 On 25 March 2002 garnishee proceedings were abolished and replaced by third 
party debt orders by the Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules 2001 (SI 
2001/2792) by the introduction of CPR Part 72. 
23 Similar to the procedure for a garnishee order which it replaces. The former 
procedure to obtain a garnishee order was contained in RSC Ord. 49. 
24 CPR r. 72.4(l). 
25 CPR r. 72.4(4). 
26 CPR r. 72.9(l). 
27 RSC Ord. 49 r. 3(2). 
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If the garnishee order were made absolute, execution could thereafter 
issue against the garnishee's own property. 28 It was the order nisi 
though which created an equitable charge over the debt. 21 The courts, 
despite some careless phrasing at timeS, 30 were consistent in deciding 
that a garnishee order nisi gave rise to an equitable charge over the 
debt in favour of the judgment creditor upon service of the order nisi 
on the garnishee. 31 The debt became subject to the charge but was not 
transferred to the judgment creditor. 32 
Under the new regime of third party debt orders there is no specific 
mention of the debt being bound by service of the interim order. 
There is a statement that the interim order 'becomes binding on a 
third party when it is served on hiM"33 but not that it is binding upon 
the actual debt. It is clearly binding personally upon the third party 
who is required to retain enough of the debt to satisfy the judgment 
and costs of the enforcement but this does not amount to the creation 
of any interest by way of charge or otherwise over the debt itself in 
favour of the judgment creditor. The upshot of this is that a third party 
debt order does not constitute the execution creditor a secured credi- 
tor. The rights of the execution creditor are in personam and not in 
rem. 
It is clear from the Lord Chancellor's Review ofEnforcement of Civil 
Court JudgmentS34 that although certain changes were intended to 
this form of execution, there was no intention to affect the secured 
status of the creditor following service of the interim (previously nisi) 
order. 35 There is no doubt that the Lord Chancellor has the power 
under the Civil Procedure Act 199711 to amend the Civil Procedure 
28 RSC Ord. 49 r. 4. 
29 Cairney v Back [190612 K13 746 at 750 per Walton J. 
30 See the criticism by D. Hare and D. Milman, above n. 9 at 62 of Farwell LJs 
dictum in Galbraith v Grimshaw and Baxter [191011 KB 339 at 343. 
31 See e. g. Lindley LJ in Rogers v Whiteley (1889) 23 QBD 236 at 238 who seems to 
use the terms 'garnishee order' and 'charging order' as interchangeable. See also 
e: g. Emanuel v Bridger (1874) LR 9 QB 286; Re Stanhope Silkstone Collieries Co, 
(1879) It ChD 160; Re National United Investment Corpn (190111 Ch 950; 
Galbraith v Grimshaw and Baxter [191011 KB 339, affd. [19101 AC 508. 
32 Chatterton v Watney (1881) 17 ChD 259. The statement by James LJ in ex p. 
Joselyne (1878) 8 ChD 327 at 330 to the effect that property in the debt is 
transferred is not to be taken literally: Norton v Yates [190611 KB 112 at 120 per 
Warrington J. See also Re Combined Weighing and Advertising Co (1889) 43 ChD 
99. 
33 CPR r. 72.4(4). 
34 Enforcement Review. Report of the First Phase of the Enforcement Review, July 
2000, Section 6 which led to the changes made by the Civil Procedure 
(Amendment No. 4) Rules 2001 (SI 2001/2792). 
35 It is on the face of it a major break with the past. The origins of garnishee 
proceedings are somewhat ancient (see e. g. Robbins v Standard (1667) 1 Sid 327; 
82 ER 1136). Initial common law application was extended to all courts after the 
Judicature Act 1875 when the garnishee provisions of the Common Law 
Procedure Act 1854 were incorporated into the RSC 1875 Ord. XLV r. 2. Until the 
recent amendment the provisions have always stated that the debt is bound by 
the order. 
36 Sections 1-4 and Sch. 1. 
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Rules by statutory instrument through the output of the Rules Com- 
mittee and so the amendment is valid. 37 It remains to be seen how the 
courts will interpret this apparent alteration. Due to the clear change 
in wording it is submitted that the only course open to the courts is to 
hold that the creditor at no time becomes a secured creditor over the 
debt owed by the third party. Although there may be rights enforce- 
able personally against the third party, these do not amount to a right 
in rem over the debt itself. As will be demonstrated later, this may 
have consequences for the execution creditor in the event of the in- 
solvency of the judgment debtor. 
ii. Charging Orders 
A charging order is defined by section 1(1) of the Charging Orders 
Act 1979 as an order'imposing on any such pýoperty of the debtor as 
rhay be specified in the order a charge for securing payment of any 
money due or to become due under [a] judgment or order'. It may be 
used by a judgment creditor to obtain a charge over the judgment 
debtor's land, stocks and shares, beneficial interest under a trust or 
over money held in court for the debtor. 31 The order secures the debt 
but in itself does not produce any money. The procedure is similar to 
that involved in third party debt proceedings in that there is a two- 
stage procesS. 31 The first stage is to obtain an interim charging order 
(formerly a charging order n1si) without a hearing. The order will 
subsequently be made final unless the debtor (or other interested 
party) can show cause as to why it should not. 10 The creditor can 
enforce the charge by applying to the court for an order of sale. 41 
If the order is over shares, the creditor may apply to the court for a 
If stop order, 42 on the company in question to prevent any transfer of 
the shares occurring or a "stop notice, 13 which prevents any such 
transfer without the company first giving the creditor notice of the 
proposed transfer. If the order is over land, in the period prior to an 
enforced sale the creditor can protect the charging order from a bona 
fide purchaser for value acquiring an unencumbered title, by registra- 
tion under the Land Charges Act 1972 or by registering a notice or 
caution at the Land Registry. " 
37 Ibid. 
38 Charging Orders Act 1979, s. 2(2). 
39 The procedure was amended at the same time as garnishee proceedings were 
replaced by third party debt orders by the Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) 
Rules 2001 (SI 2001/2792). 
40 CPR r. 73.8 and see Charging Orders Act 1979, s. 3(4). 
41 By separate proceedings under CPR Part 8. See also CPR r. 73.10. 
42 CPR r. 73.12. 
43 CPR r. 73.17. 
44 Charging Orders Act 1979, s. 3(2) and (3). 
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Effect of a Charging Order 
There is no doubt that the interim charging order takes effect as an 
immediate equitable charge on the assets. 45 The recent changes to the 
Civil Procedure Rules appear to make no difference to this rule. 
iii. Writ of Fieri Facias 
The writ of fieri facias" (commonly abbreviated to AM. ) may be used 
to execute a judgment or order for the payment of money or costs. 
The Lord Chancellor's Review of Enforcement has thus far made no 
changes to this form of execution. The writ of fl. fa. may issue im- 
mediately upon payment becoming due, which with a judgment in the 
ordinary form will mean immediately the judgment is entered. There 
will ordinarily be no need to serve notice of the judgment or the 
judgment itself on the debtor prior to the writ being issued. 47 
The writ of fl. fa. is in the form of a royal direction addressed to the 
sheriff48 of tlyo county (or bailiwick) in which the debtor's goods are 
situate, to seize and sell such goodS49 of the debtor within the county 
as may be sufficient to satisfy the judgment, interest upon the judg- 
ment (which begins to run when judgment is entered) and the costs of 
the execution itself. The writ also instructs the sheriff to pay the 
amount levied to the judgment creditor less his own costs and fees. 10 
It is the duty of the sheriff in executing the AM. to take possession of 
all the goods of the judgment debtor within his bailiwick or at least 
sufficient to satisfy the execution. " The sheriff owes a duty to the 
execution creditor to seize the debtor's goods at once. " Upon the sale 
45 See ibid. s. 3(4), CPR r. 73.4(2) and Coutts and Co v Clarke [20021 EWCA Cir. 943. 
46 CPR Sch. I Ord. 47. 
47 Land Credit Company of Ireland v Fermoy (1870) LR 5 Ch 323. 
48 To whom the writ should be delivered. It is now possible to use the simpler 
expedient of delivering the writ to the Sheriffs Lodgement Centre. 
49 At common law all goods and chattels of the judgment debtor could be seized and 
sold. This was extended by the Judgments Act 1838, s. 12 whereby money and 
banknotes could also be seized. Certain goods are exempt from execution: such 
tools, books, vehicles and other items of equipment as are necessary to that 
person for use personally by him in his employment, business or vocation and 
such clothing, bedding, furniture, household equipment and provisions as are 
necessary for satisfying the basic domestic needs of that person and his family 
(see now Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 138(3A)). A recent example of these 
exceptions is Brookes v Harris [199511 WLR 918 where the record collection of 
'Whispering' Bob Harris, a disc jockey, was held to be within the meaning of 
'tools of the trade'. 
50 Upon receipt by the sheriff, the writ must be indorsed with the hour, day, month 
and year when it was so received. Similarly, in the county court under County 
Courts Act 1984, s. 99(3), the bailiff must indorse the warrant of execution with 
the hour, day, month and year when he received it. Where there is more than one 
writ delivered to the sheriff priority is given to the writ first delivered (Supreme 
Court Act 1931, s. 133). Where there are 1-ligh Court writs of Ata. and county 
court warrants of execution issued against the same party, priority depends upon 
which was delivered to the sheriff/bailiff first. This will be apparent from the 
respective indorsements. 
51 Pitcher v King (1844) 5 QB 758; 114 ER 1436. 
52 Dennis v Whetharn (1874) LR 9 QB 345. 
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of the goods, and the proceeds being paid over to the sheriff, the 
execution creditor has a right of action against the sheriff for money 
had and received . 
53 In practice the sheriff may decide not to remove 
the goods seized from the premises but may enter into what is known 
as a 'walking possession' agreement with the debtor. This agreement 
allows the goods to remain at the debtor's premises, but as the goods 
will be in custodia legis, the debtor cannot deal with them until the 
debt is paid. " 
(a) Effect of a Writ of Peri Facias 
At common law the goods of the debtor were bound from the time of 
the issue of the writ. This rule was taken advantage of by creditors 
who, following judgment, would take out a Afa. but not deliver it to 
the sheriff. As the goods were bound by the writ, if any further credi- 
tors came in later claiming priority over the debtor's goods, the origi- 
nal judgment creditor could produce the fl. fa. and ensure being paid 
first out of the proceeds of the sale of the goods. Not surprisingly, this 
common law rule was altered. Section 16 of the Statute of FraudS55 in 
1677 provided that 'No writ of fleri facias or other writ of execution 
shall bind the property of the goods against which such writ of execu- 
tion is sued forth, but from the time that such writ shall be delivered to 
the sheriff .... 
'. 56 The effect of this provision was that the sheriff could 
not seize goods which the debtor had alienated prior to the delivery of 
the writ but he could seize goods which had been alienated after 
delivery. 57 
Although its purpose is clear, this form of wording has created 
confusion up to the present day, in that it is still not certain exactly 
what property interests are created or disturbed by the Ata. It could 
mean that the judgment creditor obtains a form of security interest in 
58 the goods. This security interest may be brought into being as soon 
53 Morland v Pellatt (1828) 8 B&C 722,108 ER 1211; and Bower v Hett [189512 QB 51. 
54 See e. g. National Commercial Bank of Scotland v Arcam Demolition and 
Construction Ltd [1966] 2 QB 593. 
55 Replaced by Sale of Goods Act 1893, s. 26 which itself was replaced by the 
current provision in the Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 138. In the county court, the 
goods are bound from the time of the application for a warrant of execution, not 
the time of delivery to the bailiff (see Murgatroyd v Wright [190712 KB 333). 
56 In 1856 a proviso was added to this that 'no such writ shall prejudice the title to 
such goods acquired by any person in good faith and for valuable consideration, 
unless such person had at the time when he acquired his title notice that such writ 
or any other writ, by virtue of which the goods of the execution debtor might be 
served or attached, had been delivered to and remained unexecuted in the hands 
of the sheriff: Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856, s. 1. See now the Supreme 
Court Act 1981, s. 138. 
57 With the exception of goods sold in market overt. See Samuel v Duke (1838) 3 
M&W 622,150 ER 1294; Lowthal v Tonkins (1740) 2 Eq Cas Abr 381,22 ER 323; 
Smallcomb v Cross (1697) 1 Ld Rayrn 251,91 ER 1064; Payne v Drewe (1804) 4 
East 523,102 ER 931. 
58 The Payne Committee at para. 682 was in no doubt about this: 'The words of the 
section "shall bind the property in the goods' have the effect of constituting a 
charge upon the goods. ' 
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as the writ is delivered to the sheriff, or possibly later upon seizure by 
the sheriff. The creditor may obtain no security interest, the only 
interest passing to the sheriff in the carrying out of his function. It is 
not clear from the wording what right, if any, the sheriff has in the 
goods. It may mean that the judgment debtor is divested of all or 
some of his interest in the goods. These are crucial issues in consider- 
ing exactly what the interests of the execution creditor are, and how 
they interact with other creditors' interests. 
The courts have not, at first blush, been entirely consistent in their 
approach to the effect of a fl. ta. Different approaches are discernible 
depending upon the era and the context in which the claim arises. 
(b) Position of the Sheriff and the Judgment Creditor under the 
Writ of Fieri Faclas 
Delivery of the writ to the sheriff is said to bind the goods of the execu- 
tion debtor from the date of delivery. It is clear that title to the goods is 
not altered. Any transfer by the debtor remains valid but the purchaser 
takes the goods subject to the rights of the execution creditor. 59 
Title to the goods is not transferred to the judgment creditor by 
either delivery of the writ to the sheriff or by seizure of goods under it 
by the sheriff. 10 This point was confirmed by the House of Lords' 
decision in Giles v Grover" in 1832. In holding that neither delivery of 
the writ nor seizure by the sheriff vests any title in the goods in the 
creditor, their lordships undertook an extremely detailed assessment 
of the effect of the writ of fl. fa. 
The facts of Giles involved a question as to who should have prior- 
ity between a creditor executing a judgment by way of AM. and the 
62 Crown which was executing under a writ of extent. The sheriff had 
seized goods of the judgment debtor under the AM. Prior to sale a 
writ of extent in aid63 was issuedagainst the debtor. The issue was 
whether the sheriff should sell the goods'under the AM. or whether 
the Crown had priority. The writ of extent gave priority to the Crown, 
due to the royal prerogative, over any subjects' unsecured claims even 
if the extent was issued second in time. Only if the subject had a 
59 Woodland v Fuller (1840) 11 Ad &E 859,113 ER 641. 
60 In Hutchinson v Johnston (1787) 1 TR 729,99 ER 1346 two writs of Ara. had been 
issued. The sheriff seized under the writ which had been delivered to him second 
in time. The court held that the sheriff might sell under the writ of the creditor 
who had delivered the writ first in time but under which he had not seized. From 
this it can be seen that mere seizure by the sheriff vests no rights in the seized 
goods in the judgment creditor. In similar circumstances in Payne v Drewe (1804) 
4 East 532 it was held that if a sheriff seizes and sells under the second delivered 
writ, the creditor who had delivered the first writ has no rights to follow the 
goods or their proceeds but has only a remedy against the sheriff. 
61 (1832) 6 Bligh NS 277,5 ER 598. 
62 A prerogative writ which was abolished by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, 
s. 33. 
63 A writ based upon the premise that the judgment creditor owed money to the 
Crown but was unable to pay it because he himself was owed money by the 
judgment debtor. 
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secured debt did the subject have priority over the Crown. Giles de- 
cided that seizure alone by the sheriff did not create any interest in the 
goods in the judgment creditor and therefore the Crown retained its 
priority. 
Upon seizure, the sheriff acquires a 'special property' in the goods. 
He may sue in trespass for them and is bound to sell them. This 
'special property' is explained by Patteson J as: 
... merely that which results from his being the appointed officer of the law, and to enable him to sell the goods and raise the money; not that 
thereby the property is taken out of the debtor ... the sheriff, whilst the 
goods are in his hands, holds them for the benefit of any one who may 
have a legal charge against them, as property of the debtor. 64 
Taunton J commented that: 
[11f, after seizure, the defendant pays the debt to the sheriff, he is entitled 
to have his. goods again without any grant from the sheriff or if a 
leasehold, without any reassignment. So also, I apprehend, if goods in 
execution are burnt, or otherwise injured, without default of the sheriff, 
it is the loss of the defendant. 65 
Title to the goods remains in the debtor until sale. Upon sale, the 
purchaser obtains a good title from the sheriff. At this point the debt- 
or's title is extinguished. The sheriff is under a duty to sell and pay 
over the proceeds to the creditor. This is a legal duty imposed by the 
writ and does not constitute the sheriff as trustee for the creditor. 
Nowhere in Giles is it suggested that the execution creditor, at any 
point, is constituted a secured creditor. 
W Bankruptcy Cases 
Throughout the development of modern bankruptcy law the legis- 
lature introduced various provisions which impacted upon the rights 
of execution creditors in the subsequent bankruptcy of the judgment 
debtor. One such provision, introduced by section 184 of the Bank- 
ruptcy Act 1849, is to the effect (limiting the discussion to AM. execu- 
tions for present purposes) that an execution creditor cannot rely 
upon the 'benefit of the execution' against goods where the execution 
is not completed by seizure and sale prior to the bankruptcy. 66 
64 Giles v Grover (1832) 6 Bligh NS 277 at 292-3. 
65 Ibid. at 334-5. Taunton J relied upon, inter alia, Lord Hardwicke's dictum In 
Lowthal v Tonkins (1740) 2 Eq Ca Abr 381 at 381: 'But neither before this Statute, 
nor since, is the Property of the Goods altered, but continues in the Defendant till 
the Execution executed. The Meaning of these Words, "That the Goods shall be 
bound from the Delivery of the Writ to the Sherifr, is, that after the Writ is so 
delivered, if the Defendant makes an Assignment of his Goods, unless in Market- 
overt, the Sheriff may take them in Execution. ' 
66 Other provisions impacting upon the execution creditor were: (1) the execution 
creditor received some protection from the operation of the doctrine of relation 
back (introduced by the Bankruptcy Act 1849, s. 133). The doctrine of relation 
back operated to relate the title of the trustee in bankruptcy back to the date of 
the first available act of bankruptcy committed within a specified period of the 
petition. In practice therefore it was often the case that the creditor would levy 
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Under the Bankruptcy Act 1869, the above rule was totally omitted. 
Section 12 of the 1869 Act stated that upon a debtor being adjudicated 
bankrupt, creditors with provable claims fell into the general bank- 
ruptcy scheme. The exception to this was that a creditor 'holding a 
security upon the property of the bankrupt' could continue to enforce 
the security. If the execution creditor could show that the process of 
execution had transformed the unsecured debt into a secured debt, 
the execution creditor could claim the benefit of the security in the 
debtor's bankruptcy. 
In Slater v Pinder, 17 decided under the 1869 Act, the sheriff had 
seized under a fl. fa. the day before a bankruptcy petition was pre- 
sented against the judgment debtor. He had yet to complete the sale of 
the goods seized when he was informed of the bankruptcy adjudica- 
tion. Martin B, in the only reserved judgment of the Court of Ex- 
chequer, stated that 'the right or claim which the judgment creditor 
had upon the. goods ofhis debtor is called a security". 613 
His lordship went carefully through the historical development of 
the bankruptcy statutory provisions relating to execution creditors 
and highlighted the fact that: 
the words 'holding a security' are the words used in the 9th section of 21 
Jac. [Bankruptcy Act 16231 and the 184th section of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106 
[Bankruptcy Act 18491, to describe the interest of the plaintiff in an 
execution under which a sheriff has seized and is in possession of 
goods ... 
69 
It is important to note that these provisions expressly included an 
execution creditor's rights under a fl. ta. as constituting a security 
interest. 
Until the 1849 Bankruptcy Act, seizure by the sheriff entitled the 
execution creditor to payment unless an act of bankruptcy (the 
ground upon which a bankruptcy order was formerly founded) was 
execution upon goods of which the debtor was ostensibly the owner, only to find 
under a subsequent bankruptcy that the trustee was in fact the person with title to 
the goods. Section 133 therefore gave protection to the execution creditor in this 
situation as long as he acted in good faith and completed the execution prior to 
the date of the bankruptcy petition. If the execution was completed prior to the 
period of relation back the creditor would be safe anyway-see Edwards v 
Scarsbrook (1862) 3B&S 280,122 ER 106. The Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 95(3) 
introduced an amendment to this by protecting the creditor if the execution was 
completed by seizure and sale before the creditor received notice of an act of 
bankruptcy; (2) the execution itself constituted an act of bankruptcy upon which a 
bankruptcy order could be founded, and importantly the sheriff was directed to 
hold the proceeds of such sale for a specified time so that any other creditor, or 
the debtor himself, could intervene by bringing bankruptcy proceedings 
(introduced by the Bankruptcy Act 1861, s. 73). As long as the period of time had 
elapsed and the sheriff had paid out the execution creditor, any subsequent 
trustee in bankruptcy could not set the payment aside-see ex p Villars (1874) LR 9 
Ch App 432 at 444 per Lord Cairns. The current equivalent bankruptcy provisions 
are contained in the Insolvency Act 1986, s. 346. 
67 (1871) LR 6 Exch 228. 
68 Ibid. at 236. 
69 Ibid. at 237. 
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committed prior to the seizure by the sheriff. By section 184 of the 
1849 Act where an act of bankruptcy occurred prior to the execution 
being perfected by seizure and sale, the title of the trustee prevailed. 
As mentioned above, the 1869 Act repealed section 184 and the posi- 
tion returned to how it was before, being governed by the 'old com- 
mon law of bankruptCyP70 as Kelly CB calls it. Channell B, in applying 
the old rules, stated '[the creditor] had, at common law, a valid title by 
such seizure, of which he could only be deprived by express statutory 
enactment .. . ". 
71 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Excheq- 
uer Chamber. 72 
It is interesting to observe the references by their lordships to the 
position at'common law'. This may mean common law in its widest 
sense, or, as the context suggests is more likely, in a narrower sense to 
include only the common law of bankruptcy, a compendious expres- 
sion for a number of judge-made rules engrafted onto the Bankruptcy 
Acts but going no further. If the narrower interpretation is the correct 
One, then the idea that a fl. ta. creditor becomes a secured creditor 
upon seizure by the sheriff is a concept which may only apply to cases 
falling to be decided under certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Acts. 
The statement that a 'valid title' was vested in the execution creditor 
appears to be at odds with Giles and without qualification appears to 
be incorrect. Channell B may have intended his words not to be 
construed as creating a title to the actual goods seized but merely the 
creation of a charge over those goods. 
In ex p Williams" the priority dispute was between an execution 
creditor under a county court warrant of execution where no seizure 
had taken place and a trustee in liquidation by arrangement. 74 Again 
the matter that fell for consideration depended upon the construction 
of the Bankruptcy Acts . 
71 It was argued that, as the Statute of Frauds 
stated that goods were bound by the delivery of the writ to the sheriff, 
the execution creditor became a secured creditor at that time. The 
Court of Appeal in following Slater v Pinder held that a 'mere right to 
seize property cannot properly be called a security-176 and therefore 
only upon seizure of the goods did the execution creditor obtain a 
security over them. 
In ex p RayneJ7 Bacon VC referred, inter alia, to Slater v Pinder and 
stated that the case had no bearing on the issue in Rayner which 
70 Ibid. at 239. 
71 Ibid. at 241. 
72 (1872) LR 7 Exch 95. 
73 (1872) 7 Ch App 314. 
74 Which for present purposes is 'of the same force and effect as if an order of 
adjudication in bankruptcy' had been made: Re Veness (1870) LR 10 Eq 419 at 423 
per Bacon VC. 
75 The operation of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 12. 
76 (1872) 7 Ch App 314 at 318 per Mellish U. 
77 (1872) 41 LJ Bcy 26. 
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involved interpretation of a different provision of the Bankruptcy Act 
1869: 78 
I take the law to have been established by the judgment of the House of 
Lords in Giles v Grover ... that 'the seizure of goods by the sheriff will 
not vest any property whatsoever in the creditor ... and no property 
is 
transferred ... to the sheriff. 
79 
In the Court of Appeal James U, with whom Mellish U concurred, is 
reported as being in entire agreement with Bacon VCs decision. 80 
This is perhaps surprising as the date of their lordships' decision is 
the same date as their decision in ex p Williams. It may be that the only 
way to reconcile these potentially divergent decisions is to recognize 
the effect of seizure under section 12 and its successors as having a 
different effect than at common law or under other provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Acts. A more convincing reconciliation would be to re- 
strict ýhe decision in Rayner to holding that no title to the seized goods 
passed to the sheriff nor to the execution creditor. This does not 
preclude the creditor having the benefit of a charge over the seized 
assets. 
The case of Re Clarke" differs from the above as it does not involve 
construction of the bankruptcy statutes. The facts of the case were 
that a debtor who had his goods seized under a writ of Afa. subse- 
quently had a receiver appointed over his affairs under the Lunacy 
Act 1890 on the ground that he was of unsound mind. The receiver 
claimed that under the Lunacy Act the lunatic debtor's assets were 
entitled to be protected from execution. The Court of Appeal found 
that there was no power available to the court to protect the assets of 
the lunatic in the absence of the receiver having actually taken posses- 
sion of the lunatic's assets prior to the execution. Importantly, Lindley 
MR stated: 
It is very true that the property in goods seized under a fl. fa. remains in 
the execution debtor until sale: Giles v Grover. But it is no less true that 
after seizure and before sale the execution creditor is as regards those 
goods in the position of a secured creditor: see Ex parte Williams and 
Slater v Pinder. He had a legal right as against the execution debtor-Le. 
owner of the goods-to have the goods sold and to be paid out of the 
proceeds of sale. ' 
Lindley MR is clearly of the view that although no property in the 
goods has passed to the execution creditor on seizure, the creditor at 
that point becomes a secured creditor. 
78 Section 87. 
79 (1872) 41 LJ Bcy 26 at 30. 
80 Ex p Rayner (1872) 7 Ch App 325. 
81 1189811 Ch 336. 
82 Ibid. at 339. 
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Section 184 of the Bankruptcy Act 1849 was effectively reintro- 
duced by section 45 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883.83 Both provisions 
prevented the creditor from retaining the 'benefit of the execution' 
unless the execution was completed by seizure and sale prior to the 
presentation of the bankruptcy petition. Case law under these provi- 
sions frequently turned upon what should happen if the sheriff had 
seized but not sold prior to the petition, although some payment had 
been received from the debtor. Did 'benefit of the execution' include 
any money received by the creditor under the execution, or could he 
keep what he had received? 
After some judicial inconsistency, the Court of Appeal in Re 
Andrew84 decided that the phrase referred to the charge created in 
favour of the execution creditor by delivery of the writ to the sheriff, in 
so far as the charge still subsisted at the time of the bankruptcy. It did 
not refer to any moneys received by the creditor prior to the bank- 
ruptcy by virtue of the execution. In considering the meaning of the 
phrase 'beneflt of the execution' in Re Godwin 85 Luxmoore J stated: 
First, what is the position at common law, and apart from the statutory 
provisions in Bankruptcy Acts, when an execution creditor issues a writ 
of A fa. and delivers it to the sheriff? From the moment of its delivery, 
the goods are bound for the benefit of the execution creditor ... the 
execution creditor has the first right to the resulting charge on the 
goods. This charge puts the execution creditor in a better position than 
the other creditors of the judgment debtor. When the sheriff has seized 
the goods, no one else can deal with them so long as the execution 
remains in force. This result can properly be described as the benefit of 
the execution from the execution creditor's point of view. 
His lordship later states that the phrase 'on the true construction of 
the section, refers solely to the protection obtained by an execution 
creditor by reason of the issue of the writ of fl. fa. and its delivery to 
the sheriffy. 86 Although slightly ambiguous in that this dictum may be 
interpreted as suggesting the charge comes into effect on delivery of 
the writ to the sheriff, the better view is that the court was merely 
repeating the words of the statutory successor to the Statute of 
Frauds" and is relatively clear that the charge only arises upon sei- 
zure by the sheriff. 
Re Godwin was followed in Re Samuels88 and in Re Andrew. 89 In the 
latter case Lord Wright MR said that the 'beneflt of the execution' 
83 This provision became the Bankruptcy Act 1914, s. 40. 'Ibc modern equivalent Is 
the Insolvency Act 1986, s. 346. 
84 [19371 Ch 122 overruling Re Ford [190011 QB 264; Re Godding 1191412 KB 70; Re 
Fairley [192212 Ch 791; Re Brelsford 1193211 Ch 24; and Re Kern 11932) 1 Ch 555 
and following Re Godwin (19351 Ch 213 and Re Samuels 119351 Ch 341. 
85 [19351 Ch 213 at 219-20. 
86 Ibid. at 223. 
87 Sale of Goods Act 1893, s. 26 which Itself was replaced by the current provision In 
the Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 138. 
88 (19351 Ch 341. 
89 [19381 Ch 122. 
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cannot refer to money already paid under the execution nor can I. -
operate on goods already sold with the proceeds applied to partiaý 
discharge of the debt but it 'can only refer, in our opinion, to the, 
charge still remaining under the still subsisting execution for the bal-ý 
ance of the debt'. 91 
(d) Is an Execution Creditor under a writ of R. Fa. a Secured 
Creditor? 
It is not immediately easy to reconcile all the above case law., It seems 
that at times the courts have taken the view that the execution creditor 
obtains no interest in the goods seized and cannot therefore be seen 
to be a secured creditor upon seizure by the sheriff. Other cases 
suggest seizure does constitute the creditor a secured creditor. It is 
not clear whether such decisions are limited to interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Acts or are statements of general law. Others seem to go 
even further and suggest delivery of the writ to the sheriff constitutes 
the creditor a secured creditor, although such a suggestion was dis- 
counted by Lord Hardwicke in 174011 and remains untenable. 
It is important to bear in mind that at the time Giles was decided, 
the equitable charge had yet to be invented. The principal non- 
possessory type of security over personalty recognized at this time 
was the mortgage-wh ether legal or equitable. 92 This type of mort- 
gage does not require the mortgagee to be in possession of the mort- 
gaged assets but does transfer title in the goods to the mortgagee. It is 
no surprise that the House of Lords refused to recognize that any 
property passes to the execution creditor (or the sheriff) under a AM. 
as clearly no title in the seized assets does pass. Seventeen years after 
Giles, the Bankruptcy Act 1849, in defining the meaning of security, 
referred to mortgages and liens but not charges. 91 
The exact moment when the equitable charge was invented and 
recognized as such is not entirely clear. It was used as early as 185994 
in an attempt to circumvent the Bills of Sale Act 1854 and was later 
expressly recognized by the courts in 1867 in Brown v Bateman. 95 It 
was included in the definition of 'security' in section 16 of the Bank- 
ruptcy Act 1869. It is noteworthy that cases such as Slater, Williams 
and Clarke were decided after the 1869 Act definition was introduced. 
It is the essence of an equitable charge that the chargee does not have 
possession or title to the charged assets but does have a right to have 
90 Ibid. at 136. Re Love [1951] Ch 952 followed Re Andrew and Re Godwin. 
According to Danckwerts J at 959, the benefit of the execution refers 'to the 
charge which a judgment creditor obtains by the issue of the execution'. 
91 Lowthal v Tonkins (1740) 2 Eq Ca Abr 381. 
92 See R. Gregory and P. Walton, 'Fixed and Floating Charges-a Revelation' [20011 
LMCLQ 123. 
93 Section 184. 
94 King v Marshall (1864) 33 Beav 565,55 ER 488. 
95 (1867) LR 2 CP 272. 
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the assets sold to pay off the charged debt. 96 This right is defeasible 
upon payment of money. in the case of a fi. fa. creditor, the creditor has 
the right to force the sheriff to seize and sell the judgment debtor's 
goods in order to pay the judgment debt. This right is defeasible, in 
that the judgment debtor can pay off the debt and the creditor's rights 
under the execution cease at that moment. 
It is therefore submitted that an execution creditor under a writ of 
fi. fa. does, as Lindley MR asserts in Clarke, become at common law a 
secured creditor once the sheriff has seized the debtor's goods. The 
nature of the security appears to be that of a fixed equitable charge. 
III. Execution Creditors and Formal Insolvency Procedures 
The foregoing discussion deals with whether or not an execution 
creditor becomes a secured creditor at any stage of the execution. If 
the judgment debtor is solvent it is likely that execution creditors will 
get paid out and so will not be overly concerned as to their secured 
status or otherwise. Where the issue becomes of greater importance 
is when the debtor enters a formal insolvency procedure. If the execu- 
tion creditor can claim a secured interest one would expect the credi- 
tor to be paid out in priority in any subsequent insolvency of the 
debtor. As'will be seen, this is not quite the case. In some non- 
terminal procedures (voluntary arrangements and administration) the 
secured status is potentially crucial. In another non-terminal proce- 
dure (receivership) the courts have partly ignored the execution credi- 
tors' claim to be secured creditors. In terminal procedures (liquidation 
and bankruptcy) the Insolvency Act 1986, in the main, overrides any 
security interest obtained by the execution creditor unless completed 
prior to the liquidation or bankruptcy. 
L Execution Creditors versus Floating Charge Holders 
(Companies in Receivership) 
A common priority dispute exists between an execution creditor on 
the one hand and the holder of a floating charge on the other. The 
dispute will frequently arise when the execution creditor has insti- 
tuted enforcement procedures and the company is put into receiver- 
ship before the creditor is paid out. " Logic would dictate that if the 
execution creditor has the benefit of a security interest before the 
floating charge crystallizes then the execution creditor should win. 
96 See Morris v Agrichemicals Ltd [19971 BCC 965 at 972 per Lord Hoffman and Re 
Cosslett Contractors Ltd [1997] BCC 724 at 733 per Millett U. 
97 It should be noted that s. 250 of the Enterprise Act 2002 has effectively abolished 
a floating charge holder's power to appoint an administrative receiver where the 
floating charge is executed after the commencement of the Enterprise Act. 
Administrative receivership will remain a significant insolvency procedure for 
many years to come in relation to pre-existing floating charges. 
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Unfortunately, in this area, logic has been conspicuous by its 
absence. 
The case law which exists is most remarkable by an almost com- 
plete absence of consideration of the rights given to execution credi- 
tors upon enforcement. The analysis, such as it is, concentrates on 
what rights are given to the holder of a floating charge. 98 The most 
unfortunate thing about this is that the cases fall broadly into two 
diametrically opposed groups as to what a floating charge actually is. 
It is small wonder then that the case law fails to be entirely logical or 
consistent either on its own terms or with the wider case law deter- 
mining the rights of execution creditors. 
(a) 'Licence' Theory 
The two categories of case law differ fundamentally as to what rights 
in the charged property a floating charge gives to the chargee prior to 
crystallization. The nature of what exactly a floating charge is remains 
to some extent uncertain even today. 99 In its early days the courts 
wrestled primarily with two possibilities. The first group of cases 
proceeded on the basis that a floating charge created an immediate 
interest in the charged property. This is what Professor Pennington 
later labelled the 'licence' theory. 100 Essentially the floating charge 
gave the chargee an immediate security interest in the assets but gave 
the chargor company a licence to continue to use the assets in the 
ordinary course of business. 
The starting point for the present discussion is the Court of Appeal 
decision in Re Standard Manufacturing Company"' where Fry LJ ob- 
served that a floating charge 'does create a charge, but gives a licence 
to the company to carry on its business'. 'Ol It has always been the case 
that execution creditors can only take the judgment debtor's assets 
If subject to equities'. 103 According to the first line of case law, these 
"equities' included a floating charge. These cases'04 decide that the 
98 The exceptions to this are the cases of Norton v Yates [190611 KB 112 and Caimey 
v Back [190612 KB 746 in both of which there was some discussion of the effect of 
garnishee orders. 99 Although some certainty as to what a floating charge actually is has been 
introduced by the Privy Council in Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Re 
Brumark Investments Ltd) [200112 AC 710, the decision is not entirely helpful; see 
e. g. R. Gregory and P. Walton, 'Brumark and the Privy Council-Was the Curia 
InT (2002) 5 Receivers, Administrators and Liquidators Quarterly 25. 100 R* Pennington, Company Law, 8th edn (Butterworths: London, 2001) at 539-41. 
101 1189111 Ch 627. 
102 Ibid. at 641 citing Jessel MR in Re Florence Land and Public Works Co (1878) 10 
Ch D 530 at 541. 
103 Re Standaixi Manufacturing Co [189111 Ch 627 at 641. 
104 Re Standard Manufacturing Co [189111 Ch 627; Re Opera [189113 Ch 260; Davey v 
Williamson [189812 QB 194; Simultaneous Colour Printing Syndicate v Foweraker 
1190111 QB 771; Duck v Tower Galvanising Co [190112 KB 314, Norton v Yates 
1190611 KB 112; Cairney v Back [1906] 2 KB 746. Norton and Cairney even go as 
far as to suggest that even after a garnishee order is made absolute, a 
subsequently created floating charge will still take priority. 
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floating charge takes priority over an execution creditor even if the 
charge has yet to crystallize, as long as the debenture is issued prior 
to the date of the execution. 101 
After referring to some of the cases in this category Buckley J said 
in Re London Pressed Hinge: 106 
Mhe fact is that the appointment of a receiver does not, as between the 
execution creditor and the debenture holder, disappoint the execution 
creditor of anything which would otherwise be his right ... [Ilt results that the creditor never had any right as between himself and the de- 
benture holder to enforce payment in priority to the debenture holder. If 
he availed himself of his legal right to judgment and execution the 
debenture holder could intercept his execution. 101 
In Re Opera, 101 Lindley U, bound by the Court of Appeal's decision in 
Re Standard Manufacturing, commented: 
[Alfter the decision in In Re Standard Manufacturing Company it seems 
tolerably plain and settled that the rights of the holders of debentures 
must prevail even as against the execution creditor, at least before sale. 
What the position of the debenture holders is after the property is sold 
and the money handed over, I do not know, and I will not say at this 
moment. 109 
There is a logic to his lordship's statement. If the licence theory is 
correct, the floating charge holder must have priority over the execu- 
tion creditor. It does not matter whether the Ata. execution creditor 
obtains a charge by way of execution as the debenture holder has the 
charge which was created first and so must have priority. It must be 
remembered that Lindley's judgment in Clarke is clear that the effect 
of seizure under a Eta. is to give the execution creditor a security 
interest. His lordship's only query in Opera is in regard to what the 
position would be if the execution was complete to the point that the 
money had been handed over to the execution creditor. Would the 
debenture holder be able to assert his rights over the proceeds of 
sale? The query is reasonable in the context. Floating charges were 
not at the time publicly registrable, 110 therefore the sheriff and the 
execution creditor could not have any constructive notice of the ex- 
istence of the charge. The execution creditor has a legal right to force 
the sheriff to seize, sell and hand over the proceeds. Once this process 
is complete, could a debenture holder, with merely equitable rights of 
105 See e. g. Simultaneous. Colour Printing Syndicate v Foweraker [190111 QB 771 at 
773 per Wright J. 
106 [190511 Ch 576. 
107 Ibid. at 582. Buckley Js disquiet at the consequences of his judgment was one of 
the matters relied upon in a minority report of the Loreburn Committee (Report of 
the Company Law Amendment Committee, Cd 3052 (1906)) which recommended 
the abolition of the floating charge. 
108 [189113 Ch 260. 
109 Ibid. at 267. 
110 Floating charges were first made registrable by the Companies Act 1900, s. 14. 
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which the execution creditor had no notice, still claim priority? As 
Lord Lindley implies, there is no easy answer to this question. 
(b) 'Mortgage of Future Assets' Theory 
The second line of cases looking at floating charge holders' priority 
battles with execution creditors views the floating charge as attaching 
to nothing until something happens to crystallize the charge. "' This is 
what Professor Pennington calls the 'mortgage of future assets' the- 
ory. "' In Robson v Smith, 113 Romer J clearly states that a floating 
charge attaches to nothing until crystallization. His lordship interprets 
Fry I-J's dictum in Standard Manufacturing to the effect that a floating 
charge creates a charge but gives the company a licence to carry on 
business with the charged assets, as meaning the company can deal 
with property in the ordinary course of business and such dealing 
If will be binding on the debenture holders, provided that the dealing 
be completed before the debentures cease to be merely a floating 
security'. 114 Romer J was able to distinguish Standard Manufacturing 
and Opera on the facts as in both those cases liquidation intervened to 
crystallize the charge before the sheriff sold the goods seized. On the 
facts of Robson a garnishee order had been made absolute prior to 
crystallization and so took priority over the floating charge. The result 
of applying the mortgage of future assets theory to the priority dis- 
pute between an execution creditor and a floating charge holder is 
therefore that the execution creditor wins if the execution is complete 
prior to crystallization of the floating charge. Although ostensibly 
consistent with Standard Manufacturing and Opera on the facts, the 
view in Robson of the effect of a floating charge is clearly different. 115 
Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd"' is widely regarded as settling 
_the 
law as to disputes between floating charges and execution credi- 
tors. It does this, following Romer Js lead in Robson, by a not very 
convincing reconciliation of only some of the previous cases. In Evans 
a judgment creditor had obtained a garnishee order nisi and the court 
had subsequently made the order absolute. By this time a floating 
charge holder had still not intervened sufficiently to crystallize the 
charge (he had merely given notice to the garnishee bank, the com- 
pany's bankers, claiming to be paid the company's bank balance 
which was subject to the garnishee order). 
III See e. g. Robson v Smith [189512 Ch 118 at 124; Taunton v Sheriff of Warwickshirc 
[189511 Ch 734; and Evans v Rival Granite [191012 KB 979. 
112 R. Pennington, Company Law, 8th edn (Butterworths: London, 2001) at 539-41. 
113 [189512 Ch 118. 
114 Ibid. at 124. 
115 See also Robinson v Bumell's Vienna Bakery Co [190412 KB 624 where it was 
decided on the facts that payment to the sheriff who had seized under a fi. fa. was 
equivalent to payment to the execution creditor. 
116 [191012 KB 979. 
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Two of the Court of Appeal judges dealt with the conflicting case law 
in a rather dismissive manner. ' 17 The first of these, Vaughan-Williams 
U, having considered Robson, stated that 'it is impossible ... to say that an execution may not be enforced so long as the debenture holders 
have not got a receiver appointed or have not done something in 
regard to the licence to the company to continue carrying on its 
business'. 1113 His lordship then considered a number of early decisions 
on the nature of a floating charge"' and clearly adheres to the mort- 
gage of future assets principle that a floating charge holder has no 
interest in specific charged assets until crystallization. His lordship 
sidesteps the contradictions of reasoning in Standard Manufacturing 
and Opera by stating 'that in each of those cases the circumstances 
were such that the execution could have been defeated by the de- 
benture holder by reason of the fact that before any sale had been 
effected circumstances had happened which entitled him to determine 
the right of the company to carry on business'. 120 
The second judge, Fletcher-Moulton U, also relies on a number of 
early decisions on the nature of a floating charge 121 and concludes 
that in order to have priority over an execution creditor a floating 
charge holder must intervene to crystallize the charge, not merely 
show a default has occurred. " Importantly his lordship states that a 
floating charge allows the company to carry on its business in the 
ordinary way which includes 'a liability to the processes of the law if it 
does not pay its debts'. 123 Fletcher-Moulton LJ considers Standard 
Manufacturing and Opera as cases where prior to sale by the sheriff, 
the floating charges had actually crystallized (a point not mentioned in 
the cases themselves): 
When in these cases the goods were seized in execution, the goods were 
not by such seizure finally alienated from the company (for the company 
might have paid out the execution), so that time was left for the rights of 
the debenture holders to develop into a fixed charge on the goods. 124 
117 See e. g. Vaughan-Williams LJ, ibid. at 988 stating that a detailed examination of 
the cases would 'serve no useful purpose'. 
118 Ibid. at 988. 
119 Wheatley v Silkstone and Haigh Moor Coal Co (1885) 29 ChD 715; Re Panama, 
New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318; Government 
Stock and Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Manila Ry Co Ltd [18971 AC 81. 
120 [191012 KB 979 at 991. 
121 Wheatley v Silkstone and Haigh Moor Coal Co (1885) 29 Chl) 715; Re Panama, 
New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318; Re Colonial Trusts 
Corpn (1879) 15 ChD 465; Illingworth v Houldsworth [1904] AC 355. His lordship 
did also briefly consider Davey, the correctness of which he doubted, and he also 
considered Cairney to be incorrectly decided. 
122 [191012 KB 979 at 993. 
123 Ibid. at 995. This supports the view of Romer J in Robson and overrules the 
statements made by Lord Russell in Davey v Williamson [189812 QB 194 at 200 
and Warrington J in Norton v Yates [1906] 1 KB 112 at 124 to the effect that to 
suffer an execution is not business being carried on in the ordinary way. 
124 [191012 KB 979 at 996. 
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Buckley LJ attempted a more comprehensive consideration of the 
cases dealing with priority issues between execution creditors and 
floating charge holders. In attempting to reconcile a number of cases, 
his lordship decided that the decisive factor was whether or not the 
execution creditor had actually received the money owed prior to 
crystallization. In arriving at this result, Buckley LJ found that even 
obtaining a garnishee order absolute prior to crystallization 125 did not 
give the execution priority. 121 The consequence of this judgment is 
that the execution must be absolutely complete prior to crystallization 
in order to win out against a floating charge. Buckley U did not 
consider whether or not seizure by the sheriff under a fi. fa. or a 
garnishee order nisi being granted gave the execution creditor a 
charge in priority to the floating charge. For these purposes execution 
appears to be complete only when the execution creditor has the 
monqy in his hands or possibly when the sheriff has the proceeds of a 
sale under a fl. fa. in his hands. 
(c) The Result 
The law is not entirely satisfactory. Evans attempts to reconcile the 
previous inconsistent case law and the resultant decision therefore 
lacks coherence. Although Evans recognizes that the floating charge 
gives no fixed interest in the charged goods until crystallization, it 
does not recognize that an execution creditor may have the benefit of 
a fixed charge by, for example, seizure by the sheriff under a fl. fa. The 
sheriff must have seized and sold the goods, if not actually handed 
over the money to the execution creditor prior to crystallization, in 
order for the creditor to have priority over the floating charge. 127 The 
common law rules for determining when an execution creditor be- 
comes a secured creditor are therefore ousted in disputes with float- 
ing charge holders. 
ii. Liquidation 
There are a number of overlapping provisions restricting the rights of 
execution creditors which apply where the debtor company is being 
wound up. There is no great logic to the provisions; some apply spe- 
cifically to compulsory winding up only but may be applied in volun- 
tary liquidation at the discretion of the court. Some apply after the 
commencement of the winding up whilst others only apply once the 
winding up has occurred. Some provisions have been interpreted by 
the courts in an unlikely manner. The consequence of the provisions is 
125 Cairney v Back [1906] 2 KB 746. 
126 His lordship also found Davey v Williamson [1898] 2 QB 194 to be correctly 
decided, seemingly identifying an early form of automatic crystallization not 
mentioned in the case itself. 
127 Although floating charge holders may still claim priority if they have an 
appropriately worded automatic crystallization clause, that is a separate matter. 
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effectively that execution creditors who have yet to be paid out under 
the execution will lose out in the winding up of the judgment debtor. 
The policy behind the rules applying to execution creditors' rights 
in winding up was summarized by James U in 1874: 
Parliament has enacted that in the case of a winding up the assets of the 
company so wound up are to be collected and applied in discharge of its 
liabilities. That makes the property clearly trust property. It is property 
affected by the Act of Parliament with an obligation to be dealt with by 
the proper officer in a particular way. Then it has ceased to be benefi- 
cially the property of the company; and, being so, it has ceased to be 
liable to be seized by the execution creditors of the company. 128 
Under section 126 of the Insolvency Act 1986, upon the presentation 
of a petition for a compulsory winding up, the company, a creditor or 
a contributory may ask the court to stay execution (or other civil 
proceeding) against the company. If no stay is obtained, the execution 
(or other proceeding) may be continued with until such time as a 
winding up order is made (or provisional liquidator appointed). In the 
absence of special circumstances the court will restrain execution in 
order to ensure an equal distribution of assets amongst the company's 
creditors. 119 
Under section 130 of the Insolvency Act 1986, once a winding up 
order is made, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or 
commenced against a company without leave of the court. 130 Action 
or proceeding in this context includes execution. 131 It is highly unlikely 
that the court will grant leave to a creditor to enforce a judgment 
against a company in compulsory liquidation as it would secure an 
advantage to which the creditor would not be properly entitled if the 
assets were to be administered in accordance with the winding up 
132 provisions , Although there are no similar specific provisions governing volun- 
tary liquidations, the liquidator may apply to the court under either 
section 126 or section 130 to have the execution stayed or set aside, by 
virtue of the court's powers under section 112.133 The onus to show 
why the execution should be stayed is on the liquidator. 134 The court's 
power to stay proceedings includes any situation where the proposed 
action threatens an equal distribution of the company's assets, and so 
128 Re Oriental Inland Steam Co (1874) 9 Ch App 557 at 559. The same principle was 
applied to voluntary winding up in IRC v Olive Mill Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 712. 
129 Bowkett v Fullers United Electric Motors Ltd (192311 KB 161. 
130 For the rationale of s. 130 see Re David Lloyd & Co (1877) 6 ChD 339 at 344 per 
James LJ. 
131 Re Artistic Colour Printing Co (1880) 14 ChD 502 at 505; Anglo-Baltic and 
Mediterranean Bank v Barber & Co 1192412 KB 410. 
132 A. Keay, McPherson's Law of Company Liquidations (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 
2001) 330-6. 
133 See Anglo-Baltic and Mediterranean Bank v Barber & Co [192412 KB 410. 
134 See Currie v Consolidated Kent Collieries Corpn [190611 KB 134. 
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is likely to be granted to prevent an execution creditor enforcing 
judgment. 135 
Under section 128 of the Insolvency Act 1986 any execution put in 
force after the commencement of a compulsory winding up is void. 136 
The meaning of "put in force' in the case of a AM. is when the goods 
are seized 131 and so when a charge has been created over the assets. 138 
If this does not occur until after commencement of the winding up the 
execution is void. Despite the very definite language of section 128, it 
has long been held that the court may give leave to a creditor to 
continue with the execution, where the process had begun, for 
example, the writ of fl. ta. had been issued, even though not 'put in 
force'. 139 In the absence of special circumstances rendering it inequit- 
able not to allow the creditor to continue with the execution, leave will 
be refused. If the creditor has been prevented from enforcing due to 
some fraud or trickery, 140 the court may grant leave to complete the 
execution. It is necessary to show something greater than the 'usual 
delaying' tactics or excuses being employed by the non-paying 
company. 141 
Under section 183 of the Insolvency Act 1986 if the execution has 
begun prior to the winding up, the creditor can only retain the 'benefit 
of the execution . 1142 or attachment if the process has been completed 
prior to the commencement of winding up. 143 An execution against 
goods is'completed'in this context by seizure and sale under a fl. fa. or 
by the making of a charging order. 144 Attachment of a debt is com- 
pleted by receipt of the debt. 141 A voluntary liquidation commences 
upon the members' resolution to wind Up146 and a compulsory liquida- 
tion commences (in most cases) with the presentation of the petition 
to the court. 147 If the creditor had notice of the calling of a meeting of 
members to consider a resolution to wind up, the date upon which the 
135 Re Dicksmith (Manufacturing) Ltd [199912 BCLC 686. 
136 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 128. 
137 Re London & Devon Biscuit Co (1871) LR 12 Eq 190. 
138 Croshaw v Lyndhurst Ship Co [189712 Ch 154. 
139 This discretion appears to originate in Re The Great Ship Co (1863) 4 De GJ &S 
63,46 ER 839 and was swiftly confirmed in Re Exhall Coal Mining Co (1864) 4 De 
GJ &S 377,46 ER 964. Despite the logic of its origins being subsequently 
questioned (see e. g. Re Lancashire Cotton Spinning Co (1887) 35 Chl) 656) the 
principle is now well established. 
140 Re London Cotton Co (1866) LR 2 Eq 53. 
141 Re Redman (Builders) Ltd [196411 All ER 851; Re Caribbean Products (Yam 
Importers) Ltd [19661 Ch 331. 
142 The meaning of 'benefit of the execution' under the reasoning in Re Andrew 
refers to the charge obtained by the execution creditor, not any money actually 
received by the creditor under the execution. 
143 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 183(l). 
144 Ibid. s. 183(3)(a). 
145 Ibid. s. 183(3)(b). It remains to be seen whether the new third party debt orders 
will be viewed as proceedings which attach a debt. 
146 Ibid. s. 86. 
147 Ibid. s. 129. 
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creditor received notice is substituted for the date of the commence- 
ment of winding Up. 1413 The court has a wide discretion to set aside the 
liquidator's right to deny the execution creditor. 141 This discretion 
gives the court 'a free hand to do what is right and fair according to 
the circumstances of each case'. 110 In practice, in the absence of fraud 
or trickery, "' weighty reasons must exist before the court will exer- 
cise its discretion to depart from the pari passu principle by permit- 
ting a creditor to retain the benefit of an incomplete execution. "' 
If goods have been seized by the sheriff but not yet sold, and if the 
sheriff is given notice of a winding up order or resolution to wind up 
voluntarily, the sheriff must, on request, deliver the assets seized to 
the liquidator. The costs of the execution are a first charge on these 
assets. 153 
If the execution is for a sum greater than E500,154 after sale, the 
sheriff must retain the sum of money for 14 days. 155 If the sheriff 
receives notice during this period of a petition for compulsory wind- 
ing up or that a meeting of members has been called to consider a 
voluntary winding up resolution, if a winding up results, the sheriff 
must pay the money over to the liquidator who has priority over the 
execution creditor. 156 The court again has a discretion to set aside the 
liquidator's rights in favour of the creditor to such extent and subject 
to such terms as it thinks f1t. 157 
In summary, the execution creditor who has not yet been paid out 
will almost always be relegated to the ranks of the unsecured credi- 
tors in the winding up of the judgment debtor. 
iii. Bankruptcy 
The ideal of equal division of the insolvent's assets free from execution 
creditor harassment also underpins the rules in bankruptcy. ",, Some- 
what frustratingly, the provisions, although largely mirroring those in 
compulsory liquidation, are drafted slightly differently. It is important 
to note that the commencement of the bankruptcy is the date of the 
bankruptcy order, not the date of the presentation of the petition. 119 
There seems no logical reason for this difference. 
The court may stay any executions at any time when proceedings 
on a bankruptcy petition are pending or when the debtor has been 
148 Ibid. s. 183(2)(a). 
149 Ibid. s. 183(2)(c). 
150 Re GrosvenorMetal Co [19501 Ch 63 at 65 perVaisey J. 
151 See Re Suidair International Airways Ltd [19511 Ch 165. 
152 Re Caribbean Products (Yam Importers) Ltd [19661 Ch 331. 
153 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 1840) and (2). 
154 Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) Order 1986 (SI 1986/1996). 
155 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 184(3). 
156 Ibid. s. 184(4). 
157 Ibid. s. 184(5). 
158 Ibid. ss. 285 and 346. 
159 Ibid. s 278. In a compulsory liquidation the date of commencement is the date of 
the petition (s. 129). 
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adjudged bankrupt. 161 After the making of the bankruptcy order no 
creditor with a provable debt can obtain any remedy against the 
property of the bankrupt. 161 In the event of the bankruptcy of the 
judgment debtor the execution creditor can retain the 'benefit of the 
execution 162 or attachment or sums paid to avoid it163 only if it is 
completed prior to the commencement of the bankruptCy. 164 Execu- 
tion is complete for these purposes against goods by seizure and sale, 
under section I of the Charging Orders Act 1979 when the charging 
order165 is made or under an attachment of a debt by receipt of the 
debt. 166 
If the execution has been commenced by fl. fa. and seizure has oc- 
curred but no sale has yet been made, if notice is given to the sheriff of 
the judgment debtor's bankruptcy, the sheriff must, on request, hand 
over the goods to the estate. In such circumstances, the costs of the 
execution will constitute a first charge on the goods or money. 167 
Where the value of the judgment being enforced exceeds E500,161 
even where the goods have been sold and therefore the execution 
deemed complete, the sheriff must not hand over the proceeds to the 
execution creditor within 14 days from the date of sale or while a 
bankruptcy petition is pending. 169 If the sheriff is given notice of a 
petition for bankruptcy against the debtor during this 14-day period 
he must await the fate of the petition. If a bankruptcy order is made 
the money held by the sheriff falls into the bankrupt's estate and the 
sheriff must pay the proceeds, after deducting the costs of the execu- 
tion, to the official receiver or trustee in bankruptcy (if there is 
one). 170 
160 Ibid. s. 285(l). The equivalent provision for companies in compulsory winding up 
is s. 126. 
161 Ibid. s. 285(3). The provision dealing with the same issue in compulsory winding 
up is s. 130. For execution against property acquired by the bankrupt after the 
bankruptcy order see s. 346(8). 
162 The meaning of 'benefit of the execution' under the reasoning in Re Andrew 
refers to the charge obtained by the execution creditor, not any money actually 
received by the creditor under the execution. 
163 Putting onto a statutory footing cases such as Re Godwin 119351 Ch 213 and 
Marley Tile Co Ltd v Burrows [19781 QB 241. 
164 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 346(l). The provisions in winding up equivalent to s. 346 
are ss. 183-4. 
165 See Roberts Petroleum Ltd v Bernard Kenny Ltd [198312 AC 192 where under the 
equivalent provision for companies (then Companies Act 1948, s. 323) the House 
of Lords ruled that in principle where a charging order nisi was made prior to the 
commencement of a winding up, the court should not make the order absolute to 
the prejudice of the general creditors. 
166 It remains to be seen whether the new third party debt orders will be viewed as 
proceedings which attach a debt. 
167 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 346(2). 
168 Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) Order 1986 (SI 1986/1996). 
169 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 346(4). 
170 Ibid. s. 346(3) and (4). 
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The court does have a discretion to set aside the rights of the estate 
in favour of the execution creditor although such applications are 
unlikely to be met with success. 171 
iv. Voluntary Arrangements 
Voluntary arrangements may be entered into by either an individual 
or a corporate debtor. The purpose of voluntary arrangements is to 
allow the debtor an opportunity to put forward to the debtor's credi- 
tors a proposal aimed at reaching a settlement of the debtor's affairs. 
It may promise a set percentage only of the overall debt owed or full 
payment over a longer period of time. Importantly, before a voluntary 
arrangement becomes binding upon the creditors the proposal must 
be approved by a majority of greater than 75 per cent in value of 
unsecured creditors. The voluntary arrangement cannot affect the 
rights of secured creditors to enforce their security unless they agree 
to be bound. 172 
An individual wishing to propose a voluntary arrangement has the 
ability to ask the court for an interim order 173 which creates a mor- 
atorium on proceedings against the insolvent debtor. The order is 
designed to give a brief breathing space whereby the proposal can be 
drafted free from creditor harassment. No execution may be com- 
menced or continued with during the period of the interim order. "' 
No such protection is available for companies"' although for small 
companies 176 the provisions of the Insolvency Act 2000177 provide a 
similar, although more extensive moratorium. 
Once the voluntary arrangement is approved, it is given effect to 
under its own terms and will expressly prevent creditors bound under 
it from enforcing their rights against the debtor whilst the voluntary 
arrangement remains in force. 178 
In the context of an individual voluntary arrangement, Peck v 
Craighead 179 considered the status of an execution creditor under a 
Eta. after seizure of the debtor's assets but prior to sale. In this case 
the debtor proposed an individual voluntary arrangement but prior to 
171 Ibid. s. 346(6). Russell LJ in the Court of Appeal in Re Caribbean Products (Yam 
Importers) Ltd [19661 Ch 331 at 351 found it hard to foresee any circumstances 
where the court's discretion could be properly exercised. 
172 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 4(3) for company voluntary arrangements and s. 258(4) for 
individual voluntary arrangements. See Calor Gas Ltd v Piercy (1994] BCC 69. 
173 See Insolvency Act 1986, ss. 252-5. 
174 Ibid. s. 2520. Prior to the order being made, but any time after the application to 
the court is made, the court may stay any execution pending the hearing (s. 254). 
175 When the Insolvency Act 1986 was passed it seems to have been assumed that a 
company, wishing protection during the period when it considered the terms of a 
voluntary arrangement proposal, would use the moratorium available to it by 
petitioning for an administration order. 
176 Defined by reference to the Companies Act 1985, s. 247(3). 
177 See ss. I and 2 and Sch. I para. 12. 
178 See e. g. the precedent individual voluntary arrangement provided by the 
Association of Business Recovery Professionals (R3) at paras. 4(3), 5(1) and 6(1). 
179 [199511 BCLC 337. 
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the creditors' meeting held to consider his proposal, ajudgment credi- 
tor proceeded to issue a writ of fl. fa. under which the sheriff seized 
goods. The issue was whether or not the creditor became a secured 
creditor for the purposes of voting on the voluntary arrangement. 
Section 383(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 defines a security as 'a 
mortgage, charge, lien or other security'. The court, in following 
Slater v Pinder and ex p Williams, held that the judgment creditor 
became a secured creditor upon seizure: 
I infer that the security right which an execution creditor has under a 
fi. ta., which has been acted upon by seizure, is not unlike a liený which is 
a security right expressly contemplated by s. 383(2). The fact that such a 
security right has not been enforced is nothing to the point. It is enough 
that the debtor's property in the goods is bound. It is clearly irrelevant 
that the property has not yet passed out of the debtor's hands as on 
completion of the execution by sale. 180 
The importance of this decision is that an execution creditor who has 
become secured before the voluntary arrangement is approved is not 
bound by its terms unless it has agreed to be bound. The creditor can 
continue with the execution. The practical impact of this is that the 
arrangement proposal will in effect have to promise the execution 
creditor full payment in order to obtain its approval. 
The potential problem for the execution creditor who agrees to 
such a voluntary arrangement occurs in the event that the arrange- 
ment fails. What happens to assets held by the supervisor on the 
premature ending of an arrangement has been the subject of some 
controversy181 but has recently been settled by the Court of Appeal. 182 
It is generally assumed by the courts that if a voluntary arrangement 
does fail, creditors who are owed money are returned to the position 
they were in prior to the arrangement being eritered into, with credit 
given for any sums of money received under the arrangement whilst it 
was on foot. 183 The problem which arises here for the execution credi- 
tor is that if the debtor goes into bankruptcy or liquidation following 
the demise of the voluntary arrangement (which would normally be 
the case) then the creditor is no longer in the position of a secured 
creditor. Under the provisions dealing with bankruptcy and liquida- 
tion the creditor would be unable to continue with the execution 
(without leave of the court) and would be reduced to the ranks of 
unsecured creditors. The obvious consequence of this is that the exe- 
cution creditor is unlikely to see much if any of the debt owed and is 
reduced from a very powerful position under the arrangement to one 
of great weakness. 
180 lbid. at 341 per Martin Mann QC. 
181 See e. g. P. Walton, 'Voluntary Arrangements-The Nature of the Beast' (1998) 3 
Receivers, Administrators and Liquidators Quarterly 267. 
182 Re NT Gallagher and Son Ltd [200212 BCLC 133. 
183 See e. g. Davis v Martin-Sklan [19951 BCC 1122 at 1125 per Blackburn J and Re NT 
Gallagher and Son Ltd [200212 BCLC 133 at 140 per Peter Gibson LL 
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The best advice to an execution creditor who has achieved secured 
creditor status for the purposes of a voluntary arrangement is not to 
agree to the proposal at all (for fear of it subsequently failing) but to 
forge ahead with the execution to ensure payment. Such advice flies in 
the face of the ideal of debtor rescue and rehabilitation inherent in the 
Insolvency Act but is the logical result of the terms of the Act. 
v. Administration 
The purpose of a company entering administration is to allow the 
company to have the benefit of a moratorium from creditor action in 
order that certain alternative statutory purposes may be achieved. 
Those purposes are: (i) the rescue of the company; (ii) that the com- 
pany's assets may be realized in a more beneficial manner than would 
occur in an immediate winding up; or (iii) that the assets may be 
realized in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditor. "' Until the Enterprise Act 2002, an adminis- 
trator could only be appointed by court order. Under the terms of the 
Enterprise Act, this route is still possible, but it is also now possible 
for an administrator to be appointed out of court by the holder of a 
qualifying floating charge, by the company itself or by the company's 
directors. 185 An administrator has wide powers"' to conduct the com- 
pany's business in a bid to satisfy the statutory purpose of the admini- 
stration. The widely drafted moratorium expressly prevents an 
execution being continued or commenced without the consent of the 
administrator or leave of the court. "' Whether or not the execution 
creditor is a secured creditor is irrelevant. The execution cannot be 
continued. 
The status of the execution creditor is relevant under Schedule BI 
paragraphs 70 and 71 of the Insolvency Act 1986.111 Paragraph 70 
permits the administrator to deal with assets subject to a floating 
charge without the charge holder's consent. Under paragraph 71 any 
property subject to other types of security cannot be dealt with by the 
administrator without the security holder's consent or leave of the 
court. If leave to deal with secured property is obtained, the admin- 
istrator must apply the proceeds of sale (or provide the market value if 
the sale achieves a lesser amount) in discharging the sums payable to 
the secured creditor. 
If the execution creditor is deemed to be the holder of a fixed 
security in the administration, the administrator can only deal with 
184 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. BI para. 3(1). 
185 See s. 248 of the Enterprise Act 2002 which effectively replaces the old Part 11 of 
the Insolvency Act 1986 with a new Sch. BI to the Act. 
186 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. I and Sch. 131 paras. 59-72. 
187 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. BI para. 43(6). For guidance as to when the court will 
grant leave see Re Atlantic Computer Systems pic [19921 Ch 505 at 542-4. 
188 These provisions were inserted by s. 248 of the Enterprise Act 2002 and largely 
replicate the former s. 15 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
206 
EXECUTION CREDITORS-(ALMOST) THE LAST RIGHTS IN INSOLVENCY 
the assets subject to the execution by, in effect, paying off the execu- 
tion creditor. If, for example, the creditor has the benefit of the sher- 
iff's walking possession agreement over all the company's chattels, 
the administrator will not be able to deal with the chattels without 
paying out the execution creditor. 
Paragraph 71 may have another positive consequence for the exe- 
cution creditor. It would usually be the case that the process of a 
company entering administration would cause a floating charge to 
crystallize. If, as in the example above, this occurs after the sheriff has 
seized but before sale, under the reasoning in Evans the floating 
charge holder would expect to have priority. Paragraph 70 allows the 
administrator to use floating charge assets without the consent of the 
charge holder but paragraph 71 only permits dealing with the assets 
subject to the execution creditor's security with the creditor's consent 
or leave of the court. This may allow the execution creditor to be paid 
out and in the process, effectively, to leapfrog the floating charge. This 
is likely to become an ever increasingly important issue as administra- 
tion slowly takes over from administrative receivership under the pro- 
visions of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
The meaning of the term 'security' for the purposes of administra- 
tion is defined by section 248(b) as meaning 'any mortgage, charge, 
lien or other security'. In the context of administration, Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson in Bristol Airport plc v Powdri]1189 stated: 
Security is created where a person ('the creditor') to whom an obligation 
is owed by another ('the debtor') by statute or contract, in addition to 
the personal promise of the debtor to discharge the obligation, obtains 
rights exercisable against some property in which the debtor has an 
interest in order to enforce the discharge of the debtor's obligation to 
the creditor. Whilst not holding that that is a comprehensive definition 
of 'securityo in my judgment it is certainly no wider than the ordinary 
meaning of the word. 110 
The definition of security contained in section 248 is in the same terms 
as the definition in section 383, '91 where in the context of voluntary 
arrangements the court has held that seizure under a fl. fa. is enough 
to constitute the execution creditor a secured creditor. 191 The defini- 
tion would also seem to include an interim charging order. As sub- 
mitted above, an execution creditor under an interim (or final) third 
party debt order will not be constituted a secured creditor for these 
purposes. 
189 [19901 Ch 744 at 760C. 
190 Adopted by Lightman J in Razzaq v Pala [19981 BCC 66 at 70. 191 Defined as 'a mortgage, charge, lien or other security'. 
192 Peck v Craighead [199511 BCLC 337. 
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An execution creditor who has become a secured creditor prior to 
the administration is in a very strong position. Although the creditor 
cannot continue with the execution without leave of the court, the 
likelihood is that the administrator will need to use the assets subject 
to the security in the administration and so the execution creditor will 
almost be guaranteed to be paid. This position is in sharp contrast to 
that if the administrator is discharged and the company goes into 
liquidation. 193 If the execution creditor remains unpaid at the end of 
the administration, in a subsequent winding up, as has previously 
been explained, the creditor will almost certainly be reduced to the 
ranks of the unsecured creditors. 
IV. Possible Reforms 
Some clarification as to the rights acquired by execution creditors is 
needed. As the law currently stands there is considerable divergence 
of opinion as to whether or not execution creditors become secured 
creditors at all and if they do, at what stage of the various execution 
procedures such status is achieved. The formal insolvency procedures 
available under the Insolvency Act treat execution creditors differ- 
ently. In the non-terminal procedures their status of secured creditors 
is recognized, even though the rules for determining secured status 
seem to vary between the procedures, and in the terminal procedures 
their rights are virtually overridden. 
In the past it has been suggested that there should be no problem in 
recognizing execution creditors as secured creditors as long as the 
fact can be discovered by other creditors dealing with the debtor. 194 
One of the problems with recognizing execution creditors as secured 
creditors is that, for example, a search at Companies House against a 
company will not show that an execution creditor has become se- 
cured. To this end some form of registration of the secured status 
could be made publicly so that no one is misled as to the position of 
the debtor (some form of public registration is currently available for 
charging orders). The law as to which events create secured creditor 
status would need to be clarified. Once this was done the effect of 
being a secured creditor would be postponed until registration of the 
event is made. This would seem a sensible and necessary tidying up 
193 A common occurrence even where the administration has been a success-see 
e. g. Re UCT (UK) Ltd [200111 BCLC 443; Re Mark One (Oxford Street) plc [200011 
BCLC 462 and Re Powerstore (Trading) Ltd [199811 BCLC 90. 
194 D. Hare and D. Milman, above n. 9 at 65 in response to the objection that 
execution creditors could surreptitiously obtain priority over other creditors (an 
objection reflected in D Wilson (Birmingham) Ltd v Metropolitan Property 
Developments Ltd [1975] 2 All ER 814 and Rainbow v Moorgate Proper-ties Ltd 
[197511 WLR 788. 
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suggestion and could be usefully looked at by the Law Commission 
under its current consultation on registration of security interests. 195 
Most people would recognize that creditors in insolvency proce- 
dures must be treated equally but that in itself is of little help. Credi- 
tors who are secured will have priority over those who are unsecured 
and so the fundamental issue as to whether execution creditors 
should be treated as secured creditors at all remains the stumbling 
block. There is a strong argument that unsecured creditors who dili- 
gently obtain judgment and proceed to enforcement should be re- 
garded differently from ordinary unsecured creditors. Their diligence 
should be rewarded. This seems to be the policy underpinning the 
rules applicable in voluntary arrangements, administrations and to a 
limited extent in receivership. In liquidation and bankruptcy this dili- 
gence is ignored and the execution creditors are returned to the ranks 
of the unsecured creditors. Although this divergence could be ex- 
plained upon the basis that terminal and non-terminal procedures 
should be viewed differently, it is not an altogether tenable position 
especially when one considers the impact of transition from non- 
terminable to terminable procedures. Whatever is the favoured policy 
it is submitted that the rules should be redrafted in simpler terms in a 
single provision and be the same for all formal insolvency 
procedures. 
V. Conclusion 
Judgment creditors have a number of options available to enforce 
their judgments. As long as the judgment debtor has sufflcient assets 
and does not enter any formal insolvency procedure, any of these 
options are likely to be met with some success. The issue as to 
. whether or not execution creditors 
become secured and if so, at what 
point in the procedure, will matter little to them. 
Secured creditor status may be essential if the judgment debtor 
does enter insolvency. Problems for the execution creditor thereafter 
abound. The type of execution chosen, the extent to which it has been 
completed and the type of insolvency procedure entered by the debtor 
will all have a bearing on whether or not the creditor is protected by a 
newly found secured creditor status. The law is particularly uncertain 
and unsatisfactory in dealing with the common priority dispute be- 
tween floating charge holders and execution creditors. The effects on 
execution creditors of the judgment debtor's transition from non- 
terminal to terminal insolvency procedures are also far from certain. 
195 Law Commission, Registration of Security Interests: Company Charges and 
Properly other than Land (2002) CP No. 164-execution creditors' interests are 
outside the Law Commission's terms of reference as currently stated but it is 
submitted such terms should either be extended or that the Law Commission's 
eventual recommendations be considered by the Lord Chancellor as part of the 
Enforcement Review. 
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It seems strange that, in a climate where the government is osten- 
sibly trying to improve the lot of unsecured creditors in insolvency 
procedures"' and to improve enforcement provisions generally,, 197 lit_ 
tle thought appears to have been given to the fundamental problems 
encountered by execution creditors on the insolvency of the judgment 
debtor. 
196 By the abolition of the Crown's preferential status by s. 251 of the Enterprise Act 
2002 and under the new s. 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986, the introduction of a 
reserved proportion of any floating charge realizations to be used exclusively for 
the benefit of unsecured creditors (where the company is in liquidation, 
administration or receivership). 
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